India Converted Kashmir into Concentration Camps By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 195 SS 66)

India Converted Kashmir into Concentration Camps By Sajjad Shaukat (JR195 SS 66)

Massacre of the Jews through various tactics of torture in the concentration camps, erected by Hitler before and during the World War 11 is still shocking and condemnable. It was a big tragedy, popularly known as the Holocaust, conducted by the forces of state terrorism.

According to the Zionist-controlled American leading think-tanks and media, “Genocide of 5 [or six] million Jews was carried out at the extermination camps, using tools of mass murder, such as gas chambers of Germany, Poland, Austria and Alsace”

But, impartial researchers have opined: “All Jews were not killed through gas chambers, but also due to hunger, diseases and depression.”

Renowned historians agree that Hitler was impulsive ruler, guided by ungoverned temper—he was the most ambitious leader who believed in the principle of “world power or downfall.” He had a firm faith in the superiority of German race and inferiority of other races. Anti-Semitism and the Nazi ideology played a major role in Hitler’s thinking. He believed that the path to German greatness was through aggressive military actions. He started a programme of enormous armament by developing German military on modern lines.

After coming to power, Adolf Hitler’s internal policies were authoritarian and totalitarian. The secret police-Gestapo was formed to deal with the slightest indication of opposition. He mixed politics with religious fervor and massacred several Jews in the concentration camps. 

Hitler and the Nazi Party had come to power with the avowed purpose of conquering colonies and foreign lands for the Germans. They must have a living space-‘Lebensraum’ as the Nazis called it for the living surplus German population and find raw materials and markets for German industrial goods.

It was due to Hitler’s unskilled diplomacy that militarization of Germany alarmed France, England and Russia. Thus, they humiliated the Germans, as their country was defeated in the World War II.

Learning no lesson from ‘Hilterite’ Germany, India converted Kashmir into concentration camps. In this respect, Indian extremist Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government ended special status of the Jummu and Kashmir on August 5, this year by abolishing articles 35A and 370 of the Constitution in a malevolent attempt to turn Muslim majority into minority in the Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK).

The upper house of India’s parliament also passed a bill proposing the state of Jammu and Kashmir which includes the Kashmir Valley and the Ladakh area—be split into two federal territories. Jammu and Kashmir will have a state legislature, and Ladakh will be ruled directly by New Delhi.

India which already had 500,000 troops in the Indian Controlled Kashmir sent almost 30000 extra troops, while escalating tensions with Pakistan.

Despite, India’s excessive deployment of troops in the Kashmir region, expulsion of Hindu pilgrims, tourists, closure of educational institutions, arrest of the Kashmiri leaders and imposition of curfew, Kashmiris have accelerated the war of liberation, being waged for their right of self-determination, which was also recgonised by the United Nations resolutions.

In fact, India is implementing brutal scheme through military operation to suppress the Kashmiris’ struggle. Indian forces have already intensified state terrorism, as every day innocent Kashmiris are being martyred. In the recent past, Indian forces again used cluster bombs on the Kashmiris. Many Kashmiris have become permanently blind and paralyzed due to pellet guns shots, including chemical weapons used by the ruthless Indian forces.

In this connection, human rights groups and even Western media have condemned Indian illegal measures and human rights violations which continue unabated.

The Independent wrote on August 13, 2019: “Kashmir’s tight security and communications lockdown remained in place…as reports emerged of daily essentials running low. Restrictions on almost all movement in the disputed Himalayan region were strictly enforced…With internet and phone lines still cut off since the decision on 5 August to strip Kashmir of its special constitutional status and the right to make its own laws, the valley has become the setting for all-out information warfare….soldiers stopping vehicles in the centre of Srinagar, causing a traffic jam just as a military surveillance drone flew over….The network of barbed passageways was unprecedented…entire Srinagar city has been knitted in razor wire to seek our silence and obedience…closure of mosques curtailed the religious freedoms of Kashmiri Muslims…Restrictions and curtailment of this fundamental religious freedom of millions of Kashmiri Muslims constitutes a serious violation of applicable international human rights law, to which India is a party.”

The New York Times wrote on August 10, 2019: “On the streets of Srinagar, Kashmir’s biggest city, security officers tied black bandannas over their faces, grabbed their guns and took positions behind checkpoints. People glanced out the windows of their homes, afraid to step outside. Many were cutting back on meals and getting hungry….Shops were shut. A.T.M.s had run dry…internet, mobile phones, even landlines…remained severed, rendering millions of people incommunicado…life under lockdown in Kashmir and found a population that felt besieged, confused, frightened and furious by the seismic event…Several residents said they had been beaten up by security forces for simply trying to buy necessities like milk. Many Kashmiris see India as an oppressive and foreign ruler. Tens of thousands of troops from the Indian Army, the Central Reserve Police Force (a paramilitary unit) and the Kashmiri State police have been deployed in just about every corner of the valley. In some villages, even remote ones, a soldier was posted outside the gate of each family’s home….The lockdown’s effects are visible everywhere. Schools have been closed. Parks are deserted. Baby food is running out…At the Lala Ded hospital, sick people had traveled more than a day to get here, only to find a skeleton crew. Many doctors couldn’t get to work. Many patients were curled up on the floor…Many Kashmiris fear that Mr. Modi’s sweeping decision, which also wiped away a decades-old provision that gave Kashmiris special land ownership rights, will encourage millions of Hindu migrants from India to move into the valley, fabled for its stunning alpine scenery and fertile soil. Kashmiris fear they will be turned into a minority in their own land.”

On August 12, 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) demanded the Indian government to lift the communications blackout and step back in Kashmir. In a statement, the HRW South Asia Director Meenakshi Ganguly said since one week Kashmiris remain mostly under lockdown and their leaders are under arrest.

In a press release on August 13, 2019, Amnesty International condemned a decision by India’s Supreme Court to allow New Delhi to continue a security crackdown and communications blackout in Kashmir. Urging New Delhi to ease restrictions imposed in Kashmir, Amnesty warned that “a complete clampdown on civil liberties is only likely to increase tensions, alienate the people and increase the risk of further human rights violations”.

Notably, various forms of state terrorism have been part of a deliberate campaign by the Indian army and paramilitary forces against the Muslim Kashmiris, particularly since 1989. It has been manifested in brutal tactics like crackdowns, curfews, illegal detentions, massacre, targeted killings, sieges, burning the houses, torture, disappearances, rape, breaking the legs, molestation of Muslim women and killing of persons through fake encounters.

Besides Human Rights Watch, in its report on July 2, 2015, the Amnesty International has highlighted extrajudicial killings of the innocent persons at the hands of Indian security forces in the Indian Held Kashmir. The report said, “Tens of thousands of security forces are deployed in Indian-administered Kashmir…the Armed Forces Special Powers Act allows troops to shoot to kill suspected militants or arrest them without a warrant…not a single member of the armed forces has been tried in a civilian court for violating human rights in Kashmir…this lack of accountability has in turn facilitated other serious abuses…India has martyred one 100,000 people. More than 8,000 disappeared (while) in the custody of army and state police.”

It is of particular attention that in 2008, a rights group reported unmarked graves in 55 villages across the northern regions of the IOK. Then researchers and other groups reported finding thousands of mass graves without markers. In this respect, in August, 2011, Indian Jammu and Kashmir State Human Rights Commission officially acknowledged in its report that innocent civilians killed in the two-decade conflict have been buried in unmarked graves.

Foreign sources and human rights organisations have revealed that unnamed graves include those innocent persons, killed by the Indian military and paramilitary troops in the fake encounters, including those who were tortured to death by the RAW. In the recent past, more unmarked graves have been discovered.

In this regard, in its report, China’s leading News Agency Xinhua has unearthed more unnamed graves in Poonch of the Indian Controlled Kashmir. The report quoted the statement of Sofi Aziz Joo, caretaker of a graveyard as saying, “Police and Army used to bring those bodies and direct me to bury them. The bodies were usually bullet-ridden, mutilated, faces disfigured and sometimes without limbs and heads.”

It is noteworthy that in a series of tweets on August 12, this year, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has likened India’s abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir state’s autonomy to Nazi ideology, and warned the international community that inaction would be similar to appeasing Hitler Munich.

Prime Minister Khan further stated: “The ideology of Hindu Supremacy, like the Nazi Aryan Supremacy, will not stop in Kashmir…the Hindu Supremacists version of Hitler’s Lebensraum would lead to the suppression of Muslims in India and eventually lead to targeting of Pakistan…Attempt is to change demography of Kashmir through ethnic cleansing”.

Addressing the session of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly in Muzaffarabad on August 14, this year, Prime Minister Imran Khan said: “He has assumed responsibility of raising the voice of Kashmir in the world by exposing the true face of RSS ideology dominant in India is dangerous for all…he has tried to fully expose the true face of BJP and its leader Modi before the world in his statements and tweets…ideology of RSS which was inspired from Nazi party of Hitler. RSS followers considered themselves superior to other nations in India. The RSS ideology hates Muslims and Christians for their ruling of India. In their agenda, ethnic cleansing of Muslims is also included…the extremist mindset and ideology of Hindus was responsible for killing of Mahatma Gandhi. This ideology also showed its ugly face in Gujarat carnage of Muslims…the intensity of violence against Muslims in Occupied Kashmir during the last five years is also due to this fanatic ideology”.

The premier also warned that Pakistan will respond with full force, if India launches any aggression against Pakistan, and said, “not only our valiant armed forces, but the whole nation is ready to defend the motherland”.

Taking cognizance of revoking special status of the Jummu and Kashmir by New Delhi, including restrictions on the Kashmiris, Pakistan celebrated its Independence Day on August 14 in showing solidarity with the Kashmiris and observed Indian Independence Day on August 15 as the Black Day in Pakistan.

It is because of joint efforts of Pakistan and China that the United Nations Security Council will hold a session to discuss the situation in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir and India’s decision to revoke the special status of occupied Jammu and Kashmir on Friday (August 16, 20119).

Undoubtedly, we can conclude that India converted Kashmir into concentration camps.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Modi’s Return to Power Will further Strengthen ‘Hindutva’ By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 194 SS 54)

Modi’s Return to Power Will further Strengthen ‘Hindutva’ By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 194 SS 54)

In the Indian general elections of 2019, BJP and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) won huge majority in the Lok Sabha, with the BJP sweeping up 303 seats on its own—21 seats more than it won in the 2014 elections. Across most of North and Central India, BJP candidates also won with bigger vote shares and wider victory margins than in 2014.

Hindu majority was mobilized on ‘hate Muslim’ slogans and ‘anti-Pakistan’ jargons, while the incessant and unjust Indian propaganda against the Muslims and Pakistan was beyond anybody’s cognition, which still keeps on going.

Indian Prime Nerendar Modi’s extremist party BJP had got a land sliding triumph in the Indian elections 2014 on the basis of anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan slogans. Indian election-campaign against Islam, Muslims and Pakistan enabled BJP hardliner Modi to become Indian prime minister. Whereas, the Muslim community in India had felt alienated, frightened and perturbed, as most of them were also effectively disenfranchised.

Muslims were already aware of Modi’s agenda to reduce the Muslim community in India to second class citizens, and had felt nervous and gloomy. Their anxiety was multiplying due to the fact that during the election-campaign, the BJP was also speaking of Hindu deep seated animosity against Pakistan and Pakistani public.

In this regard, various developments like unprecedented rise of Hindu extremism, persecution of Muslims, assaults on Muslims, including their places of worships and property by the fanatic Hindu mobs, inclusion of Hindu religious books in curriculum, forced conversion of Muslims into Hindus and ban on beef and cow slaughter clearly showed that encouraged by the Hindu fundamentalist groups such as BJP, RSS VHP, Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena, including other similar parties have been promoting religious and ethnic chauvinism in India by propagating the ideology of ‘Hindutva’ (Hindu nationalism) which is the genesis of Hindu terrorism.

However, BJP played the same anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan card to gain votes of a majority of Hindus in the general elections 2019. Therefore, since the Prime Minister Modi returned to power, he has been implementing anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan agenda with the support of fanatic coalition outfits to further strengthen the ideology of ‘Hindutva’. 

It is notable that very tension escalated rapidly between New Delhi and Islamabad when on February 27, this year, in response to the Indian so-called pre-emptive air strike near the town of Balakot, close to the border with Pakistan’s sector of Kashmir, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shot down two Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets and launched aerial strikes at six targets in the Indian Occupied (IOK).

In this respect, the aftermath of the false flag terror attack at Pulwama and the so-called surgical strikes were manipulated by New Delhi against Islamabad as the election-stunt. But, truth about India’s surgical strikes unmasked, when Indian top civil and military leaders failed in providing any evidence.

The myth of Indian surgical strikes was further exposed, when, referring to the statement of the Indian India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who admitted on April 18, 2019 that no Pakistani soldier or citizen died in the air strike carried out by IAF across the border in Balakot, Director General of Pakistan Army’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Maj-Gen. Asif Ghafoor stated on April 19, 2019: “After India finally admitted that their so-called air strike carried on February 26 in Balakot caused no deaths and casualties…Hopefully, so will be about other false Indian claims [such as] surgical strike of 2016, denial of shooting down of two Indian Air Force [IAF] jets by Pakistan Air Force and claims about F16…Better late than never.”

Besides, owing to the huge mandate of the BJP, violence has been let loose, with “Jai Shri Ram”–a slogan that roughly translates to “Hail Lord Ram”. As Modi was named as the leader of the NDA for a second time, minority communities especially Muslims have made to live in fear by the extremist Hindus.

In this connection, in the aftermath of the election results, news reports have highlighted different cases in which Dalits and particularly Muslims were violently targeted for reasons as varied as allegedly possessing beef, protesting against caste-based discrimination or simply being Muslim. Particularly, various incidents of arrests, violent assaults on the Muslims, including even killings by the Hindus have been recorded.

In one of the worst incidents, a 15-year-old Muslim boy was set on fire on July 29, this year by four Hindus in Chandauli district of Uttar Pradesh. The teenager was allegedly forced to chant Jai Shri Ram.

While, in the run-up to May’s general elections and after the results were declared, Mamata Banerjee, chief minister of Bengal, was constantly heckled by BJP mobs to shout, “Jai Shri Ram”.

Nevertheless, persecution of the Muslims continues unabated in India and the BJP-ruled central government has been largely silent in this regard.

In this connection, Hindu-Muslim communal tension flared up in Old Delhi’s Hauz Qazi on July 1, this year after 3 or 4 Hindu boys, including 45-year-old Sanjeev Kumar Gupta tortured a Muslim boy Aas Mohammad (20) on alleged wrong parking of motor bike on night of June 30, 2019 outside his house next to the temple. Muslims of the area observed shutter down strike. During protest, another scuffle took place between Hindus and Muslims, which resulted into increased tensions. A group of Muslims damaged two Mandirs in the area. However, no casualty took place.

India’s Central Reserve Police (CRPF) cordoned the areas of Darya Gunj, Pahar Gunj, Lal Kunwan, Jamia Masjid and Chandni Chowk with unannounced curfew like situation. New Delhi ensured a complete black-out of the incident in print and electronic media.

According to the India Today, “Politicians giving communal spin to the incident: Sanjiv Kumar, man involved parking scuffle in Delhi, speaks to India Today...Reiterating that there was no intention to give the Hauz Qazi incident a communal colour…Politicians end up giving communal colour to everything. Whether it is the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), there is no exception.”

It is mentionable that even foreign print and electronic media and analysts opined, “Modi’s election win is a victory for far right Hindu nationalism…India’s secular democracy is under threat…BJP’s record in 2015-2019 has been divisive to say the least. The party has marginalised religious minorities, especially Muslims, from public life with many, as a result, being lynched by Hindu nationalists in the name of cow protection…Jingoism and Islamophobia has propelled the BJP to an even stronger showing than in 2014. A Modi victory puts India’s 200 million Muslims in danger…Modi is part of the large Hindu supremacist family…In his home state of Odisha, he furthered India’s sectarian divide, pushed the idea of Hindu supremacy and with that, violence against Muslims, Christians and other minorities…Modi is radicalising Muslims.”

It is noteworthy that P.M. Modi has been consolidating his grip on power through hand-picked choices, based upon anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan rhetoric. He has included hardliner and extremist ministers in the cabinet, while ministries of some ministers were changed by replacing them. And the appointments to the top posts in the external and domestic intelligence agencies were made by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is the chairman of this committee. In this regard, the Modi government on June 26, 2019 appointed a new head of the intelligence agency RAW. Reports suggests that Samant Goel, an officer from the national police cadre, IPS, as is the national security adviser Ajit Doval, played a key role in India’s air attack on Balakot. The government has also appointed senior IPS officer Arvind Kumar as the director of the Intelligence Bureau. He is said to be as an expert on the troubled disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Nonetheless, we can note that the Constitution declares India to be a secular state, granting equal rights to the religious minorities, but in practice, ideology of ‘Hindutva’ prevails. Hindu politics and culture, dominated by the extremist Hindu parties have been propagating ‘Hindutva’ agenda. After the election victory of the BJP and its coalition parties led by the fundamentalist Prime Minister Modi, Muslim anxiety in India is increasing due to the fact that like the previous elections, during the election-campaign of 2019, Hindu majority was mobilized on the anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim slogans. Now, encouraged by his unprecedented return to power, Modi will further strengthen ‘Hindutva’

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan enjoyed a warm visit to Washington this week, with his hosts, from President Donald Trump to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Lindsey Graham, all affirming the importance in particular of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. For a Pakistani government that viewed Khan’s visit as an opportunity to reset a relationship that suffered immensely during the early months of the Trump administration, it was an encouraging sign. The bilateral relationship has indeed come a long way since 2017 and 2018, when Trump threatened a harder line on   tweeted angrily about Islamabad’s “lies and deceit,” and suspended American security assistance. The main reason for this about-face is rooted in Trump’s increasingly urgent desire to end the long war in Afghanistan—a war he often criticized before becoming president and has never seemed comfortable continuing, even when he announced a new South Asia strategy in August 2017 that entailed staying the course. ..

General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's powerful military chief, accompanied the prime minister, along with intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed. Khan and his delegation also held meetings with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US congressional leaders, and the heads of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

For Trump, one of the most significant outcomes of the Washington visit by PM Khan and the military leadership will be Islamabad's renewed commitment to finding an inclusive and peaceful end to the long war in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the visit has been a win on two fronts. First, Khan has been able to generate significant positive momentum through the visit while his government faces stiff opposition at home. This will help Khan in Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan's leadership has engaged directly with the Trump administration at the highest level, something seen as key in building a working relationship. It has also fought its case on counterterrorism efforts, action under the Financial Action Task Force, and Pakistan's regional priorities both at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Faced with a short timetable on reaching an agreement before the September [Afghan] presidential election, Washington sees an intra-Afghan dialogue and a ceasefire as essential towards finalising a withdrawal, which will be crucial in Trump's reelection bid next year.

Imran Khan has indicated that Pakistan will exert maximum pressure on the Taliban to agree to an intra-Afghan process. It's also significant that the PM mentioned that Pakistan would like the Taliban to be part of an inclusive presidential election. This indicates that the timeline of concrete action on Afghanistan will be swift in the coming months.

In recent months, the Trump White House has decided to aggressively pursue peace talks in Afghanistan and to enlist Islamabad as a key partner in helping launch and sustain negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistani government sought an audience with Trump and White House contacts of the Saudi connection arranged a meeting .The administration agreed and invited Khan to Washington in large part to recognize and reward Pakistan for its help with the Afghan reconciliation process over the past year, bringing U.S. government officials and Taliban representatives together for multiple bilateral talks in Qatar. However, despite this progress, it would be premature to conclude—as many in Islamabad would like to—that the relationship with Washington has been reset. A restoration of security assistance, a resumption of highlevel dialogue or other signs of repaired relations are not on the horizon anytime soon. In essence, from the Trump administration’s perspective, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a much with Trump. Washington’s two core priorities with Pakistan are Islamabad’s assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistani counterterrorism efforts.

To be sure, the Trump administration is open to broader cooperation, particularly when it comes to trade and investment. During Khan’s visit, an official White House statement, and Trump himself, made reference to U.S.-Pakistan trade cooperation, while Khan met with both the secretaries of the treasury and commerce. However, for the Trump administration, there’s little real interest in truly broadening the scope of the relationship until it believes Pakistan is doing more on the Afghan reconciliation and counterterrorism fronts. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a reset is in order—or that Trump even wants one. This leads to the second reason why a reset isn’t in the cards: Islamabad is unlikely to deliver in a way that satisfies Washington. The Trump administration wants Pakistan to convince the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire and to formal negotiations with the Afghan government. Yet Taliban insurgents have categorically rejected these demands and appear to be interested only in a deal with Washington that involves the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban, of course, enjoys ample leverage and comes into talks from a position of renewed strength. It is waging intense battlefield offensives, holds more territory than at any time since the U.S. invasion following 9/11, and most importantly has little urgency to conclude a deal. This means that any entity—even one like Pakistan that has close ties to the Taliban, and considerable leverage over it—will struggle to get the insurgents to agree to American demands. Similarly, Washington wants Islamabad to take irreversible steps against terrorist groups in Pakistan that target both Afghanistan and India. It has not been satisfied with Pakistan’s recent  moves which have involved the arrests of dozens of militants . Third, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains beset by tensions rooted in fundamental policy differences. Despite recent bumps in its ties with India, Washington remains committed to forging a deep, strategic partnership with New Delhi, Pakistan’s bitter enemy. Similarly, Islamabad is closely allied with China, Washington’s top strategic rival. In effect, Washington and Islamabad enjoy deep partnerships with  —a geopolitical reality that constrains closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. Indeed, hypothetical scenarios that could actually boost bilateral ties—such as Washington scaling down its ties with India and easing up on pressuring Islamabad to detain terrorists who target India, or Islamabad pivoting away from Beijing—are not in the offing. More broadly, each country pursues foreign policy objectives throughout Asia that go against the other’s interests: Pakistan seeks to limit the influence of India, while the U.S. is pursuing an Indo-Pacific strategy that is meant to push back against China. Finally, the Trump administration does not support the type of diplomacy that one would expect to see in a rebooted relationship. It prioritizes bursts of transactional diplomacy over sustained and formal dialogue. In effect, there’s no going back to the early years of the Obama administration, when the two sides launched an albeit short-lived strategic dialogue, focused on a variety of topics, not all of them security-related. The Trump administration simply isn’t interested in investing the resources in such broad and extended exchanges, which, if they were to take place, could go a long way toward generating more confidence and goodwill for a relationship that badly needs new infusions of both, even after Khan’s positive visit.

The "do more" rhetoric has gone away; it has just gone a bit softer. Whereas in the past this message would be delivered forcefully and threateningly, this time around it was likely conveyed gently, with Trump and other US officials inviting Islamabad to take its assistance in Afghanistan to another level. What's next with the Taliban talks depends on Islamabad's next move, and more importantly how the Taliban responds. Washington's asks of Islamabad have become more ambitious. It's one thing for Pakistan to simply bring the  Taliban  to the table. It is a very different thing for Pakistan to convince them  to agree to demands - a ceasefire and talks with Kabul - that it has consistently and categorically rejected to this point.

The bottom line is that while Khan’s trip to Washington may have been full of smiles and good vibes, and it may have even solidified U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be mistaken for a reset in troubled ties. This newfound comity can’t mask the reality that U.S.-Pakistan relations are still in need of major repair . The demands from Washington have not changed. While it is significant that the US has publicly acknowledged Pakistan's efforts in pushing the reconciliation process and initial steps to curb militant groups, privately the US would have rehashed its menu of concerns and sought commitments on them.

Afghan Peace Process: July, 30, 2019: THE Afghan peace process has entered a crucial phase, making it even trickier for Pakistan. As many had anticipated, Afghanistan remained the main point of deliberations held between the Pakistani and US leaderships in Washington, D.C. last week. Prime Minister Imran Khan has pledged to pursue the Afghan Taliban leadership to initiate talks with the Afghan government.

During the prime minister’s visit, most US leaders and officials acknowledged and appreciated Pakistan’s role in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for talks. The US administration didn’t use the mantra of ‘do more’ this time, but politely requested Pakistan to continue playing a constructive role in the Afghan peace process. Pakistan’s leadership categorically agreed to take up the task. On the other hand, the Taliban have also indicated that they will accept the invitation of meeting the Pakistani prime minister. The meeting will indicate how much influence Pakistan still has over the Taliban.

So far, the Taliban’s position on the option of direct talks with the government of President Ashraf Ghani has remained stiff. However, they had indicated that if their negotiations with the US succeed, they would then initiate negotiations with other Afghan stakeholders including the Afghan government. Yet it remains to be seen whether or not they change their position on initiating a separate talks channel with Kabul. In the event they show reluctance and deny Pakistan’s request, will Pakistan adopt a coercive approach? If so, it will be interesting to see how it affects the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan.

For Pakistan, restoring its relationship with the US is important not only for speeding up economic recovery but also for rebalancing its regional geostrategic position. The country had been suffering because of its dissimilar approaches towards the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. In recent years, it has tried to diversify its strategic partnerships, ranging from Moscow to Beijing, and Istanbul to Riyadh, which also entailed some valuable defence partnerships. But it appears as though the policymakers did not see these partnerships as a counterbalance to growing US unfriendliness. The strengthening strategic partnership between India and the US also affected the Pakistani establishment’s policy choices, forcing it to review its approaches towards Afghanistan and the Taliban.  

Pakistan, however, has reviewed its approaches before taking more losses. The country is set to gain in the whole process as India has failed to develop its relevance in the Afghan peace process. On this ground alone, Pakistan’s establishment considers it a major achievement. Similarly, the US offer of mediation over the Kashmir issue has put pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It has happened at a time when the Trump administration was not comfortable with India’s recent multibillion-dollar deals with Russia, and trade tensions between the two nations were rising.

Mr Khan’s visit to the US is bringing the country back onto the regular diplomacy tracks. To keep this momentum, the government has to deliver on Afghanistan. The probability of direct talks between the Taliban and Kabul would be one challenge, but influencing the former to commit to a lasting ceasefire could prove another daunting task.  .

For Pakistan, the Taliban will remain a challenge at both stages. The US and other major global actors, including China and Russia, are relying on Pakistan — and if the Taliban refuses to listen to Pakistan, it would be a disaster for the establishment. It is a known fact that many Taliban field commanders are not happy with Pakistan, and the Taliban leadership resists Pakistani pressure citing this as their argument. What can Pakistan do in such a worst-case scenario? Arrests of dissenting elements when they enter Pakistan would be an option, which has been used in the past. Many commanders apparently still have families inside Pakistan, and the government can use this factor as a tool.

Pakistan might also have other options to pressurise the Taliban leadership. The Haqqanis could be effective in the Taliban decision-making process, but they have a limit to their influence. Can Pakistan envision a complete disconnect with the Taliban? This is a tough question, but the Taliban too cannot afford to say goodbye to Pakistan. It will be a test case for the prime minister and military leadership to fulfill the international community’s expectations — ie to make a deal possible between the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders.

US PAK relations: Aug., 22, 2019:

"Pakistan should aspire a working relationship with the US, which is cordial and dynamic, not curtailing our sovereignty and national interest," Ambassador Khokhar said at a guest lecture organized here by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).

Ambassador Khokhar, who served as Pakistan's envoy to Dhaka, New Delhi, Washington and Beijing before becoming Foreign Secretary in 2002, emphasized on finding areas of convergence between Pakistan and the US including trade, energy, transport, and especially education to expand the scope of collaboration

Ambassador Khokhar said Pakistan's relationship with the US could not be analysed in isolation since the international order was in flux with China rising phenomenally, Russia re-asserting itself, and the middle East in extreme turmoil. He pointed out that India was also an important actor influencing Pak-US dynamics as the US expected India to be a partner in the containment of China. In this regard, Pakistan's overall endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative might also be problematic for Washington, he added.

Ambassador Khokhar said Afghanistan remained a main issued of interest for the US since there was a realisation in Washington that there was no military solution to the issue. On rising tension in Indian Occupied Kashmir, the Ambassador remarked that war was neither an option for India nor for Pakistan due to their nuclear capabilities.

Vice Admiral Saddique said Pakistan's relationship with Washington was generally hyphenated with India and Afghanistan and emphasized that "working together would accrue mutual benefits, whereas, antagonism would serve neither party".

Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Pakistan Reset By Madiha Afzal on Oct 25, 2020 10:01 am Editor’s Note: Pakistan has bedeviled multiple U.S. administrations, proving itself a necessary but often hostile partner with regard to U.S. counterterrorism and U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Madiha Afzal, my Brookings colleague, examines the evolution of U.S. policy in Pakistan and how it changed during the Trump administration. She argues that the current transactional approach has brought benefits, but additional changes are necessary to make the relationship more fruitful and sustainable in the years to come. Daniel Byman *** Looking back over the past four years, the Trump administration’s Pakistan policy can be divided into two phases: bilateral relations that were decidedly strained for the first two years of the administration and, since 2019, a far more positive relationship marked by cooperation on the Afghan peace process and attempts, with limited success, to boost the relationship on other fronts. The reset that occurred in 2019 was due not to Trump’s impulsiveness, but to a transactional approach driven by Pakistan’s usefulness in the Afghan peace process. It is an approach that has had its advantages, but it has run into obvious limits as well. Seven Decades of U.S.-Pakistan Relations Pakistan and the United States established diplomatic ties on Aug. 15, 1947, the day after Pakistan gained independence. It was a close relationship for the new country’s first few decades, especially as U.S. relations with Pakistan’s archrival, India, were relatively cold. In many ways, 1979 marked a turning point for both countries, and Afghanistan became a defining feature in their relationship over the next four decades. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, Pakistan became party to the Soviet-Afghan conflict and used U.S. and Saudi money to train and arm the mujahideen. In 1989, when the Soviets exited Afghanistan, the United States left the region, fueling a visceral sense of American abandonment in Pakistan and a sense that America could not be trusted. The U.S. relationship with India has been a second defining factor in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan has been sensitive about growing U.S.-India bilateral ties since the 1990s. In 1998, the Clinton administration imposed costly economic sanctions on Pakistan (to its considerable angst) for testing its nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear test. Concerns about U.S. preferences on the subcontinent persist. According to a 2015 Pew poll, 53 percent of Pakistani respondents said they believed U.S. policies toward India and Pakistan favored India; only 13 percent said they favored Pakistan. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan joined the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Pakistan allowed NATO access to supply routes through the country and received considerable military and security assistance in return. President George W. Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004. Relations cooled during the Obama administration as concerns grew about Pakistan’s safe havens for the Taliban and the presence of al-Qaeda in the country. This history has, for many Pakistanis, fueled the belief that Republican presidents are better than Democratic presidents for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. A Low Point and a Reset Enter the Trump administration and Trump’s focus on his campaign promise of getting U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. The relationship with Pakistan for the first two years of the administration was characterized by an almost-singular focus on U.S. concerns about Pakistani safe havens for the Haqqani Network. The administration said it would make economic ties contingent on Pakistan taking action against militant and terrorist groups. Things soured further in January 2018, when Trump accused Pakistan of “lies and deceit” in its relationship with America, tweeting that it took U.S. aid for nothing in return. The administration cut off $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance following Trump’s tweet. By the fall of 2018, the Trump administration seemed to have calculated that an exit out of Afghanistan would not come via a military victory. Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as his special envoy to Afghanistan, and Khalilzad began the painstakingly slow work of the Afghan peace process. Though Trump had engaged in a war of words on Twitter with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just a few weeks before, Trump wrote Khan a letter in the fall of 2018 asking for help with the Afghan peace process. Khan, who had long argued for political reconciliation in Afghanistan, was forthcoming. The seeds for a reset had been sown. Pakistan produced Mullah Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban who had been in Pakistani custody. His release helped jump-start the peace process, and Baradar became the Taliban’s chief negotiator. In many ways, Pakistan was uniquely positioned to help, enjoying leverage with the Taliban and a working relationship with the United States. Khalilzad has visited Pakistan at least 15 times in the past two years. Pakistan considers the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February a product of its help, and Khalilzad has publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s help with the process numerous times. The hoped-for reset in the bilateral relationship was acknowledged formally during Imran Khan’s visit to Washington in July 2019, when he and Trump first met and hit it off. In a presidency where personalities have mattered a great deal, it was clear that these two celebrity-turned-populist politicians enjoyed meeting each other. They have since developed a personal connection, meeting again on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 2019 and at the World Economic Forum in early 2020. During the first meeting with Khan at the White House, Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, setting off alarm bells in New Delhi—India almost immediately responded that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Trump also called for dramatically strengthening trade ties between Pakistan and the United States. America is Pakistan’s top export destination, but these trade gains have yet to be realized. Nevertheless, the bilateral reset has sustained. Pakistan is now helping with the intra-Afghan peace process as well, though it was not obvious that Pakistan would remain involved in this phase. Trump’s messaging on Pakistan has been scrupulously positive since the reset, something the country appreciates as it seeks to move past an image associated with terrorism. The United States has given Pakistan $8 million to help its fight against the coronavirus; Pakistan returned the favor with a goodwill gesture of personal protective equipment donations. China’s growing presence in the region, and the United States’s willingness to tolerate Beijing’s close economic and strategic ties to Pakistan, has also reassured Pakistan that major powers value its partnership. The Advantages and Limits of a New Approach Trump’s relatively hands-off approach to India and Pakistan has had benefits, but it has also run into limits. While Pakistan welcomed Trump’s July 2019 offer to mediate the Kashmir dispute, that pronouncement may have done more harm than good. Some Indian political analysts surmised that it might have accelerated India’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, announced just a couple of weeks later, on Aug. 5. More broadly, Trump’s approach to the region has largely decoupled India and Pakistan, which has generated less concern from Pakistan about the U.S.-India relationship. India’s lack of a role in the Afghan peace process has also allayed Pakistan’s fears. Trump even mentioned his “very good relationship” with Pakistan on his visit to India—a comment that Pakistan appreciated (and that New Delhi did not like, but let go). The Trump administration has also taken a different tack in trying to influence Pakistan. Rather than using direct assistance as a tool to drive Pakistan’s actions—which would have a limited effect given Pakistan’s economic relationship with China—the Trump administration has relied on other tools to affect Pakistan’s behavior. Most notably, the administration moved to change Pakistan’s status with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog that monitors terrorist financing, in February 2018. Pakistan was placed on the FATF increased monitoring “grey list” in June that year; the designation impedes economic investment into the country and causes it financial harm. (Pakistan had also been placed on the grey list in 2008, and from 2012 to 2015.) In its bid to avoid being blacklisted, Pakistan has since 2018 taken actions against militant groups—including placing economic sanctions on Lashkar-e-Taiba and sentencing the group’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, to 11 years in prison for terrorist financing. The Khan government has made it a key goal to come off the grey list, passing legislation to help its case. In its latest review this October, FATF announced that Pakistan has made “significant progress” and has largely addressed 21 out of 27 action items; it will remain on the grey list and has until February 2021 to address the remaining requirements. While the FATF listing is multilateral and therefore a less direct policy tool than U.S. assistance, many observers in Pakistan still perceive it as a U.S. instrument, and it is driving growing backlash in a public that perceives Pakistan’s greylisting as unfair. Although Trump has been criticized for playing fast and loose with America’s alliances and cavorting with its foes, his Pakistan policy reveals a practical side. This more transactional approach has yielded results for the United States on the Afghan peace process and has largely been received well by Pakistan since the reset. Yet the limits of Trump’s rhetoric and lack of homework before making pronouncements are also apparent. The trade gains Trump promised Pakistan have not materialized. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross visited Pakistan in February 2020, but the United States has had trouble investing in Pakistan due to “Pakistan’s significant business climate issues, including regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and discriminatory taxation,” according to the State Department. With the FATF, the Trump administration has chosen an economic tool more effective than aid to encourage Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. So far, this approach has worked. Pakistan is eager to shed its image associated with terrorism and increasingly recognizes that global stature is driven by economic ascendance rather than strategic importance. Yet with the United States making a deal with the Taliban and giving it legitimacy, many Pakistanis have wondered why Pakistan is still maligned for its relationship with the group. The Trump administration has not offered Pakistanis the clarity they need on that front. The Next Administration If Joe Biden is elected president this November, he will find a different U.S. relationship with Pakistan than the one he left behind with the Obama administration four years earlier, partly because Pakistan has changed but also because of changes in the region and the Trump administration’s unique approach to the country. The road to the U.S. reset with Pakistan in 2019 came through Afghanistan. Pakistan’s closeness with a rising China has offset some of Pakistan’s existential angst about its relationship with the United States. Trump has, against all odds, successfully balanced the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and India in a way that doesn’t worsen Pakistan’s paranoia, and the administration’s reliance on the FATF listing as a tool has also proved effective in goading Pakistan to take action against militant groups. Yet this approach is piecemeal and opportunistic. The next administration will need to round out America’s Pakistan policy, to make it comprehensive and take a longer term view. This is especially true as the United States seeks to withdraw troops completely from Afghanistan—for the first time in more than four decades, the two countries may be looking at a bilateral relationship not driven by Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, long dominated by strategic concerns, can become a productive one for both countries, if redefined carefully and with an open mind.