China has shattered the assumption of US dominance in the Middle East

 

China has shattered the assumption of US dominance in the Middle East

Nic Robertson

Analysis by Nic Robertson, CNN

Published 12:21 AM EDT, Wed March 15, 2023

 

With a grandiose diplomatic flourish China brokered a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the process upending US calculus in the Gulf and beyond.

 

While the United States has angered its Gulf allies by apparently dithering over morality, curbing arms supplies and chilling relations, Saudi Arabia’s King-in-waiting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, has found a kindred spirit in China’s leader Xi Jinping.

 

Both are bold, assertive, willing to take risks and seemingly share unsated ambition.

 

Friday’s announcement that Riyadh and Tehran had renewed diplomatic ties was unexpected, but it shouldn’t have been. It is the logical accumulation of America’s diplomatic limitations and China’s growing quest to shape the world in its orbit.

 

Beijing’s claim that “China pursues no selfish interest whatsoever in the Middle East,” rings hollow. It buys more oil from Saudi Arabia than any other country in the world.  

 

Xi needs energy to grow China’s economy, ensure stability at home and fuel its rise as a global power.

 

His other main supplier, Russia, is at war, its supplies therefore in question. By de-escalating tensions between Saudi and Iran, Xi is not only shoring up his energy alternatives but, in a climate of growing tension with the US, also heading off potential curbs on his access to Gulf oil.

 

Xi’s motivation appears fueled by wider interests, but even so the US State Department welcomed the surprise move, spokesman Ned Price saying, “we support anything that would serve to deescalate tensions in the region, and potentially help to prevent conflict.”

 

Iran has buy-in because China has economic leverage. In 2021 the pair signed a trade deal reportedly worth up to $400 billion of Chinese investment over 25 years, in exchange for a steady supply of Iranian oil.

 

Tehran is isolated by international sanctions and Beijing is providing a glimmer of financial relief.

 

And, in the words of Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei last year, there’s also the hope of more to come as he sees geopolitical power shifting east.

 

“Asia will become the center of knowledge, the center of economics, as well as the center of political power, and the center of military power,” Khamenei said.

 

Saudi has buy-in because war with Iran would wreck its economy and ruin MBS’s play for regional dominance. His bold visions for the country’s post fossil-fuel future and domestic stability depend on inwardly investing robust oil and gas revenues.

 

US State Department spokesman Ned Price pictured in July 2022.

US State Department spokesman Ned Price pictured in July 2022.

Stefani Reynolds/Pool/AFP/Getty Images

US influence on the wane

It may sound simple, but the fact the US couldn’t pull it off speaks to the complexities and nuance of everything that’s been brewing over the past two decades.

 

America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have burned through a good part of its diplomatic capital in the Middle East.

 

Many in the Gulf see the development of the war in Ukraine as an unnecessary and dangerous American adventure, and some of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s territorial claims over Ukraine not without merit.

 

 

What the global West sees as a fight for democratic values lacks resonance among the Gulf autocracies, and the conflict doesn’t consume them in the same way as it does leaders in European capitals.

 

Saudi Arabia, and MBS in particular, have become particularly frustrated with America’s flip-flop diplomacy: dialling back relations over the Crown Prince’s role in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi (which MBS denies); then calling on him to cut oil production swiftly followed by requests to increase it.

 

These inconsistencies have led the Saudis to hew policy to their national interests and less to America’s needs.

 

During his visit to Saudi last July, US President Joe Biden said: “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.” It seems now that the others are walking away from him.

 

China steps up

On Beijing’s part, China’s Gulf intervention signals its own needs, and the opportunity to act arrived in a single serving.

 

Xi helped himself because he can. The Chinese leader is a risk taker.

 

His abrupt ending of austere Covid-19 pandemic restrictions at home is just one example, but this is a more complex roll of the dice.

 

Mediation in the Middle East can be a poisoned chalice, but as big as the potential gains are for China, the wider implications for the regional, and even global order, are quantifiably bigger and will resonate for years.

 

 

Yet harbingers of this shake-up and the scale of its impact have been in plain sight for months. Xi’s high-profile, red-carpet reception in Riyadh last December for his first overseas visit after abandoning his domestic “zero-Covid” policy stirred the waters.

 

During that trip Saudi and Chinese officials signed scores of deals worth tens of billions of dollars.

 

China’s Foreign Ministry trumpeted Xi’s visit, paying particular attention to one particular infrastructure project: “China will deepen industrial and infrastructure cooperation with Saudi Arabia (and) advance the development of the China-Saudi Arabia (Jizan) Industrial Park.”

 

The Jizan project, part of China’s belt and road initiative, heralds huge investment around the ancient Red Sea port, currently Saudi’s third largest.

 

 

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Jizan lies close to the border with Yemen, the scene of a bloody civil war and proxy battle between Riyadh and Tehran since 2014, sparking what the United Nations has described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

 

Significantly since Xi’s visit, episodic attacks by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels on Jizan have abated.

 

There are other effects too: the plans to upscale Jizan’s container handling puts Saudi in greater competition with the UAE’s container ports and potentially strains another regional rivalry, as MBS drives to become the dominant regional power, usurping UAE’s role as regional hub for global businesses.

 

Xi will have an interest seeing both Saudi Arabia and the UAE prosper, but Saudi is by far the bigger partner with higher potential global economic heft and, importantly, massive religious clout in the Islamic world.

 

Rivals share common ground on Iran policy

Where the UAE and Saudi align strongly is eschewing direct conflict with Tehran.

 

A deadly drone attack in Abu Dhabi late last year was claimed by the Houthis, before the rebels quickly rescinded it. But no one publicly blamed the Houthis’ sponsors in Tehran.

 

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A once shaky ceasefire in Yemen now also seems to be moving toward peace talks, perhaps yet another indication of the potential of China’s influence in the region.

 

Beijing is acutely aware of what a continued war over the Persian Gulf could cost its commercial interests – another reason why a Saudi/Iran rapprochement makes sense to Xi.

 

Iran blames Saudi for stoking the massive street protests through its towns and cities since September.

 

Saudi denies that accusation, but when Iran moved drones and long-range missiles close to its Gulf coast and Saudi, Riyadh called on its friends to ask Tehran to de-escalate. Russia and China did, the threat dissipated.

 

Questions remain over nuclear weapons

Tehran, despite US diplomatic efforts, is also closing in on nuclear weapons capability and Saudi’s MBS is on record saying he’ll ensure parity, “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”

 

Late last week US officials said Saudi was seeking US security guarantees and help developing a civilian nuclear program as part of a deal to normalize relations with Israel, an avowed enemy of Iran’s Ayatollahs.

 

Indeed, when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Israel late January, concerned over a rising Palestinian death toll in a violent year in the region, potential settlement expansions and controversial changes to Israel’s judiciary Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke to Blinken about “expanding the circle of peace,” and improving relations with Arab neighbours, including Saudi Arabia.

 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 2021.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 2021.

Haim Zach/Government Press Office/Getty Images

But as Saudi seems to shift closer to Tehran, Netanyahu’s mission just got harder. While both Saudi and Israel strongly oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, only Netanyahu seems ready to confront Tehran.

 

“My policy is to do everything within Israel’s power to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,” the Israeli leader told Blinken.

 

Riyadh favors diplomacy. As recently as last week the Saudi foreign minister said: “It’s absolutely critical … that we find and an alternative pathway to ensuring an (Iranian) civilian nuclear program.”

 

By improving ties with Tehran, he said, “we can make it quite clear to the Iranians that this is not just a concerns of distant countries but it’s also a concern of its neighbors.”

 

For years this is what America did, such as brokering the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, in 2015.

 

Xi backed that deal, the Saudis didn’t want it, Iran never trusted it, Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump’s withdrawal confirmed Iran’s fears and sealed its fate, despite the ongoing proximity talks to get American diplomats seated at the table again.

 

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman welcomes Chinese President Xi Jinping in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 8, 2022.

5 key takeaways from Xi's trip to Saudi Arabia

Iran has raced ahead in the meantime, massively over-running the bounds of the JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment and producing almost weapons-grade material.

 

What’s worse for Washington is that Trump’s JCPOA withdrawal legacy tainted international perceptions of US commitment, continuity and diplomacy. All these circumstances perhaps signaled to Xi that his time to seize the lead on global diplomacy was coming.

 

Yet the Chinese leader seems to accept what Netanyahu won’t and what US diplomacy is unable to prevent: that sooner, rather than later, Iran will have a nuclear weapon. As such, Xi may be fostering Saudi-Iran rapprochement as a hedge against that day.

 

So Netanyahu looks increasingly isolated and the Israeli leader, already under huge domestic pressure from spiking tensions with Palestinians and huge Israeli protests over his proposed judicial reforms, now faces a massive re-think on regional security.

 

Pieces of regional puzzle shifting

The working assumption of American diplomatic regional primacy is broken, and Netanyahu’s biggest ally is now not as hegemonic as he needs. But by how much is still far from clear.

 

It’s not a knockout, but a gut blow, to Washington. How Xi calculates the situation isn’t clear either. The US is not finished, far from it, but it is diminished, and both powers are coexisting in a different way now.

 

Earlier this month, the Chinese leader made unusually direct comments accusing the US of leading a campaign against China and causing serious domestic woes.

 

Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission attends a meeting with Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani and Minister of State and national security adviser of Saudi Arabia Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban in Beijing, China March 10, 2023. China Daily via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. CHINA OUT.

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“Western countries led by the United States have contained and suppressed us in an all-round way, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our development,” Xi told a group of government advisers representing private businesses on the sidelines of an annual legislative meeting in Beijing.

 

Meanwhile, Biden has defined the future US-China relationship as “competition not confrontation,” and he has built his foreign policy around the tenets of standing up for democracy.

 

It is striking that neither Xi, nor Khamenei, nor MBS are troubled by the moral dilemmas that circumscribe Biden. This is the big challenge the US president warned about, and now it’s here. An alternative world order, irrespective of what happens in Ukraine.

 

The U.S. Failure in Afghanistan Is Not Pakistan’s Fault

Anatol Lieven Thursday, Oct. 14, 2021

The anger directed by Americans at Pakistan in the wake of the disorderly end of the U.S. war in Afghanistan is understandable. After all, Pakistan really did give shelter to the Afghan Taliban, something that played a vital role in the Taliban’s eventual victory. However, the reaction in Washington is also a way of avoiding an honest analysis of the comprehensive failures of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Moreover, it misses key aspects of what motivated Pakistan’s behavior, with very important implications for how the United States itself understands and acts in the world.

To begin with, Islamabad’s support for the Afghan Taliban was not just a product of the Pakistani military’s strategic approach to the conflict in Afghanistan. It also reflected the opinion of a large majority of people in northern Pakistan, and among the Pashtun minority in particular. This was combined with a hostility to the U.S. that was among the highest anywhere in the world. The sympathy Pakistanis felt for the Taliban had its roots in the same dynamics that motivated their support for the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. It can also be seen in the context of the historical memory of Afghan resistance to the British Empire in the 19th century. 

But the U.S. refused to learn from the experience of other countries or to draw any parallels between their past roles and that of the U.S. today. When I and other observers suggested to U.S. officials in the early years of the war that they might study the Soviet failure in Afghanistan, they rejected the idea dismissively. That stubborn refusal befuddled the entire U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

As for official Pakistani policy toward the Taliban, it was largely driven by fear of India’s role in Afghanistan, as has been widely noted. But it was also shaped by concerns that the U.S. and the West would leave Afghanistan without creating a successful Afghan state, and that Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan’s other neighbors, would be left to live with the resulting mess. This is what had happened in the 1990s, and Islamabad—rightly, it turned out—feared it would happen again. 

Both a practical and an ethical issue are involved here. In the end, because of its geographic location, the U.S. faces no real existential, territorial threats. All of its foreign military operations are therefore to a greater or lesser degree a matter of choice. The countries located in regions where the U.S. conducts military operations have no such choice. They cannot pack up and go home. 

Every U.S. intervention must therefore be shaped with the wishes of regional countries firmly in mind, while recognizing that, from a practical point of view, the hostility of regional powers to Washington’s objectives will almost certainly doom any counterinsurgency effort to defeat. By the end of the United States’ presence in Afghanistan, its wider policies had meant that this presence was opposed by all Afghanistan’s most important neighbors. Pakistan was infuriated by U.S. drone strikes and what it regarded as bullying, and it feared possible U.S. support for an increased Indian presence in Afghanistan. Iran feared that Washington would use Afghanistan to attack Iran, and Tehran supported the Taliban in order to give itself the ability to strike back in the event such an attack took place. Growing hostility between the U.S. on one hand and Russia and China on the other meant that these countries opposed the presence of U.S. bases in their vicinity.

No counterinsurgency can succeed where the entire region is hostile to it. This is particularly true when neighboring countries provide safe haven to the insurgents. In such cases, great powers fighting counterinsurgencies often consider invading the neighboring countries to eliminate these safe havens. But they almost always reject the option—rightly—on the grounds that far from winning the war, doing so would only vastly expand it. .

The same logic holds true with regard to the argument made repeatedly over the years by many U.S. commentators that Washington should have “done something” about Islamabad’s behavior. What exactly the U.S. should have done, however, is never explicitly described. Invading Pakistan would have only succeeded in colossally widening the scope of the war. 

As for U.S. economic pressure on Pakistan, it was also constrained by a dilemma or ambiguity at the core of U.S. strategy in the region. On one hand, the U.S. wished to defeat or at least contain the Afghan Taliban, though as time went on this was chiefly driven by the desire to maintain U.S. “credibility.” On the other hand, Washington was still concerned with the original purpose of the invasion of Afghanistan, namely to counter Islamist terrorism. 

Any economic pressure sufficient to change its behavior would also have risked the collapse of a state that possesses more than five times Afghanistan’s population, nuclear weapons, and an army of half a million soldiers. That in turn would have created a terrorist threat that would have dwarfed Afghanistan and Syria combined. As a result, U.S. economic pressure on Pakistan was limited to the withholding of U.S. aid, which China soon replaced on a much larger scale. 

Ultimately, the U.S. needed three things from Pakistan: a crackdown on the Afghan Taliban, land routes to supply U.S. forces in Afghanistan and cooperation against international terrorism. Washington never got the first, but it did get the second and most of the third. Pakistan failed to hunt down Osama bin Laden, but it did capture and hand over to the U.S. numerous other al-Qaida leaders and operatives, and cooperated quietly with the CIA and U.K. intelligence to identify plots by Pakistanis against the American and British homelands. 

That illustrates a fundamental lesson of international affairs that the U.S. establishment would do well to study. The U.S. can rarely get everything it wants. It will often have to make compromises and settle for an uncomfortable but tolerable outcome. Living with Saddam Hussein was uncomfortable for America. Invading Iraq to get rid of him led to disaster. Losing in Afghanistan has been acutely uncomfortable for America. Destroying Pakistan for the sake of an illusory Afghan victory would have led to catastrophe on an almost unimaginable scale.

Finally, what has happened in Afghanistan demonstrates the truth of the principle that, in practice, geopolitical and military power is local and relative, not universal and absolute. The outcome of any contest between two countries will depend on the power that one of them is willing and able to bring to bear in a particular place or on a particular issue, relative to the power that another is willing and able to employ to oppose it.

Those decisions, in turn, will be determined by the location of the countries concerned and whether the issue involved is a vital or only a secondary interest for them. By those standards, just as Russia is a great power in eastern Ukraine and the U.S. is not, so Pakistan is a great power in eastern Afghanistan—and the U.S. is not. The U.S. does not have the physical power to dominate everywhere. Equally important, most Americans do not feel that most issues around the world are of vital concern to the United States. This inevitably limits the commitments and sacrifices they are prepared to make in these cases, especially over the long term. 

The lessons from Afghanistan are a case study of these principles. Future U.S. strategy should be shaped with them firmly in mind.

Foreign Policy of Pakistan (JR129)

Foreign Policy of Pakistan (JR129)

  Introduction

 

Foreign policy, solely guided by a country’s national interest, is used as a tool by a particular country for dealing with the outside world in various areas such as security, economy, trade, commerce, culture and technology. As International Relations have been evolving since the treaty of Westphalia, the conduct, methods and scope of foreign policy have also been changing.In the age of Globalization, more and more areas of global, regional and bilateral interactions today fall within the ambit of foreign policy. Terms like cultural diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, defence diplomacy, digital diplomacy, economic diplomacy and regional. Diplomacy are presently considered part and parcel of foreign policy. Foreign Policy is the reflection of a country’s internal environment and, states’ foreign policy remains neither static nor rigid.  The objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as: Promotion of Pakistan as a dynamic, progressive, moderate, and democratic Islamic country; Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers and immediate neighbors; Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic interests, including Kashmir; Consolidating our commercial and economic cooperation with international community; Safeguarding the interests of Pakistani Diaspora abroad; and Ensuring optimal utilization of national resources for regional and international cooperation.

The objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the contemporary era can be outlined as under:

1.                   The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to safeguard the national security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country.

2.                   To protect Pakistan’s economic interests abroad.

3.                   To project the image of Pakistan as a progressive, modern and democratic Islamic country.

4.                   To  promote  peace,  stability  and  friendly  relations  with

Afghanistan.

5.                   To find the resolution of all disputes with India including the   issue   of   Kashmir.   Raise   the   Kashmir   issue   on international forums.

6.                   To forge cordial and friendly relations with all neighbors, Muslim countries and the larger international community.

7.                   To fulfill its responsibilities as a responsible member of the international community.

8.                   To prevent and respond to threats and capitalize on opportunities.

9.                  To safeguard the interests of Pakistani diaspora.

10.             Seek relevant  technology transfer to assist the effort to industrialize the country

11.             Seek space for Pakistani exports.

12.             Work towards beneficial trade agreements on bilateral and multi lateral basis.

 The country has historically enjoyed cordial relations with states like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Iran. But, at the same time, it had to change course at various crossroads of global politics

India

With India, Pakistan has core territorial and serious water issues coupled with alleged interference in each other’s affairs. Pakistan has been repeatedly saying that India is using Afghan territory to sponsor terrorism in Pakistan but has not been able to convince the world community of the veracity of its claims. A serving Indian Naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav, was arrested in Pakistan who also confessed to have been a RAW agent and had carried out activities to destabilize the Pakistani state by terrorist activities. On the other hand, India has succeeded in creating a perception around the world as a result of terrorist events like the attack on Indian parliament in 2001, the Mumbai terrorists’ attack in 2008, and armed assaults in Uri and Pathankot a few years ago. The very recent US attempt to seek withdrawal form Afghanistan and Pakistan’s contributions related to ongoing negotiations, have somewhat altered the equation in the sub continent. The US is unlikely to abandon the Indian connection as that is still needed in the effort to contain China, India as per US perceptions could contribute to the Naval domination efforts to contain China. US could however alter the relationship with India and Pakistan to make this a little more balanced and even handed. This altered environment has also resulted in India to slowly  seek a more normal relationship with Pakistan.

India is a huge market for Western consumer and military goods and services. At the same time, it has strategic significance for the US in its policy of containing China. This has created a sympathetic environment for India in the West. It has also created a sense of arrogance and pride in India. In recent years, Pakistan has approached India multiple times to revive the comprehensive dialogue process which was disrupted after the 2008 Mumbai attack. But it has met with a cold Indian response. The Indian response to any Pakistani talk offers in the last ten years has been to reject it on the pretext that Pakistan was sponsoring terrorism in India-occupied Kashmir and that India would consider resuming the dialogue when IOK becomes peaceful again.

The flurry of events after the new Pakistani government proposed a meeting of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers at the UN General Assembly is evidence of the Indian mindset. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ statement in response to the Pakistani proposal seems to have lacked seriousness. First, it accepted the idea of the meeting but a day later backtracked on the grounds of a postage stamp issued by the Pakistani government honouring the late Kashmiri freedom fighter Burhan Wani sometime ago. This was a flimsy reason as the postage stamp was issued before the present Imran Khan’s government came into power and a caretaker set-up had taken that decision.

India has made significant economic progress in the past two decades Choosing its way between Socialism and Capitalism, the Indian economy stands 3rd as per GDP (PPP) in the world and is likely to grow further. This is an important development for Pakistan because India, like any other country in the world, is translating its economic development into political, military and diplomatic strength.

The environment that surrounds Pakistan clearly dictates that Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India will be guided by security – that should be considered as the rule of the thumb. Henceforth, the general expectation should be that Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India will remain directed by the security concerns emanating from across its eastern and western borders. This means, Pakistan will be taking a good care of its borders, improving its conventional and deterrent capability against India, while at the same time allowing diplomacy to try its luck on Kashmir, trade, crisis management, and people-to-people contact.

Diplomacy, no doubt, plays a significant role in resolving long standing disputes. The appeasement of India, however, should neither be the choice nor option. Thus, Pakistan would not like another Ufa taking place, where India dictated the rules of engagement. It is to be noted here that by not reciprocating to the goodwill gestures of Pakistan, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to have decided to walk on the traditional path of keeping Pakistan under diplomatic pressure.

The events of the past two years, therefore, lead us to the conclusion  that  India  will  try  to  use  pressure  tactics  in  order  to  take concessions from Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues. If history be the guide, India’s current strategy is that normalization of relations with Pakistan will depend on Islamabad’s acceptance of Indian regional hegemony and its stance on Kashmir. Pakistan on the other hand, should maintain its position by telling India that normalization of relations will not be coming without discussing and resolving the core issues between the two countries. The Musharraf regime did make unilateral concessions whilst none were made by India, Pakistan agreed and implemented the elimination of terror camps in AJ&K and elsewhere  and allowed India to build the fence that put to stop most if not all infiltration .India now seeks that Pakistan also clamp on non State actors and on Kashmir movements for freedom inside held Kashmir .

Pakistan seeks to eliminate or reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan should develop an approach that can bring about normalization of relations with Afghanistan that should also aim at a reduced Indian influence as a crucial component of this process.

Pakistan’s immediate goal should be to minimize and, ultimately, eliminate threats to its security on the eastern border, while India’s influence in Afghanistan should be viewed in a relative rather than in an absolute way. This means that India will remain influential in Afghanistan, because over the last 15 years it has massively invested in creating a pro- Indian lobby in the political and defence establishment of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy, therefore, by combining soft and smart power, should play a skilful stroke of public and economic diplomacy to counter Indian propaganda, increase trade and commercial activities with Afghanistan and work on an outreach to all Afghans.

India has grown economically and strengthened diplomatically. With Narendra Modi occupying the office of the Prime Minister of India, relations should not be expected to take a turn towards normalcy any times soon. The government led by Narendra Modi may add even more offensive elements to its foreign policy viz-a-viz Pakistan which might include, massive arms buildup, conspiring against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, defaming Pakistan diplomatically, violation of the ceasefire on the border with Pakistan, and a more potent interference in FATA and Baluchistan.

India’s violations of the ceasefire along the Pakistan-India border have risen sharply. Moreover, Pakistan’s internal problems as well as the conflict in Baluchistan and Fata should give enough reason to India for becoming more offensive. Thus, India, by benefitting from its economic stability and diplomatic clout in the world and by capitalizing on the diplomatic lag of Pakistan, will continue to create more problems for Pakistan. So it should not be beyond the imagination of anyone in Pakistan’s foreign office that India would like to bring Pakistan face to face with a strategic fatigue or choke.

With the “Cold Start” in place and the doctrine of “Offensive Defense” in operation, Ajit Doval, the national security adviser to Prime Minister Modi, has publicly stated that India will exploit Pakistan’s internal problems for its advantage As long as India continues with its “Offensive Defence” policy viz-à-viz Pakistan, Islamabad must be cautious in yielding any such incentive to New Delhi. Pakistan’s defense of Indian offence has started giving its own fruit.

The internal dynamics of Pakistan are changing. What had kept Pakistan and its society bleeding over the past 10 years or so, are taking its final breaths. Thanks to operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan has made significant gains against extremism. Insurgency in Baluchistan has been degraded and FATA is no more a rendezvous for local and international militants. The mood at all levels inside. The people, government and the army of Pakistan have decided to put an end to the menace of terrorism, fanaticism and sectarianism. In a nutshell, it can be said that Pakistan is on the right track that will finally lead it to come out of the baggage of the Afghan war.

Pakistan’s military and nation as a whole have proved its mettle and resilience. This must be enough to make India understand that they too will be dealing with a different Pakistan in the times to come. And if economic turnaround is also made — the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor be the case in point — then Pakistan will be even stronger and different.

So the change that Pakistan is currently going through is positive, solid and will have long-lasting effects. China is now a global economic powerhouse and its relations with Pakistan will further enhance in the coming years. Sri Lanka can also be considered as wary of Indian domination in the region and the sane heads in Washington and Kabul realize that Pakistan’s role with regards to any settlement in Afghanistan is vital and cannot be ignored. Moreover, Pakistan’s relations with Iran are expected to improve further especially after Islamabad’s principled stance on Yemen. All of these developments, when looked at collectively, provide Pakistan ample opportunities to play an active role and adopt a region- centric approach to counter Indian designs.

Iran

Despite some difficulties common in international relations — Pakistan’s relations with Iran have remained good and friendly. Both countries have enjoyed a long period of good relations that are central to the stability of the region.     Pakistan and Iran have stakes in Afghanistan as well as in the wider region

Pakistan must bring dynamism in its foreign policy regarding Iran and the gulf countries. Walking a fine line between Iran and the GCC will be a major challenge for Pakistan’s future foreign policy.

Iran also looks freer and more confident after the nuclear deal., even though the deal has since been cancelled by the Trump administration, The Europeans have upheld the deal and have made practical steps to  assist Iran in circumventing the American sanctions ( a SPV to allow payments for oil and other products to be made to Iran  to circumvent US sanctions for example) So Iran,  too,  must be  looking  for  a  strategy  to  translate its  huge stock  of natural resources into economic and political strength. Again, Pakistan’s policymakers should be cognizant of the fact that Iran’s role in the Middle East and Afghanistan and its relations with India will strongly resonate in Pakistan as well as across the OPEC Recent investments and deposits to bridge the foreign exchange reserves by Saudi and GCC has the potential to drive a wedge between Pakistan and Iran., a large refinery is envisaged by the Saudis in CPEC. Saudis and GCC have concerns related to the Charbahar port. This will require very careful handling of the relations with Iran, The US under Trump is also raising the temperature against Iran and may attempt to use Baluchistan as a launching pad against Iranian South East. Pakistan should stay away from such efforts and refuse to allow its territory to be used against Iran. Efforts to destabilize Iran are underway and attempts will be made to use Baluchistan for this effort, Pakistan needs to strictly stop any such effort being made through its territory. A recent attack on Iranian soil seems a harbinger of things to come( One member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards was killed and five were wounded in an attack on a base in southeastern Iran on Saturday, as the country holds official celebrations on the 40th anniversary of its Islamic Revolution. On Tuesday, Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice) claimed responsibility for two bombings that wounded three police officers in front of a police station in the city of Zahedan, capital of Sistan-Baluchestan province.)

Middle East

The Middle East is undergoing a significant change that has not only transformed the Middle East but has sent shocks much beyond the region. Although one would have been expecting or wishing for a different kind of change, yet no matter how it is, the change is occurring. Most of the Middle East has fallen into chaos. Syria, Yemen, Palestine and, Iraq are bleeding,  .   The US has lost both its credibility and efficacy in the Middle East and now Russia is emerging to fill the void. As it did in Ukraine, Syria and might be thinking of reasserting itself over geopolitics in Central Asia as well. Russians cooperate with Iran and China to offer alternative s to the US and the West . The Trump administration has moved the US embassy to Jerusalem and are now encouraging the “Zero” Palestine solution, where Gaza and West Bank will be divided between Egypt, Jordan and Israel, thereby eliminating any trace of Palestine.

The Middle East is one of the most troubled regions today. It is considered as an “arc of crisis” owing to the speedy changes that have swept the region since the US invasion of Iraq, and later the Arab spring that began in 2011. As Iran, the GCC and the wider Middle East comprises of Islamic countries, the concept of Muslim brotherhood will naturally resonate across the width and breadth of Pakistan. Our relations with the GCC, Afghanistan and Iran involve societal, religious and cultural factors that come under the broad umbrella of ideology.

No doubt ideology is an important part here,  but it should not supersede the vital interests of Pakistan such as religious and sectarian harmony as well as social cohesion. Pakistan should know that the ideology  has  not  worked  in  its  diplomacy  as  far  as  the  Middle  East is concerned. Therefore, future foreign policy must revolve around our national interest.  One of the most outstanding challenges for Pakistan’s

Foreign policy viz-a-viz the gulf countries will be to wash away the impact of Pakistan’s decision on Yemen. It will take some time to undo the effects of Pakistan’s decision on Yemen, but again Yemen should serve as an example for Pakistan so in the future it should not opt for indulging in any regional conflict.

The widening gulf between Saudi GCC with Iran and also the gulf within GCC are issues that will need careful attention. Qatar has been practically expelled from GCC. Iran, Russia and Turkey now play crucial roles with the Middle East. Pakistan should seek a reduction of animosities with In Muslim nations and should avoid becoming a party to that various warring parties within the Middle East.

Afghanistan

As regards Afghanistan, it differs with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. The background of the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation and the recent War on Terror are issues on which Pakistan and Afghanistan see the developments differently. Pakistan, along with the United States and Saudi Arabia, had supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan Jihad but in the latter years, the Afghan government began to suspect that Pakistan was also backing the Afghan Taliban in the ongoing War on Terror. Pakistan believes that irrespective of issues of trust deficit, the conflict in Afghanistan has no military solution and favours reconciliation between the Afghan government and the fighting groups.

Afghanistan has seen political instability and internal fighting for the last four decades. Afghan instability has also a spillover effect on Pakistan. Pakistan has experienced the proliferation of gun and violence as a result of internal instability in Afghanistan and suffered from acts of terrorism. In fact, Afghan policymakers in collusion with their Indian counterparts, particularly their intelligence agencies, have been jointly working to carry out terrorist activities inside Pakistan, as suspected by the Pakistani leadership.

Afghanistan provides a mix of challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. As with India, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been hostage to security. However, the biggest trouble with Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is its deep socio-political and economic impact on Pakistan. The past 35 years have proven the fact that any foreign policy towards Afghanistan will have great social, economic and political fallout on Pakistan be it the Afghan-Soviet war of 1979 to 1988, the era of Taliban or 9/11.

Since the unfortunate event of 9/11, Afghanistan and the region have gone through a rapid change. The Taliban, although ousted from power, are not yet defeated. America and the West have, to a large extent, given up their interest in Afghanistan; new players have taken positions in the region. The only thing that one finds common when it comes to Afghanistan, is the concern among Afghanistan’s neighbors regarding the threat of terrorism, extremism and militancy reaching their borders. This threat,  therefore,  raises  the  interest  of  all  neighboring  states  to  get

Involved with Afghanistan. So dealing with Afghanistan means dealing with a number of countries that include China, Russia, United States and Iran.

Since the United States attack on Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan has been facing continued challenges on its western border. Unfortunately,

Promises that the Americans made to Pakistan prior to the attack were not

kept. Resultantly, Pakistan could not develop a considerable support base or a strategic space in Afghanistan’s current political establishment.

Secondly, Pakistan, due to its own economic downturn, could not buttress  its  foreign  policy  goals  in  Afghanistan  with  economic  tools.

Therefore, we could not invest much in Afghanistan as India or Iran did. Thirdly,  the  mistrust  between  the  two  countries  as  well  as  with  the

Americans and NATO remained a hurdle in developing friendly relations with Afghanistan.

Pakistan should clearly and effectively communicate to Afghanistan that Pakistan’s foremost objective — the sanctity of its sovereignty,    security    and    territorial    integrity    —    can    never    be

compromised.   Therefore,   cooperation   with    Afghanistan   will    be conditioned with the elimination of anti-Pakistan elements on Afghan soil

— be it the Baloch separatists, remnants of the TTP or other terrorist outfits.

 Stability in Afghanistan is in the utmost security, political, economic and social interest of Pakistan. Policymakers in Washington and Kabul understand that stability will not come to Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help. Kabul and Islamabad also agree that terrorists, extremists, militants and others of their likes cannot be and will not be allowed to hijack the destiny of the two countries. The presence of militants on both sides of the border necessitates mutual cooperation to deal with this menace. But in

reality this has proved to be an ardent task. Translating the goal of ending militancy into practical action requires; coordination, trust, political will, vision and flexibility which unfortunately do not exist currently.During  last  few  years,  Pakistan  has  taken  serious  measures  to reach  to  all  Afghans.   This  time  Afghanistan  must  understand  that blaming Pakistan for everything that goes wrong in Afghanistan will achieve no end. Therefore, the government in Kabul should look to their own incompetence, discrepancies, governmental and institutional problems rather than blaming Pakistan for every wrongdoing that takes place in Afghanistan.

  The most crucial point on Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda with Afghanistan should be preventing India from using Afghanistan   . Recent development related to the announced US withdrawl  and the report agreement on a peace agreement between US and Taliban has raised hopes for reduction in terrorism within Afghanistan. So far the talks have been held only between US and Taliban the missing discussions between Taliban and The Afghan Government and or the Northern Alliance or the non Pakthun Afghan population are still outstanding. If the negotiations between Taliban and Afghan government do not proceed smoothly Afghanistan could well see an increase in the civil war .  

United States

The Pak-US relationship has seen both positive and negative phases in its diplomatic history. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has been a major reason for cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. The US mainly sought Pakistani cooperation in promoting its interests against a third party. The Soviet Union was such a party during the Cold War and the Taliban after 9/11. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan was a major determinant in both cases. Factors other than its location have played only a minor role in the relations between the two countries.

The Afghan Jihad was an era of close cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. Both the US and Pakistan supported the Afghan Mujahideen in order to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship saw a decline. But post- 9/11 Pak-US ties again saw an upward trajectory, whereby the US needed Pakistani support to support its fighting in Afghanistan. Pakistan did support the US to the extent to which it had agreed initially but the United States expected more from Pakistan. The US developed the mantra of “do more” vis-à-vis Pakistan. As the war on terror in Afghanistan has prolonged and has reached a stalemate now over seventeen years, Pak-US ties have come to their lowest level ever. The US has stopped military assistance to Pakistan. It has also been blaming Pakistan for its failure in Afghanistan. The Trump Administration’s 2017 South Asia Strategy clearly reflected this perspective.

The United States can also influence Pakistan’s dealings with international organisations. Pakistan could not get the support of the United States on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issue. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also warned against the International Monetary Funds’ financing to Pakistan citing the likelihood of Pakistan using the funds for paying back the Chinese debts.

US, Afghanistan and India

Another aspect of Pakistan’s relationships with India, Afghanistan and the US is a strong trilateral relationship between the latter three countries. US, India, and Afghanistan are closely aligned with one another albeit indirectly. India enjoys a close relationship with both the US and Afghanistan. Similarly, the US presence and long-term interests in Afghanistan make it a troublesome stakeholder in that country and decisions it takes with regard to its security. They share similar views on the War on Terror and blame Pakistan for backing terrorism in Afghanistan and India. Hence, they collude against Pakistan.

Their trilateral understanding of events makes it harder for Pakistan to convince any one of these three countries. To convince Afghanistan of its sincere intentions to resolve the Afghan issue would also require the United States to believe in the sincerity of its efforts. Similarly, Afghanistan is not likely to improve relations with Pakistan without the consent of India and the United States.

The nationalistic governments in both the US and India rely heavily on political rhetoric. They focus on strategy to make the outer world look evil to secure their respective political support base. India and Afghanistan will hold general elections in 2019 and later 2018, respectively. Anti-Pakistan rhetoric is likely to see a sharp rise in India. During this time any hope of even minimal engagements between Pakistan on the one hand and the US and India on the other may not materialize. Pakistan, meanwhile, can wait for the new administrations in India and Afghanistan to come into power and start fresh engagement with them.

China and Afghanistan

 Pakistan and China have been enjoying close, amiable and ever- growing diplomatic, economic, trade and security relations since the independence of Pakistan. After partition of the sub-continent both China and Pakistan have been working closely with each other in many areas of mutual interests. As the time passed by, the relations of Pakistan  and China have gathered more strength and dynamism. Currently these relations cover a wide spectrum of areas such as; diplomacy, culture, science, technology, economy, military and people-to-people contact.

Pakistan and China’s interest converges in many areas that makes cooperation both possible and desirable. Pakistan’s geography attracts huge interest from China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is crucial for China’s economic development because this project provides the shortest transit route between Eastern China, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It is not only about distance, CPEC is also of strategic importance  for  China  because  it  acts  a  malady  for  China’s  “Malacca Dilemma.” So the huge economic opportunities that CPEC gives to both countries necessitate deep and growing relations between the two neighbors. In addition to these, the India factor will also be a crucial player in Pak-China relations.  Both Pakistan and  China  serve  each  other  as  a counter-weight to Indian designs. So Pakistan’s relations with China have a strategic, economic and political value for Pakistan and are expected to become stronger as well as closer with the passage of time. The Chinese do insist on keeping engaged with the Indians and attempt to mitigate the Indian involvements to embrace the US designs, Indians of course are playing the usual double game , they derive as much benefit from the US embrace as possible whilst keeping communications open with the Chinese .

China has being paying attention to Afghanistan. China will reportedly train Afghan troops for deployment in the Wakhan Corridor, which links the Afghan province of Badakshan with western China. It is also considering Afghanistan’s request for combat aircraft. These are the latest developments in a growing military relationship: Beijing has granted $70 million in military aid to Kabul over the past three years. China has also held meetings with Afghan Taliban representatives over the past year, and was rumored (alongside Pakistan) to have brokered and guaranteed the Eidul Fitr ceasefire. These developments should remind Pakistan that China only does what it does to serve its own interests. In this case, Beijing has three reasons to pursue closer involvement in Afghanistan.

The most important, in Beijing’s perspective, is to check Uighur radicalization. China fears that oppressed Uighurs will increasingly depart for Afghanistan to receive militant training, and that fighters affiliated with both the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the militant Islamic State group will increasingly access western China via the Wakhan Corridor to carry out attacks.

The main goal of Chinese investment in a ‘mountain brigade’ in the Wakhan Corridor is to block this two-way flow. This also explains why the majority of Chinese development spending in Afghanistan — $90m worth in September 2017 alone — is concentrated in Badakshan, the proximate Afghan province.

Media reports suggest that part of China’s efforts to engage with the Afghan Taliban is to dispel the perception that the Chinese are anti-Muslim (apparently Taliban representatives were offered tours of a Chinese mosque). These interactions are aimed at staving off Beijing’s nightmare scenario of the Afghan Taliban formally joining forces with ETIM.

China’s second, related goal is to ensure the security of its Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has recognised that an Afghanistan offering sanctuary to various militant groups poses the greatest threats to its flagship CPEC projects, and seeks to stabilise the country before the corridor is fully ‘online’. Finally, growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan will help loosen the historic US grip over Kabul, something Beijing will in­­creasingly seek as Sino-US tensions intensify.

These drivers present Islamabad with an opportunity to equalise its relationship with Beijing. After all, China does not know Afghanistan the way Pakistan does. It requires Pakistani interlocutors to achieve its goals. And in exchange for facilitation, China will be the heavy hitter ensuring Pakistan’s seat on the table during any peace negotiations.

Knowing this, China is already playing an important role in brokering Af-Pak ties. It has urged the new government to establish a crisis prevention mechanism to prevent hostilities from escalating after incidents such as terror attacks within Afghanistan. Last December, it hosted trilateral talks where Kabul, Beijing and Islam­abad jointly called on the Afghan Taliban to engage in peace talks.

But China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan may also create tensions in the Sino-Pak relationship. Here’s the thing: China’s main goal in Afghanistan is ostensibly to keep ETIM out, while Pakistan’s is to keep India out. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s counterproductive last visit   is a good reminder of how alliances end up when supposed allies have divergent strategic objectives.

China will use all the resources at its disposal to achieve its ends in Afghanistan. And this includes India. Just this April, Xi Jingping and Narendra Modi agreed to cooperate in Afghanistan, including by launching joint economic projects to spur growth and stability. At some point, China may ask Pakistan to curb what some allege is its tolerance of militants in Afghanistan.

So far, Islamabad has not appeared averse to Chinese intervention in its security policies. But as Washington will tell Beijing, there is a point at which Pakistan will not budge from prioritizing its security and strategic objectives, no matter how high or sweet the friendship. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will be the forge that further melds the allies, or the anvil on which the relationship faces blows.   

US needs exit strategy from Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan has already gone on 11 years longer than World War II. And whereas Germany and Japan were both modern industrial nations with their own histories of democracy when that war started and have since become close allies, Afghanistan, still beset by conflict, has never really been anything more than a collection of ethnic clans only loosely bound together by nationhood—where the fragments often command a greater allegiance from individual citizens than the whole.

The U.S. Defense Department’s own metrics suggest that Afghanistan’s insurgents are nowhere near losing. The percentage of the country’s 407 districts under government control has decreased from 66 percent in May 2016 to 56 percent in May 2018. Over the same two-year period, the number of areas under Taliban or insurgent control has risen, as did the number of districts considered “contested,” according to an audit by the Pentagon’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

Afghanistan is as much the graveyard of empires as it ever was. But U.S. civilian and military leaders routinely claim that they are capable of winning the war there. That wishful thinking aside, the argument against withdrawing U.S. forces boils down to inertia. As in Vietnam, the United States is trapped. It can’t win, yet it can’t leave for fear that the government in Kabul would collapse and Afghanistan could once again become an oasis for terrorists who threaten the United States.

 There is reason to believe that the realities on the ground—exhaustion after years of war, a more politically sophisticated Taliban, and a multiplicity of competing jihadi groups—have changed and that a different outcome is now possible. And other countries, including China, could be convinced to take on a greater role in assuring Afghanistan’s future.

It is not hard to understand why the idea that the United States can stay in Afghanistan and win seems to hold widespread appeal. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have defined the careers of an entire generation of the U.S. military  

The U.S. presence in Afghanistan safeguards two vital interests: the need to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and to eliminate terrorist safe havens. But the United States could ensure those interests without staying in Afghanistan forever. However, the country would need to change its mindset in order to both get out and have a chance of avoiding a much-feared collapse in Kabul, which would lead to Afghanistan becoming a jihadi playground.  

Any plausible exit strategy must involve handing over U.S. military and political roles to the countries most directly impacted by turmoil in Afghanistan. First on that list is China, which has large economic and counterterrorism interests at stake. Washington should signal its intent to withdraw troops and quietly begin a dialogue with Beijing to coordinate an exit that minimizes the possibility of a political-military vacuum. China prefers to free-ride on the United States but, faced with the reality of U.S. withdrawal, could assemble a group committed to securing Afghanistan—including Russia, India, Pakistan, and Iran—operating under a U.N. Security Council mandate.

Then, under U.N. auspices, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the loose Eurasian alliance aimed at counterterrorism and regional cooperation, perhaps in cooperation with NATO, could convene a peace conference in Geneva. The participants would primarily focus on setting the terms and conditions for the Taliban to take on a primary position in a national unity government—on the condition that it holds free and fair elections within 12 to 18 months of assuming power.

In return, a Taliban-majority government would have to agree to deny safe haven to the Islamic State or other Islamist militant groups; to support the inclusion of major non-Pashtun ethnic groups (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen) in a de facto federal system that grants autonomy to non-Pashtun districts; and to solemnly promise to protect women’s rights, especially to education and to participation in social life—something the Taliban now claim to accept, although the facts on the ground tell a different story.

One major incentive for the Taliban would be the creation of a $25 billion multiyear reconstruction fund jointly managed by the Asian Development Bank and Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The fund would operate on principles similar to those of the U.S. Millennium Challenge account created by the George W. Bush administration; grants and loans offered through the fund would require fully vetted business plans. And assistance would be conditioned on the Taliban abiding by the terms of the peace accord: that is, no safe havens for terrorists and political tolerance.

There is reason to think this exit strategy is plausible. China, through its massive Belt and Road development strategy and long-standing alliance with Pakistan, has far more leverage with Islamabad than the United States does. Beyond its large-scale investments in Afghan mining, China’s counterterrorism policies also overlap with the United States’. Thus, U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism cooperation in both Afghanistan and in the greater Middle East could continue. It might even be a tonic for the otherwise volatile relationship between the two countries.

First, depleted blood and treasure is the price it has paid for allowing al Qaeda a safe haven. Moreover, its evolution from an insurgency tasked with destruction to a governing political party will undoubtedly change its decision-making calculus. In 2018, even a Taliban regime in Afghanistan would have little incentive to open the country’s doors to the Islamic State or any of a plethora of Islamist militant groups to undo a fragile peace. Indeed, the political incentive of becoming not only a legitimate political party but the dominant one should not be underestimated, especially in combination with the economic benefits such an agreement would unlock.

Meanwhile, with the Taliban as the dominant power in Kabul, Islamabad may find reason to be a more cooperative member of the negotiating team. Chinese pressure could reinforce the tilt. The United States faces enormous global and regional strategic challenges from China and Russia from which it cannot afford to be distracted by continuing its presence in Afghanistan. In his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump pushed for a radical rethink of this endless and unwinnable war. His instincts were right on this. A pragmatic, workable exit strategy from Afghanistan is the least dishonorable way for the United States to turn the page and step out of the graveyard that, from the time of Alexander, has buried empires.

In his latest book, Fear, Bob Woodward notes Trump had initially insisted “Afghanistan is a total disaster. We don’t know what we are doing. Let’s get out". After becoming president he found his generals opposed his views. National Security Adviser Gen McMaster sought to “align military recommendations for Afghanistan with the president’s goals” but he discovered “this president’s only goal was to get out”. Since then, the generals and civilian hawks have controlled Trump and got him to stay on in Afghanistan indefinitely.

A State Department official asked the generals some “fundamental questions”. Why do we think we need a counterterrorism base in Afghanistan to prevent another (9/11) attack? What do we think the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan really is? Why do we think thousands of US troops and intelligence specialists are needed when we have drones and everything else?

An enduring US presence in Afghanistan, he said, could cause “further instability from not only insurgents, but also regional players, such as Pakistan”. Moreover, when the US invaded Afghanistan it did not want to establish a permanent presence. Why did it want to after 16 years? The military denied it wanted a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The official accordingly asked: when would the US military presence end? Or was the search for a political settlement “a way to sell continued US military engagement in Afghanistan?” Senator Lindsey Graham answered a similar question from Trump by saying “It never ends.”

Pakistan, however, cannot broker a peace settlement between a Kabul government that deeply mistrusts it and the Taliban insurgency that is suspicious of Pakistan’s motives and reliability. Reports that Pakistan now wants US forces to stay in Afghanistan until peace is achieved would confirm Taliban suspicions and the success of US pressure on Pakistan to realign its Afghanistan policy. Pakistan does have limited influence with the Taliban, such influence has resulted in the partial peace agreement between US and the Taliban .

Should the US be willing to consider a time-based, instead of a conditions-based, withdrawal from Afghanistan, a sensible and far-sighted Pakistan policy could, in concert with other regional countries, significantly assist a time-lined Afghan settlement. So far, this has not been Pakistan’s preferred policy option.  

President Ghani “dangled the possibility that the US would have exclusive access to the vast mineral wealth” of Afghanistan saying “there’s so much money to be made. Don’t walk away. Rare earth minerals, like lithium, etc worth several trillion dollars!” An impressed Trump said, “[the Afghans] have offered us their minerals. Offered us everything! Why aren’t we there taking them? The Chinese are raiding the place.” McMaster pointed out that “a lot of the minerals are in Taliban-controlled areas”.

Ghani also promised Trump he would allow “as many counterterrorism troops as he wanted plus CIA bases wherever he wanted”. But Kabul failed to regain Taliban-controlled areas because, as the US Directorate of National Intelligence reported, “Pakistan was not playing ball or responding to pressure. Any settlement was premised on Pakistani participation". Moreover, “a drought was coming, and with it a crisis of food security”. In addition, Pakistan was about to send back “one or two million Afghan refugees”.

It is still not clear whether Trump wants to include Pakistan or exclude it from an Afghan peace process. The US needs Pakistan. But it prefers to see Indian influence prevail in Afghanistan. It also wants an Afghan settlement that forestalls Chinese influence. Pakistan needs the US to adopt a more balanced policy towards it. But not at the cost of its strategic relationship with China.

In turn, China realizes Trump is a dangerous and destabilizing foe, not the global partner for regional and international stability it had hoped. For India, a Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement is a strategic nightmare. Regarding Afghanistan, almost everyone is “as straight as a jalebi”. Woodward notes McMaster proposed a R4 strategy: Reinforce (Kabul); Realign (concentrate on areas under its control); Reconcile (with the Taliban while killing and dividing them); and Regionalize (essentially bringing in India).

This was to reinforce his four frames policy: achieving political stability through a political settlement with the Taliban; building institutions to counter the Taliban; increasing pressure on Pakistan which was playing a “double game”, and maintaining allied support. Trump believed “things will work out with Pakistan”. But, according to US intelligence, “Pakistan has not changed since 9/11 and they won’t".

The only option in Afghanistan was “a new House of Broken Toys” (the CIA’s reference to Iraq when it was planning its invasion). In other words, the US needed a CIA or US Army-run Afghan insurgency against the Taliban insurgency (and Pakistan).The “House of Broken Toys” in the Afghan context alludes to expanding Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT) made up of “the best Afghan fighters, the cream of the crop” who are “paid, trained and controlled by the CIA”. Could this “CIA paramilitary force” make a US troop increase unnecessary? CTPTs had previously “conducted dangerous and highly controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan”. The CIA now wanted to hit two High Value Targets in Pakistan! Moreover, Senator Graham warned Trump that pulling out of Afghanistan could lead to another 9/11 for which he would be condemned.

To conclude, US Afghan policy is focused on containing China. Staying on in Afghanistan, having military/intelligence bases, and disengaging Pakis­tan from its embrace of China are part of the US strategy. So are its threats, sanctions, FATF and the IMF’s focus on “China debt”. These are ultimately aimed at CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative.An intelligent and sustainable Afghan policy is an urgent strategic requirement for Pakistan. It would need to be situated in a broader set of domestic and external policies.

Recent US announcement to withdraw from Afghanistan and the subsequent agreement to withdraw with 18 months from Afghanistan has altered most thinking related to Afghanistan. The Taliban has agreed to a peace agreement. The missing part is an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government, without which peace will not prevail in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s immediate foreign policy challenges: Building the Pakistan-China strategic partnership-China has the strategic motivation and financial, technological and weapons capabilities to help Pakistan emerge as a militarily strong and economically dynamic state. The substance and depth of the future strategic partnership will depend mainly on the ability of the Pakistan government and its private sector to conceive and execute cooperative projects and ventures with China. Pakistan needs to prepare for utilization of the full impact of CPEC, by means of human development and identification of key areas of cooperation. Pakistan also needs to address the inimical trade agreement already signed with China; Managing Sino-US rivalry-The Trump administration has designated China as a strategic competitor and opposes China’s Belt and Road Initiative including CPEC. The US diplomatic and media onslaught against China and CPEC has intensified. In fact, China’s investment and infrastructure building can help stabilize the entire South Asian region including Afghanistan. With growing indications that Donald Trump wants a hurried withdrawal from Afghanistan, agreement on the role China can and should play in stabilizing the region must become a priority for Pakistan’s regional diplomacy.: Afghanistan-Pakistan and US positions appeared to converge recently as the US belatedly accepted the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan and opened direct talks with the Afghan Taliban which Pakistan facilitated. However, the entire negotiating process, including the one initiated by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, may be thrown in disarray by Trump’s announcement to withdraw 7,000 US troops from Afghanistan. Sensing US abandonment, and under unrelenting Taliban pressure, the Kabul ‘unity’ government, even the Afghan National Army, may collapse, reviving the likelihood of another prolonged civil war. Pakistan needs to assist in the oderly change in regime in Kabul. Pakistan’s diplomacy must work simultaneously with the US and China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent civil war and promote a viable political settlement in Afghanistan. A conference involving these states and major Afghan parties could be convened to draw up the broad parameters of such a settlement; Pakistan-US-In Trump’s ‘America First’ environment, there is a growing ‘Washington Consensus’ against China, Russia and the Muslim world, including compliant ‘allies’. The US has been reluctant to acknowledge Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan and continued to adopt punitive measures against it. If the US leaves Afghanistan without a political settlement, it may feel free to take further action against Pakistan. Islamabad needs to negotiate the structure of its future ties with the US in tandem with arrangements for US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. After America’s exit, Pakistan’s leverage will be diminished. Pakistan should not assume clear sailing in US Pakistan ties, the lull is temporary and tactical, US will revert back to its pre pull out stance -once they wash their hands off Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to reset relations with US at a low but stable level; Kashmir and India-It is evident that Imran Khan, the PTI government and Pakistan’s army chief desire normalisation with India. This sentiment is not reciprocated, although Pakistan’s unilateral gesture of opening the Kartarpur corridor put New Delhi temporarily on the defensive. In the run-up to the 2019 Indian elections, the Modi government may seek to revive its flagging political fortunes by generating hostility against Pakistan, or even ‘limited’ military action, on some cooked-up pretext. Pakistan must remain vigilant and defeat any aggressive move. Normalisation with India is highly unlikely so long as it continues its oppression in occupied Kashmir and refuses to resume a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan. To defend Kashmiris’ fundamental rights, Pakistan must launch an international diplomatic and media campaign to project and condemn India’s human rights violations in occupied Kashmir (confirmed and documented in the recent report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights). There are signs that India is aware of the altered environment post US departure from Afghanistan and at some stage India may chose to deal directly with Pakistan (most likely after Indian general elections) instead of the present where relations are managed through China and Iran. Already the Kartarpur crossing, power projects inception by Pakistani experts, and prisoners release and exchange signal a slight softening in the Indian stance ; Terrorism-India’s campaign to portray Pakistan as a sponsor of ‘terrorism’ is designed to constrict Islamabad’s ability to advance its national security and economic development goals. Fortunately, this campaign, although supported by the US, has failed so far. Pakistan must kill it. To this end, it could: 1) fulfill its obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions (placing required restraints on designated entities and persons); 2) insist on elimination of the BLA and TTP presence from Afghanistan in the context of an Afghan political settlement, and 3) launch a diplomatic and media campaign to project India’s state-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir and from Afghanistan and elsewhere; Saudi Arabia and Iran-The government has, by force of circumstance, revived Pakistan’s close relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their financial support is essential at present to keep the economy afloat. The future commercial viability of Gwadar (and CPEC) depends to a considerable extent on its emergence as the oil and gas transshipment centre and a petrochemical complex. This will become feasible if Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies route a part of their oil, gas and refined product exports through Gwadar to China. Pakistan should resist the urge to mediate between Riyadh and Tehran, at least for now. Pakistan’s ties with Iran are vital and Saudi-Iranian reconciliation is essential for regional peace and stability. However, the US and Israel are likely to subvert mediatory efforts. Riyadh is vulnerable to US pressure at this time. Pakistan still has issues to resolve with Iran including the reported presence of RAW operatives on its soil and cross-border incidents eg the recent attack on the FC patrol. Saudi will also try and use Pakistani soil for actions against Iran , already a few incidents have occurred where a Sunni group has taken a few terrorist acts within Iran, Pakistan should not allow its territory to be used against Iran ; Economic diplomacy-Pakistan’s diplomats and embassies should play a larger role in promoting trade and investment. But Pakistan must first be able to produce goods and services it can export and create the economic environment conducive for foreign investment. Pakistani diplomats should also seem transfer of appropriate technology to Pakistan; Islamic world-Pakistan should revive its traditional leadership role in the Muslim world which confronts multiple challenges. An initiative to provide humanitarian support to Muslims in occupied territories and war zones could be a worthy initiative. Larger objective of seeking peace between warring Muslim sections and also within GCC is perhaps not ripe for diplomacy on a large scale at this point in time; Global challenges-Nor should Pakistan discard its traditional leadership role at the UN and other international fora. Although by population Pakistan is the sixth largest country, it has been excluded from most groupings of the powerful — G20, BRICS, APEC, etc. Yet, by this very token, Pakistan is well placed to lead the vast majority of developing countries, which have also been excluded from these ‘elite’ groups, and ensure their voices are heard on global issues like climate change, development and disarmament.

Shortly after this, Pakistan caved into pressure from the failed Kabul regime and cancelled a meeting that was scheduled between Afghan Taliban representatives and Prime Minister Imran Khan. This betrayed any sense of logic as American, Russian, Iranian and Chinese officials have met with Taliban officials in pursuit of bringing some sense of normalcy to Afghanistan. It is ludicrous that as Pakistan stands to gain more from a placid Afghanistan than America, Russia, China or even Iran, the Pakistan government caved into pressure from a regime that does not even control much (if not most) of its own territory. This of course came at a time when the wider world including many in Washington openly admit that Pakistan has a vital role to play in the all-parties peace process.

More recently, the same PTM that the civilian government had been walking on egg shells to appease has been exposed as an anti-state organisation that recently conducted a violent attack against the Army. Whilst ISPR has revealed PTM’s foreign links to the world, the civilian authorities have yet to designate the group as a terrorist organisation. This is both dangerous and dangerously embarrassing.

Now, after having insulted the Taliban, the only Pashtun faction in Afghanistan that is not explicitly anti-Pakistan, Imran Khan is set to host Kabul regime leader Ashraf Ghani, a man who is no longer even taken seriously by his American patrons, yet a man who still refuses to recognise Pakistan’s borders in spite of not even controlling those of his own nation.

When taken as a whole, this means that Pakistan’s government is in disarray and self-evidently the “opposition” parties are vastly worse. Due to the fact that Pakistan remains at war (however much liberals in Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad may pretend otherwise) it is high time to reconsider not only Pakistan’s methodological but infrastructural approach to foreign policy and security matters.

Pakistan must consider transforming the Foreign Ministry into a High Council of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security. Such a Council would be comprised of a combination of highly patriotic independent experts, military commanders, ISI officials, some elected members of the National Assembly, representatives of all provinces and a small number of directly elected individuals. All and all, the Council ought to start with 15 members with the aim to expand as credible, strategic and intelligent patriotic voices rise to the fore.

The Council would continue its work uninterrupted in spite of any election cycles. New appointments to the Council could only be made through a 2/3rds vote of existing Council members that would later be approved by a simple majority of the National Assembly. Likewise, one could only be removed from the Council through a 2/3rd vote of other Council members or by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly.

Such a High Council of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security could not only harmonise the relationship between military and civilian authorities but it would help to largely de-politicise this relationship. Furthermore, by elevating foreign affairs to an apolitical status, it would mean that like the Army and ISI, foreign affairs could at long last begin to transcend the vulgar and petty nature of political points scoring.

Pakistan’s political class is letting the nation down by allowing foreign affairs and security matters to take a backseat to the inanity that continues to define Pakistani party politics. By creating a High Council of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security, democracy could continue to develop at pace whilst those protecting Pakistan would have a diplomatic voice whose professionalism could match that of the Army and ISI. The time to consider such a re-organisation of foreign and security affairs cannot come soon enough.

US China Cold War: June, 10, 2019:  Rivalry with China is becoming an organising principle of US economic, foreign and security policies”; “The aim is US domination. This means control over China, or separation from China”.   “This is the most important geopolitical development of our era. ...[I]t will increasingly force everybody else to take sides or fight hard for neutrality”; “ Anybody who believes that a rules-based multilateral order, our globalised economy, or even harmonious international relations, are likely to survive this conflict is deluded”.

Pakistan is near if not in the eye of the brewing Sino-US storm. Neutrality is not an option for Pakistan. The US has already chosen India as its strategic partner to counter China across the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and South Asia. The announced US South Asia policy is based on Indian domination of the subcontinent. Notwithstanding India’s trade squabbles with Donald Trump, the US establishment is committed to building up India militarily to counter China.

On the other hand, strategic partnership with China is the bedrock of Pakistan’s security and foreign policy. The Indo-US alliance will compel further intensification of the Pakistan-China partnership. Pakistan is the biggest impediment to Indian hegemony over South Asia and the success of the Indo-US grand strategy. Ergo, they will try to remove or neutralise this ‘impediment’.

The US is arming India with the latest weapons and technologies whose immediate and greatest impact will be on Pakistan. India’s military buildup is further exacerbating the arms imbalance against Pakistan, encouraging Indian aggression and lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a Pakistan-India conflict. Washington has joined India in depicting the legitimate Kashmiri freedom struggle as ‘Islamist terrorism’.

A hybrid war is being waged against Pakistan. Apart from the arms buildup, ceasefire violations across the LoC and opposition to Kashmiri freedom, ethnic agitation in ex-Fata and TTP and BLA terrorism has been openly sponsored by India, along with a hostile media campaign with Western characteristics. FATF’s threats to put Pakistan on its black list and the opposition to CPEC are being orchestrated by the US and India. The US has also delayed the IMF package for Pakistan by objecting to repayment of Chinese loans from the bailout.

Although the US has moderated its public antipathy towards Pakistan while it extracts Pakistan’s cooperation to persuade the Taliban to be ‘reasonable’, it is likely to revert to its coercive stance once a settlement is reached in Afghanistan, or if the negotiations with the Taliban break down.

The Sino-US confrontation is likely to escalate further in the foreseeable future. US pressure on smaller states to fall in line will become more intense under the direction of US hawks. Under Xi Jinping, China will not “hide its strength or bide its time”. Beijing has retaliated against Washington’s trade restrictions. It will “defend every inch” of Chinese territory.

Likewise Narendra Modi in his second term is unlikely to become more pliant towards Pakistan. He has been elected on a plank of extreme Hindu nationalism and hostility towards Muslims, Kashmiris and particularly Pakistan. Modi will not shift from this posture since he needs to keep his people’s attention away from the BJP’s failure to create jobs and improve living conditions for anyone apart from India’s elite. India’s economy is facing headwinds and growth has slowed. There are multiple insurgencies across the country, apart from the popular and sustained revolt in disputed Kashmir against India’s brutal occupation.

The Pulwama crisishas confirmed the imminent danger posed by the Kashmir dispute. In their resistance to Indian occupation, Kashmiris groups will at times respond violently to India’s gross and systematic violations of human rights. India will blame Pakistan for such violence and its failure to put down the Kashmiri resistance. The next Pakistan-India confrontation could lead to general hostilities. These could escalate rapidly to the nuclear level.

The most dangerous scenario for Pakistan would be an Indian conventional attack under a US nuclear ‘umbrella’. Pakistan’s second strike capability is the only certain counter to this catastrophic scenario.

Some in Pakistan may be sufficiently disheartened by its imposing challenges to advocate peace with India at any cost. But, for Pakistan, “surrender is not an option” (to quote the title of John Bolton’s book about the UN).

Accepting Indian domination over South Asia will compromise the very raison d’être for the creation of Pakistan. The current plight of India’s trapped Muslims should be an object lesson to those who believe that displays of goodwill will buy India’s friendship. A thousand years of history refutes that thesis.

In any event, irrespective of what Pakistan does, the Kashmiris will persist in their struggle. They have survived periods of Pakistani indifference. If Modi’s government attempts to fulfil its campaign pledge to abrogate Jammu & Kashmir’s special, autonomous status, the Kashmiri resistance will further intensify. Islamabad will then face a choice of supporting the just Kashmiri struggle or cooperating with the Indians to suppress it (just as the Arab states are being pressed to do to the Palestinian struggle for statehood.)

Even as it seeks to stabilise the economy and revive growth, Pakistan’s civil and military leadership must remain focused on preserving Pakistan’s security and strategic independence. The alternative is to become an Indo-American satrap. A better future is possible. But it is not visible on the horizon.

Against all odds, presidents Trump and Xi may resolve their differences over trade and technology at the forthcoming G20 Summit or thereafter. Or, Trump may be defeated in 2020 by a reasonable Democrat who renounces the cold war with China. Alternately, Modi may be persuaded by Putin, Xi and national pride not to play America’s cat’s-paw and join a cooperative Asian order, including the normalisation of ties with Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan cannot base its security and survival on such optimistic future scenarios. It must plan for the worst while hoping for the best.