Saudi and GCC Activism
Introduction
Saudi Arabia has traditionally tended to avoid direct confrontation with strong enemies.
Instead, it uses its deep pockets to increase its impudence and focuses on attempts at mediation in the Arab world in order to neutralize dangers. In spite of its political and religious standing
and its being the largest
exporter of oil in the world, with one-quarter of the
proven oil reserves on its territory, it sees
surrounding states such
as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen as a threat,
although for differing
reasons. This sense of vulnerability, along with Saudi Arabia’s
relative military weakness – its borders
are long and easily penetrated, and its military, though equipped with advanced weaponry, is small and untrained
– has until now prompted
it to rely on American
patronage for deterrence and defense. However, the turbulence in the Arab world has led Saudi Arabia to a stronger
sense that it is left on its own to cope with the threats
it faces, as well as to the recognition that the challenges at home and abroad compel it to adopt different solutions than in the past. This has led it largely to abandon its former relative
passivity, to fling down the gauntlet
to Iran, and even to adopt a more independent policy toward the United
States.
Saudi Arabia has been free to attempt to restore
the regional status quo, and if it could, to compete for leadership of the Sunni world. Perhaps its most dramatic
step is connected to the initiative to enlarge the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by including Jordan (and perhaps
Morocco) in a new bloc of monarchies
in order to prevent them from bowing to the demands of protesters and implementing significant reforms. The Saudi elite, which fears that governmental reforms
in the Arab world will serve as a role model for opposition forces in Saudi
Arabia, is seeking
to immunize the monarchies from possible risks to their stability and to strengthen their legitimacy, both domestically and abroad. In this framework, it is pushing to include Jordan in the GCC in spite of the reservations of some of its members,
who fear that
their standing in the organization will be harmed and who
still remember King
Hussein’s support for Saddam, and despite the longstanding hostility
between the Saudis and the Hashemites. Inviting Jordan, likewise a pro-Western Sunni monarchy that opposes Iran, into the private club of oil producers (at this stage, it is not clear
what its status
will be) will give the loose thirty-year old GCC political and security depth; contribute to increasing investments in Jordan; and facilitate the supply of cheap oil from the Gulf states.
This is a fundamental issue
for Jordan – whose economy
is even smaller
than Oman’s – as 80 percent of its electricity production is dependent on the supply of Egyptian gas. In parallel,
Saudi Arabia transferred $1.5 billion to Jordan as part of a five-year plan intended to assist it in coping
with
In parallel
with the negotiations to include Jordan
in the GCC, Riyadh is providing Gulf states that were hit with protests
with large grants
($20 billion for Bahrain
and Oman, most
of it Saudi money). These
moves have already produced results,
and the GCC appears
more united than ever. Egypt has expressed
support for Saudi
policy, including in Bahrain, and has made it clear
that it considers the security
of the Gulf to be the security
of Egypt itself – a clear signal to Iran to stop its negative involvement in the Gulf states. Indeed, it is unlikely that Cairo actually intends to implement one of the most fundamental changes in its foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution,
particularly in light of various
long term goals. At the same time, and particularly if the Muslim
Brotherhood attains substantial influence in the future Egyptian
regime, Egypt’s relations with Iran may
grow stronger despite
the different ideologies because of common
short term goals. And indeed, according to Israeli Military
Intelligence chief Major General Aviv Kochavi, Iran “is funding
and strengthening its ties
with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to influence the results of the
political process in Egypt.”
Flinging Down the Gauntlet to Iran
Classic balance of power considerations and Sunni-Shia rivalry are intertwined with Saudi activism
in an attempt to contain
Iran and create a Sunni front as a counterweight to Iranian influence. Indeed, the
turbulence in the Arab world has revealed
the depth of, and has perhaps even increased, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In the first stages
of the Arab spring, Iran
attempted to present
the protests as an achievement for itself. For Iran,
the protests, at least until
they reached its Syrian ally, looked
like a golden opportunity, an opportunity to weaken the
Sunni front and
take credit for
the achievements of the masses.
And in fact,
Saudi Arabia fears that one of the results of the Arab spring will be to tip the regional balance of power in the direction of Iran, given that Saudi Arabia’s friends in the “moderate” camp have been undermined, and given the increasing threats to its security with the collapse
of the old order around
it.
The uprising in Bahrain, which has clear ethnic characteristics, looked to Riyadh like a critical
event in the Sunni-Shiite conflict
and an opportunity to redesign the rules of the game
with Iran. In its involvement in Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia sought to establish: first,
when there is a danger to the stability of the kingdom,
it will act, even against the advice of Washington. Second, it will use force openly if required, as evidenced in the battle Saudi Arabia waged in 2009-10 against the Houthis on its border
with Yemen, who it claims are receiving Iranian
support (this was the largest
military battle
in the Arabian Peninsula
since the Gulf War). It appears
that the events in Bahrain,
which were seen as an Iranian plot, provided a sense of urgency for the need to contain
the influence of Iran. The House of Khalifa, from
many points of view – geographic, historical, and even familial
– is closest to Saudi Arabia, and therefore, it was no surprise that the Saudis
sent forces to protect it.The Saudis
also sent (on March 15, 2011) military forces
to their neighbor
Bahrain in order
to ensure that the House of Khalifa
would not become a constitutional monarchy and that the Shiite
protests would not “infect” the Shiite population
centers
in the northwest of the kingdom. Calm has been preserved for
now, though at the price of tension in relations with the Americans
as well as with the Iranians, all
of whom did
not view the
Saudi intervention favorably, though for
different reasons
This dispatch of forces was intended to prevent the Shiites, who are the majority in the tiny archipelago, from threatening the rule of the al-Khalifa family, but also to send a clear signal
to Iran that Bahrain is located deep within the Saudi realm of influence.
Saudi forces have not yet completely left Bahrain, even after the state of emergency was canceled, and it was reported that there is an intention
to establish a permanent base in the country for the Gulf states’
joint military force.
The vigorous response of the Saudi-headed Gulf camp to the events in
Bahrain also included closure of dozens of Iranian and Shiite media channels; expulsion of Iranian diplomats by Kuwait and Bahrain; a serious escalation of anti-Iranian rhetoric;
calls for waging
economic warfare against Iran by sending Iranian workers back from the Gulf; a letter to the Security
Council on the matter of Iran; and even calls for incitement of the Arab population in Khuzestan in response to Iranian incitement of the Shiites
in the Arab Gulf States.
Saudi
Arabia, the world’s energy superpower, and the economic engine and last
remaining political heavyweight in Arab world, will continue for a variety of
reasons to take a far more proactive and assertive role in maintaining
stability and security in the Middle East and North Africa and the broader
Muslim world.
Iraq
Another issue troubling Saudi Arabia is that Iraq is becoming increasingly identified with Iran.10 This can be seen in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent expression of support for the Shiite protest in Bahrain, in the closer economic relations
between Iraq and Iran, in Iraq’s support
for the Asad
regime, and even
in Iraq’s support
for Iran in its struggle
against Saudi Arabia
within OPEC.
Syria
First
and foremost, the Syrian tragedy clearly represents a turning point in the
historical practice of the West in intervening in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
As has been shown during the last two and a half years, the United States,
United Kingdom and France no longer have the political and economic stomach to
unilaterally engage their militaries in the region. While the so-called Arab
Spring brought about a host of revolutions and significant transformations,
leading to varying degrees of instability and opportunity in numerous Arab
countries, the West's disengagement is going to trigger even more important
implications as regional realignments of sovereign borders and military
alliances usher in a transition period from Syria, like Iraq, is liable to become
a theater of conflict between
Iran and the Arab states,
this time led by Saudi
Arabia, which does
not hesitate to oppose
Bashar al-Asad openly
and lend active
support to the Sunnis. The Saudis have sought to limit Iranian influence in various areas, but their realization that placing themselves at the head of the anti-Iranian camp in Syria would bring them into conflict with Tehran has thus far prevented
them from adopting
a more assertive policy. Now Saudi Arabia is seeking
to oust Asad,
if only because
this will cause
Iran to lose a major ally, undermine the radical camp,
and
give Saudi Arabia
an opportunity to lead a Sunni camp that is larger and more cohesive than in
the past.
Other
Gulf States have stepped up the pace of oil production in order to cover
the deficit in Syrian oil in the European markets,
and that they are actively
aiding the Sunni rebels. In the Saudi view, it is still not too late to take advantage of Asad’s weakness
and offer him a “deal”: implement “reforms” and stay in power
in exchange for cutting off relations with
Iran and Hizbollah. Saudi Arabia
hopes that undermining the Asad regime will reduce
Iran to its “natural
size.” This would be the best scenario for Saudi Arabia,
second only to the fall of the Islamic Republic. Russian intervention has
resulted in saving Asad , with the West withdrawing Asad, Iran and Russia have
almost managed to regain control of the entire country , but at a very high
cost. Both Iran and Russia do not have the capacity to fund reconstruction and
the West will not pitch in unless Asad steps down .
Israel
Saudi Arabia’s
assertiveness vis-à-vis its stance towards
Iran is apparently viewed positively
in Jerusalem. In recent
years, what has connected the Gulf States
with Israel more than anything
is the growing fear of Iran, and it was even reported that several Gulf States, including
Saudi Arabia, have been holding
an intelligence dialogue with Israel,
directly as well as indirectly. It is possible
that this dialogue does not touch specifically on Iranian nuclear
development, but it is not inconceivable that the sides are working
to expose and foil activity
by Iran or its proxies
in the region.
Beyond an intelligence dialogue, the sides may also be coordinating policy on one level or another, vis-à-vis the US administration as well, whose
policy on the Iranian issue
is not entirely consistent with their policy. Israel
and Saudi Arabia
are anxious not only about Iran, but also about
the turbulence in the region.
And in fact, since the beginning of the
Arab spring, they have both demonstrated a clear preference for maintaining the status quo, which is another reason for the tacit alliance
between them. This secret
dialogue between the Sunni Arab World and Israel has pushed to the forefront
the possibility of presenting and forcing then zero Palestine solution on the
almost friendless Palestinians.
Assessment
Saudi Arabia tries to neutralize dangers to its national security
by hedging its bets, avoiding
use of open military means, and attempting to avoid leadership roles. Diplomacy and cash are the preferred
tools, and at the same time, there is an attempt to work behind the scenes. It is true that the kingdom is equipped with relatively good tools for coping with potential domestic protests – including economic capability, religious legitimacy, and the loyalty of the National
Guard – but Riyadh may understand that traditional methods
through which it has shaped its foreign policy are now insufficient. It
must also harness new means to neutralize
dangers to its national security, and if necessary, attempt to take the reins of leadership in the Arab world. This would expose it to conflict with
its chief rival
on the one hand, and its main
ally on the other.
The overthrow of the Sunni regimes
in North Africa, the continued
unrest in Bahrain,
the chronic instability in Yemen,
and Iraq’s increasing move toward the Iranian sphere of influence
increase Riyadh’s fear of the collapse of the existing
order and increased Iranian influence in the
region. It is not clear whether the unconventional means used thus far to assist the aging royal house to better cope with the old-new challenges, both domestic and foreign, is sufficient. Saudi Arabia’s advantage is in indirect conflicts; it has no battalions, only money and a leading role in the Muslim
world. This is no small
edge, but the role it seeks to play depends,
apart from repairing
the rift with United States, on backing the Arab-Sunni region, and on the illusory character of the “Arab revolution,” which may topple enemies
but also eventually reach Saudi Arabia’s
doorstep.
Western Disengegment
Second,
while many in the West are hailing the statements of the new Iranian president,
Hassan Rouhani, as indicating his nation's interest in a rapprochement after
years of tension and sanctions, the Saudis have welcomed Rouhani’s sensible
rhetoric but are in no position to simply trust that change is imminent from
Iran and therefore ease their vigilance and engagement. Saudi Arabia and Iran
are on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict and various other regional
complexities. In order to meet this daunting challenge successfully, the
kingdom will have to be more proactive, but also develop a new national
security framework to increase its capacity to successfully handle crises
across the Muslim world.
Growing
Iranian involvement in Syria will lead to increasing the Saudis' stake in the
situation, as the two leading regional powers seek predominance in resolving
that conflict and emerging as the most influential arbiter post-conflict.
Considering the shift in Western and regional international priorities — as
well as the current political climate and regional stakes in the Syrian
conflict — there is a realization in Riyadh that it is time for the major Arab
powers to prepare a response for maintaining order in the Arab world and to
counter Iran's expanding infiltrative policies. The kingdom and its regional
allies will increase their support to the Syrian rebels and prevent the
collapse of collateral nations, such as Lebanon and Jordan. The removal
of the tyrannical regime in Damascus is simply too important for the future of
the Arabs.
Yemen
Saudi Arabia
has recently proven its growing political strength in regional affairs, having
successfully spearheaded resolution of the situations in Bahrain and Yemen. In
spring 2011, the Bahraini monarchy realized that what had begun as a genuine
popular plea for reform in their country was being hijacked by Shiite theocratic revolutionary
movements. As Iranian
intentions became more apparent, the Bahraini leadership activated the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) joint defense treaty, in effect
since 2000, inviting a Saudi-led GCC force to assist in securing the vital and
critical infrastructure of the state.
Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
acted to affirm that the stability and security of Bahrain was integral to the
GCC and its common vital interests. Relying on intrinsic pillars of the
Bahraini state, that is, the monarchy, political institutions and civil
society, the Saudis used their diplomatic might to lead a collective strategic
response to the Bahraini crisis and checkmate Iran's revolutionary intentions.
Thus, as the Western powers showed no sign of directly supporting the Bahraini
monarchy, the Saudi-supported GCC force was dispatched to create a political
environment suitable for dialogue. This allowed the Bahraini government, under
the leadership of Prime Minister Prince Khalifa bin Salman, to steer clear of
the fate of other failed regional states weathering upheaval.
Yemen
In a similar
vein, Saudi Arabia took on the role of regional problem solver in November
2011, when it spearheaded a solution to mounting civil unrest in Yemen and the
resultant political deadlock between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the
popular opposition movement calling for his removal. Although the Yemeni
revolution initially looked to reduce the country’s unemployment, strengthen
the economy and curtail government corruption, like many Arab Awakening
movements it quickly escalated into a call for the ruler’s resignation. As the
revolution spiraled from organized demonstrations to violent clashes, tribal
warfare, secessionist movements and the ascendance of terrorist cells, Saudi Arabia
and the GCC could no longer consider the situation a local affair.
Reintroducing stability in Yemen became imperative for regional security. The
Saudis recognized Saleh no longer stood as a protector of stability, but as the
opposite.
Once Saleh
was identified as an obstacle to Yemen’s well-being, a Saudi-instigated GCC
transition plan removed Saleh in exchange for immunity for him and his family.
While both Saleh and the opposition seemed receptive to the agreement, the
president began to backtrack and refused to sign. This tug-of-war between
Saleh, the opposition and the GCC went on for months, exacerbating the
political and economic chaos and bringing Yemen to the brink of civil war.
Ultimately, however, Saudi leaders convinced Saleh to sign the power transfer
agreement in Riyadh. The deal, signed by Saleh and the opposition movement, mandated that Saleh relinquish the
reins to his vice president, Abedrabbu Mansour Hadi, until a new head of state
could be fairly elected. An election held in February 2012 resulted in Hadi
remaining in power. Since then, the kingdom has kept a close eye on Yemen as it
transitions with a less-corrupt, unity government that has expanded to include
a prime minister from the opposition.
Middle East
The
economic, political and military cover that Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies
brought to Bahrain and Yemen proved pivotal in returning these countries to
stability. A similar, but not identical regional initiative should be
considered for significantly expanded action by the Saudis in Syria. It is
absolutely vital that a Saudi-led regional project succeed there , although the
chance for that seem dim at this point in time ..
The only way
the Arab world can make progress is through a collective security framework
initially consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and the GCC
nations. It is time for the Arab states, working through a much-needed, reformed
Arab League, to assume responsibility for their own region and work together to
increase their collective security. Such a shift away from Western dependency
and toward more local (and successful) interventionism will take some time.
While Saudi Arabia has grown stronger in the last two decades, the other
traditionally dominant Arab countries — Egypt, Iraq and Syria — have stalled,
derailed or altogether abandoned state-building efforts to prioritize their
survival. Despite this, through ever-growing Saudi leadership, a revitalized
Arab alliance can and must rise to the challenge and prepare for a new paradigm
in the security of the Arab world.
Libya: Apr.,14,2019:
Days before Libya's renegade General Khalifa
Haftarlaunched an offensive on the country's capital, Tripoli, Saudi Arabia
offered tens of millions of dollars to help pay for the operation, the Wall Street
Journal has reported. The offer came during a visit by Haftar to the
Saudi capital, Riyadh, ahead of his April 4 military campaign, the Journal said
on Friday. Citing senior advisers to the Saudi government, the Journal said the
offer of funds - accepted by Haftar - was intended to buy the loyalty of tribal
leaders, recruit and pay fighters, and other military purposes. The latest
conflict in the North African country pits Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA)
against forces allied to the United Nations-backed Government of National
Accord (GNA). The GNA controls Tripoli, situated in northwestern Libya,
while the LNA is allied to a parallel administration based in the east of the
oil-rich country, which splintered into a patchwork of competing power bases
following the overthrow of former leader Muammar
Gaddafi in 2011. The United
Nations, which had hoped to organise a national conference this
month bringing the rival eastern and western administrations together to
organise an election, has called for a ceasefire. The United States,
G7 bloc of wealthy nations and the European
Union have also urged the LNA to halt its offensive. According to
the latest UN figures, at least 75 people have been killed in the fighting
between the warring parties while 320 others were wounded. Some 9,500 people
have also been forced from their homes. Several Middle Eastern countries including Egypt
and the United Arab
Emirates have backed Hafter as a bulwark against Islamist groups,
notably the Muslim Brotherhood, who took a prominent role in Libya following
the 2011 uprising and continued to participate in Libyan politics under the
Tripoli government. "There was an increase in support, clearly, but not a
change in the political role. I think Saudi Arabia wanted to up its
participation in the conflict in Libya and that probably contributed to the
visit of General Haftar to the kingdom and his meeting with both King Salman
and the Crown Prince," Jahshan said.
Saudi
Money to Abbas: : May.,2, 2019 : Saudi Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman offered Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas
$10bn to accept a controversial US-backed peace plan, Lebanese newspaper
Al-Akhbar has reported. Abbas rejected the offer, saying supporting US
President Donald Trump's "deal of the century" would be "the end
of his political life", the paper reported on Tuesday, citing leaked
diplomatic reports based on conversations between the two leaders. One of the
Saudi offers, according to the Jordanian's report, was to exchange Palestinian
recognition of Trump's deal for $10bn to assist West Bank authorities and
refugee resettlement, along with “unlimited financial and political support”. "One
billion US dollars," Abbas replied, to which MBS was said to have
responded:“
I will give you $10bn over ten years if you accept the deal.” The crown prince reportedly added that
Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab countries, had been asked by the Americans
to provide the Palestinians with financial support to launch projects in the
West Bank that would lead to economic prosperity. The projects would also, he
said, see the expansion of the West Bank's Area B, where the PA and Israel hold
administrative and military control, and Area C, which constitutes 60 percent
of the territory, and is exclusively under Israeli military authority. “Saudi
Arabia will support the PA with more than four billion in principle,” the envoy
wrote, citing conversations between Abbas and MBS. Shawabkeh mentioned in his
report that Abbas told Bin Salman that he could not accept any concessions with
regards to settlements, the two-state solution and Jerusalem. Abbas, however,
believed that the Americans would not provide any written proposals, but would
adopt a “Balfour-style tactic”. According to the Jordanian envoy, Abbas said
that the PA would dismantle itself if it became subject to any pressure from
any side, and would “hold Israel responsible for managing the affairs of
occupied territories Palestinian leaders
have vehemently denounced key points of the plan that have been leaked. They include
recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, offering the East Jerusalem
suburb of Abu Dis as the capital of a future Palestinian state, taking refugees'
right of return off the table, and drastically cutting the number of registered
refugees. Saeb Erekat, the veteran Palestinian negotiator, told MEE in
June that the deal of the century was not a deal and was already being
implemented on the ground."If there's any plan, this is being implemented
on the ground: with moving the US embassy to occupied Jerusalem, withdrawing
support for the two-state solution, cutting funds to UNRWA and, eventually,
trying to normalize the Israeli apartheid in Palestine," Erekat said.