Saudi and GCC Activism

Saudi and GCC Activism

Introduction

 Saudi Arabia has traditionally tended to avoid direct confrontation with strong enemies. Instead, it uses its deep pockets to increase its impudence and focuses on attempts at mediation in the Arab world in order to neutralize dangers. In spite of its political and religious standing and its being the largest exporter of oil in the world, with one-quarter of the proven oil reserves on its territory, it sees surrounding states such as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen as a threat, although for differing reasons. This sense of vulnerability, along with Saudi Arabia’s relative military weakness – its borders are long and easily penetrated, and its military, though equipped with advanced weaponry, is small and untrained – has until now prompted it to rely on American patronage for deterrence and defense. However, the turbulence in the Arab world has led Saudi Arabia to a stronger sense that it is left on its own to cope with the threats it faces, as well as to the recognition that the challenges at home and abroad compel it to adopt different solutions than in the past. This has led it largely to abandon its former relative passivity, to fling down the gauntlet to Iran, and even to adopt a more independent policy toward the United States.  

Saudi Arabia has been free to attempt to restore the regional status quo, and if it could, to compete for leadership of the Sunni world. Perhaps its most dramatic step is connected to the initiative to enlarge the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by including Jordan (and perhaps Morocco) in a new bloc of monarchies in order to prevent them from bowing to the demands of protesters and implementing significant reforms. The Saudi elite, which fears that governmental reforms in the Arab world will serve as a role model for opposition forces in Saudi Arabia, is seeking to immunize the monarchies from possible risks to their stability and to strengthen their legitimacy, both domestically and abroad. In this framework, it is pushing to include Jordan in the GCC in spite of the reservations of some of its members, who fear that their standing in the organization will be harmed and who still remember King Hussein’s support for Saddam, and despite the longstanding hostility between the Saudis and the Hashemites. Inviting Jordan, likewise a pro-Western Sunni monarchy that opposes Iran, into the private club of oil producers (at this stage, it is not clear what its status will be) will give the loose thirty-year old GCC political and security depth; contribute to increasing investments in Jordan; and facilitate the supply of cheap oil from the Gulf states. This is a fundamental issue for Jordan – whose economy is even smaller than Oman’s – as 80 percent of its electricity production is dependent on the supply of Egyptian gas. In parallel, Saudi Arabia transferred $1.5 billion to Jordan as part of a five-year plan intended to assist it in coping with

its budget deficit, which has grown significantly as a result of the rise in energy prices. There is also a not-insignificant security dimension to the initiative. From the Saudi perspective, Jordan’s joining the GCC will improve the Saudi ability to cope with a possible deterioration in the security situation. Jordan’s special units and intelligence services have a good reputation, and they have been training and assisting security forces in the Gulf for several years (it was even reported that Jordanian troops joined the forces that entered Bahrain in March 2011).

In parallel with the negotiations to include Jordan in the GCC, Riyadh is providing Gulf states that were hit with protests with large grants ($20 billion for Bahrain and Oman, most of it Saudi money). These moves have already produced results, and the GCC appears more united than ever.  Egypt has expressed support for Saudi policy, including in Bahrain, and has made it clear that it considers the security of the Gulf to be the security of Egypt itself – a clear signal to Iran to stop its negative involvement in the Gulf states. Indeed, it is unlikely that Cairo actually intends to implement one of the most fundamental changes in its foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution, particularly in light of various long term goals. At the same time, and particularly if the Muslim Brotherhood attains substantial influence in the future Egyptian regime, Egypt’s relations with Iran may grow stronger despite the different ideologies because of common short term goals. And indeed, according to Israeli Military Intelligence chief Major General Aviv Kochavi, Iran “is funding and strengthening its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to influence the results of the political process in Egypt.”

Flinging Down the Gauntlet to Iran

Classic balance of power considerations and Sunni-Shia rivalry are intertwined with Saudi activism in an attempt to contain Iran and create a Sunni front as a counterweight to Iranian influence. Indeed, the turbulence in the Arab world has revealed the depth of, and has perhaps even increased, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In the first stages of the Arab spring, Iran attempted to present the protests as an achievement for itself. For Iran, the protests, at least until they reached its Syrian ally, looked like a golden opportunity, an opportunity to weaken the Sunni front and take credit for the achievements of the masses. And in fact, Saudi Arabia fears that one of the results of the Arab spring will be to tip the regional balance of power in the direction of Iran, given that Saudi Arabia’s friends in the “moderate” camp have been undermined, and given the increasing threats to its security with the collapse of the old order around it.

The uprising in Bahrain, which has clear ethnic characteristics, looked to Riyadh like a critical event in the Sunni-Shiite conflict and an opportunity to redesign the rules of the game with Iran. In its involvement in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia sought to establish: first, when there is a danger to the stability of the kingdom, it will act, even against the advice of Washington. Second, it will use force openly if required, as evidenced in the battle Saudi Arabia waged in 2009-10 against the Houthis on its border with Yemen, who it claims are receiving Iranian support (this was the largest military battle in the Arabian Peninsula since the Gulf War). It appears that the events in Bahrain, which were seen as an Iranian plot, provided a sense of urgency for the need to contain the influence of Iran. The House of Khalifa, from many points of view – geographic, historical, and even familial – is closest to Saudi Arabia, and therefore, it was no surprise that the Saudis sent forces to protect it.The Saudis also sent (on March 15, 2011) military forces to their neighbor Bahrain in order to ensure that the House of Khalifa would not become a constitutional monarchy and that the Shiite protests would not “infect” the Shiite population centers in the northwest of the kingdom. Calm has been preserved for now, though at the price of tension in relations with the Americans as well as with the Iranians, all of whom did not view the Saudi intervention favorably, though for different reasons

This dispatch of forces was intended to prevent the Shiites, who are the majority in the tiny archipelago, from threatening the rule of the al-Khalifa family, but also to send a clear signal to Iran that Bahrain is located deep within the Saudi realm of influence. Saudi forces have not yet completely left Bahrain, even after the state of emergency was canceled, and it was reported that there is an intention to establish a permanent base in the country for the Gulf states’ joint military force. The vigorous response of the Saudi-headed Gulf camp to the events in Bahrain also included closure of dozens of Iranian and Shiite media channels; expulsion of Iranian diplomats by Kuwait and Bahrain; a serious escalation of anti-Iranian rhetoric; calls for waging economic warfare against Iran by sending Iranian workers back from the Gulf; a letter to the Security Council on the matter of Iran; and even calls for incitement of the Arab population in Khuzestan in response to Iranian incitement of the Shiites in the Arab   Gulf States.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s energy superpower, and the economic engine and last remaining political heavyweight in Arab world, will continue for a variety of reasons to take a far more proactive and assertive role in maintaining stability and security in the Middle East and North Africa and the broader Muslim world.

Iraq

Another issue troubling Saudi Arabia is that Iraq is becoming increasingly identified with Iran.10 This can be seen in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent expression of support for the Shiite protest in Bahrain, in the closer economic relations between Iraq and Iran, in Iraq’s support for the Asad regime, and even in Iraq’s support for Iran in its struggle against Saudi Arabia within OPEC.

Syria

First and foremost, the Syrian tragedy clearly represents a turning point in the historical practice of the West in intervening in the Arab and Muslim worlds. As has been shown during the last two and a half years, the United States, United Kingdom and France no longer have the political and economic stomach to unilaterally engage their militaries in the region. While the so-called Arab Spring brought about a host of revolutions and significant transformations, leading to varying degrees of instability and opportunity in numerous Arab countries, the West's disengagement is going to trigger even more important implications as regional realignments of sovereign borders and military alliances usher in a transition period from  Syria, like Iraq, is liable to become a theater of conflict between Iran and the Arab states, this time led by Saudi Arabia, which does not hesitate to oppose Bashar al-Asad openly and lend active support to the Sunnis. The Saudis have sought to limit Iranian influence in various areas, but their realization that placing themselves at the head of the anti-Iranian camp in Syria would bring them into conflict with Tehran has thus far prevented them from adopting a more assertive policy. Now Saudi Arabia is seeking to oust Asad, if only because this will cause Iran to lose a major ally, undermine the radical camp, and  give Saudi Arabia an opportunity to lead a Sunni camp that is larger and more cohesive than in the past.  Other Gulf States have stepped up the pace of oil production in order to cover the deficit in Syrian oil in the European markets, and that they are actively aiding the Sunni rebels. In the Saudi view, it is still not too late to take advantage of Asad’s weakness and offer him a “deal”: implement “reforms” and stay in power in exchange for cutting off relations with Iran and Hizbollah. Saudi Arabia hopes that undermining the Asad regime will reduce Iran to its “natural size.” This would be the best scenario for Saudi Arabia, second only to the fall of the Islamic Republic. Russian intervention has resulted in saving Asad , with the West withdrawing Asad, Iran and Russia have almost managed to regain control of the entire country , but at a very high cost. Both Iran and Russia do not have the capacity to fund reconstruction and the West will not pitch in unless Asad steps down .

Israel

Saudi Arabia’s assertiveness vis-à-vis its stance towards Iran is apparently viewed positively in Jerusalem. In recent years, what has connected the Gulf States with Israel more than anything is the growing fear of Iran, and it was even reported that several Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, have been holding an intelligence dialogue with Israel, directly as well as indirectly. It is possible that this dialogue does not touch specifically on Iranian nuclear development, but it is not inconceivable that the sides are working to expose and foil activity by Iran or its proxies in the region. Beyond an intelligence dialogue, the sides may also be coordinating policy on one level or another, vis-à-vis the US administration as well, whose policy on the Iranian issue is not entirely consistent with their policy. Israel and Saudi Arabia are anxious not only about Iran, but also about the turbulence in the region. And in fact, since the beginning of the Arab spring, they have both demonstrated a clear preference for maintaining the status quo, which is another reason for the tacit alliance between them. This secret dialogue between the Sunni Arab World and Israel has pushed to the forefront the possibility of presenting and forcing then zero Palestine solution on the almost friendless Palestinians.

Assessment

Saudi Arabia tries to neutralize dangers to its national security by hedging its bets, avoiding use of open military means, and attempting to avoid leadership roles. Diplomacy and cash are the preferred tools, and at the same time, there is an attempt to work behind the scenes. It is true that the kingdom is equipped with relatively good tools for coping with potential domestic protests – including economic capability, religious legitimacy, and the loyalty of the National Guard – but Riyadh may understand that traditional methods through which it has shaped its foreign policy are now insufficient. It must also harness new means to neutralize dangers to its national security, and if necessary, attempt to take the reins of leadership in the Arab world. This would expose it to conflict with its chief rival on the one hand, and its main ally on the other.

The turbulence in the Arab world, which is redrawing the map of alliances in the region, provides Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to position itself more forcefully as the leader of an Arab camp more united than in the past, even if it is weakened and battered. But along with the opportunities there are also risks, chiefly to the relationship with the United States, which constitutes a significant if damaged layer in Saudi Arabia’s national security. In addition, over time Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to lead the Arab camp alone, without Egypt and the united Gulf bloc behind it, and the recent burst of activism is liable to end quickly. The Saudis are also ambivalent about Turkey’s attempts to return to a position of leadership in the Middle East. On the one hand, the opposition to Israel and the Sunni alternative to Iran are viewed positively in Riyadh. On the other hand, Turkey’s “return” to the Middle East is liable to be at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Sunni world. The negative memory of Ottoman rule is still fresh in Riyadh, and the model of Islam in Turkey that is preached by Erdogan threatens the conservative character of the kingdom.

The overthrow of the Sunni regimes in North Africa, the continued unrest in Bahrain, the chronic instability in Yemen, and Iraq’s increasing move toward the Iranian sphere of influence increase Riyadh’s fear of the collapse of the existing order and increased Iranian influence in the region. It is not clear whether the unconventional means used thus far to assist the aging royal house to better cope with the old-new challenges, both domestic and foreign, is sufficient. Saudi Arabia’s advantage is in indirect conflicts; it has no battalions, only money and a leading role in the Muslim world. This is no small edge, but the role it seeks to play depends, apart from repairing the rift with United States, on backing the Arab-Sunni region, and on the illusory character of the “Arab revolution,” which may topple enemies but also eventually reach Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.

Western Disengegment

Second, while many in the West are hailing the statements of the new Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, as indicating his nation's interest in a rapprochement after years of tension and sanctions, the Saudis have welcomed Rouhani’s sensible rhetoric but are in no position to simply trust that change is imminent from Iran and therefore ease their vigilance and engagement. Saudi Arabia and Iran are on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict and various other regional complexities. In order to meet this daunting challenge successfully, the kingdom will have to be more proactive, but also develop a new national security framework to increase its capacity to successfully handle crises across the Muslim world.

Growing Iranian involvement in Syria will lead to increasing the Saudis' stake in the situation, as the two leading regional powers seek predominance in resolving that conflict and emerging as the most influential arbiter post-conflict. Considering the shift in Western and regional international priorities — as well as the current political climate and regional stakes in the Syrian conflict — there is a realization in Riyadh that it is time for the major Arab powers to prepare a response for maintaining order in the Arab world and to counter Iran's expanding infiltrative policies. The kingdom and its regional allies will increase their support to the Syrian rebels and prevent the collapse of collateral nations, such as Lebanon and Jordan. The removal of the tyrannical regime in Damascus is simply too important for the future of the Arabs.

Yemen

Saudi Arabia has recently proven its growing political strength in regional affairs, having successfully spearheaded resolution of the situations in Bahrain and Yemen. In spring 2011, the Bahraini monarchy realized that what had begun as a genuine popular plea for reform in their country was being hijacked by Shiite theocratic revolutionary movements. As Iranian intentions became more apparent, the Bahraini leadership activated the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint defense treaty, in effect since 2000, inviting a Saudi-led GCC force to assist in securing the vital and critical infrastructure of the state. 

Bahrain

Saudi Arabia acted to affirm that the stability and security of Bahrain was integral to the GCC and its common vital interests. Relying on intrinsic pillars of the Bahraini state, that is, the monarchy, political institutions and civil society, the Saudis used their diplomatic might to lead a collective strategic response to the Bahraini crisis and checkmate Iran's revolutionary intentions. Thus, as the Western powers showed no sign of directly supporting the Bahraini monarchy, the Saudi-supported GCC force was dispatched to create a political environment suitable for dialogue. This allowed the Bahraini government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Prince Khalifa bin Salman, to steer clear of the fate of other failed regional states weathering upheaval.

Yemen

In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia took on the role of regional problem solver in November 2011, when it spearheaded a solution to mounting civil unrest in Yemen and the resultant political deadlock between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the popular opposition movement calling for his removal. Although the Yemeni revolution initially looked to reduce the country’s unemployment, strengthen the economy and curtail government corruption, like many Arab Awakening movements it quickly escalated into a call for the ruler’s resignation. As the revolution spiraled from organized demonstrations to violent clashes, tribal warfare, secessionist movements and the ascendance of terrorist cells, Saudi Arabia and the GCC could no longer consider the situation a local affair. Reintroducing stability in Yemen became imperative for regional security. The Saudis recognized Saleh no longer stood as a protector of stability, but as the opposite.

Once Saleh was identified as an obstacle to Yemen’s well-being, a Saudi-instigated GCC transition plan removed Saleh in exchange for immunity for him and his family. While both Saleh and the opposition seemed receptive to the agreement, the president began to backtrack and refused to sign. This tug-of-war between Saleh, the opposition and the GCC went on for months, exacerbating the political and economic chaos and bringing Yemen to the brink of civil war. Ultimately, however, Saudi leaders convinced Saleh to sign the power transfer agreement in Riyadh. The deal, signed by Saleh and the opposition movement, mandated that Saleh relinquish the reins to his vice president, Abedrabbu Mansour Hadi, until a new head of state could be fairly elected. An election held in February 2012 resulted in Hadi remaining in power. Since then, the kingdom has kept a close eye on Yemen as it transitions with a less-corrupt, unity government that has expanded to include a prime minister from the opposition.

Middle East

The economic, political and military cover that Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies brought to Bahrain and Yemen proved pivotal in returning these countries to stability. A similar, but not identical regional initiative should be considered for significantly expanded action by the Saudis in Syria. It is absolutely vital that a Saudi-led regional project succeed there , although the chance for that seem dim at this point in time ..

The only way the Arab world can make progress is through a collective security framework initially consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the GCC nations. It is time for the Arab states, working through a much-needed, reformed Arab League, to assume responsibility for their own region and work together to increase their collective security. Such a shift away from Western dependency and toward more local (and successful) interventionism will take some time. While Saudi Arabia has grown stronger in the last two decades, the other traditionally dominant Arab countries — Egypt, Iraq and Syria — have stalled, derailed or altogether abandoned state-building efforts to prioritize their survival. Despite this, through ever-growing Saudi leadership, a revitalized Arab alliance can and must rise to the challenge and prepare for a new paradigm in the security of the Arab world.

Libya: Apr.,14,2019: Days before Libya's renegade General Khalifa Haftarlaunched an offensive on the country's capital, Tripoli, Saudi Arabia offered tens of millions of dollars to help pay for the operation, the Wall Street Journal has reported. The offer came during a visit by Haftar to the Saudi capital, Riyadh, ahead of his April 4 military campaign, the Journal said on Friday. Citing senior advisers to the Saudi government, the Journal said the offer of funds - accepted by Haftar - was intended to buy the loyalty of tribal leaders, recruit and pay fighters, and other military purposes. The latest conflict in the North African country pits Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) against forces allied to the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA controls Tripoli, situated in northwestern Libya, while the LNA is allied to a parallel administration based in the east of the oil-rich country, which splintered into a patchwork of competing power bases following the overthrow of former leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The United Nations, which had hoped to organise a national conference this month bringing the rival eastern and western administrations together to organise an election, has called for a ceasefire. The United States, G7 bloc of wealthy nations and the European Union have also urged the LNA to halt its offensive. According to the latest UN figures, at least 75 people have been killed in the fighting between the warring parties while 320 others were wounded. Some 9,500 people have also been forced from their homes.  Several Middle Eastern countries including Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have backed Hafter as a bulwark against Islamist groups, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who took a prominent role in Libya following the 2011 uprising and continued to participate in Libyan politics under the Tripoli government. "There was an increase in support, clearly, but not a change in the political role. I think Saudi Arabia wanted to up its participation in the conflict in Libya and that probably contributed to the visit of General Haftar to the kingdom and his meeting with both King Salman and the Crown Prince," Jahshan said. 

Saudi Money to Abbas: : May.,2, 2019 : Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman offered Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas $10bn to accept a controversial US-backed peace plan, Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar has reported. Abbas rejected the offer, saying supporting US President Donald Trump's "deal of the century" would be "the end of his political life", the paper reported on Tuesday, citing leaked diplomatic reports based on conversations between the two leaders. One of the Saudi offers, according to the Jordanian's report, was to exchange Palestinian recognition of Trump's deal for $10bn to assist West Bank authorities and refugee resettlement, along with “unlimited financial and political support”. "One billion US dollars," Abbas replied, to which MBS was said to have responded:“ I will give you $10bn over ten years if you accept the deal.”  The crown prince reportedly added that Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab countries, had been asked by the Americans to provide the Palestinians with financial support to launch projects in the West Bank that would lead to economic prosperity. The projects would also, he said, see the expansion of the West Bank's Area B, where the PA and Israel hold administrative and military control, and Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of the territory, and is exclusively under Israeli military authority. “Saudi Arabia will support the PA with more than four billion in principle,” the envoy wrote, citing conversations between Abbas and MBS. Shawabkeh mentioned in his report that Abbas told Bin Salman that he could not accept any concessions with regards to settlements, the two-state solution and Jerusalem. Abbas, however, believed that the Americans would not provide any written proposals, but would adopt a “Balfour-style tactic”. According to the Jordanian envoy, Abbas said that the PA would dismantle itself if it became subject to any pressure from any side, and would “hold Israel responsible for managing the affairs of occupied territories  Palestinian leaders have vehemently denounced key points of the plan that have been leaked. They include recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, offering the East Jerusalem suburb of Abu Dis as the capital of a future Palestinian state, taking refugees' right of return off the table, and drastically cutting the number of registered refugees. Saeb Erekat, the veteran Palestinian negotiator, told MEE in June that the deal of the century was not a deal and was already being implemented on the ground."If there's any plan, this is being implemented on the ground: with moving the US embassy to occupied Jerusalem, withdrawing support for the two-state solution, cutting funds to UNRWA and, eventually, trying to normalize the Israeli apartheid in Palestine," Erekat said.