History of Afghanistan War1978 to Present (JR134)
History
From 1933 to 1973 Afghanistan experienced a lengthy period of
peace and relative stability It was ruled as a
monarchy by King Zahir Shah, who belonged to the Afghan Musahiban Barakzai dynasty In the 1960s, Afghanistan as a constitutional monarchy held
limited parliamentary elections. Zahir Shah, who would become the last King of Afghanistan, was overthrown by his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in July 1973, after discontent with the monarchy grew in the urban areas of
Afghanistan The country had gone through several droughts, and charges of
corruption and poor economic policies were leveled against the ruling dynasty.
Khan transformed the monarchy into a republic, and he became the first President of Afghanistan. He was supported by a faction of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan's
communist party, which had been founded in 1965 and enjoyed strong relations
with the Soviet Union. The establishment of the Republic of Afghanistan
increased the Soviet investment in Afghanistan and the PDPA influence in the
government's military and civil bodies In 1976, alarmed by the growing power of the
PDPA and the party's strong affiliation with the Soviet Union, Daoud Khan tried
to scale back the PDPA's influence. He dismissed PDPA
members from their government posts, appointed conservative elements instead
and finally announced the dissolution of the PDPA, arresting senior party
members
On April 27, 1978, the PDPA and military units loyal to the PDPA
killed Daoud Khan, his immediate family and bodyguards in a violent coup,
seizing control of the capital, Kabul. As the PDPA had chosen a weekend holiday to conduct the coup,
when many government employees were having a day off, Daoud Khan was not able
to fully activate the well-trained armed forces which remained loyal to him to
counter the coup.
The new PDPA government, led by a revolutionary council, did not
enjoy the support of the masses. Therefore, it soon announced and implemented a hostile
doctrine against any political dissent, whether inside or outside the party. The first communist leader in Afghanistan,Nur Muhammad Taraki, was assassinated by his
fellow communist Hafizullah Amin. Amin was known for his independent and nationalist inclinations,
and was also seen by many as a ruthless leader. He has been accused of killing
tens of thousands of Afghan civilians at Pul-e-Charkhi and other national prisons: 27,000 politically motivated
executions reportedly took place at Pul-e-Charkhi prison alone.[
Introduction
This article covers the history of Afghanistan since the communist military coup on 27 April 1978, known as
the Saur Revolution, when the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took power.
Since that day, an almost continuous series of armed conflicts has dominated
and afflicted Afghanistan..After this Saur
Revolution, most of Afghanistan experienced uprisings against the PDPA
government. The Soviet–Afghan War began in December 1979 to replace the existing communist
government. Afghanistan's resistance forces, known as the mujahideen, fought against the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan. Some factions received support from the United States, with the
Pakistani ISI handling tne direct tactical operations. The Soviet
Union had to withdraw its
troops in February 1989. The Soviet-backed Afghan communist government survived
for three more years until the fall of Kabul in 1992.
Peshawar
Accord
In 1992, the Afghan political parties agreed on the Peshawar
Accords which established the
Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government. Militia
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was opposed to the agreement and with Pakistani support started
a bombardment campaign against Kabul. Additionally, three militias who had been
able to occupy some suburbs of Kabul engaged in a violent war against each
other. Regional powers such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, India and Uzbekistan seeking influence over the geo-strategically
located Afghanistan each supported and in some cases controlled one of those
militias. While Kabul and some other major cities witnessed most of the
fighting during that period, most of the more rural parts of Afghanistan, which
had seen especially massive bombardment by the Soviets and Communists, remained
relatively calm. In late 1994/early 1995, as the Islamic State's minister of
defense Ahmad Shah Massoud had been able to defeat most of the militias militarily in Kabul
and had restored some calm to the capital, the Taliban emerged as a new faction
threatening Kabul.
Taliban
The Taliban had initially emerged as a new force in the southern city of Kandahar conquering many southern and central
provinces not under Islamic State control in the course of 1994. In early 1995,
as they launched a major operation against the capital Kabul, they suffered a
devastating defeat against the Islamic State forces of Massoud in what many
analysts saw as the movement's end. By 1996, however, they had regrouped with
massive military support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi Arabia. In
September 1996 they took power in Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. The United
Islamic Front (Northern Alliance)
was created under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Massoud as a military-political resistance force against the Taliban
Emirate which was backed militarily by Pakistan's
Army and enforced by
several thousand al-Qaeda fighters from Arab countries and Central
Asia.
Following the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001, NATO invaded
Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. The purpose of this was to defeat al-Qaeda,
to remove the Taliban from power, and to create a viable democratic state to
deny terrorists a place to recruit and operate. Although some of these
objectives were achieved, a protracted and costly period of intervention
followed and continues as of 2019.
Soviet intervention and withdrawal
The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan on December 24, 1979.
Amin was deposed from power almost immediately, as he and 200 of his guards
were killed
on December 27 by Soviet Army Spetsnaz, replaced by Babrak
Karmal. After deployment
into Afghanistan, Soviet forces along with government forces would begin to
engage in a protracted counter-insurgency war with mujahideen fighters. Some of those Islamic fighters
would later transform into the Taliban .The West helped the Taliban to fight the
Soviet takeover of Afghanistan.
The Soviet government realized that a military solution to the
conflict would require far more troops. Because of this they discussed troop
withdrawals and searched for a political and peaceful solution as early as
1980, but they never took any serious steps in that direction until 1988. Early
Soviet military reports confirm the difficulties the Soviet army had while
fighting on the mountainous terrain, for which the Soviet army had no training
whatsoever. Parallels with the Vietnam
War were frequently
referred to by Soviet army officers Policy failures, and the stalemate that
ensued after the Soviet intervention, led the Soviet leadership to become
highly critical of Karmal's leadership. Under Mikhail
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was
able to depose Karmal and replace him with Mohammad Najibullah. Karmal's leadership was seen as a failure by the Soviet Union
because of the rise of violence and crime during his administration.
Throughout the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, troop convoys
came under attack by Afghan rebel fighters. In all, 523 Soviet soldiers were
killed during the withdrawal. The total withdrawal of all Soviet troops from
Afghanistan was completed in February 1989. The last Soviet soldier to leave was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, leader of the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan at the
time of the Soviet invasion. In total 14,453 Soviet soldiers died during the Afghan war.
The Soviet war had a damaging impact on Afghanistan. Soviet
forces and their proxies committed genocide against the Afghan people and
killed up to 2 million Afghans. 5–10 million Afghans fled to
Pakistan and Iran, which was 1/3 of the prewar population of the country, and
another 2 million were displaced within the country. Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province functioned as an organizational and
networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the province's
influential Deobandi ulama playing a major supporting role in promoting the 'jihad'
Fall of communism
After the Soviet withdrawal, the Republic of Afghanistan under
Najibullah continued to face resistance from the various mujahideen forces.
Najibullah received funding and arms from the Soviet Union until 1991 when the
Soviet Union collapsed. The government was dealt a major blow when Abdul Rashid Dostum, a leading general, created an alliance with the Shura-e
Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Large parts of the Afghan communist government capitulated to
the forces of Massoud in early 1992. After the Soviet defeat, the Wall Street Journal named Massoud "the Afghan who won the
Cold War".[ He had defeated the Soviet forces nine times
in his home region of the Panjshir
Valley in northeastern
Afghanistan.
Pakistan tried to install Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in power in Afghanistan against the opposition of all other
mujahideen commanders and factions As early as October 1990, the Inter-Services Intelligence had devised a plan for Hekmatyar to conduct a
mass bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul with possible Pakistani troop
enforcements.[This unilateral ISI-Hekmatyar plan came
although the thirty most important mujahideen commanders had agreed on holding
a conference inclusive of all Afghan groups to decide on a common future
strategy the other mujahideen commanders was like a "firestorm". Ahmad
Zia Massoud, the brother of Ahmad
Shah Massoud, said that his faction strongly opposed the plan and like other
factions would take measures if any "Pakistani troops reinforced
Hekmatyar". Abdul Haq was reportedly so angry about the ISI plan
that he was "red in the face".[ And Nabi Mohammad,
another commander, pointed out that "Kabul's 2 million could not escape
Hekmatyar's rocket bombardment – there would be a massacre Massoud's,
Abdul Haq's and Amin Wardak's representatives said that "Hekmatyar's
rocketing of Kabul would produce a civilian bloodbath. The United States
finally put pressure on Pakistan to stop the 1990 plan, which was subsequently
called off until 1992.
After the fall of Najibullah's government in 1992, the Afghan
political parties agreed on a power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar
Accord. The Peshawar Accord
created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general democratic
elections.The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after the
fall of the Soviet-backed
Najibullah government. With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties were ostensibly unified under this government
in April 1992. Hekmatyar's Hezb-e
Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the
period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces
and Kabul generally. Shells
and rockets fell everywhere.
Saudi
Arabia and Iran—as competitors for regional hegemony—supported Afghan militias hostile towards
each other , Iran was assisting the Shia Hazara Hezb-i
Wahdat forces of Abdul
Ali Mazari, as Iran was
attempting to maximize Wahdat's military power and influence. Saudi
Arabia supported the Wahhabite Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i
Islami faction.Conflict
between the two militias soon escalated into a full-scale war.
Due to the sudden initiation of the war, working government
departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the
newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form.
Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while
Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos Because of the chaos, some leaders
increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders. For civilians there was little security from murder, rape and
extortion. An estimated 25,000 people died during the most intense period
of bombardment by Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami and the Junbish-i
Milli forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had created an alliance with Hekmatyar in 1994.[ Half a million people fled Afghanistan .Rare ceasefires, usually
negotiated by representatives of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi or Burhanuddin Rabbani [the interim government], or officials from the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly
collapsed within days.
Taliban rise to power
Southern Afghanistan was under the control of neither
foreign-backed militias nor the government in Kabul, but was ruled by local
leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias. In 1994, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also
developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in
opposition to the tyranny of the local governor.[ Mullah
Omar started his movement
with fewer than 50 armed madrassah students in his hometown of Kandahar. When the Taliban took control of the city in 1994, they forced
the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a
situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities..[In 1994, the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern
and central Afghanistan.
In late 1994, most of the militia factions (Hezb-i Islami,
Junbish-i Milli and Hezb-i Wahdat) which had been fighting in the battle for
control of Kabul were defeated militarily by forces of the Islamic State's Secretary of Defense Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombardment of the capital came to a halt. Massoud
tried to initiate a nationwide political
process with the goal of
national consolidation and democratic elections, also inviting the Taliban to join the process Massoud had united
political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and
representatives to reach a lasting agreement. Massoud, like most people in
Afghanistan, saw this conference as a small hope for democracy and for free
elections. His favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr.Mohammad Yusuf, the first democratic prime
minister under Zahir Shah, the former king. In the first meeting representatives from 15
different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were already 25
provinces participating. Massoud went unarmed to talk to several Taliban leaders
in Maidan Shar, but the Taliban declined to join this political process.[When Massoud returned safely, the Taliban leader who had
received him as his guest paid with his life: he was killed by other senior
Taliban for failing to execute Massoud while the possibility was there.
The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were
defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under Ahmad Shah Massoud. .This is the first time in several months that
Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and shelling aimed at
residential areas in the city. The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were
followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses. Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban On
September 26, 1996, as the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and
financial support by Saudi Arabia, prepared for another major offensive,
Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul. The Taliban seized Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established
the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.
Taliban
Emirate against United Front
The Taliban began preparing offensives against the remaining
areas controlled by Ahmad Shah Massoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum. Massoud and Dostum, former foes, responded by allying to form
the United
Front (Northern Alliance)
against the Taliban.[In addition to the dominantly Tajik forces of Massoud and the Uzbek forces of Dostum, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders
such as Abdul Haq or Haji
Abdul Qadir. Prominent
politicians of the United Front were in example diplomat and Afghan prime
minister Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai or the UF's foreign minister Abdullah
Abdullah. From the Taliban
conquest in 1996 until November 2001 the United Front controlled roughly 30% of
Afghanistan's population in provinces such as Badakhshan, Kapisa,
Takhar and
parts of Parwan,
Kunar,
Nuristan, Laghman, Samangan, Kunduz, Ghōr and Bamyan
Anti-Taliban resistance
Abdul Rashid Dostum and his forces were defeated by the Taliban in 1998. Dostum
subsequently went into exile. The only leader to remain in Afghanistan, and who
was able to defend vast parts of his area against the Taliban, was Ahmad Shah Massoud. In the areas under his control Ahmad Shah Massoud set up
democratic institutions .The Taliban repeatedly offered Massoud a position of
power to make him stop his resistance. Massoud declined..Massoud with his Proposals
for Peace wanted to convince
the Taliban to join a political process leading towards nationwide democratic
elections in a foreseeable future.
In early 2001 Massoud employed a new strategy of local military
pressure and global political appeals. ]Resentment was increasingly gathering against
Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society including the Pashtun areas.[ Massoud publicized their cause of "popular consensus,
general elections and democracy" worldwide. At the same time he was very
wary not to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s In 1999, he
began training police forces specifically to keep order and protect the
civilian population, in case the United Front was successful
In early 2001 Ahmad Shah Massoud addressed the European Parliament in Brussels asking the international community to provide humanitarian help to the people of Afghanistan. He stated
that the Taliban and Al Qaeda had introduced "a very wrong perception of Islam and that without the support of Pakistan and
Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for
up to a year. On this visit to Europe he also warned that his intelligence had
gathered information about a large-scale attack on U.S. soil being imminent.
On September 9, 2001, Massoud, then aged 48, was the target of a
suicide attack by two Arabs posing as journalists at Khwaja Bahauddin, in the Takhar
Province of Afghanistan. Massoud
died in a helicopter taking him to a hospital. The funeral, though in a rather
rural area, was attended by hundreds of thousands of mourning people.
Islamic
Republic and NATO
The US-led war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, as Operation Enduring Freedom. It was designed to capture or kill Osama
bin Laden and al-Qaeda militants, as well as replace the
Taliban with a US-friendly government. The Bush
Doctrine stated that, as
policy, it would not
distinguish between al-Qaeda and nations that harbor them. Several Afghan
leaders were invited to Germany in December 2001 for the UN sponsored Bonn Agreement, which was to restore stability and
governance in their country. In the first step, the Afghan Transitional
Administration was formed and was
installed on December 22, 2001. Chaired by Hamid
Karzai, it numbered 30
leaders and included a Supreme Court, an Interim Administration, and a Special
Independent Commission.
A loya jirga (grand assembly) was convened in June 2002 by former King Zahir
Shah, who returned from
exile after 29 years. Hamid Karzai was elected President for the two years in
the jirga, in which the Afghan Interim Authority was also replaced with the
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA). A constitutional loya jirga
was held in December 2003, adopting the new 2004 constitution, with a presidential form of government and a
bicameral legislature.Karzai
was elected in the 2004 presidential
election followed by winning a
second term in the 2009 presidential
election. Both the 2005 and the 2010 parliamentary
elections were also
successful.In the meantime, the reconstruction process of Afghanistan began in
2002. There are more than 14,000 reconstruction projects under way in
Afghanistan, such as the Kajaki and the Salma
Dam. Many of these projects are being supervised by the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. The World Bank
contribution is the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
(ARTF), which was set up in
2002. It is financed by 24 international donor countries and has spent more
than $1.37 billion as of 2007. Approximately 30 billion dollars have been provided by the
international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, most of it from
the United States. In 2002, the world community allocated $4 billion at the
Tokyo conference followed by another $4 billion in 2004. In February 2006,
$10.5 billion were committed for Afghanistan at the London Conference and $11 billion from the United States in early 2007. Despite
these vast investments by the international community, the reconstruction
effort's results have been mixed. Implementation of development projects at the
district and sub-district level has been frequently marred by lack of coordination,
knowledge of local conditions, and sound planning on the side of international
donors as well as by corruption and inefficiency on the side of Afghan
government officials. On the provincial and national level, projects such as
the National Solidarity Programme, inter-provincial road construction, and the
US-led revamping of rural health services have met with more success. As NATO
prepares to withdraw the majority of remaining ISAF troops by the end of 2014,
whether the Afghan government will be able to sustain the developmental gains
made over the past 12 years, and to what extent international civilian aid
organizations will be able to continue operations or refocus their efforts
based on lessons learned, remains to be seen.
The UN Security Council established the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in December
2001 to provide basic security for the people of Afghanistan and assist the Karzai administration. Since 2002, the total number of ISAF and U.S. forces have
climbed from 15,000 to 150,000. The majority of them belong to various branches
of the United States Armed Forces, who are not only fighting the Taliban insurgency but also training the Afghan Armed Forces and Afghan National Police. They are scheduled to withdraw slowly until the end of 2014
but Vice President Joe
Biden has proposed to
retain an unknown number of U.S. military personnel after the 2014 deadline if the security situation required and
the Afghan government and people desired. Germany has announced that they will continue training Afghan
police recruits after the 2014 withdrawal date for military troops.
NATO and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban in this period. By
2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form, complete with their own
version of mediation court. In 2010,U.S.
President Barack
Obama deployed an
additional 30,000 soldiers over a period of six months and proposed that he
would begin troop withdrawals by 2012. At the 2010 International
Conference on Afghanistan
in London,Afghan President Hamid
Karzai said he intended to
reach out to the Taliban leadership (including Mullah
Omar,Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Supported by senior U.S. officials Karzai called on the
group's leadership to take part in a loya
jirga meeting to initiate
peace talks
At the end of July 2010, the Netherlands became the first NATO
ally to end its combat mission in Afghanistan after 4 years military deployment
including the most intense period of hostilities. They withdrew 1,900 troops.
The Atlantic Council described the decision as "politically significant
because it comes at a time of rising casualties and growing doubts about the
war. Canada withdrew troops in 2011, but about 900 were left to train Afghani
soldiers.
In February 2012, a small number of American service members burned several copies of the Quran. Some Afghans responded with
massive demonstrations and riots in Kabul and other areas. Assailants killed
several American military personnel, including two officers in the Interior
Ministry building following this event.
According to ISAF there were about 120,000 NATO-led troops in
Afghanistan per December 2012, of which 66,000 were US troops and 9,000
British. The rest were from 48 different countries. A process of handing over
power to local forces has started and according to plans a majority of
international troops will leave in 2014.
On November 24, 2013, President Karzai made a Loya
jirga and put a ban on NATO
house raids. This ban was put in place, and NATO soldiers were instructed to
obey and follow this ban. In December 2013, a house raid in Zabul Province was
exceptionally carried out by two NATO soldiers. Karzai condemned this in a
highly publicised speech. On January 3, 2014 a bomb was heard by NATO soldiers
in a base in Kabul; there were no reported casualties or injuries. The day
after, a bomb hit a US military base in Kabul and killed one US citizen. The
bomb was planted by the Taliban and the American service member was the first
combat casualty in Afghanistan in that year. The Taliban immediately claimed
responsibility for the attack.
On May 1, 2015 the media reported about a scheduled meeting in
Qatar between Taliban insurgents and peacemakers, including the Afghan
President, about ending the war.
Trump and
Afghan War
President
Trump put forward in 2017 a
long-awaited strategy for resolving the nearly 16-year-old conflict in
Afghanistan .In a nationally televised prime-time speech to troops at Fort
Myer, Va., Mr. Trump said there would be no “blank check” for the American
engagement in Afghanistan. But in announcing his plan, Mr. Trump deepened
American involvement in a military mission that has bedeviled his predecessors
and that he once called futile.“My original instinct was to pull out, and
historically I like following my instincts,” Mr. Trump said. “But all my life,
I’ve heard that decisions are much different when you sit behind the desk in
the Oval Office.” Mr. Trump said that he had been convinced that “a hasty
withdrawal would create a vacuum for terrorists, including ISIS and Al
Qaeda.” the end, we will win.” Part of
the Trump’s plan was to deploy more American troops to Afghanistan to continue
to train Afghan forces there, with the goal of convincing the Taliban — which
has recently gained substantial ground in the war — that they could not win on
the battlefield.
Donald Trump in
end 2o18 announced that He is planning to withdraw more than 5,000 of the
14,000 US troops in Afghanistan there already were signs that Trump’s patience with America’s
longest war is wearing thin.The decision had been made and verbal orders had
been given to start planning for the drawdown.
It is unclear how the US – with less than 9,000 troops in Afghanistan
would be able to fulfil the full set of missions now underway, including
training Afghan forces, advising them in the field, and conducting an air
campaign against the Taliban and other militant groups. The US almost certainly
would have to curtail its missions, something that could provide an opportunity
for a resurgent Taliban to expand their offensives across Afghanistan.
January 2019, six-day talks between the U.S. and Taliban
were the clearest sign yet that the U.S. is intent on withdrawing its forces
from Afghanistan, and that the Taliban and its regional allies perceive that
intent as an opportunity The Doha talks
also were the first time that the U.S. has publicly acceded to the Taliban’s
insistence that bilateral negotiations on terms for a troop withdrawal precede
any peace negotiations involving other Afghans. The Taliban have made no
evident concessions, but hints are emerging of some consensus on key issues.
Ultimately, the significance of the talks depends on what happens next: if the
framework of a deal reportedly sketched out in Doha leads to substantive
negotiations among a wider array of stakeholders on future political and
security arrangements, then these talks will have produced an important
breakthrough.
U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad told The New York Times that the U.S. and Taliban have
agreed in principle on a framework for a deal under which the Taliban would
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a “platform for international terrorist
groups or individuals” and that the U.S. would pull out troops. Khalilzad also
said that, as the framework is further fleshed out, Taliban concessions will
need to include a ceasefire and agreement to talk directly with the Afghan
government. The Taliban appears now to be considering whether it is prepared to
make such concessions.
An exchange of commitments between
the Taliban and U.S. on counter-terrorism and troop withdrawal may be enough to
end American military involvement in Afghanistan, but without a more complete
peace deal it will not end what is now the deadliest conflict in
the world. At the
moment, the U.S. reportedly is taking the position that a troop withdrawal
would only be part of a bigger package including settlement of political and
security issues among Afghans. Whether the U.S. sticks with that position will
be important to watch.
A major unanswered question is how
to structure an intra-Afghan dialogue. How do you get all sides sitting around
a table, after decades of war? Also unclear is what the Taliban is willing to
accept on timing and sequencing of such dialogue – that is, do they see
dialogue launching before a foreign troop withdrawal commences, or only later,
after a troop withdrawal that diminishes Afghan government and U.S. leverage is
underway? The Taliban have long been willing to negotiate openly with the U.S.,
as has now happened, and they have more vaguely indicated willingness to talk
subsequently with other Afghans, but the specifics of an intra-Afghan
negotiation format that can attract the support of all sides remains uncertain.
Details have not yet emerged
regarding the counter-terrorism assurances the Taliban offered in Doha and how
definitively acceptable they are to Washington. The U.S. may be looking for the
Taliban to say something that goes beyond what they have declared in the past.
Since at least 2010, the Taliban have promised that they will not let
Afghanistan be used to threaten other countries, in a veiled reference to
preventing transnational jihadist groups from sheltering in their territory.
That kind of oblique language may or may not be sufficient in a peace
agreement; its acceptability will depend in part on how anxious the U.S. is to
exit Afghanistan. One question is whether the Taliban might be willing to go
further now, committing for the first time to actively counter jihadist groups.
From the Taliban perspective, they need to see a firm U.S. commitment on
complete troop withdrawal with no ambiguity in the wording.
A comprehensive ceasefire is,
unfortunately, more unlikely than not at this early stage of negotiations. The
Taliban worry about losing their battlefield momentum if they agree to a
ceasefire, and their battlefield momentum has won them considerable leverage. A
first, brief ceasefire in June 2018 was unusually successful, revealing a groundswell of popular support for
an end to the conflict.
The scenes of Taliban fighters celebrating in the streets with their opponents
caught the insurgent leadership by surprise. Taliban officials say the aim of
the previous ceasefire was to show the world that if they want to stop fighting,
they can. Until now, however, a long-term ceasefire has been conceivable to the
Taliban only in the context of an imminent transition to a negotiated peace
involving other Afghan parties. The Taliban are undoubtedly aware that a
ceasefire would be a significant political win for the government in Kabul and
morale booster for government forces, and thus undoubtedly are disinclined to
enable those gains.
In the meantime, the Taliban seem
poised to continue fighting. The group is configured to draw strength from its
performance on the battlefield, not from politics. As a Taliban fighter told
Crisis Group recently: “The reason everyone is talking about us is our military
power and fighting ability; otherwise, nobody would have been talking about
peace and reconciliation.” In some respects, the prospect of a peace agreement
threatens the Taliban’s existence in its current form. They do not seem likely
to give up the fight prematurely.
Previous rounds of U.S. talks with
the Taliban raised the prospect of negotiating a troop withdrawal but did not
address that issue head on. This time the Americans seem to have acceded to
Taliban insistence on front-loading discussions on a U.S. troop withdrawal,
before details are established on intra-Afghan political dialogue. This step
reflects U.S. interest in winding down its military involvement in Afghanistan
that has been building for years but has spiked sharply in the second year of
the Trump administration.
The fact that the U.S. has openly
been negotiating bilaterally on substantive issues with the Taliban is another
change from past discussions. There have been intermittent U.S.-Taliban
contacts since 2011, but never with as much publicity and as many expressions
of urgency. How deeply the latest talks have delved into the core substantive
issues will only be apparent once more details emerge.
U.S. envoy Khalilzad travelled to
Kabul for a meeting with President Ashraf Ghani after the talks in Doha.
Subsequently, on 28 January, Ghani made a formal address on state television
about a future Afghanistan without international troops – something his
administration has resisted envisioning for years. He mentioned recent air
strikes that reportedly killed civilians and expressed his hopes that Afghan
security forces would have a different role after a peace agreement. Still, the
president was cautious in his comments on the talks. Ghani reminded his
audience of the fate of his predecessor Mohammad Najibullah, who survived the
withdrawal of Soviet forces only to be killed by the Taliban during the chaos
that ensued.
Whereas Ghani may view a deal with
the Taliban as a threat to his position, some of his political opponents among
the Afghan elite seem more positive toward the developments in Doha, perhaps
hoping for roles in an interim administration that might be installed as part
of a peace agreement. Still, the entrenched view among anti-Taliban political
factions is that major compromises with their opponents – such as an entirely
new constitution – are unacceptable. They also are concerned that the U.S.
risks making a “separate peace” and leaving them behind. The U.S. will likely
need to use its considerable leverage with these Afghan political factions to
bring them to the table and encourage a deal with the Taliban.
As talks progressed last week, the
Taliban announced that their co-founder Abdul Ghani Baradar would assume the
title of deputy leader and become responsible for the Taliban “political
commission” based in Doha, making him their chief negotiator. This development
suggests the Taliban are serious about negotiations and may reflect a
constructive role by Pakistan – which had imprisoned Baradar in 2010, releasing
him only last October as U.S. negotiating efforts began to gain traction. The
appointment also cemented the role of Qatar as the main venue for negotiations,
despite efforts by other regional countries to serve as facilitators. The
Taliban had been waiting for the right moment to make this announcement, once
they believed that peace efforts had moved to a sufficiently advanced stage.
Baradar is a senior and widely respected member of the movement who is probably
empowered to test whether the group can achieve its goals through politics
rather than fighting.
Details do not appear to have been
hammered out yet, and, until results are shown in writing, it is also possible
that U.S. and Taliban negotiators have somewhat different understandings about
what has been agreed to so far. As details emerge from the talks, Crisis Group
will be watching for answers to these and other questions: to what degree are
the elements of the framework understanding part of a package deal that
includes a ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue? How will implementation of a
troop withdrawal be tied to these issues? Would the understandings so far –
especially on troop withdrawal – be implemented regardless of how much progress
is achieved in the subsequent stages of the process? To the extent that the
Taliban agree to negotiate with their Afghan opponents, would they talk to the
government or only to some yet-to-be-formed broader collection of Afghan power
holders? What will be the agenda of intra-Afghan talks, and, specifically, will
the current constitutional system be the starting point for hashing out future
political arrangements, or will everything be up for grabs?
The Taliban have since stated that
they do not envisage governing Afghanistan by themselves. In a meeting arranged
by Russia Taliban and Afghan politicians held talks. There is emerging the
possibility of dialogue between various players within the country. Pakistan
seems to have played a positive role and has helped bring the Taliban and US in
direct talks.
Russian hosted talks: Feb., 7, 2019: Russia on Tuesday
hosted talks between the Taliban and senior Afghan politicians aimed at
speeding the exit the United States.
The talks, held in Moscow’s President Hotel, which is owned by the Kremlin,
offered a clearer view of how the Taliban see an end to the 18-year war . While
the Afghan politicians, part of a delegation led by former President Hamid
Karzai, spoke of protecting the hard gains of the past two decades, the Taliban
denounced a new Afghan Constitution that lays out a system of governance built
at enormous cost. The Taliban representatives also offered a rare look at how
they now see the role of women. While they barred women from public life during
their time in power, they said they now believed in women’s rights, including
to education and work — a claim met with skepticism by some women in
Afghanistan. The Moscow gathering, which included a Taliban delegation led by
their chief negotiator, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, represented the most
significant contact between senior Afghan politicians and the Taliban since the
United States toppled the hard-line Islamist group from power at the end of
2001. The delegation headed
by Mr. Karzai consisted entirely of former officials, representatives of
political parties — many of them involved in the country’s bloody civil war —
and current members of Parliament
Negotiations:
Feb.,9,2019: Taliban was formed in the early 1990s by a faction of
"mujahideen", Muslim Afghan fighters who had resisted the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Taking advantage of the power vacuum
created by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the group easily expanded its
sphere of influence in the years following its formation and seized control of
Afghanistan in 1996. It held control of most of the country until being
overthrown after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in December 2001 following
the September 11 attacks.
After the toppling of the Taliban regime, the group's members were
ready and willing to accept a peace deal that would allow them a modest but
dignified existence in the country. Yet, politicians and decision-makers both
inside and outside Afghanistan, intoxicated by their decisive victory, refused
to entertain this option and swiftly kicked the Taliban off the negotiating
table. At the Bonn Conference, which determined the country's destiny, they
completely ignored the group's most basic demands and facilitated the formation
of a strictly anti-Taliban government. This was the fundamental mistake that
triggered the latest round of bloodshed in Afghanistan and brought us to where
we are today.Today, we are dealing with a group whose members view themselves
as holy warriors who managed to defeat an unjust foreign invasion.
In the past 17 years, countless Taliban leaders were killed,
humiliated and forced into exile by US forces. The ones that were not so lucky
ended up in cages at Guantanamo or Bagram, where they were subjected to
unspeakable torture and degradation. All this caused members of the group to
view their fight against US forces as inevitable, necessary and even
sacred.
Moreover, the governing powers forced members of the Taliban to
live in conditions so grave - as fugitives always on the run - that entering
the battleground became an easy, even natural, choice for them. Perhaps more
significantly, over the years the Taliban continued to expand its zone of
influence in Afghanistan and came to think of itself as the victor in the
conflict. The group also managed to win the hearts and minds of a portion of
the disenchanted rural population that views the central government as
ineffective in providing them with basic services and is overwhelmingly drowned
in endemic corruption.
Now, as an influential political and military entity recognised by
all involved parties, the Taliban wants to achieve two long-term goals: The complete withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Afghanistan and the establishment of an inclusive Islamic
government.
Of course, the group, which believes it has the upper hand in
negotiations, also has multiple short-term demands aimed at building
confidence. The Taliban wants its leaders to be taken off international
sanctions lists, its prisoners to be released and its political office in Doha
to be recognized internationally. Unlike the period following its defeat in
2001, the Taliban now believes it has earned the right to remain a substantial
political force in Afghanistan following a settlement. It has a clear political
vision and wants to set some parameters for its future international relations.
This is why it is also keen to sign bilateral non-aggression treaties with
regional and international powers.
Pakistan’s Role: Feb., 9, 2019: Pakistan, long at
odds with the United States over the war in Afghanistan, has begun to play a
behind-the-scenes but central role in supporting US peace talks with the Afghan
Taliban, including by facilitating travel to negotiations, US officials and
Taliban sources tell Reuters.
The Pakistani assistance, which has not been
reported in such detail before, also includes exerting pressure on Taliban
leaders who fail to cooperate, including by detaining members of the militants’
families, the insurgents say. The Pakistani role in the peace negotiations is a
delicate one, with Islamabad seeking to avoid demonstrating the kind of broad
influence over the Taliban that Washington has long accused it of having. One
senior US official, who declined to be identified, said of Pakistan’s role in
the talks: “We know it just wouldn’t be possible without their
support.”“They’ve facilitated some movement and travel to the discussions in
Doha,” the official said.
Taliban sources said Pakistan’s role in
bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table was instrumental. In one
instance, Islamabad sent a message to the militants through religious leaders
that they had to talk to the United States or risk a cut-off in ties.They
detained Taliban members’ families as a way to pressure them, a Taliban leader
told Reuters.
“I haven’t seen Pakistan so serious before,”
the senior Taliban leader said. The Taliban leader, who declined to be named,
said Pakistan had kept “unprecedented pressure” on the militants and their
close relatives over the past few months.“They made it clear to us that we
(Taliban) have to talk to the US and Afghan government,” the Taliban leader
said.
Pakistani sources suggest that the driver
behind their country’s support for the talks is not US aid but growing concerns
over the regional economic shockwaves that could follow an abrupt US pullout
from Afghanistan. Those concerns have been strengthened by Trump’s surprise
decision in December to withdraw completely from Syria, despite objections from
the Pentagon.
Islamabad says it cannot afford to see
Afghanistan slide into chaos just as Pakistan is trying to attract foreign
investors to shore up its own economy.“That is our main worry in all of this,”
said a senior official who is closely involved in cross-border relations. “We
have enough economic issues of our own to deal with already.”
An US
assessment of Afghan Peace Process: Apr., 22, 2019: The U.S.-Taliban talks are aimed at
resurrecting the path to peace and security for Afghanistan. As U.S. Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo tweeted in late January, “The U.S. is serious about pursuing
peace, preventing Afghanistan from continuing to be a space for international
terrorism & bringing forces home.” However, as currently structured, the
negotiations will create new challenges regardless of their stated success.
Zalmay Khalilzad, President Trump’s special representative for Afghanistan
reconciliation, may achieve some of the goals outlined by Pompeo, at least on
paper, but direct talks with the Taliban are unlikely to bring about an
enforceable deal that maintains the authority of the Afghan state and
significantly reduces the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. What’s
more, if Khalilzad does not achieve meaningful gains, the negotiations will
leave the U.S. and Afghan governments worse off than before. Afghanistan will
face not only continued violence but also less favorable conditions for
negotiating and governing, which will hamper Kabul’s and Washington’s abilities
to realize their key interests.
If the format of direct
talks persists, the Taliban stand to gain the most, while the Afghan and U.S.
governments are on track to make disproportionate concessions that will
diminish their leverage. The exclusion of the democratically elected,
internationally recognized Afghan government is particularly troubling and may
unintentionally undermine the legitimacy of the very state that the United
States and its partners have worked so hard to build up. Policymakers should be
concerned that the current format of the talks paints the United States as a
fatigued neocolonialist power; the Taliban as a unified, legitimate negotiating
partner and quasi-government; and the Afghan government as irrelevant and
dependent. Instead of elevating the Taliban and sidelining the Afghan
government, the Trump administration should insist on Afghan government
involvement in the peace process.
After
almost two decades of U.S. military involvement, including over 2,400 American military fatalities and $1.07 trillion spent by Washington directly and indirectly on
the war in Afghanistan, the country stands in stalemate and the U.S. public is
war weary.
The
Afghan government largely controls the country’s urban areas, and the Taliban
generally exert influence or control in rural areas, although district-level
data show a more complex picture. According to the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s October 2018 report, 63.5 percent of the
population resides in districts under Afghan government control or influence, a
slight decrease from the previous quarter. Quality of life has improved for
some Afghans since the 2001. Women in particular have experienced gradual
gains, although the country still has one of the world’s worst track records on
women’s rights. Nonetheless, in 2018, a record number of civilians—more than 3,800—died in the conflict, and experts have noted
that the Taliban are stronger militarily now than at any point since 2001.
While
the United States, NATO, and other countries continue to back Afghan government
forces, foreign support for the Taliban is still fueling the group’s
resilience. It has long been known that Islamabad provides support to the
Afghan Taliban, including critical sanctuaries within Pakistan. More recently,
the New York Times and others have reported that Iran has provided military support to the Taliban, and Russia has supplied arms.
Persisting
with a military approach is unlikely to provide the “win” that Washington and
Kabul are seeking. However, the diplomatic approach underway is also on track
to deliver little and create unintended consequences for the Afghan people and
government.
In
September 2018, Pompeo appointed Ambassador Khalilzad as the special
representative for Afghanistan reconciliation to pursue talks with the Taliban.
Khalilzad has asserted that the main U.S. objective is realizing an
intra-Afghan peace agreement that would ensure that terrorist organizations can
never again use Afghan territory to prepare attacks against the United States
or the international community. So far, the Afghan government has not been
directly involved, but it continues to insist on a seat at the table.
After
U.S.-Taliban talks in Qatar, Khalilzad announced at the end of January 2019
that he had agreed in principle to a framework for peace with the Taliban:
The Taliban would guarantee that Afghan territory would not be used by
terrorists, and the United States would withdraw its troops. However, this
overarching proposal is subject to further negotiations, and Khalilzad
has emphasized that “[n]othing is agreed until everything is
agreed, and ‘everything’ must include an intra-Afghan dialogue and
comprehensive ceasefire.”
In
mid-March, after a new round of talks, the United States and the Taliban had not reached a breakthrough. U.S. officials insisted that
they were close to a final agreement with the Taliban on barring terrorist
attacks coming out of Afghanistan and that they had made progress on detailing
a plan for withdrawing U.S. troops, but negotiators remain far from agreement
on the second point. Both sides are expected to deliberate with their
leadership before reconvening.
Many
observers have cautioned that the U.S.-Taliban talks will not get much further.
The Taliban are willing to negotiate about foreign troops departing, but they continue to reject a comprehensive ceasefire and direct talks
with the Afghan government, which they see as an illegitimate regime imposed by
foreign actors. This week, Taliban negotiators even objected to the number of Afghan government officials who were
planning to serve in a personal capacity on an Afghan delegation that was
expected to meet with Taliban representatives informally this weekend, forcing
the indefinite postponement of the intra-Afghan talks. The Taliban has also
continued to dismiss calls for a ceasefire and on April 12 launched its annual spring offensive, which they named “Victory.” These actions
raise concerns about the Taliban’s commitment to reaching an agreement,
especially one that includes the Afghan government. Serious doubts also remain
about their willingness and ability to reduce terrorist activity, even if they
commit to do so.
There
is also reason to be concerned that the United States might prioritize military
withdrawal before a comprehensive agreement is reached, even though Khalilzad
has expressed commitment to a full deal. President Trump has telegraphed his deep frustration with America’s longest war and his intent to pull American troops out of Afghanistan, which would
weaken the U.S. negotiating position. U.S. military plans in Afghanistan have been unclear in recent
months, with conflicting signals from the administration, the military and the
media. News outlets published contradictory reports about President Trump’s
plans to withdraw 5,000 to 7,000 of the 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, causing
anxiety in the Afghan government. Military leaders maintain that they have not received orders to begin a drawdown. Despite the
confusion, one fact is clear: A full-scale withdrawal would likely lead to the
Afghan government’s collapse.
While
many applaud what looks like steps toward peace, direct talks warp the relative
standing and legitimacy of the parties directly and indirectly involved, most
notably by hurting the Afghan government and elevating the Taliban. U.S.
negotiators are discussing the wrong transactions with the wrong people around
the table. The Taliban are directly involved, while the Afghan government
stands on the sidelines. The current approach also shrinks attention on
hard-fought human rights gains and local peace building efforts.
The
U.S.-Taliban talks have frustrated Afghan officials and pose a threat to the
government’s legitimacy. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has warned that a deal made
without the Afghan government could bring about the kind of devastating civil
strife that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. For a government
that is already hard-pressed to demonstrate its relevance and capacity,
exclusion from the talks has been seen as a step backward, reinforcing the idea
that the Afghan government stands in the shadow of the United States.
Undercutting the reputation and sovereignty of the Afghan government
counteracts the immense resources that have been put toward rebuilding state
institutions and participatory governance. Furthermore, the U.S.-Taliban talks
have created additional complications for Kabul. The presidential elections
have been postponed from April to July. Technical capacity has been the public justification for the delay, but others assert the timeline
was pushed back due to worries that a change in leadership would hurt the
U.S.-Taliban talks. Delaying the elections also leaves open the possibility of establishing an interim government to
facilitate reconciliation, although this would pose an even greater threat to
the legitimacy of government institutions.
The
optics of the direct talks further weaken the government’s standing, which in
turn will hurt U.S. interests in the region. Photos of U.S. officials meeting
with Taliban leaders in Qatar, with the Afghan government conspicuously missing,
send the message that the Afghan government is not central to the country’s
future. Adding insult to injury, Khalilzad has praised the Taliban’s deputy leader as a patriot while U.S.
officials refuse to attend meetings with the Afghan president’s national
security adviser, Hamdullah Mohib.
The
current format for negotiations is detrimental to the Afghan government’s legitimacy,
reducing its ability to be an effective partner to the United States in
countering terrorism and building stability in the region. It is not too late
to change course. If the widespread domestic and international calls for Afghan
government participation and an Afghan-led process are heeded, the government
could again reassert its role as an irreplaceable and necessary voice in
determining Afghanistan’s future. The Taliban may reject this path, but the
United States should not be enabling the Taliban’s goal of sidelining the
government.
Direct
U.S.-Taliban talks have provided the Taliban with a state-like platform.
Throughout the talks, the Taliban have gained influence over the country’s path
forward, affecting both concrete issues (such as elections) as well as the
broader discourse about the character and governance of the country. Analysts at RAND previously worried that the Afghan government
would not accept the Taliban as a legitimate negotiating partner. Today, the
Taliban do not accept the Afghan government as a legitimate counterpart, and
the current format of the talks adds credibility to that perspective. While the
Taliban decide for themselves who they send to represent their interests in the
negotiations, Afghan government participation is dictated by others.
The
negotiations also inaccurately convey that the Afghan Taliban are a unified
group, and that all Taliban will follow through on the commitments made by
their representatives. The death of Taliban founder Mullah Mohammed Omar fueled doubts
about the group’s chain of command (he died in 2013, but the Taliban did not
confirm this information until 2015). The Taliban’s new chief negotiator,
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was released from Pakistani detention at
Khalilzad’s request. The New York Times reports that he has brought “clarity” to the talks, but his current authority in
the organization is untested and it remains unclear if there is a structure that can enforce commitments
made by Taliban delegates.
The
concessions up for discussion also play to the Taliban’s favor. The Taliban are
expected to promise to ensure that Afghanistan will not be used to plan
terrorist attacks. Yet, it is not clear that the Taliban would actually try to
rein in terrorist activity or have the capacity to do so. They have made, and
failed to keep, similar pledges before. Following through on the commitment
this time around would require the Taliban to police over a dozen organizations that have aims to strike at least
five other countries. Especially relevant to U.S. security, the Taliban have
not demonstrated an ability or willingness to curtail al-Qaeda’s activities.
While the Taliban have contributed to the fight against Islamic State forces in
Afghanistan (also known as Islamic State Khorasan or ISK), the Taliban do not
hold sway over this group and are not expected to eradicate this resilient rival.
Even if the Taliban intend to stifle terrorism, they are likely making a
promise they cannot keep in return for one of their key objectives—the
departure of foreign troops. The United States would lack the capacity to
enforce an agreement once it draws down troops, further benefiting the Taliban
and leaving Kabul unprepared to take on mounting challenges from ISK or others.
Even in the most optimistic scenario, undercutting the government by discussing
these concessions without it hurts the future prospect of security and rule of
law, leaving an environment ripe for future threats.
From
the U.S. perspective, U.S.-Taliban talks may provide the appearance of
progress, but they are unlikely to significantly reduce the threat of
terrorism. Instead, they are sure to elevate the Taliban and undercut Kabul
while constraining the United States in its own counterterrorism efforts. The
United States is on track to relinquish leverage and its commitment to the
Afghan government in the hope of potential counterterrorism gains, despite
significant doubts that the Taliban will follow through on their end of the
bargain. Making commitments to the Taliban without the Afghan government in the
room makes the United States look more like a puppeteering neocolonial power
and less like a dependable ally. In fact, the United States could be bargaining
away its commitments to the Afghan government as part of the legally binding
U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Some commentators have argued that it is better for the United States to withdraw
from Afghanistan with a deal than to leave without one. However, this stance is
based on the assumption that the United States would still completely withdraw
from Afghanistan without a deal, which is unlikely. As it stands now, the
United States is betting on unlikely gains while giving up definite
concessions.
The
talks will also have enduring implications for human rights and the rule of law
in Afghanistan. Following their current trajectory, the negotiations could
result in the unintended consequences of reversing gains in women’s rights,
demeaning local peace building efforts and reempowering predatory leadership
structures (warlords). The negotiations’ exclusion of women and silence on
human rights are particularly concerning if the hope is to ensure real and
inclusive peace. Emphasizing high-level power brokering among armed groups
while overlooking locally organized, trust-building reconciliation efforts (or
at least indicating that they have little significance in the process of
designing the future of Afghanistan) sends a dangerous message that will be
hard to retract. Any negotiated deal with the Taliban may threaten progress in
these areas, but the current approach is on track to be particularly damaging
given that the Afghan government and other voices for these interests are
missing from the table, while their detractors are disproportionately
represented.
To
better advance Afghan and American interests, the United States should reassert
Kabul’s central role in the peace process and reaffirm its commitment to the
Afghan government. Most critically, the United States must insist on direct
Afghan government involvement in any peace process focused on the nation’s
political and security future. Excluding the Afghan government undermines
national and international efforts to build institutions, legitimacy and the
conditions for lasting security. The Taliban may reject Afghan government
participation, but unless U.S. negotiators are planning to sidestep the
government throughout the process, the talks would eventually hit this
roadblock anyway. If this disagreement is likely to derail the talks sooner or
later, it would be better to broach it before further undermining the Afghan
government’s authority. Some observers may say that the U.S. government has
already gone too far down the path of direct talks to change course now, but
Afghan government involvement aligns with an array of U.S. policy statements
and the tone of Khalilzad’s April trip to Afghanistan. To bolster the Afghan
government in the negotiations and assuage its concerns of abandonment,
Washington should consistently reiterate its comprehensive commitment to Kabul,
including diplomatic, governance and economic support, as well as security
resources.
The
manner in which the Afghan government participates in the talks also matters. One idea being discussed is that the Afghan negotiating team
could include both government officials and other political leaders. However,
this could inadvertently undermine elected government officials, elevate
warlords and exacerbate fractures. As a sovereign state, the Afghan government
should be the primary representative of the country and should have the final
say on who is part of the Afghan negotiating team. Inclusivity matters, but it
should not be used as justification for undermining the government.
Implementing
these recommendations may lead to a longer U.S. presence in Afghanistan than
administration officials would like to consider. It is important to acknowledge
the human and financial costs of deploying U.S. forces and civilians abroad, as
well as the political costs for policymakers. But officials must also recognize
that pulling out without careful planning and communication with Afghan
counterparts may end the war for U.S. forces but will not create peace.
Departing after signing a deal that elevates insurgents and is nearly
impossible to enforce would leave Afghanistan plagued by violence and the
international community vulnerable to insecurity and terrorism emanating from
the region.
It
is encouraging to see the Trump administration prioritizing diplomatic
strategies, but diplomacy can be a weapon of war, too. In this case, the
Taliban’s amplified power and the Afghan government’s damaged standing are
likely to outlast the U.S.-Taliban talks or any deal they could deliver. The
United States should adjust its strategy to ensure that the reconciliation
process strengthens the role of the Afghan government and the foundation for
lasting peace, instead of weakening both.
Afghanistan Data
Total
area:
250,000 sq mi (647,500 sq km)
Population (2014 est.): 31,822,848
(growth rate: 2.3%); birth rate: 38.8/1000; infant mortality rate: 117.23/1000;
life expectancy: 50.49; density per sq mi: 123.7
Capital
and largest city
(2011 est.): Kabul, 3,097,300
Other
large cities:
Kandahar, 349,300; Mazar-i-Sharif, 246,900; Charikar, 202,600; Herat, 171,500
Monetary
unit:
Afghani
National name: Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Afghanestan
Languages: Dari
Persian, Pashtu (both official), other Turkic and minor languages
Ethnicity/race: Pashtun
42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
Religion: Sunni
Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
National Holiday: Independence
Day, August 19
Literacy rate:28.1% (2000 est.)
Economic summary:
GDP/PPP (2013 est.): $45.3 billion; per capita
$1,100.
Real
growth rate: 3.1% (2013 est.).
Inflation:
6.8% (2013 est.).
Unemployment: 35% (2008 est.).
Arable land: 11.95%.
Agriculture: opium, wheat, fruits, nuts;
wool, mutton, sheepskins, lambskins.
Labor
force: 15 million; agriculture 80%, industry 10%, services 10%.
Natural
resources: natural gas, petroleum, coal, copper, chromate, talc, barites,
sulfur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones.
Industries: small-scale production of
textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement; hand woven carpets;
natural gas, coal, copper.
Exports: $376 million; note - not including illicit
exports or reexports (2012): opium, fruits and nuts, hand woven carpets, wool,
cotton, hides and pelts, precious and semiprecious gems.
Imports: $6.39 billion (2012): capital goods, food,
textiles, petroleum products.
Major trading partners: Pakistan,
India, U.S., Germany, Russia, China, Tajikistan.
Communications: Telephones: main
lines in use: 13,500 (2012); mobile cellular: 18 million (2012).
Radio broadcast stations: AM 21,
FM 5, shortwave 1 (broadcasts in Pashtu, Afghan Persian (Dari), Urdu, and
English) (2007).
Television broadcast stations: at least
7 (1 government-run central television station in Kabul and regional stations
in 6 of the 34 provinces) (2007).Internet users:1,000,000 (2012).
Transportation : Highways: total:
42,150 km; (2012).Waterways: 1,200 km; chiefly Amu Darya, which handles
vessels up to about 500 DWT.Ports and harbors: Kheyrabad, Shir Khan. Airports:
52 (2012).
International disputes: World's
largest producer of opium; poppy cultivation increased 57%, from 115,000
hectares in 2011 to 180,000 hectares in 2012. The
Taliban and other antigovernment groups participate in and profit from the
opiate trade, which is a key source of revenue for the Taliban inside
Afghanistan; widespread corruption and instability impede counterdrug efforts;
most of the heroin consumed in Europe and Eurasia is derived from Afghan opium;
Afghanistan is also struggling to respond to a burgeoning domestic opiate
addiction problem; vulnerable to drug money laundering through informal
financial networks; regional source of hashish (2013).
Peace Process: May, 29, 2019: A group of Afghan politicians led by former President Hamid Karzai and
members of the Taliban led by the deputy leader of the group Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar on Tuesday attended a ceremony in Moscow on 100 years of
Afghanistan-Russia diplomatic relations Addressing the ceremony, Taliban deputy
leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar said “the Islamic Emirate wants peace”, but
“the hurdles on the way of peace should be removed”.“The key barrier to peace
is the presence of foreign forces,” Baradar reiterated, referring to the
Taliban’s longtime stance on the presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan
who toppled the regime in the aftermath of 9/11 ,” Baradar added. “The Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan wants friendly relations with all its neighbors and will not allow
anyone to use Afghanistan’s soil against others,” said Latif Khan Mutaqi, a
member of Taliban delegation
Today’s meeting in
Moscow marks the first time that a senior leader from the insurgency holding
talks face-to-face with the Afghan politicians. Karzai also called on
the US and Russia to help Afghanistan to reach peace and stability.
Fareed:
10 Years After bin Laden Raid, the Threat of Islamist Terrorism Has Faded
“This weekend marks the 10th anniversary of the operation,
code-named Neptune Spear, that killed Osama bin Laden,” Fareed writes in his latest Washington Post column.
“It’s an opportunity to reflect on the state of Islamist terrorism and radical
Islam more generally. And the initial diagnosis is clear: The movement is in
bad shape.”
The number of deaths caused by terrorism around the world has
fallen sharply since 2014, and right-wing extremism poses a greater threat in
the US, Fareed notes. As a political movement, Islamism is flailing, as Iraqis
and Syrians fled ISIS’s caliphate “in droves,” and as Egyptians protested the
Muslim Brotherhood government there. Today, the appeal of jihadist
groups—whether in Afghanistan, Nigeria, or the Horn of Africa—largely centers
on local grievances, not ideology, a “major reversal from the glory days of
al-Qaeda” and its global aims.
“For America, there is one big lesson,” Fareed writes: “Stay
calm. In the months after 9/11, we panicked, sacrificing liberties at home and
waging war abroad, terrified that we were going to be defeated by this new
enemy. This is part of a worrying American tradition of exaggerating the
threats we face, from the Soviet Union to Saddam Hussein. As we scour the world
for new foes, let’s learn to right-size our adversaries and find a way to run
fast but not run scared.”
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