Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)
Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan enjoyed a warm visit to
Washington this week, with his hosts, from President Donald Trump to Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Lindsey Graham, all affirming the importance in
particular of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. For a
Pakistani government that viewed Khan’s visit as an opportunity to reset a
relationship that suffered immensely during the early months of the Trump
administration, it was an encouraging sign. The bilateral relationship has
indeed come a long way since 2017 and 2018, when Trump threatened a harder line
on tweeted angrily about Islamabad’s “lies and
deceit,” and suspended American security assistance. The main reason for this
about-face is rooted in Trump’s increasingly urgent desire to end the long war
in Afghanistan—a war he often criticized before becoming president and has
never seemed comfortable continuing, even when he announced a new South Asia
strategy in August 2017 that entailed staying the course. ..
General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's powerful military chief,
accompanied the prime minister, along with intelligence chief
Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed. Khan and his delegation also held meetings with
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US congressional leaders, and the heads of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
For Trump, one of the most significant outcomes of the Washington
visit by PM Khan and the military leadership will be Islamabad's renewed
commitment to finding an inclusive and peaceful end to the long war in
Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the visit has been a win on two fronts. First, Khan
has been able to generate significant positive momentum through the visit while
his government faces stiff opposition at home. This will help Khan in Pakistan.
Secondly, Pakistan's leadership has engaged directly with the
Trump administration at the highest level, something seen as key in building a
working relationship. It has also fought its case on counterterrorism efforts,
action under the Financial Action Task Force, and Pakistan's regional
priorities both at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Faced with a short
timetable on reaching an agreement before the September [Afghan] presidential
election, Washington sees an intra-Afghan dialogue and a ceasefire as essential
towards finalising a withdrawal, which
will be crucial in Trump's reelection bid next year.
Imran Khan has indicated that Pakistan will exert maximum pressure
on the Taliban to agree to an intra-Afghan process. It's also significant that the PM mentioned that Pakistan would like
the Taliban to be part of an inclusive presidential election. This
indicates that the timeline of concrete action on Afghanistan will be swift in
the coming months.
In recent months, the Trump White House has decided to
aggressively pursue peace talks in Afghanistan and to enlist Islamabad as a key
partner in helping launch and sustain negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistani government
sought an audience with Trump and White House contacts of the Saudi connection arranged
a meeting .The administration agreed and invited Khan to Washington in large
part to recognize and reward Pakistan for its help with the Afghan
reconciliation process over the past year, bringing U.S. government officials
and Taliban representatives together for multiple bilateral talks in Qatar.
However, despite this progress, it would be premature to conclude—as many in
Islamabad would like to—that the relationship with Washington has been reset. A
restoration of security assistance, a resumption of highlevel dialogue or other
signs of repaired relations are not on the horizon anytime soon. In essence,
from the Trump administration’s perspective, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may
have improved, but that doesn’t mean a much with Trump. Washington’s two core
priorities with Pakistan are Islamabad’s assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistani
counterterrorism efforts.
To be sure, the Trump administration is open to broader
cooperation, particularly when it comes to trade and investment. During Khan’s
visit, an official White House statement, and Trump himself, made reference to
U.S.-Pakistan trade cooperation, while Khan met with both the secretaries of
the treasury and commerce. However, for the Trump administration, there’s
little real interest in truly broadening the scope of the relationship until it
believes Pakistan is doing more on the Afghan reconciliation and
counterterrorism fronts. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but
that doesn’t mean a reset is in order—or that Trump even wants one. This leads
to the second reason why a reset isn’t in the cards: Islamabad is unlikely to
deliver in a way that satisfies Washington. The Trump administration wants
Pakistan to convince the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire and to formal
negotiations with the Afghan government. Yet Taliban insurgents have
categorically rejected these demands and appear to be interested only in a deal
with Washington that involves the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban, of
course, enjoys ample leverage and comes into talks from a position of renewed
strength. It is waging intense battlefield offensives, holds more territory
than at any time since the U.S. invasion following 9/11, and most importantly
has little urgency to conclude a deal. This means that any entity—even one like
Pakistan that has close ties to the Taliban, and considerable leverage over
it—will struggle to get the insurgents to agree to American demands. Similarly,
Washington wants Islamabad to take irreversible steps against terrorist groups
in Pakistan that target both Afghanistan and India. It has not been satisfied
with Pakistan’s recent moves which have
involved the arrests of dozens of militants . Third, the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship remains beset by tensions rooted in fundamental policy
differences. Despite recent bumps in its ties with India, Washington remains
committed to forging a deep, strategic partnership with New Delhi, Pakistan’s
bitter enemy. Similarly, Islamabad is closely allied with China, Washington’s
top strategic rival. In effect, Washington and Islamabad enjoy deep
partnerships with —a geopolitical
reality that constrains closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. Indeed, hypothetical
scenarios that could actually boost bilateral ties—such as Washington scaling
down its ties with India and easing up on pressuring Islamabad to detain
terrorists who target India, or Islamabad pivoting away from Beijing—are not in
the offing. More broadly, each country pursues foreign policy objectives
throughout Asia that go against the other’s interests: Pakistan seeks to limit
the influence of India, while the U.S. is pursuing an Indo-Pacific strategy
that is meant to push back against China. Finally, the Trump administration
does not support the type of diplomacy that one would expect to see in a
rebooted relationship. It prioritizes bursts of transactional diplomacy over
sustained and formal dialogue. In effect, there’s no going back to the early
years of the Obama administration, when the two sides launched an albeit
short-lived strategic dialogue, focused on a variety of topics, not all of them
security-related. The Trump administration simply isn’t interested in investing
the resources in such broad and extended exchanges, which, if they were to take
place, could go a long way toward generating more confidence and goodwill for a
relationship that badly needs new infusions of both, even after Khan’s positive
visit.
The "do more" rhetoric has gone away; it has just gone a
bit softer. Whereas in the past this message would be delivered forcefully and
threateningly, this time around it was likely conveyed gently, with Trump and
other US officials inviting Islamabad to take its assistance in Afghanistan to
another level. What's next with the Taliban talks depends on Islamabad's next
move, and more importantly how the Taliban
responds. Washington's asks of Islamabad have become more ambitious. It's one
thing for Pakistan to simply bring the
Taliban to the table. It is a
very different thing for Pakistan to convince them to agree to demands - a ceasefire and talks
with Kabul - that it has consistently and categorically rejected to this point.
The bottom line is that while Khan’s trip to Washington may
have been full of smiles and good vibes, and it may have even solidified
U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be mistaken for a reset
in troubled ties. This newfound comity can’t mask the reality that
U.S.-Pakistan relations are still in need of major repair . The demands from
Washington have not changed. While it is significant that the US has publicly
acknowledged Pakistan's efforts in pushing the reconciliation process and
initial steps to curb militant groups, privately the US would have rehashed its
menu of concerns and sought commitments on them.
Afghan Peace Process: July, 30,
2019: THE Afghan peace process has entered a crucial
phase, making it even trickier for Pakistan. As many had anticipated,
Afghanistan remained the main point of deliberations held between the Pakistani
and US leaderships in Washington, D.C. last week. Prime Minister Imran Khan has
pledged to pursue the Afghan Taliban leadership to initiate talks with the
Afghan government.
During the
prime minister’s visit, most US leaders and officials acknowledged and
appreciated Pakistan’s role in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for
talks. The US administration didn’t use the mantra of ‘do more’ this time, but
politely requested Pakistan to continue playing a constructive role in the
Afghan peace process. Pakistan’s leadership categorically agreed to take up the
task. On the other hand, the Taliban have also indicated
that they will accept the invitation of meeting the Pakistani prime minister.
The meeting will indicate how much influence Pakistan still has over the
Taliban.
So far, the
Taliban’s position on the option of direct talks with the government of
President Ashraf Ghani has remained stiff. However, they had indicated that if
their negotiations with the US succeed, they would then initiate negotiations
with other Afghan stakeholders including the Afghan government. Yet it remains
to be seen whether or not they change their position on initiating a separate
talks channel with Kabul. In the event they show reluctance and deny Pakistan’s
request, will Pakistan adopt a coercive approach? If so, it will be interesting
to see how it affects the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan.
For Pakistan,
restoring its relationship with the US is important not only for speeding up
economic recovery but also for rebalancing its regional geostrategic position.
The country had been suffering because of its dissimilar approaches towards the
Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. In recent years, it has tried to
diversify its strategic partnerships, ranging from Moscow to Beijing, and
Istanbul to Riyadh, which also entailed some valuable defence partnerships. But
it appears as though the policymakers did not see these partnerships as a
counterbalance to growing US unfriendliness. The strengthening strategic partnership
between India and the US also affected the Pakistani establishment’s policy
choices, forcing it to review its approaches towards Afghanistan and the
Taliban.
Pakistan,
however, has reviewed its approaches before taking more losses. The country is
set to gain in the whole process as India has failed to develop its relevance
in the Afghan peace process. On this ground alone, Pakistan’s establishment
considers it a major achievement. Similarly, the US offer of mediation over the
Kashmir issue has put pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It has
happened at a time when the Trump administration was not comfortable with
India’s recent multibillion-dollar deals with Russia, and trade tensions
between the two nations were rising.
Mr Khan’s
visit to the US is bringing the country back onto the regular diplomacy tracks.
To keep this momentum, the government has to deliver on Afghanistan. The
probability of direct talks between the Taliban and Kabul would be one
challenge, but influencing the former to commit to a lasting ceasefire could
prove another daunting task. .
For Pakistan,
the Taliban will remain a challenge at both stages. The US and other major
global actors, including China and Russia, are relying on Pakistan — and if the
Taliban refuses to listen to Pakistan, it would be a disaster for the
establishment. It is a known fact that many Taliban field commanders are not
happy with Pakistan, and the Taliban leadership resists Pakistani pressure
citing this as their argument. What can Pakistan do in such a worst-case
scenario? Arrests of dissenting elements when they enter Pakistan would be an
option, which has been used in the past. Many commanders apparently still have
families inside Pakistan, and the government can use this factor as a tool.
Pakistan
might also have other options to pressurise the Taliban leadership. The
Haqqanis could be effective in the Taliban decision-making process, but they
have a limit to their influence. Can Pakistan envision a complete disconnect
with the Taliban? This is a tough question, but the Taliban too cannot afford
to say goodbye to Pakistan. It will be a test case for the prime minister and
military leadership to fulfill the international community’s expectations — ie
to make a deal possible between the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders.
US PAK relations: Aug., 22, 2019:
"Pakistan
should aspire a working relationship with the US, which is cordial and dynamic,
not curtailing our sovereignty and national interest," Ambassador Khokhar
said at a guest lecture organized here by Islamabad
Policy Research Institute (IPRI).
Ambassador Khokhar,
who served as Pakistan's envoy to Dhaka,
New Delhi, Washington
and Beijing before becoming Foreign Secretary in 2002, emphasized
on finding areas of convergence between Pakistan
and the US including trade, energy, transport, and especially education
to expand the scope of collaboration
Ambassador Khokhar
said Pakistan's relationship with the US could not be analysed in
isolation since the international order was in flux with China
rising phenomenally, Russia
re-asserting itself, and the middle
East in extreme turmoil. He pointed out that India was also an important actor influencing Pak-US dynamics
as the US expected India to be a partner in the containment of China.
In this regard, Pakistan's overall endorsement of the Belt and Road
Initiative might also be problematic for Washington,
he added.
Ambassador Khokhar
said Afghanistan remained a main issued of interest for the US
since there was a realisation in Washington
that there was no military solution to the issue. On rising tension in Indian Occupied Kashmir, the Ambassador remarked that war was neither
an option for India nor for Pakistan
due to their nuclear capabilities.
Vice Admiral Saddique
said Pakistan's relationship with Washington
was generally hyphenated with India
and Afghanistan and emphasized that "working together would
accrue mutual benefits, whereas, antagonism would serve neither party".
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