Junagadh Annexation

Junagadh Annexation

Background

In the run-up to the Indian Independence 600-odd princely states, another legacy of the British Raj, were being divvied up between India and Pakistan. In the last few months of British India, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Lord Mountbatten were trying convince, cajole, bribe or threaten all the state princes into submission. Remarkably, by 15 August, Indian Government had managed to get almost all of them in line; only three states ended up proving to be troublesome – Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh. Junagadh was a princely state of British India, located in what is now Gujarat, outside but under the suzerainty of British India. In the independence and partition of British India of 1947, the 552 princely states were given a choice to either join the new Dominion of India or the newly formed state of Pakistan.

Introduction

Junagadh was a state on the southwestern end of Gujarat, with the principalities of Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad. The Arabian Sea stood between it and Pakistan. The state had an overwhelming Hindu population who constituted more than 80%; of its citizens, whilst the ruler of the state was a Muslim.

Junagadh   was a state on the southern-tip of Gujarat within a region called Kathiawar. The region was peppered with tiny states,. Junagadh itself contained dozens of petty estates and sheikhdoms within it. In fact the situation was so confusing that it took the Government of India several weeks just to figure out the correct borders before they could formulate a military plan. Moreover, the government lawyers couldn’t figure out whether these tiny sheikhdoms were legally independent or under the suzerainty of Junagadh even after the accession. But Junagadh was an important state, with a population of 700,000, 80% of them Hindus but ruled by a Muslim prince.

On August 15 1947 the ruler of the state Nawab of Junagarh Manabhar Khanji acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan confirmed the acceptance of the accession in September 1947. India did not accept the accession as legitimate. The Indian point of view was that since Junagarh was a state with a predominantly Hindu population it should be a part of India. Additionally, since the state was encircled by Indian territory it should have been a part of India. Indian politicians also stated that by giving Pakistan a predominantly Hindu region to govern the basis of the two nation theory was contradicted.

  

The Nawab of Junagadh was an eccentric character, famously obsessed with dogs. He was said to have owned 800 of them, each with its individual human attendant the actual governing of the Junagadh was carried out by his dewan  Chief Minister). In the last months of British India his dewan was a Muslim League politician named Shah Nawaz Bhutto (father of future Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar and grandfather to Benazir Bhutto).

Junagadh and small principalities for some two hundred years, decided that Junagadh should become part of Pakistan, much to the displeasure of many of the people of the state, an overwhelming majority of who were Hindus. The Nawab acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan on 15 September 1947, against the advice of Lord Mountbatten, arguing that Junagadh joined Pakistan by sea.  The principality of Babariawad and Sheikh of Mangrol reacted by claiming independence from Junagadh and accession to India, although the Sheikh of Mangrol withdrew his accession to India the very next day. When Pakistan accepted the Nawab's Instrument of Accession on 16 September, the Government of India was outraged that Muhammad Ali Jinnah could accept the accession of Junagadh despite his argument that Hindus and Muslims could not live as one nation. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel believed that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would exacerbate the communal tension already simmering in Gujarat.

The princely state was surrounded on all of its land borders by India, with an outlet onto the Arabian Sea. The unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led to a cessation of all trade with India and the food position became precarious. With the region in crisis, the Nawab, fearing for his life, felt forced to flee to Karachi with his family and his followers, and there he established a provisional government.

The Pakistani point of view was that since Junagarh had a ruler who chose to accede to Pakistan he should be allowed to do so. Junagarh, having a coastline could have maintained maritime links with Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistani politicians stated that the two nation theory did not necessarily mean a clear division of land and absolute transfer of populations as the sheer magnitude of such a proceeding would wreck havoc upon countless millions. Needless to say, neither of the two states was able to resolve this issue amicably and it only added fuel to an already charged environment.

Sardar Patel, India's then Defence Minister felt that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would create communal unrest across Gujarat. The government of India gave Pakistan time to void the accession and hold a plebiscite in Junagadh to pre empt any violence in Gujarat. Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Arzi Hukumat (in Urdu: Arzi: Transitional, Hukumat: Government) of the people of Junagarh. Patel ordered the annexation of Junagarh's three principalities. Junagarh, facing financial collapse, first invited the Arzi Hukumat, and later the Government of India to accept the reins of power 

Vallabhbhai Patel offered Pakistan time to reverse its acceptance of the accession and to hold a plebiscite in Junagadh.Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat (in Urdu: Aarzi: Temporary, Hukumat: Government) of the people of Junagadh. Eventually, Patel ordered the forcible annexation of Junagadh's three principalities. Junagadh's state government, facing financial collapse and lacking forces with which to resist Indian force, invited the Government of India to take control. A plebiscite was conducted in December, in which approximately 99.95% of the people chose India over Pakistan. Scholars have observed that India annexed Junagadh through force with scholars viewing the annexation as part of a wider program by the Indian state of forcing or bullying the rulers of princely states to accede.

Matters come to fore in late October, as the conflict in Kashmir erupted. With Nehru’s unwillingness to go to war with Pakistan was now immaterial. The Indian government became more willing to use force in Junagadh. The news had been coming of harassment of Hindus by the Khan of Manavadar, the tiny state which had been threatening to go over to Pakistan. Government, in no mood to be trifled with, sent a small force to take over the state on 22 October.

Accession

Junagadh leadership was in communication with the Pakistani government. Bhutto was being courted by Jinnah to switch sides. And so on 15 August, as independence rolled around, Junagadh declared itself acceding to Pakistan. The Indian government didn’t even hear about it until it was published in the newspapers on 17 August!  Immediately after making the announcement in Dastrural Amal Sarkar Junagadh, the Jungadh government communicated to Pakistan its wish to accede, and a delegation headed by Ismail was sent to Karachi with the Instrument of Accession signed by the Nawab. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan considered the proposal in detail and approved it. The Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as Governor General of Pakistan, counter-signed the Instrument of Accession on 15 September 1947. This was notified in the Gazette of Pakistan and Dasturul Amal, the Gazette of Junagadh, on that date.The Instrument of Accession provided for the right of the Pakistan legislature to legislate in the areas of Defence and Communication, as well as others.

Although the territory of Junagadh was geographically not adjoining the existing Pakistan, it had a link by sea through the Veraval Port of Junagadh. Mountbatten and Aynnangar both agreed that the issue of geographical contiguity had no legal standing and that Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was strictly and legally correct. But Sardar Patel demanded that the matter of accession should be decided by the people of the state and not its ruler.Nehru laid out India's position which was that India did not accept Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. Later at the United Nations Security Council, India's argument revolved around the wishes of the people which it charged the Nawab had ignored. India's representative at the UNSC was also advised to avoid legalistic arguments about the Instrument of Accession because of the impact it could have on Kashmir.

New Delhi also dispatched VP Menon, a civil servant who had taken a demotion to be the point man of whole state integration project, to Junagadh. There he was met by Bhutto. He tried to convince Bhutto the absurdity of joining Pakistan which had no connection with Junagadh by land. Bhutto dismissed it saying that the two were connected by the sea (300 miles between port of Veraval and Karachi). Besides, Bhutto continued, it was only a matter of time before communists took over Congress and it was in the best interest of Junagadh to stay away from such trouble. Dismayed, Menon returned empty-handed. At this point, several confusing threads began unfolding in parallel. In Rajkot, Samaldas Gandhi (a nephew of Mahatma) established a provisional government with the plan of starting an insurrection against the Nawab. While later the Indian government claimed to have nothing do with the insurrection, it may very well be that it was Menon who had given Gandhi the go-ahead. Parallel to it, another tiny state Manavadar bordering Junagadh started suggesting that it might go over to Pakistan as well. Meanwhile, two tiny estates within Junagadh – Babariawad and Mangrol – consisting of fifty villages each, declared their independence from Junagadh and their decision to accede to India. As a response, Bhutto sent his forces into these estates to take control of them.

V. P. Menon, the Secretary of the States department of the Government of India, travelled to Junagadh on 17 September 1947 and met Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the dewan (or Chief Minister) of Junagadh. Menon said he had brought a message from the Indian Government and wished to deliver it to the Nawab in person. Bhutto said he could not arrange a meeting with the Nawab as he was not feeling well. Menon expressed displeasure, but conveyed the message of the Indian Government to Bhutto, insisting that Junagadh should withdraw its accession to Pakistan. Bhutto told Menon that the accession was now complete and that according to international law only the Government of Pakistan was responsible

Provisional Government

At Menon's suggestion Samaldas Gandhi, nephew of Mahatma Gandhi, formed a provisional government of Junagadh in Bombay. This provisional government received the sponsorship of the All India States Peoples' Conference's Praja Mandal movement and had the support of the Bombay-based 'Gujarat States Organisation', led by the Maharaja of Lunawada. On 24 September 1947, Mohandas K. Gandhi condemned the action of the Junagadh government in a prayer meeting held at Delhi.

India allowed the provisional government to take control over outlying areas of the Junagadh state However, India later at the UNSC denied ever having supported the provisional government. Pakistan also protested against India's indifference to the activities of the provisional government of Junagadh Nehru wrote to Pakistan that the provisional government was a spontaneous expression of popular resistance to the state's accession to Pakistan by Junagadh's local population. However, India did not reveal Menon's role in the formation of the provisional government

In the meanwhile, there were exchanges between the governments of India and Pakistan. Pakistan told the Indian Government that the accession was in accordance with the Scheme of Independence announced by the outgoing British and that Junagadh was now part of Pakistan. While this exchange of correspondence was going on, India closed all its borders to Junagadh and stopped the movement of goods, transport and postal articles. To force the Nawab of Junagadh to change his decision, India imposed a blockade on the state

India later denied ever having stopped supplies to Junagadh In view of worsening situation, the Nawab and his family left Junagadh and arrived in Karachi on 25 October 1947. On 27 October 1947, Bhutto, as Chief Minister of Junagadh, wrote a letter to Jinnah explaining the critical situation of the State government. As the situation worsened, he wrote again on 28 October 1947 to Ikramullah, Secretary of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeking help and directions.

When all hopes for assistance from Pakistan were lost, Bhutto wrote by telegram on 1 November 1947 to Nawab Saheb at Karachi, explaining the situation and the danger to life and property, considering an armed attack was imminent. In a return telegram, the Nawab authorised Bhutto to act in the best interests of the Muslim population of Junagadh

A meeting of the Junagadh State Council was called on 5 November to discuss the critical situation. The Council authorised Bhutto to take appropriate action. He sent Captain Harvey Johnson, a senior member of the Council of Ministers, to Rajkot to meet Indian officials^. Another meeting of the Junagadh State Council was convened on 7 November, and some prominent citizens of Junagadh state were also invited. The meeting continued till 3 o'clock in the morning and decided that instead of surrendering to the "Provisional Government", the Indian Government should be requested to take over the administration of Junagadh to protect the lives of its citizens, which were being threatened by Provisional Government forces.

Invasion by India

In New Delhi, the issue proved to be divisive. Sardar Patel was in favour of using military force since Junagadh’s “invasion” of Babariawad and Mangrol could be construed as an “act of war”. But Jawaharlal Nehru was reluctant to use force since it would mean a war with Pakistan, which would prove to be very costly for India To complicate the matters further, India’s chiefs of staff submitted a white paper to the cabinet saying that in the event of a war with Pakistan, the British officers (still serving in the Indian army) will not stand down, since they could not fight against the British officers serving in the Pakistani Army. The Indian leaders were outraged at this, saying that military chiefs were exceeding their bounds. The next day Mountbatten convinced the military chiefs to back down and the showdown between the military and the government was averted. By end of September, Nehru had decided to surround Junagadh with army and navy but not to use force. Meanwhile, he continued to pressurize Pakistani government to come to terms over the issue.

Over the month of October, conditions worsened in Junagadh which was fast running out of food and other essentials under Indian embargo. Meanwhile, Gandhi’s provisional government had started their insurrection, taking over some towns of state. The whole drama also acquired communal overtones and risk of Hindu-Muslim riots in Kathiawar heightened. As the situation worsened, the Nawab decided to flee to Pakistan, taking all the money in the state treasury, most (but not all) of his wives and some of his dogs, with him. Bhutto was left in charge of the state. 

Then on 1 November, forces were dispatched to take over administration of Babariawad and Mangrol. Junagadh forces had already fled, hours before Indian troops reached these estates. But Indian government still held back from a full-fledged invasion of Junagadh  On 8 November, Bhutto sent a letter to Nilam Butch, Provincial Head of the Indian Government in Rajkot, requesting him to help to restore law and order in Junagadh to prevent bloodshed. Harvey Johnson took the message to Rajkot. The head of the Indian administration telephoned V. P. Menon in Delhi and read out the letter. Menon immediately rushed to see Jawaharlal Nehru and explained the situation. After consultation with Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel, the home minister and other ministers, a formal order was drafted and a notification issued announcing the take-over of Junagadh at the request of its Chief Minister. The notification promised a referendum in due course. Bhutto left Junagadh for Karachi on the night of 8 November 1947. On 9 November, the Indian Air Force flew several sorties at low level over Junagadh

Soon columns of Indian tanks and other vehicles carrying Indian soldiers entered Junagadh state, led by Brig. Gurdial Singh, commander of the Kathiawar defense force. The States of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar and Porbander had agreed to the request to place their State forces under the command of Gurdial Singh  At 6 p.m. on 9 November, Captain Harvey Johnson and Chief Secretary Gheewala, a civil servant of Junagadh state, formally handed over the charge of the State to the Indian Government.

On the same day, Nehru sent a telegram to,Liaquat Ali Khan about the Indian take-over of Junagadh. Khan sent a return telegram to Nehru stating that Junagadh was Pakistani territory, and nobody except the Pakistan government was authorized to invite anybody to Junagadh. He also accused the Indian Government of naked aggression on Pakistan's territory and of violating international law. The Government of Pakistan strongly opposed the Indian occupation. Nehru wrote “In view of special circumstances pointed out by Junagadh Dewan that is the Prime Minister of Junagadh – our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot has taken temporarily charge of Junagadh administration. This has been done to avoid disorder and resulting chaos. We have, however, no desire to continue this arrangement and wish to find a speedy solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Junagadh. We have pointed out to you previously that final decision should be made by means of referendum or plebiscite. We would be glad to discuss this question and allied matters affecting Junagadh with representatives of your Government at the earliest possible moment convenient to you. We propose to invite Nawab of Junagadh to send his representatives to this conference.”

The Government of Pakistan protested, saying that the accession of the state to Pakistan was already accepted. In reply to the above telegram, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent the following:

“Your telegram informing that your Government had taken charge of Junagadh was received by me on November 10, 1947. Your action in taking over State Administration and sending Indian troops to state without any authority from Pakistan Government and indeed without our knowledge is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International law. Indian Government’s activities on accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have all been directed to force the State to renounce accession and all kinds of weapons have been used by you to achieve this end. We consider your action in taking charge of Junagadh Administration and sending Indian troops to occupy Junagadh to be a direct act of hostility against Pakistan Dominion. We demand that you should immediately withdraw your forces, and relinquish charge of administration to the rightful ruler and stop people of Union of India from invading Junagadh and committing acts of violence.^”

This was the followed by a Press Statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was communicated to Prime Minister of India on 16 November 1947 and read as follows:

“In spite of the gravest provocation, we have refrained from any action which should result in armed conflict. We could with full justification and legal right could have sent our forces to Junagadh but at no time since the accession of state, was a single soldier sent by us to Junagadh and our advice throughout to the State Authorities was to exercise the greatest restraint. Manavadar, another State which had acceded to Pakistan and Mangrol and Babariawad have also been occupied by Indian troops.^”

Immediately after the take-over of the state, all rebel Muslim officials of the state were put behind bars. They included Ismail Abrehani, a senior minister in the Junagadh government, who had taken the instrument of Accession to Jinnah for his signature. Abrehani refused to leave Junagadh, even when he was offered in jail the option of going to Pakistan, saying that despite its occupation Junagadh was part of Pakistan according to international law and he preferred to remain. He stayed and later died in Junagadh.

Reports arrived of widespread murder, rape and looting of Muslims in Junagadh following the arrival of Indian troops. Many Muslims from Junagadh began migrating to Pakistan. After India assumed administration in Junagadh, India's Ministry of Law made it clear that Junagadh's accession to Pakistan had not been nullified by referendum and that Junagadh had not acceded to India yet. But India went ahead with the referendum because it believed the result would be in its favor. 

In the end, these are merely political arguments. At the end, fate of these disputes was sealed by military power. As Sardar Patel had observed while discussing Junagadh, in such cases “possession is nine-tenths of the law”.

Plebiscite

On 24 September, legal adviser Monckton had informed Mountbatten that Pakistan's consent would be needed for any plebiscite India wished to conduct in Junagadh since the Nawab of Junagadh had signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan. Nehru had shifted from his earlier position of allowing a plebiscite under the UN and now said that it was unnecessary for a plebiscite to be held under the UN though it could send one or two observers if it wished to do so. However, India also made it clear that it would not under any circumstances postpone the plebiscite so as to allow the UN or Pakistan to send observers.

A plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948, in which all but 91 out of 190,870 who voted (from an electorate of 201,457) voted to join India, i.e. 99.95% of the population voted to join India. Douglas Brown of the Daily Telegraph as well as Pakistani newspaper Dawn expressed concerns about the propriety of the plebiscite's arrangement. On 26 February, Pakistan termed India's proceeding with the plebiscite a 'discourtesy to Pakistan and the Security Council'. In the plebiscite India polled 222,184 votes and Pakistan 130 out of a total population of 720,000 of Junagadh and its feudatories.

Only 15 percent (21,606) of Junagadh's Muslim population voted while 30 percent (179,851) of the non-Muslim population voted. The total number of voters on electoral rolls was 200, 569 and less than 10,000 Muslims voted for India.

In Manvadar, 276 out of 520 Muslims voted for India, in Bantwa 19 out of 39 and 79 out of 231 in Sardargarh. In Bantwa and Babariawad the number of voters who cast their votes in India's favor was less than the number of non-Muslim voters there, which meant that even some non-Muslims did not vote for India.

Arrangements after annexation

Junagadh became part of the Indian Saurashtra State until 1 November 1956, when Saurashtra became part of Bombay State. Bombay State was split into the linguistic states of Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, and Junagadh is now one of the modern districts of Saurasthra in Gujarat.

Conclusion

  Here was a state which India had forcibly occupied against the wishes of its Muslim ruler, claiming to protect the Hindu population. In Kashmir, opposite was true. There India claimed to be upholding its agreement with a Hindu king while disregarding the sentiments of a Muslim population. Pakistan continued show Junagadh as part of it in its maps well into 1950s. Meanwhile, Indian side maintained that India had not invaded Junagadh, but had taken it over only after Nawab’s government had completely collapsed. India carried out a plebiscite, but did not allow UN or Pakistan to witness the plebiscite, in any case the plebiscite had to be agreed by Pakistan and supervised by the UN .According to scholar Rakesh Ankit India took liberties with facts and laws as it acted as the judge, jury and executioner of the whole plebiscite. The Kashmir conflict eclipsed the matter of Junagadh at the United Nations Security Council, where Pakistan's complaint against India over Junagadh is still pending