The U.S. Failure in Afghanistan Is Not Pakistan’s Fault

Anatol Lieven Thursday, Oct. 14, 2021

The anger directed by Americans at Pakistan in the wake of the disorderly end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan is understandable. After all, Pakistan really did give shelter to the Afghan Taliban, something that played a vital role in the Taliban’s eventual victory. However, the reaction in Washington is also a way of avoiding an honest analysis of the comprehensive failures of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Moreover, it misses key aspects of what motivated Pakistan’s behavior, with very important implications for how the United States itself understands and acts in the world.

To begin with, Islamabad’s support for the Afghan Taliban was not just a product of the Pakistani military’s strategic approach to the conflict in Afghanistan. It also reflected the opinion of a large majority of people in northern Pakistan, and among the Pashtun minority in particular. This was combined with a hostility to the U.S. that was among the highest anywhere in the world. The sympathy Pakistanis felt for the Taliban had its roots in the same dynamics that motivated their support for the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. It can also be seen in the context of the historical memory of Afghan resistance to the British Empire in the 19th century. 

But the U.S. refused to learn from the experience of other countries or to draw any parallels between their past roles and that of the U.S. today. When I and other observers suggested to U.S. officials in the early years of the war that they might study the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, they rejected the idea dismissively. That stubborn refusal befuddled the entire U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

As for official Pakistani policy toward the Taliban, it was largely driven by fear of India’s role in Afghanistan, as has been widely noted. But it was also shaped by concerns that the U.S. and the West would leave Afghanistan without creating a successful Afghan state, and that Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan’s other neighbors, would be left to live with the resulting mess. This is what had happened in the 1990s, and Islamabad—rightly, it turned out—feared it would happen again. 

Both a practical and an ethical issue are involved here. In the end, because of its geographic location, the U.S. faces no real existential, territorial threats. All of its foreign military operations are therefore to a greater or lesser degree a matter of choice. The countries located in regions where the U.S. conducts military operations have no such choice. They cannot pack up and go home. 

Every U.S. intervention must therefore be shaped with the wishes of regional countries firmly in mind, while recognizing that, from a practical point of view, the hostility of regional powers to Washington’s objectives will almost certainly doom any counterinsurgency effort to defeat. By the end of the United States’ presence in Afghanistan, its wider policies had meant that this presence was opposed by all Afghanistan’s most important neighbors. Pakistan was infuriated by U.S. drone strikes and what it regarded as bullying, and it feared possible U.S. support for an increased Indian presence in Afghanistan. Iran feared that Washington would use Afghanistan to attack Iran, and Tehran supported the Taliban in order to give itself the ability to strike back in the event such an attack took place. Growing hostility between the U.S. on one hand and Russia and China on the other meant that these countries opposed the presence of U.S. bases in their vicinity.

No counterinsurgency can succeed where the entire region is hostile to it. This is particularly true when neighboring countries provide safe haven to the insurgents. In such cases, great powers fighting counterinsurgencies often consider invading the neighboring countries to eliminate these safe havens. But they almost always reject the option—rightly—on the grounds that far from winning the war, doing so would only vastly expand it. .

The same logic holds true with regard to the argument made repeatedly over the years by many U.S. commentators that Washington should have “done something” about Islamabad’s behavior. What exactly the U.S. should have done, however, is never explicitly described. Invading Pakistan would have only succeeded in colossally widening the scope of the war. 

As for U.S. economic pressure on Pakistan, it was also constrained by a dilemma or ambiguity at the core of U.S. strategy in the region. On one hand, the U.S. wished to defeat or at least contain the Afghan Taliban, though as time went on this was chiefly driven by the desire to maintain U.S. “credibility.” On the other hand, Washington was still concerned with the original purpose of the invasion of Afghanistan, namely to counter Islamist terrorism. 

Any economic pressure sufficient to change its behavior would also have risked the collapse of a state that possesses more than five times Afghanistan’s population, nuclear weapons, and an army of half a million soldiers. That in turn would have created a terrorist threat that would have dwarfed Afghanistan and Syria combined. As a result, U.S. economic pressure on Pakistan was limited to the withholding of U.S. aid, which China soon replaced on a much larger scale. 

Ultimately, the U.S. needed three things from Pakistan: a crackdown on the Afghan Taliban, land routes to supply U.S. forces in Afghanistan and cooperation against international terrorism. Washington never got the first, but it did get the second and most of the third. Pakistan failed to hunt down Osama bin Laden, but it did capture and hand over to the U.S. numerous other al-Qaida leaders and operatives, and cooperated quietly with the CIA and U.K. intelligence to identify plots by Pakistanis against the American and British homelands. 

That illustrates a fundamental lesson of international affairs that the U.S. establishment would do well to study. The U.S. can rarely get everything it wants. It will often have to make compromises and settle for an uncomfortable but tolerable outcome. Living with Saddam Hussein was uncomfortable for America. Invading Iraq to get rid of him led to disaster. Losing in Afghanistan has been acutely uncomfortable for America. Destroying Pakistan for the sake of an illusory Afghan victory would have led to catastrophe on an almost unimaginable scale.

Finally, what has happened in Afghanistan demonstrates the truth of the principle that, in practice, geopolitical and military power is local and relative, not universal and absolute. The outcome of any contest between two countries will depend on the power that one of them is willing and able to bring to bear in a particular place or on a particular issue, relative to the power that another is willing and able to employ to oppose it.

Those decisions, in turn, will be determined by the location of the countries concerned and whether the issue involved is a vital or only a secondary interest for them. By those standards, just as Russia is a great power in eastern Ukraine and the U.S. is not, so Pakistan is a great power in eastern Afghanistan—and the U.S. is not. The U.S. does not have the physical power to dominate everywhere. Equally important, most Americans do not feel that most issues around the world are of vital concern to the United States. This inevitably limits the commitments and sacrifices they are prepared to make in these cases, especially over the long term. 

The lessons from Afghanistan are a case study of these principles. Future U.S. strategy should be shaped with them firmly in mind.

Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan enjoyed a warm visit to Washington this week, with his hosts, from President Donald Trump to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Lindsey Graham, all affirming the importance in particular of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. For a Pakistani government that viewed Khan’s visit as an opportunity to reset a relationship that suffered immensely during the early months of the Trump administration, it was an encouraging sign. The bilateral relationship has indeed come a long way since 2017 and 2018, when Trump threatened a harder line on   tweeted angrily about Islamabad’s “lies and deceit,” and suspended American security assistance. The main reason for this about-face is rooted in Trump’s increasingly urgent desire to end the long war in Afghanistan—a war he often criticized before becoming president and has never seemed comfortable continuing, even when he announced a new South Asia strategy in August 2017 that entailed staying the course. ..

General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's powerful military chief, accompanied the prime minister, along with intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed. Khan and his delegation also held meetings with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US congressional leaders, and the heads of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

For Trump, one of the most significant outcomes of the Washington visit by PM Khan and the military leadership will be Islamabad's renewed commitment to finding an inclusive and peaceful end to the long war in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the visit has been a win on two fronts. First, Khan has been able to generate significant positive momentum through the visit while his government faces stiff opposition at home. This will help Khan in Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan's leadership has engaged directly with the Trump administration at the highest level, something seen as key in building a working relationship. It has also fought its case on counterterrorism efforts, action under the Financial Action Task Force, and Pakistan's regional priorities both at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Faced with a short timetable on reaching an agreement before the September [Afghan] presidential election, Washington sees an intra-Afghan dialogue and a ceasefire as essential towards finalising a withdrawal, which will be crucial in Trump's reelection bid next year.

Imran Khan has indicated that Pakistan will exert maximum pressure on the Taliban to agree to an intra-Afghan process. It's also significant that the PM mentioned that Pakistan would like the Taliban to be part of an inclusive presidential election. This indicates that the timeline of concrete action on Afghanistan will be swift in the coming months.

In recent months, the Trump White House has decided to aggressively pursue peace talks in Afghanistan and to enlist Islamabad as a key partner in helping launch and sustain negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistani government sought an audience with Trump and White House contacts of the Saudi connection arranged a meeting .The administration agreed and invited Khan to Washington in large part to recognize and reward Pakistan for its help with the Afghan reconciliation process over the past year, bringing U.S. government officials and Taliban representatives together for multiple bilateral talks in Qatar. However, despite this progress, it would be premature to conclude—as many in Islamabad would like to—that the relationship with Washington has been reset. A restoration of security assistance, a resumption of highlevel dialogue or other signs of repaired relations are not on the horizon anytime soon. In essence, from the Trump administration’s perspective, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a much with Trump. Washington’s two core priorities with Pakistan are Islamabad’s assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistani counterterrorism efforts.

To be sure, the Trump administration is open to broader cooperation, particularly when it comes to trade and investment. During Khan’s visit, an official White House statement, and Trump himself, made reference to U.S.-Pakistan trade cooperation, while Khan met with both the secretaries of the treasury and commerce. However, for the Trump administration, there’s little real interest in truly broadening the scope of the relationship until it believes Pakistan is doing more on the Afghan reconciliation and counterterrorism fronts. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a reset is in order—or that Trump even wants one. This leads to the second reason why a reset isn’t in the cards: Islamabad is unlikely to deliver in a way that satisfies Washington. The Trump administration wants Pakistan to convince the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire and to formal negotiations with the Afghan government. Yet Taliban insurgents have categorically rejected these demands and appear to be interested only in a deal with Washington that involves the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban, of course, enjoys ample leverage and comes into talks from a position of renewed strength. It is waging intense battlefield offensives, holds more territory than at any time since the U.S. invasion following 9/11, and most importantly has little urgency to conclude a deal. This means that any entity—even one like Pakistan that has close ties to the Taliban, and considerable leverage over it—will struggle to get the insurgents to agree to American demands. Similarly, Washington wants Islamabad to take irreversible steps against terrorist groups in Pakistan that target both Afghanistan and India. It has not been satisfied with Pakistan’s recent  moves which have involved the arrests of dozens of militants . Third, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains beset by tensions rooted in fundamental policy differences. Despite recent bumps in its ties with India, Washington remains committed to forging a deep, strategic partnership with New Delhi, Pakistan’s bitter enemy. Similarly, Islamabad is closely allied with China, Washington’s top strategic rival. In effect, Washington and Islamabad enjoy deep partnerships with  —a geopolitical reality that constrains closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. Indeed, hypothetical scenarios that could actually boost bilateral ties—such as Washington scaling down its ties with India and easing up on pressuring Islamabad to detain terrorists who target India, or Islamabad pivoting away from Beijing—are not in the offing. More broadly, each country pursues foreign policy objectives throughout Asia that go against the other’s interests: Pakistan seeks to limit the influence of India, while the U.S. is pursuing an Indo-Pacific strategy that is meant to push back against China. Finally, the Trump administration does not support the type of diplomacy that one would expect to see in a rebooted relationship. It prioritizes bursts of transactional diplomacy over sustained and formal dialogue. In effect, there’s no going back to the early years of the Obama administration, when the two sides launched an albeit short-lived strategic dialogue, focused on a variety of topics, not all of them security-related. The Trump administration simply isn’t interested in investing the resources in such broad and extended exchanges, which, if they were to take place, could go a long way toward generating more confidence and goodwill for a relationship that badly needs new infusions of both, even after Khan’s positive visit.

The "do more" rhetoric has gone away; it has just gone a bit softer. Whereas in the past this message would be delivered forcefully and threateningly, this time around it was likely conveyed gently, with Trump and other US officials inviting Islamabad to take its assistance in Afghanistan to another level. What's next with the Taliban talks depends on Islamabad's next move, and more importantly how the Taliban responds. Washington's asks of Islamabad have become more ambitious. It's one thing for Pakistan to simply bring the  Taliban  to the table. It is a very different thing for Pakistan to convince them  to agree to demands - a ceasefire and talks with Kabul - that it has consistently and categorically rejected to this point.

The bottom line is that while Khan’s trip to Washington may have been full of smiles and good vibes, and it may have even solidified U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be mistaken for a reset in troubled ties. This newfound comity can’t mask the reality that U.S.-Pakistan relations are still in need of major repair . The demands from Washington have not changed. While it is significant that the US has publicly acknowledged Pakistan's efforts in pushing the reconciliation process and initial steps to curb militant groups, privately the US would have rehashed its menu of concerns and sought commitments on them.

Afghan Peace Process: July, 30, 2019: THE Afghan peace process has entered a crucial phase, making it even trickier for Pakistan. As many had anticipated, Afghanistan remained the main point of deliberations held between the Pakistani and US leaderships in Washington, D.C. last week. Prime Minister Imran Khan has pledged to pursue the Afghan Taliban leadership to initiate talks with the Afghan government.

During the prime minister’s visit, most US leaders and officials acknowledged and appreciated Pakistan’s role in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for talks. The US administration didn’t use the mantra of ‘do more’ this time, but politely requested Pakistan to continue playing a constructive role in the Afghan peace process. Pakistan’s leadership categorically agreed to take up the task. On the other hand, the Taliban have also indicated that they will accept the invitation of meeting the Pakistani prime minister. The meeting will indicate how much influence Pakistan still has over the Taliban.

So far, the Taliban’s position on the option of direct talks with the government of President Ashraf Ghani has remained stiff. However, they had indicated that if their negotiations with the US succeed, they would then initiate negotiations with other Afghan stakeholders including the Afghan government. Yet it remains to be seen whether or not they change their position on initiating a separate talks channel with Kabul. In the event they show reluctance and deny Pakistan’s request, will Pakistan adopt a coercive approach? If so, it will be interesting to see how it affects the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan.

For Pakistan, restoring its relationship with the US is important not only for speeding up economic recovery but also for rebalancing its regional geostrategic position. The country had been suffering because of its dissimilar approaches towards the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. In recent years, it has tried to diversify its strategic partnerships, ranging from Moscow to Beijing, and Istanbul to Riyadh, which also entailed some valuable defence partnerships. But it appears as though the policymakers did not see these partnerships as a counterbalance to growing US unfriendliness. The strengthening strategic partnership between India and the US also affected the Pakistani establishment’s policy choices, forcing it to review its approaches towards Afghanistan and the Taliban.  

Pakistan, however, has reviewed its approaches before taking more losses. The country is set to gain in the whole process as India has failed to develop its relevance in the Afghan peace process. On this ground alone, Pakistan’s establishment considers it a major achievement. Similarly, the US offer of mediation over the Kashmir issue has put pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It has happened at a time when the Trump administration was not comfortable with India’s recent multibillion-dollar deals with Russia, and trade tensions between the two nations were rising.

Mr Khan’s visit to the US is bringing the country back onto the regular diplomacy tracks. To keep this momentum, the government has to deliver on Afghanistan. The probability of direct talks between the Taliban and Kabul would be one challenge, but influencing the former to commit to a lasting ceasefire could prove another daunting task.  .

For Pakistan, the Taliban will remain a challenge at both stages. The US and other major global actors, including China and Russia, are relying on Pakistan — and if the Taliban refuses to listen to Pakistan, it would be a disaster for the establishment. It is a known fact that many Taliban field commanders are not happy with Pakistan, and the Taliban leadership resists Pakistani pressure citing this as their argument. What can Pakistan do in such a worst-case scenario? Arrests of dissenting elements when they enter Pakistan would be an option, which has been used in the past. Many commanders apparently still have families inside Pakistan, and the government can use this factor as a tool.

Pakistan might also have other options to pressurise the Taliban leadership. The Haqqanis could be effective in the Taliban decision-making process, but they have a limit to their influence. Can Pakistan envision a complete disconnect with the Taliban? This is a tough question, but the Taliban too cannot afford to say goodbye to Pakistan. It will be a test case for the prime minister and military leadership to fulfill the international community’s expectations — ie to make a deal possible between the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders.

US PAK relations: Aug., 22, 2019:

"Pakistan should aspire a working relationship with the US, which is cordial and dynamic, not curtailing our sovereignty and national interest," Ambassador Khokhar said at a guest lecture organized here by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).

Ambassador Khokhar, who served as Pakistan's envoy to Dhaka, New Delhi, Washington and Beijing before becoming Foreign Secretary in 2002, emphasized on finding areas of convergence between Pakistan and the US including trade, energy, transport, and especially education to expand the scope of collaboration

Ambassador Khokhar said Pakistan's relationship with the US could not be analysed in isolation since the international order was in flux with China rising phenomenally, Russia re-asserting itself, and the middle East in extreme turmoil. He pointed out that India was also an important actor influencing Pak-US dynamics as the US expected India to be a partner in the containment of China. In this regard, Pakistan's overall endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative might also be problematic for Washington, he added.

Ambassador Khokhar said Afghanistan remained a main issued of interest for the US since there was a realisation in Washington that there was no military solution to the issue. On rising tension in Indian Occupied Kashmir, the Ambassador remarked that war was neither an option for India nor for Pakistan due to their nuclear capabilities.

Vice Admiral Saddique said Pakistan's relationship with Washington was generally hyphenated with India and Afghanistan and emphasized that "working together would accrue mutual benefits, whereas, antagonism would serve neither party".

Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Pakistan Reset By Madiha Afzal on Oct 25, 2020 10:01 am Editor’s Note: Pakistan has bedeviled multiple U.S. administrations, proving itself a necessary but often hostile partner with regard to U.S. counterterrorism and U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Madiha Afzal, my Brookings colleague, examines the evolution of U.S. policy in Pakistan and how it changed during the Trump administration. She argues that the current transactional approach has brought benefits, but additional changes are necessary to make the relationship more fruitful and sustainable in the years to come. Daniel Byman *** Looking back over the past four years, the Trump administration’s Pakistan policy can be divided into two phases: bilateral relations that were decidedly strained for the first two years of the administration and, since 2019, a far more positive relationship marked by cooperation on the Afghan peace process and attempts, with limited success, to boost the relationship on other fronts. The reset that occurred in 2019 was due not to Trump’s impulsiveness, but to a transactional approach driven by Pakistan’s usefulness in the Afghan peace process. It is an approach that has had its advantages, but it has run into obvious limits as well. Seven Decades of U.S.-Pakistan Relations Pakistan and the United States established diplomatic ties on Aug. 15, 1947, the day after Pakistan gained independence. It was a close relationship for the new country’s first few decades, especially as U.S. relations with Pakistan’s archrival, India, were relatively cold. In many ways, 1979 marked a turning point for both countries, and Afghanistan became a defining feature in their relationship over the next four decades. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, Pakistan became party to the Soviet-Afghan conflict and used U.S. and Saudi money to train and arm the mujahideen. In 1989, when the Soviets exited Afghanistan, the United States left the region, fueling a visceral sense of American abandonment in Pakistan and a sense that America could not be trusted. The U.S. relationship with India has been a second defining factor in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan has been sensitive about growing U.S.-India bilateral ties since the 1990s. In 1998, the Clinton administration imposed costly economic sanctions on Pakistan (to its considerable angst) for testing its nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear test. Concerns about U.S. preferences on the subcontinent persist. According to a 2015 Pew poll, 53 percent of Pakistani respondents said they believed U.S. policies toward India and Pakistan favored India; only 13 percent said they favored Pakistan. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan joined the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Pakistan allowed NATO access to supply routes through the country and received considerable military and security assistance in return. President George W. Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004. Relations cooled during the Obama administration as concerns grew about Pakistan’s safe havens for the Taliban and the presence of al-Qaeda in the country. This history has, for many Pakistanis, fueled the belief that Republican presidents are better than Democratic presidents for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. A Low Point and a Reset Enter the Trump administration and Trump’s focus on his campaign promise of getting U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. The relationship with Pakistan for the first two years of the administration was characterized by an almost-singular focus on U.S. concerns about Pakistani safe havens for the Haqqani Network. The administration said it would make economic ties contingent on Pakistan taking action against militant and terrorist groups. Things soured further in January 2018, when Trump accused Pakistan of “lies and deceit” in its relationship with America, tweeting that it took U.S. aid for nothing in return. The administration cut off $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance following Trump’s tweet. By the fall of 2018, the Trump administration seemed to have calculated that an exit out of Afghanistan would not come via a military victory. Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as his special envoy to Afghanistan, and Khalilzad began the painstakingly slow work of the Afghan peace process. Though Trump had engaged in a war of words on Twitter with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just a few weeks before, Trump wrote Khan a letter in the fall of 2018 asking for help with the Afghan peace process. Khan, who had long argued for political reconciliation in Afghanistan, was forthcoming. The seeds for a reset had been sown. Pakistan produced Mullah Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban who had been in Pakistani custody. His release helped jump-start the peace process, and Baradar became the Taliban’s chief negotiator. In many ways, Pakistan was uniquely positioned to help, enjoying leverage with the Taliban and a working relationship with the United States. Khalilzad has visited Pakistan at least 15 times in the past two years. Pakistan considers the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February a product of its help, and Khalilzad has publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s help with the process numerous times. The hoped-for reset in the bilateral relationship was acknowledged formally during Imran Khan’s visit to Washington in July 2019, when he and Trump first met and hit it off. In a presidency where personalities have mattered a great deal, it was clear that these two celebrity-turned-populist politicians enjoyed meeting each other. They have since developed a personal connection, meeting again on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 2019 and at the World Economic Forum in early 2020. During the first meeting with Khan at the White House, Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, setting off alarm bells in New Delhi—India almost immediately responded that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Trump also called for dramatically strengthening trade ties between Pakistan and the United States. America is Pakistan’s top export destination, but these trade gains have yet to be realized. Nevertheless, the bilateral reset has sustained. Pakistan is now helping with the intra-Afghan peace process as well, though it was not obvious that Pakistan would remain involved in this phase. Trump’s messaging on Pakistan has been scrupulously positive since the reset, something the country appreciates as it seeks to move past an image associated with terrorism. The United States has given Pakistan $8 million to help its fight against the coronavirus; Pakistan returned the favor with a goodwill gesture of personal protective equipment donations. China’s growing presence in the region, and the United States’s willingness to tolerate Beijing’s close economic and strategic ties to Pakistan, has also reassured Pakistan that major powers value its partnership. The Advantages and Limits of a New Approach Trump’s relatively hands-off approach to India and Pakistan has had benefits, but it has also run into limits. While Pakistan welcomed Trump’s July 2019 offer to mediate the Kashmir dispute, that pronouncement may have done more harm than good. Some Indian political analysts surmised that it might have accelerated India’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, announced just a couple of weeks later, on Aug. 5. More broadly, Trump’s approach to the region has largely decoupled India and Pakistan, which has generated less concern from Pakistan about the U.S.-India relationship. India’s lack of a role in the Afghan peace process has also allayed Pakistan’s fears. Trump even mentioned his “very good relationship” with Pakistan on his visit to India—a comment that Pakistan appreciated (and that New Delhi did not like, but let go). The Trump administration has also taken a different tack in trying to influence Pakistan. Rather than using direct assistance as a tool to drive Pakistan’s actions—which would have a limited effect given Pakistan’s economic relationship with China—the Trump administration has relied on other tools to affect Pakistan’s behavior. Most notably, the administration moved to change Pakistan’s status with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog that monitors terrorist financing, in February 2018. Pakistan was placed on the FATF increased monitoring “grey list” in June that year; the designation impedes economic investment into the country and causes it financial harm. (Pakistan had also been placed on the grey list in 2008, and from 2012 to 2015.) In its bid to avoid being blacklisted, Pakistan has since 2018 taken actions against militant groups—including placing economic sanctions on Lashkar-e-Taiba and sentencing the group’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, to 11 years in prison for terrorist financing. The Khan government has made it a key goal to come off the grey list, passing legislation to help its case. In its latest review this October, FATF announced that Pakistan has made “significant progress” and has largely addressed 21 out of 27 action items; it will remain on the grey list and has until February 2021 to address the remaining requirements. While the FATF listing is multilateral and therefore a less direct policy tool than U.S. assistance, many observers in Pakistan still perceive it as a U.S. instrument, and it is driving growing backlash in a public that perceives Pakistan’s greylisting as unfair. Although Trump has been criticized for playing fast and loose with America’s alliances and cavorting with its foes, his Pakistan policy reveals a practical side. This more transactional approach has yielded results for the United States on the Afghan peace process and has largely been received well by Pakistan since the reset. Yet the limits of Trump’s rhetoric and lack of homework before making pronouncements are also apparent. The trade gains Trump promised Pakistan have not materialized. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross visited Pakistan in February 2020, but the United States has had trouble investing in Pakistan due to “Pakistan’s significant business climate issues, including regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and discriminatory taxation,” according to the State Department. With the FATF, the Trump administration has chosen an economic tool more effective than aid to encourage Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. So far, this approach has worked. Pakistan is eager to shed its image associated with terrorism and increasingly recognizes that global stature is driven by economic ascendance rather than strategic importance. Yet with the United States making a deal with the Taliban and giving it legitimacy, many Pakistanis have wondered why Pakistan is still maligned for its relationship with the group. The Trump administration has not offered Pakistanis the clarity they need on that front. The Next Administration If Joe Biden is elected president this November, he will find a different U.S. relationship with Pakistan than the one he left behind with the Obama administration four years earlier, partly because Pakistan has changed but also because of changes in the region and the Trump administration’s unique approach to the country. The road to the U.S. reset with Pakistan in 2019 came through Afghanistan. Pakistan’s closeness with a rising China has offset some of Pakistan’s existential angst about its relationship with the United States. Trump has, against all odds, successfully balanced the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and India in a way that doesn’t worsen Pakistan’s paranoia, and the administration’s reliance on the FATF listing as a tool has also proved effective in goading Pakistan to take action against militant groups. Yet this approach is piecemeal and opportunistic. The next administration will need to round out America’s Pakistan policy, to make it comprehensive and take a longer term view. This is especially true as the United States seeks to withdraw troops completely from Afghanistan—for the first time in more than four decades, the two countries may be looking at a bilateral relationship not driven by Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, long dominated by strategic concerns, can become a productive one for both countries, if redefined carefully and with an open mind.

Pakistan Playing Key Role in the US-Taliban Talks by Sajjad Shaukat(JR 146 SS 32)

Pakistan Playing Key Role in the US-Taliban Talks by Sajjad Shaukat(JR 146 SS 32)

Despite hurdles, the fifth round of peace talks which started between the US negotiators and the Taliban in the Doha-the capital of Qatar on February 25, this year, is making progress gradually.

Hinting that US forces could leave Afghanistan within five years under a Pentagon plan offered as part of a potential deal with the Taliban to end the nearly 18-year war, The New York Times reported on March 7, 2019, “Nearly 11 days after peace negotiations between the United States and the Taliban began with high hopes…it has become clear that any resolution to the 18-year war could be frustratingly slow. One of the most prominent issues thwarting progress is a disagreement over a fundamental question: What is terrorism, and who is a terrorist? The answer is so important because the two sides had already agreed in principle on a framework for two crucial issues: the withdrawal of American troops, and a commitment that Afghan soil would not again be used to launch terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies…American negotiators have insisted on specifying that Afghanistan not be used by “terrorist” groups, but the Taliban have resisted, saying there was no universal definition of terrorism”.

However, the meetings between the interlocutors restarted over in Doha after a temporary halt to allow for internal consideration. Conflicting reports are coming about the progress of the dialogue, as these delicate talks are being conducted by both the sides with much care.

In this regard, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said on March 4, 2019: “The current round of talks in Doha is advancing on a step-by-step basis. As the issue at hand is immensely crucial and delicate, it’s progression is taking place with much care and vigilance…the negotiations continue to focus primarily on a potential US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and a pact to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a safe haven for terrorists…no understanding has so far been reached about any agreement or document.”

The latest meetings follow marathon negotiations in January, this year, which saw the US and the Taliban walk away with a draft framework on the two issues. America has insisted for a ceasefire and the opening of a dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government whom the former considered puppet regime of the US-led Western countries. However, the Taliban repeatedly rejected the demands, while the continuation of the talks followed a major attack on a joint US-Afghan base in southwestern Afghanistan’s Helmand province on March 1, this year with at least 23 Afghan security forces killed.

Meanwhile, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on February 10, 2019 offered the Taliban for opening of an office in Afghanistan, but, the Taliban swiftly rejected the proposal.

In September 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named veteran diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as a newly-named State Department special envoy to Afghanistan. Khalilzad, Pompeo said, would be “full time focused on developing the opportunities to get the Afghans and the Taliban to come to reconciliation.”

Since Khalilzad started his efforts to convince the Taliban to have direct talks with the US, Pakistan has been playing a key role in the US-Taliban talks, as Islamabad succeeded in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating Table. Zalmay Khalilzad who repeatedly visited Pakistan and met the civil and military leadership, including country’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Quershi admired Pakistan’s role in the US-Taliban peace dialogue.

Although the US has not clearly released a statement regarding the status of the talks, yet it has admitted Pakistan’s central role in the negotiations between America and the Taliban leaders.

In this connection, while giving briefing to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on March 8, this year, the head of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) General Joseph Votel has lauded Pakistan’s role for maintaining peace and stability in the region. The General elaborated, “We have had some success with Pakistan, they’ve been more helpful in terms of bringing the Taliban to the [Peace negotiating] table…positive steps [Of Pakistan] to assist Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in support of Afghanistan reconciliation by facilitating talks with the Taliban. As we have requested [from] them, we have seen instances where they have taken action against the safe haven areas of the militants”.

In a discourse in CBS programme-“Face the Nation” on February 3, 2019, US President Donald Trump has made it clear that he is determined to get out of “endless wars” in Afghanistan and Syria. President Trump stated: “I have been hitting very hard in Afghanistan and now we are negotiating with the Taliban…If you look at Afghanistan we are going in very soon we will be going into our 19th year spending $50 billion a year”.

American President Trump’s determination and gesturing has already manifested in the diplomatic manuvours of Khalilzad, resulting in silver-lining for Afghan peace process in Doha.

It is notable that the war in Afghanistan is America’s longest military intervention which has cost Washington nearly US $.1.7 trillion. Hence, positive shift in America’s policy towards Islamabad, seeking cooperation and re-establishing the association, have raised hopes regarding the probability of peace in the war-torn Afghanistan.

It is mentionable that in the aftermath of Pulwama terror attack in the Indian Occupied Kashmir and escalation of tension between Pakistan and India, on February 28, this year, US President Trump hoped that Pakistan-India tension will de-escalate soon—the United States has been mediating between the two sides and trying to have them stop. Trump also acknowledged that Washington has improved her relations with Islamabad shortly.

Particularly, Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State stated that he has spoken with the leaders of India and Pakistan and has urged them to avoid “any action that would escalate and greatly increase risk”.

American State Department deputy spokesperson Robert Palladino said on March 5, 2019 that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo played an essential role in de-escalating tensions between India and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, President Donald Trump’s positive approach towards Islamabad endorsed the fact that America needs Pakistan’s help to reach an agreement with the Taliban as soon as possible.

It is of particular attention that in his first interview to the NBC News on October 31, 2018, indicating NATO defeat in Afghanistan, the US General Austin Miller-NATO’s head of Resolute Support in Afghanistan had admitted by saying: “This is not going to be won militarily…This is going to a political solution…My assessment is…if you realize you can’t win militarily at some point…So you do not necessarily wait us out, but I think now is the time to start working through the political piece of this conflict.”

Besides, in order to resolve the Afghan imbroglio, Russia is also facilitating approach towards the Taliban. In this context, a two days conference ended in Moscow on February 6, 2019. Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai who was among the most high profile attendees in Moscow, pointed out Kabul’s role in negotiations was something for it to resolve with the Taliban. He stated: “We understand that the government in Kabul needs to be part of these negotiations, we wish that they would have been here today”. During the meeting with Afghan politicians outside of government, senior Taliban leaders said that the US had agreed to draw down half of its 14,000 force in Afghanistan by April, a claim later denied by officials in Washington.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani criticised the gathering in Moscow, saying they amounted to “nothing more than a fantasy.”

The moot in Moscow also played some positive role and probably compelled Washington to intensify efforts to reach an agreement with the Taliban in connection with Afghanistan. Besides, the role of China to create stability and peace in Afghanistan has also been very positive.

It is analyzed that continued suicides by the US war veterans (Reportedly, 20 per day) also exerted pressure on President Trump to make urgent overtures vis-à-vis Pakistan and Taliban to implement the withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan and to improve relations with Islamabad.

It is noteworthy that these related developments seem to have increased the agony of Indian deep state. Reportedly, an orchestrated Indian campaign to portray the talks with negative colours has already been launched, focusing on human rights issues and plight of Afghan Women.

With the covert assistance of Kabul, India has also activated her proxies, including “Pashtoon Tahfuz Movement (PTM) with new offensives to create disturbance and law and order situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and that of Baluchistan. Apart from other similar incidents, recent terror attack on the DIG Police Loralai office in Balochistan, which killed nine people, including eight policemen on January 29, this year is an indicator.

It worth-mentioning that security situation in Afghanistan is well beyond the control of Afghan security forces and the National Unity Government of that country. For all its failure, New Delhi and Kabul has been blaming Pakistan in accordance with their collective agenda which also includes Israel.

In fact, since the occupation of Afghanistan by the US-led NATO forces, the country has become center of American CIA, Indian RAW and Israeli Mossad which are in connivance to obtain the covert designs of the their countries and some Western countries against Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. Under the cover of fighting terrorism, these foreign agencies which are also in collaboration with the Afghanistan’s intelligence agency National Directorate of Security (NDS) support the militants of ISIS and Afghanistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including their linked outfits which have been conducting terror-assaults in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of the secret strategy of the US-led countries—double game of America. These terrorist groups have also been destabilising Tibetan regions of China and Iranian Sistan-Baluchistan through subversive activities.

Especially, India and Afghan government which want to prolong the stay of NATO forces in Afghanistan are also playing double game against America. New Delhi knows that after the withdrawal of the NATO forces, Taliban will eliminate the secret network of RAW, the NDS and Mossad in that lawless country. Therefore, these intelligence agencies are particularly using the terrorists of TTP and ISIS in wakening Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Regarding Indian activities in Afghanistan the then NATO commander, Gen. McChrystal had pointed out: “Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan…is likely to exacerbate regional tensions.”

Similarly, while taking note of Indian role in Afghanistan, US Republican Senator John McCain had reminded the Obama administration that encouraging India to take a more active role in Afghanistan, while simultaneously criticising Pakistan could be a recipe for disaster.

It is also of particular attention that armed forces of Pakistan have successfully broken the backbone of the foreign-backed terrorists by the successful military operations Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad which have also been extended to other parts of the country, including Balochistan province. And Pakistan’s primarily intelligence agency, ISI has broken the network of these terrorist groups by capturing several militants, while thwarting a number of terror attempts. But, in the recent past and during the election-campaign of 2019, blasts in Balochistan and other regions of the country and failed attempt at the Chinese Consulate in Karachi showed that the US-led India, Afghanistan and Israel have again started acts of sabotage especially to weaken Pakistan and to damage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is part of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative or BRI. Washington and New Delhi have already opposed this project.

Now, in backdrop of Afghan Taliban’s successes in maximizing the physical occupation of the country and recent political/diplomatic gains and the US-led prolonged war forced America to have a deal with the Taliban. As RAW and Mossad are in collaboration, therefore, it can be predicted that Afghanistan in particular and Pakistan in general will witness a surge in the activities of out-laws, terrorists and the Indian proxies.

Some analysts opine that Afghan elite class, comprising of businessmen, civil-military bureaucracy and other rich people might opt to migrate from the country to adjacent areas in case of the Taliban-USA agreement. However, till that time, usual anti-Pak rhetoric will remain the common norm for most of the Afghan government officials, as evident from recent accusative outbursts from Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during a meeting with the US peace negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad.

In any case, Pakistan needs to make arrangements for another exodus of Afghan migrants (Afghan elites) in the wake of success of Taliban-US peace talks. Resultant effect will be more economic burden on Pakistan and socio-economic effects on the local trade and commerce and influx of more Afghan refugees.

It is imperative for Pakistan to keep following the evolving meetings in Afghanistan to counter the drastic aftermath on the region. Intense diplomatic activity, engaging Iran and other regional countries such as China, Russia and the Middle East will help in containing the negative spillover effects of the prospective US-Taliban deal and expected withdrawal of American troops.

Nonetheless, now; President Trump has become lenient towards Pakistan. Instead of blaming Islamabad for cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan and emphasizing to ‘do more’ against terrorism, he is asking for its assistance to ‘help more’ to pull out the US-led NATO forces from that war-torn country. Although Pakistan is playing a key role in the US-Taliban talks, yet after obtaining its selfish aims after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, America can again leave both Pakistan and Afghanistan to face the fallouts of the ongoing war, as it did after fulfilling its interests against the former Soviet Union.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com