Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistan US Ties Reset (JR 193)

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan enjoyed a warm visit to Washington this week, with his hosts, from President Donald Trump to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Sen. Lindsey Graham, all affirming the importance in particular of cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. For a Pakistani government that viewed Khan’s visit as an opportunity to reset a relationship that suffered immensely during the early months of the Trump administration, it was an encouraging sign. The bilateral relationship has indeed come a long way since 2017 and 2018, when Trump threatened a harder line on   tweeted angrily about Islamabad’s “lies and deceit,” and suspended American security assistance. The main reason for this about-face is rooted in Trump’s increasingly urgent desire to end the long war in Afghanistan—a war he often criticized before becoming president and has never seemed comfortable continuing, even when he announced a new South Asia strategy in August 2017 that entailed staying the course. ..

General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's powerful military chief, accompanied the prime minister, along with intelligence chief Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed. Khan and his delegation also held meetings with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, US congressional leaders, and the heads of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

For Trump, one of the most significant outcomes of the Washington visit by PM Khan and the military leadership will be Islamabad's renewed commitment to finding an inclusive and peaceful end to the long war in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the visit has been a win on two fronts. First, Khan has been able to generate significant positive momentum through the visit while his government faces stiff opposition at home. This will help Khan in Pakistan.

Secondly, Pakistan's leadership has engaged directly with the Trump administration at the highest level, something seen as key in building a working relationship. It has also fought its case on counterterrorism efforts, action under the Financial Action Task Force, and Pakistan's regional priorities both at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Faced with a short timetable on reaching an agreement before the September [Afghan] presidential election, Washington sees an intra-Afghan dialogue and a ceasefire as essential towards finalising a withdrawal, which will be crucial in Trump's reelection bid next year.

Imran Khan has indicated that Pakistan will exert maximum pressure on the Taliban to agree to an intra-Afghan process. It's also significant that the PM mentioned that Pakistan would like the Taliban to be part of an inclusive presidential election. This indicates that the timeline of concrete action on Afghanistan will be swift in the coming months.

In recent months, the Trump White House has decided to aggressively pursue peace talks in Afghanistan and to enlist Islamabad as a key partner in helping launch and sustain negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistani government sought an audience with Trump and White House contacts of the Saudi connection arranged a meeting .The administration agreed and invited Khan to Washington in large part to recognize and reward Pakistan for its help with the Afghan reconciliation process over the past year, bringing U.S. government officials and Taliban representatives together for multiple bilateral talks in Qatar. However, despite this progress, it would be premature to conclude—as many in Islamabad would like to—that the relationship with Washington has been reset. A restoration of security assistance, a resumption of highlevel dialogue or other signs of repaired relations are not on the horizon anytime soon. In essence, from the Trump administration’s perspective, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a much with Trump. Washington’s two core priorities with Pakistan are Islamabad’s assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistani counterterrorism efforts.

To be sure, the Trump administration is open to broader cooperation, particularly when it comes to trade and investment. During Khan’s visit, an official White House statement, and Trump himself, made reference to U.S.-Pakistan trade cooperation, while Khan met with both the secretaries of the treasury and commerce. However, for the Trump administration, there’s little real interest in truly broadening the scope of the relationship until it believes Pakistan is doing more on the Afghan reconciliation and counterterrorism fronts. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship may have improved, but that doesn’t mean a reset is in order—or that Trump even wants one. This leads to the second reason why a reset isn’t in the cards: Islamabad is unlikely to deliver in a way that satisfies Washington. The Trump administration wants Pakistan to convince the Taliban to agree to a cease-fire and to formal negotiations with the Afghan government. Yet Taliban insurgents have categorically rejected these demands and appear to be interested only in a deal with Washington that involves the withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Taliban, of course, enjoys ample leverage and comes into talks from a position of renewed strength. It is waging intense battlefield offensives, holds more territory than at any time since the U.S. invasion following 9/11, and most importantly has little urgency to conclude a deal. This means that any entity—even one like Pakistan that has close ties to the Taliban, and considerable leverage over it—will struggle to get the insurgents to agree to American demands. Similarly, Washington wants Islamabad to take irreversible steps against terrorist groups in Pakistan that target both Afghanistan and India. It has not been satisfied with Pakistan’s recent  moves which have involved the arrests of dozens of militants . Third, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains beset by tensions rooted in fundamental policy differences. Despite recent bumps in its ties with India, Washington remains committed to forging a deep, strategic partnership with New Delhi, Pakistan’s bitter enemy. Similarly, Islamabad is closely allied with China, Washington’s top strategic rival. In effect, Washington and Islamabad enjoy deep partnerships with  —a geopolitical reality that constrains closer U.S.-Pakistan cooperation. Indeed, hypothetical scenarios that could actually boost bilateral ties—such as Washington scaling down its ties with India and easing up on pressuring Islamabad to detain terrorists who target India, or Islamabad pivoting away from Beijing—are not in the offing. More broadly, each country pursues foreign policy objectives throughout Asia that go against the other’s interests: Pakistan seeks to limit the influence of India, while the U.S. is pursuing an Indo-Pacific strategy that is meant to push back against China. Finally, the Trump administration does not support the type of diplomacy that one would expect to see in a rebooted relationship. It prioritizes bursts of transactional diplomacy over sustained and formal dialogue. In effect, there’s no going back to the early years of the Obama administration, when the two sides launched an albeit short-lived strategic dialogue, focused on a variety of topics, not all of them security-related. The Trump administration simply isn’t interested in investing the resources in such broad and extended exchanges, which, if they were to take place, could go a long way toward generating more confidence and goodwill for a relationship that badly needs new infusions of both, even after Khan’s positive visit.

The "do more" rhetoric has gone away; it has just gone a bit softer. Whereas in the past this message would be delivered forcefully and threateningly, this time around it was likely conveyed gently, with Trump and other US officials inviting Islamabad to take its assistance in Afghanistan to another level. What's next with the Taliban talks depends on Islamabad's next move, and more importantly how the Taliban responds. Washington's asks of Islamabad have become more ambitious. It's one thing for Pakistan to simply bring the  Taliban  to the table. It is a very different thing for Pakistan to convince them  to agree to demands - a ceasefire and talks with Kabul - that it has consistently and categorically rejected to this point.

The bottom line is that while Khan’s trip to Washington may have been full of smiles and good vibes, and it may have even solidified U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan, it shouldn’t be mistaken for a reset in troubled ties. This newfound comity can’t mask the reality that U.S.-Pakistan relations are still in need of major repair . The demands from Washington have not changed. While it is significant that the US has publicly acknowledged Pakistan's efforts in pushing the reconciliation process and initial steps to curb militant groups, privately the US would have rehashed its menu of concerns and sought commitments on them.

Afghan Peace Process: July, 30, 2019: THE Afghan peace process has entered a crucial phase, making it even trickier for Pakistan. As many had anticipated, Afghanistan remained the main point of deliberations held between the Pakistani and US leaderships in Washington, D.C. last week. Prime Minister Imran Khan has pledged to pursue the Afghan Taliban leadership to initiate talks with the Afghan government.

During the prime minister’s visit, most US leaders and officials acknowledged and appreciated Pakistan’s role in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the table for talks. The US administration didn’t use the mantra of ‘do more’ this time, but politely requested Pakistan to continue playing a constructive role in the Afghan peace process. Pakistan’s leadership categorically agreed to take up the task. On the other hand, the Taliban have also indicated that they will accept the invitation of meeting the Pakistani prime minister. The meeting will indicate how much influence Pakistan still has over the Taliban.

So far, the Taliban’s position on the option of direct talks with the government of President Ashraf Ghani has remained stiff. However, they had indicated that if their negotiations with the US succeed, they would then initiate negotiations with other Afghan stakeholders including the Afghan government. Yet it remains to be seen whether or not they change their position on initiating a separate talks channel with Kabul. In the event they show reluctance and deny Pakistan’s request, will Pakistan adopt a coercive approach? If so, it will be interesting to see how it affects the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan.

For Pakistan, restoring its relationship with the US is important not only for speeding up economic recovery but also for rebalancing its regional geostrategic position. The country had been suffering because of its dissimilar approaches towards the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. In recent years, it has tried to diversify its strategic partnerships, ranging from Moscow to Beijing, and Istanbul to Riyadh, which also entailed some valuable defence partnerships. But it appears as though the policymakers did not see these partnerships as a counterbalance to growing US unfriendliness. The strengthening strategic partnership between India and the US also affected the Pakistani establishment’s policy choices, forcing it to review its approaches towards Afghanistan and the Taliban.  

Pakistan, however, has reviewed its approaches before taking more losses. The country is set to gain in the whole process as India has failed to develop its relevance in the Afghan peace process. On this ground alone, Pakistan’s establishment considers it a major achievement. Similarly, the US offer of mediation over the Kashmir issue has put pressure on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It has happened at a time when the Trump administration was not comfortable with India’s recent multibillion-dollar deals with Russia, and trade tensions between the two nations were rising.

Mr Khan’s visit to the US is bringing the country back onto the regular diplomacy tracks. To keep this momentum, the government has to deliver on Afghanistan. The probability of direct talks between the Taliban and Kabul would be one challenge, but influencing the former to commit to a lasting ceasefire could prove another daunting task.  .

For Pakistan, the Taliban will remain a challenge at both stages. The US and other major global actors, including China and Russia, are relying on Pakistan — and if the Taliban refuses to listen to Pakistan, it would be a disaster for the establishment. It is a known fact that many Taliban field commanders are not happy with Pakistan, and the Taliban leadership resists Pakistani pressure citing this as their argument. What can Pakistan do in such a worst-case scenario? Arrests of dissenting elements when they enter Pakistan would be an option, which has been used in the past. Many commanders apparently still have families inside Pakistan, and the government can use this factor as a tool.

Pakistan might also have other options to pressurise the Taliban leadership. The Haqqanis could be effective in the Taliban decision-making process, but they have a limit to their influence. Can Pakistan envision a complete disconnect with the Taliban? This is a tough question, but the Taliban too cannot afford to say goodbye to Pakistan. It will be a test case for the prime minister and military leadership to fulfill the international community’s expectations — ie to make a deal possible between the Taliban and other Afghan stakeholders.

US PAK relations: Aug., 22, 2019:

"Pakistan should aspire a working relationship with the US, which is cordial and dynamic, not curtailing our sovereignty and national interest," Ambassador Khokhar said at a guest lecture organized here by Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI).

Ambassador Khokhar, who served as Pakistan's envoy to Dhaka, New Delhi, Washington and Beijing before becoming Foreign Secretary in 2002, emphasized on finding areas of convergence between Pakistan and the US including trade, energy, transport, and especially education to expand the scope of collaboration

Ambassador Khokhar said Pakistan's relationship with the US could not be analysed in isolation since the international order was in flux with China rising phenomenally, Russia re-asserting itself, and the middle East in extreme turmoil. He pointed out that India was also an important actor influencing Pak-US dynamics as the US expected India to be a partner in the containment of China. In this regard, Pakistan's overall endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative might also be problematic for Washington, he added.

Ambassador Khokhar said Afghanistan remained a main issued of interest for the US since there was a realisation in Washington that there was no military solution to the issue. On rising tension in Indian Occupied Kashmir, the Ambassador remarked that war was neither an option for India nor for Pakistan due to their nuclear capabilities.

Vice Admiral Saddique said Pakistan's relationship with Washington was generally hyphenated with India and Afghanistan and emphasized that "working together would accrue mutual benefits, whereas, antagonism would serve neither party".

Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Pakistan Reset By Madiha Afzal on Oct 25, 2020 10:01 am Editor’s Note: Pakistan has bedeviled multiple U.S. administrations, proving itself a necessary but often hostile partner with regard to U.S. counterterrorism and U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Madiha Afzal, my Brookings colleague, examines the evolution of U.S. policy in Pakistan and how it changed during the Trump administration. She argues that the current transactional approach has brought benefits, but additional changes are necessary to make the relationship more fruitful and sustainable in the years to come. Daniel Byman *** Looking back over the past four years, the Trump administration’s Pakistan policy can be divided into two phases: bilateral relations that were decidedly strained for the first two years of the administration and, since 2019, a far more positive relationship marked by cooperation on the Afghan peace process and attempts, with limited success, to boost the relationship on other fronts. The reset that occurred in 2019 was due not to Trump’s impulsiveness, but to a transactional approach driven by Pakistan’s usefulness in the Afghan peace process. It is an approach that has had its advantages, but it has run into obvious limits as well. Seven Decades of U.S.-Pakistan Relations Pakistan and the United States established diplomatic ties on Aug. 15, 1947, the day after Pakistan gained independence. It was a close relationship for the new country’s first few decades, especially as U.S. relations with Pakistan’s archrival, India, were relatively cold. In many ways, 1979 marked a turning point for both countries, and Afghanistan became a defining feature in their relationship over the next four decades. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, Pakistan became party to the Soviet-Afghan conflict and used U.S. and Saudi money to train and arm the mujahideen. In 1989, when the Soviets exited Afghanistan, the United States left the region, fueling a visceral sense of American abandonment in Pakistan and a sense that America could not be trusted. The U.S. relationship with India has been a second defining factor in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan has been sensitive about growing U.S.-India bilateral ties since the 1990s. In 1998, the Clinton administration imposed costly economic sanctions on Pakistan (to its considerable angst) for testing its nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear test. Concerns about U.S. preferences on the subcontinent persist. According to a 2015 Pew poll, 53 percent of Pakistani respondents said they believed U.S. policies toward India and Pakistan favored India; only 13 percent said they favored Pakistan. After the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan joined the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Pakistan allowed NATO access to supply routes through the country and received considerable military and security assistance in return. President George W. Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally in 2004. Relations cooled during the Obama administration as concerns grew about Pakistan’s safe havens for the Taliban and the presence of al-Qaeda in the country. This history has, for many Pakistanis, fueled the belief that Republican presidents are better than Democratic presidents for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. A Low Point and a Reset Enter the Trump administration and Trump’s focus on his campaign promise of getting U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. The relationship with Pakistan for the first two years of the administration was characterized by an almost-singular focus on U.S. concerns about Pakistani safe havens for the Haqqani Network. The administration said it would make economic ties contingent on Pakistan taking action against militant and terrorist groups. Things soured further in January 2018, when Trump accused Pakistan of “lies and deceit” in its relationship with America, tweeting that it took U.S. aid for nothing in return. The administration cut off $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance following Trump’s tweet. By the fall of 2018, the Trump administration seemed to have calculated that an exit out of Afghanistan would not come via a military victory. Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as his special envoy to Afghanistan, and Khalilzad began the painstakingly slow work of the Afghan peace process. Though Trump had engaged in a war of words on Twitter with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just a few weeks before, Trump wrote Khan a letter in the fall of 2018 asking for help with the Afghan peace process. Khan, who had long argued for political reconciliation in Afghanistan, was forthcoming. The seeds for a reset had been sown. Pakistan produced Mullah Baradar, the deputy leader of the Taliban who had been in Pakistani custody. His release helped jump-start the peace process, and Baradar became the Taliban’s chief negotiator. In many ways, Pakistan was uniquely positioned to help, enjoying leverage with the Taliban and a working relationship with the United States. Khalilzad has visited Pakistan at least 15 times in the past two years. Pakistan considers the U.S.-Taliban deal signed in February a product of its help, and Khalilzad has publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s help with the process numerous times. The hoped-for reset in the bilateral relationship was acknowledged formally during Imran Khan’s visit to Washington in July 2019, when he and Trump first met and hit it off. In a presidency where personalities have mattered a great deal, it was clear that these two celebrity-turned-populist politicians enjoyed meeting each other. They have since developed a personal connection, meeting again on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 2019 and at the World Economic Forum in early 2020. During the first meeting with Khan at the White House, Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir, setting off alarm bells in New Delhi—India almost immediately responded that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Trump also called for dramatically strengthening trade ties between Pakistan and the United States. America is Pakistan’s top export destination, but these trade gains have yet to be realized. Nevertheless, the bilateral reset has sustained. Pakistan is now helping with the intra-Afghan peace process as well, though it was not obvious that Pakistan would remain involved in this phase. Trump’s messaging on Pakistan has been scrupulously positive since the reset, something the country appreciates as it seeks to move past an image associated with terrorism. The United States has given Pakistan $8 million to help its fight against the coronavirus; Pakistan returned the favor with a goodwill gesture of personal protective equipment donations. China’s growing presence in the region, and the United States’s willingness to tolerate Beijing’s close economic and strategic ties to Pakistan, has also reassured Pakistan that major powers value its partnership. The Advantages and Limits of a New Approach Trump’s relatively hands-off approach to India and Pakistan has had benefits, but it has also run into limits. While Pakistan welcomed Trump’s July 2019 offer to mediate the Kashmir dispute, that pronouncement may have done more harm than good. Some Indian political analysts surmised that it might have accelerated India’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy, announced just a couple of weeks later, on Aug. 5. More broadly, Trump’s approach to the region has largely decoupled India and Pakistan, which has generated less concern from Pakistan about the U.S.-India relationship. India’s lack of a role in the Afghan peace process has also allayed Pakistan’s fears. Trump even mentioned his “very good relationship” with Pakistan on his visit to India—a comment that Pakistan appreciated (and that New Delhi did not like, but let go). The Trump administration has also taken a different tack in trying to influence Pakistan. Rather than using direct assistance as a tool to drive Pakistan’s actions—which would have a limited effect given Pakistan’s economic relationship with China—the Trump administration has relied on other tools to affect Pakistan’s behavior. Most notably, the administration moved to change Pakistan’s status with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog that monitors terrorist financing, in February 2018. Pakistan was placed on the FATF increased monitoring “grey list” in June that year; the designation impedes economic investment into the country and causes it financial harm. (Pakistan had also been placed on the grey list in 2008, and from 2012 to 2015.) In its bid to avoid being blacklisted, Pakistan has since 2018 taken actions against militant groups—including placing economic sanctions on Lashkar-e-Taiba and sentencing the group’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, to 11 years in prison for terrorist financing. The Khan government has made it a key goal to come off the grey list, passing legislation to help its case. In its latest review this October, FATF announced that Pakistan has made “significant progress” and has largely addressed 21 out of 27 action items; it will remain on the grey list and has until February 2021 to address the remaining requirements. While the FATF listing is multilateral and therefore a less direct policy tool than U.S. assistance, many observers in Pakistan still perceive it as a U.S. instrument, and it is driving growing backlash in a public that perceives Pakistan’s greylisting as unfair. Although Trump has been criticized for playing fast and loose with America’s alliances and cavorting with its foes, his Pakistan policy reveals a practical side. This more transactional approach has yielded results for the United States on the Afghan peace process and has largely been received well by Pakistan since the reset. Yet the limits of Trump’s rhetoric and lack of homework before making pronouncements are also apparent. The trade gains Trump promised Pakistan have not materialized. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross visited Pakistan in February 2020, but the United States has had trouble investing in Pakistan due to “Pakistan’s significant business climate issues, including regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and discriminatory taxation,” according to the State Department. With the FATF, the Trump administration has chosen an economic tool more effective than aid to encourage Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. So far, this approach has worked. Pakistan is eager to shed its image associated with terrorism and increasingly recognizes that global stature is driven by economic ascendance rather than strategic importance. Yet with the United States making a deal with the Taliban and giving it legitimacy, many Pakistanis have wondered why Pakistan is still maligned for its relationship with the group. The Trump administration has not offered Pakistanis the clarity they need on that front. The Next Administration If Joe Biden is elected president this November, he will find a different U.S. relationship with Pakistan than the one he left behind with the Obama administration four years earlier, partly because Pakistan has changed but also because of changes in the region and the Trump administration’s unique approach to the country. The road to the U.S. reset with Pakistan in 2019 came through Afghanistan. Pakistan’s closeness with a rising China has offset some of Pakistan’s existential angst about its relationship with the United States. Trump has, against all odds, successfully balanced the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and India in a way that doesn’t worsen Pakistan’s paranoia, and the administration’s reliance on the FATF listing as a tool has also proved effective in goading Pakistan to take action against militant groups. Yet this approach is piecemeal and opportunistic. The next administration will need to round out America’s Pakistan policy, to make it comprehensive and take a longer term view. This is especially true as the United States seeks to withdraw troops completely from Afghanistan—for the first time in more than four decades, the two countries may be looking at a bilateral relationship not driven by Afghanistan. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship, long dominated by strategic concerns, can become a productive one for both countries, if redefined carefully and with an open mind.

Elections in the Merged Tribal Districts Show Historical Change By Sajjad Shaukat JR192SS63

Elections in the Merged Tribal Districts Show Historical Change  By Sajjad Shaukat JR192SS63

This is the first time in the history of Pakistan that polling was held for elections of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Assembly in the merged tribal districts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on July 20, this year and the counting of votes is underway, with the unofficial results  have started pouring in.

Sixteen seats have been contested in seven districts. Of the 285 candidates standing for the elections, 202 are independent candidates. There are over 2.8 million registered voters in the area, of which 1.13 million are women.

At 16, the PTI has the most candidates who contested the elections from the ruling political party. The JUI-F has 15 candidates, ANP has 14, PPP and JI both have 13 and the PML-N has five candidates. Two women are also contested the election–the ANP’s Naheed Afridi in PK-106 Khyber and JI’s Malasa Bibi in PK-108 Kurram.

A total of 1,897 polling stations have been set up across the merged districts. Of these, 482 have been reserved for men, 376 for women, and 1,049 are combined. Pakistan Army, police and Frontier Constabulary personnel have been deployed at polling stations across the seven districts. In this regard, Spokesperson of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) Nadeem Qasim said it may take a day for the official results to be announced in ex-FATA elections. He elaborated: “Polling has completed peacefully in the region. He appreciated the role of all institutions, including Army for making a peaceful election happen”.

According to reports, voter turnout remained decent.

In fact, Pakistan Army played a key role in restoring peace in the tribal regions. Hence, almost all political parties nominated their candidates for the constituencies, as the political activities have gained peace. Army made strenuous efforts to bring the people of FATA in the mainstream of the country.

The government has expressed resolve to spend billions of rupees in the next 10 years for the development of FATA and the uplift of the local population in order to bring them at par with the citizens of the other areas of the country and to remove any sense of deprivation among them.

The tribal regions remained troubled for over a decade ever since the US-led so-called war on terror started. Pakistan’s Armed Forces and especially Army have successfully broken the backbone of the foreign-backed terrorists by the military operations Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad, while country’s primary intelligence agency ISI has broken the network of these terrorist groups by capturing several militants and thwarting a number of terror attempts. Besides other provinces, peace has been restored in the KP.

In this respect, thousands of terrorists were killed and huge quantity of explosives seized during the operations of the security agencies.

So as to sustain the hard-earned peace, Pakistan Army has also started the fencing of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It would stop preventing illegal cross-border movement—including those of terrorists who enter Pakistan from Afghanistan’s side and bring the drug-weapon trade to a halt. The fencing of the Pak-Afghan border which is 2,611-kilometre is expected to be completed by 2020 whereas 643 kilometres–462 kilometers in KP and 181 kilometers in Balochistan have been covered so far. 843 border posts are planned, out of which 233 have been completed, while the construction of 140 posts is underway.

It is due to the huge sacrifices of Army and other law-enforcement agencies that improvement in the security situation in the tribal areas became possible. The number of check posts has also decreased by 31 percent in the past three years, resulting in growing trade activities. Roads have been improved for connectivity with other areas of the country, including FATA. In this regard, more than 800-kilometres of roads have been constructed in the tribal districts as part of the communication network, thus reducing the time to one-thirds.

However, with the assistance of the security forces, Pakistan held the epoch-making elections in the tribal districts and thus, gave a strong message to the international community that peace has returned in the conflict zone.

It is notable that external powers which have been supporting the Baloch Sub-Nationalists (BSNs) are also behind the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) as part of their unfinished agenda against Pakistan. They leave no stone unturned in misguiding the people of the Balochistan and particularly those of the KP by creating one after another issue. In this respect, emergence of the PTM at a crucial time, which is being paid by anti-Pakistan hostile elements and countries, aims at accentuating the ethnic cleavages of the country, influence Pashtun population in pursuance of strategic objectives of the foreign powers. PTM which is actually a veritable political entity of the Afghanistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and wants to accomplish its nefarious designs against Pakistan and its Army has opposed the amalgamation of FATA/PATA with KP province.

Nevertheless, it is because of the Amry’s development-works in the tribal areas that the PTM has failed in instigating the public against the federation of the country. While, amalgamation of FATA/PATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province will result into multiple benefits for the people by overcoming their multi-faceted problems. Therefore, the merger of FATA/PATA with the KP was welcomed by the tribal people—the tribal people will get representation in the KP Assembly and the National Assembly.

Earlier, the proceedings for the merger have witnessed intense activities in shape of meetings, debate etc. High-powered National Implementation Committee (NIC) on FATA Reforms had earlier endorsed the merger of tribal regions with KP in a meeting attended by the prime minister, chief of army staff, and others, including chief minister of the KP and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on FATA Reforms Sartaj Aziz. Later, in May 2018, National Security Committee (NSC) in its 23^rd meeting endorsed the merger of FATA with KP, while noting the regional and global security situation.

The credit for making the merger a reality has been attributed to Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who continued to push the political leadership for requisite activism on the issue. The role of opposition parties also remained positive and appreciable. 

The merger of FATA/PATA with the KP province has been a long awaited move, as there has been too much suffering in the tribal areas. FATA was administered through Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), and political agent acted as a justice along with other executive tasks. FCR was a set of laws under which joint territorial duties and penalties were imposed. Since America’s attack on Afghanistan, FATA arose as a zone of trouble and proxy warfare. It also became security risk for the region and put Pakistan into many hardships.

FCR which was officially enacted in 1901 has its origins in laws which were enacted by the British colonialists in the Pashtun-inhabited tribal areas in the Northwest of British India. They were specifically devised to counter the opposition of the Pashtuns to British rule. The main objective of the FCR was to protect the interests of the British Empire. More than a century later, this law continued to be applied to FATA residents by the Government of Pakistan.  Not only did the FCR deprived the people of FATA their fundamental rights, but also had taken away their basic legal rights like ‘Appeal, Wakeel and Daleel’.

So, it is positive dimension for the tribal people, as they have got rid of colonialism which continued after the partition of the Sub-continent. The tribal Sardars (Lords) who continued British practices were in favour of the division of FATA/PATA and KP. Now, this merger is likely to upset sub-nationalist tendencies, being exploited by Pakistan’s foreign enemies and some internal entities.

At present, FATA is most deprived and least-developed area in Pakistan. With lowest per capita income in the country, two third of its population simply lives below the poverty line. The literacy rate is as low as only 17% among males and only 3% among females. And, almost half population has no access to clean drinking water. No substantial endeavor had been made to promote the socio-economic wellbeing of the people in FATA.

It is worth-mentioning that since the occupation of Afghanistan by the US-led NATO forces, Pakistan has become center of the intelligence agencies such as American CIA, Indian RAW and Israeli Mossad which are in collusion with Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) to obtain the covert designs of the their countries and some Western countries against Russia, China and Pakistan, including Iran.

Under the cover of fighting terrorism, these secret agencies support the militants of Islamic State group (Also known as ISIS, ISIL and Daesh) and Afghanistan-based TTP, including their linked outfits which have been conducting terror-assaults in Afghanistan and Pakistan as part of the double game of the US-led countries. And CIA and RAW which are in collaboration with NDS are clandestinely assisting the Afghan National Unity Government (NUG) to manipulate the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), as these external entities are behind this movement.

Nonetheless, we can conclude that the nation, especially the people of FATA are thankful to the Pakistan Army which played a major role in integration of the tribal regions with the mainstream of the country. Therefore, during the polling-day, people were raising slogans in favour of Pakistan Army, while elections in the merged tribal districts show historical change.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Verdict of ICJ about Kulbhushan Jadhav Case: Pakistan’s Victory over India By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 191 SS 62)

Verdict of ICJ about Kulbhushan Jadhav Case: Pakistan’s Victory over India By Sajjad Shaukat (JR191SS62)

The Hague-based International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced its verdict about the case of Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav and on July 17, this year. In its judgment, ICJ President Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf ordered Pakistan to allow India consular access to Kulbhushan Jadhav and rejected India’s demand that Jadhav’s conviction by a military court be dismissed.

In the verdict, the Court stated that Pakistan should review the case, while considering, under the laws of Pakistan. The ICJ, however, rejected all other remedies sought by India, which included the annulment of the military court decision convicting Jadhav, restricting Pakistan from executing the sentence, securing Jadhav’s release and ordering his return to India. Therefore, Pakistan now can consider whether the same military courts should adjudicate the matter or whether somehow an appeal should lie before the civilian courts in this case.

But, setting aside the facts of the ICJ verdict, Indian media and its political leaders misinterpreted the judgment by moulding it in favour of New Delhi. They manipulated India’s demand for consular access, but, ignored other major points which favour Islamabad.

In this regard, Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated the ICJ for “a verdict based on extensive study of facts”. Indian former external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj said: “I wholeheartedly welcome the verdict of International Court of Justice in the case of Kulbhushan Jadhav. It is a great victory for India”.

On the other side, taking cognizance of the reality, leaders of the ruling party-the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) and main mainstream political parties, including renowned persons and experts appreciated the verdict of the ICJ, taking it as a victory of Pakistan over India.

Notably, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, claimed it was a “victory” for Pakistan, while confirming that Islamabad will not be releasing Jadhav”.

Pakistan’s Foreign Office (FO) released a statement saying “Indian Naval Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav entered Pakistan without a visa on authentic Indian Passport with a fake alias Hussain Mubarak Patel…Kulbhushan Jadhav is responsible for acts of sabotage, espionage and multiple terrorist incidents in which scores of innocent Pakistani citizens were killed resulting into umpteen women being widowed and numerous children becoming orphans…Jadhav has confessed all these acts during his trial in Pakistani court in front of a Judicial Magistrate. This is a clear case of Indian state terrorism”.

Following the judgment of the ICJ, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Asif Ghafoor, while speaking to a private TV channel congratulated the nation on “the success achieved” and lauded the efforts made by the legal team and the FO which represented Pakistan. He explained that it “is a big victory for Pakistan…the review and reconsideration can be done by means of our own choosing is great validation for our judicial system…It’s another Feb 27 for India; they have been surprised again. They thought that…they can manipulate justice too but that did not happen…India’s false narratives continue” and that “after this verdict they are practically certified to have undertaken state-sponsored terrorism and the world has seen what their role in Pakistan has been.”

In a tweet, Reema Omar, the International Legal Advisor for South Asia at the ICJ, admitted that India’s appeal for Jadhav’s release and return was not granted by the Court. The Court has rejected most of the remedies sought by India, including annulment of military court decision convicting Jadhav, his release and safe passage to India”.

In her tweet, Nasim Zehra, senior journalist and author of Pakistan said: “The judgment acknowledges Pakistan’s position that Jadhav is a spy, while asking “a Pakistani court review the military court’s decision, it doesn’t quash the military court’s decision and safe passage to India”.

It is mentionable that Jadhav was a serving commander of the Indian Navy associated with Indian spy agency RAW and was arrested on March 3, 2016, from Balochistan province, as he was found involved in espionage and terrorism-related activities. In his subsequent trial at a military court, he had confessed to his involvement in terrorist plots. The spy was sentenced to death in 2017. However, India insisted that Jadhav was not a spy and alleged that he was kidnapped from Iran.

On April 10, 2017, Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen Qamar Bajwa had endorsed the death penalty for Jadhav. In June 2017, the Indian spy had filed a mercy petition against the death penalty, in which he again confessed to his involvement in terrorist activities.

Nevertheless, before Pakistani authorities could make a final decision, the ICJ, after being approached by New Delhi, had ordered a stay in his execution through an interim order.

In February, this year, in their arguments, India’s lawyers told the Court that the case was “farcical” and based on “malicious propaganda”. Pakistan’s lawyers hit back by accusing Jadhav of “terrorism”. Pakistan’s attorney general stated that Jadhav’s “unlawful activities were directed at creating anarchy in Pakistan and particularly targeted the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office (FO) on July 18, 2019 announced, “As a responsible state, Pakistan will grant consular access to Commander Kulbushan Jadhav according to Pakistani laws, for which modalities are being worked out” with India.

It is noteworthy that showing optimistic approach, on humanitarian ground, Pakistan had allowed mother and wife of Indian convicted spy Kulbhushan Jadhav to meet him. They visited Pakistan on December 25, 2017 and met him at the office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad.

In the past, Pakistan has repeatedly requested India for assistance in the investigation process, but, no such request had been accepted. Subsequently, India took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which after the oral hearing ruled on May 18, 2017 to grant provisional measures, halting the execution of Commander Kulbushan pending a final judgment of the court.

Pakistan respects the sanctity of the international institutions and its obligations under the international law. It was in this spirit that Islamabad attended the proceeding of the ICJ at a short notice.

It is worth-mentioning that in 2012, as part of the exchange of prisoners, Pakistani government released Indian spy, Surjeet Singh who was handed over to the Indian authorities at the Wagah border crossing. He openly admitted that he was in Pakistan to spy when he was arrested in 1982. In this respect, Surjeet Singh stated: “I was a RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) agent. No one bothered about me after I got arrested.” Surjeet told reporters soon after stepping on Indian soil.

Quite opposite to the admission of Surjeet, on June 29, 2012, the then Indian Home Secretary RK Singh told a news conference in New Delhi, saying, “We do not accept this that Singh was Indian spy…it is completely wrong.” However, it shows Indian illogical approach as New Delhi denied facts in order to conceal the presence of other Indian spies in Pakistan.

While, Pakistan’s former President Asif Ali Zardari commuted death sentence of another Indian spy of RAW, Sarabjit Singh into life imprisonment on June 26, 2012. Surjeet Singh revealed, “Sarabjit Singh is a terrorist and terrorists are neither released.” On the other side, Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna who had welcomed Surjeet Singh’s release and stated on June 25, 2012, “It was now “time for Sarabjit Singh to be freed.” Like Indian home secretary, even external affairs minister was defending the Indian agents. It shows that Indian high officials are deliberately and officially supporting RAW agents to destabilize Pakistan.

Besides, Indian spy Surjeet Singh had also pointed out, “All Indian prisoners are treated well in Pakistani jails. Sarabjit Singh is also doing well there…I was treated well by prison officials and I am thankful to them.”

India has arrested hundreds of Pakistan’s citizens, often accusing them of being spies after they have strayed across the land or maritime border due to unconscious mistake. It also includes some tourists who went to India. Quite contrary to the well-treatment of Indian spies in Pakistani jails, RAW and other security agencies employ various techniques of torture on the so-called Pakistan’s suspected persons. Most of the Pakistani nationals have also been killed in Indian jails, while a majority of them have been killed by Indian security agencies in fake encounters.

Nonetheless, both Surjeet Singh and Sarabjit Singh were responsible for the string of blasts in Faisalabad, Lahore, and Multan in 1990 in which several innocent people were killed. They were also behind other terror-activities in Pakistan.

On June 28, 2012, BBC reported, “in recent years, several Indians returning from Pakistani jails have admitted to spying for Indian intelligence agency RAW” and “some have criticised India’s government for abandoning them.”

In fact, admission of the Indian spies indicates that RAW has a well-organised spy-network in Pakistan. Besides supporting separatist elements in the Balochistan, directly or indirectly, RAW agents conducted many terrorism-related attacks in Pakistan such as target killings, bomb blasts, suicide attacks and assaults on civil and military installations, including forced abductions and sectarian violence.

Undoubtedly, we can conclude that verdict of the ICJ about Kulbhushan Jadhav case is Pakistan’s victory over India.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com