Yemen Civil War (JR 159)

Yemen Civil War (JR 159)

Introduction

Yemen's recent history is one of division and bloodshed. Until the early 1960s, the country was ruled by a monarchy in the north and the British in the south. Coups in both regions plunged the country into decades of violence, ending with reunification in 1990.

The Middle Eastern nation has long been one of the regions poorest. In 2015, it was ranked 168 out of 188 countries on the Human Development Index, which measures life expectancy, education and standard of living.

Prior to the war, Yemen's population of more than 20 million was projected to double by 2035. Amid high unemployment and dissatisfaction with the ruling Saleh family, the country was ready for change when the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. Yemen's war unfolded over several years, beginning with the Arab Spring in 2011. Pro-democracy protesters took to the streets in a bid to force President Ali Abed Allah Saleh to end his 33-year rule. He responded with economic concessions, but refused to resign. By March, tensions on the streets of the capital city, Sanaa, saw protesters dying at the hands of the military. One of Yemen's most prominent commanders backed the opposition, paving the way for deadly clashes between government troops and tribal militias.

The conflict has its roots in the failure of a political transition supposed to bring stability to Yemen following an Arab Spring uprising that forced its longtime authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011. As president, Mr Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by jihadists, a separatist movement in the south, and the continuing loyalty of security personnel to Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity.

The Houthi movement, which champions Yemen's Zaidi Shia Muslim minority and fought a series of rebellions against Saleh during the previous decade, took advantage of the new president's weakness by taking control of their northern heartland of Saada province and neighbouring areas.   in late 2014 and early 2015, the rebels took over Sanaa.

Alarmed by the rise of a group they believed to be backed militarily by regional Shia power Iran, Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states began an air campaign aimed at restoring Mr Hadi's government.The coalition received logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK and France. At the start of the war Saudi officials forecast that the war would last only a few weeks. But four years of military stalemate have followed.

Coalition ground troops landed in the southern port city of Aden in August 2015 and helped drive the Houthis and their allies out of much of the south over the next few months. Mr Hadi's government has established a temporary home in Aden, but it struggles to provide basic services and security and the president remains in exile.

The Yemeni Civil War is an ongoing conflict that began in 2015 between two factions: the internationally recognized Yemeni government, led by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the Houthi armed movement, along with their supporters and allies. Both claim to constitute the official government of Yemen. Houthi forces controlling the capital Sanaʽa, and allied with forces loyal to the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, have clashed with forces loyal to the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, based in Aden. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have also carried out attacks, with AQAP controlling swathes of territory in the hinterlands, and along stretches of the coast.

Participants in the War

Multiple factions are entangled in Yemen's war. However, the conflict divides into two main categories: pro-government forces led by President Hadi and anti-government forces led by the Houthis, who are backed by former President Saleh.

The Houthis hail from Yemen's north and belong to a small branch of Shiite Muslims known as Zaydis. Until summer 2015, the insurgents had infiltrated much of the country's south. They currently maintain control over key central provinces in the north. Hadi's government has accused Iran of smuggling them military arms, an accusation which Tehran has denied.

ul President Hadi's government is headquartered in Aden and is the internationally-recognized government of Yemen. In 2015, Saudi Arabia launched an international coalition in a bid to reinstate Hadi. In recent months, fissures have appeared in Hadi's exiled government, with his former security adviser, Aidarous al-Zubaidi and former cabinet member Hani Bin Braik, spearheading a secessionist movement with Emirati backing.

Background   

Ansar Allah (sometimes Anglicised as Ansarullah), known popularly as the Houthis, is a Zaidi group with its origins in the mountainous Sa'dah Governorate on Yemen's northern border with Saudi Arabia. They led a low-level  insurgency against the Yemeni government in 2004 after their leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed in a government military crackdown following his protests against government policies. The intensity of the conflict waxed and waned over the course of the 2000s, with multiple peace agreements being negotiated and later disregarded. The Houthi insurgency heated up in 2009, briefly drawing in neighboring Saudi Arabia on the side of the Yemeni government, but quieted the following year after a ceasefire was signed.During the early stages of the Yemeni Revolution in 2011, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declared the group's support for demonstrations calling for the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.^{[  ]}Later in the year, as Saleh prepared to leave office, the Houthis laid siege to the Salafi-majority village of Dammaj in northern Yemen, a step toward attaining virtual autonomy for Sa'dah

The Houthis boycotted a single-candidate election in early 2012 meant to give Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi a two-year term of office.They participated in a National Dialogue Conference, but withheld support from a final accord in early 2014 that extended Hadi's mandate in office for another year. Meanwhile, the conflict between the Houthis and Sunni tribes in northern Yemen spread to other governorates, including the Sanaʽa Governorate by mid-2014.After several weeks of street protests against the Hadi administration, which made cuts to fuel subsidies that were unpopular with the group, the Houthis came to blows with Yemen Army forces under the command of General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar. In a battle that lasted only a few days, Houthi fighters seized control of Sanaʽa, the Yemeni capital, in September 2014. The Houthis forced Hadi to negotiate an agreement to end the violence, in which the government resigned and the Houthis gained an unprecedented level of influence over state institutions and politics

In January 2015, unhappy with a proposal to split the country into six federal regions^[ Houthi fighters seized the presidential compound in Sanaʽa. The power play prompted the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and his ministers.The Houthi political leadership then announced the dissolution of parliament and the formation of a Revolutionary Committee to govern the country on 6 February 2015.

On 21 February, one month after Houthi militants confined Hadi to his residence in Sanaʽa, he slipped out of the capital and traveled to Aden. In a televised address from his hometown, he declared that the Houthi takeover was illegitimate and indicated he remained the constitutional president of Yemen.His predecessor as president, Ali Abdullah Saleh—who had been widely suspected of aiding the Houthis during their takeover of Sanaʽa the previous year—publicly denounced Hadi and called on him to go into exile.

Initiation of war

Troops loyal to Hadi clashed with those who refused to recognise his authority in the Battle of Aden Airport on 19 March 2015. The forces under General Abdul-Hafez al-Saqqaf were defeated, and al-Saqqaf himself reportedly fled toward Sanaʽa.^[In apparent retaliation for the routing of al-Saqqaf, warplanes reportedly flown by Houthi pilots bombed Hadi's compound in Aden

After the 20 March 2015 Sanaʽa mosque bombings, in a televised speech, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis, said his group's decision to mobilize for war was "imperative" under current circumstances and that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates—among whom he counts Hadi—would be targeted, as opposed to southern Yemen and its citizens. ^]President Hadi declared Aden to be Yemen's temporary capital while Sanaʽa remained under Houthi control. Also, the same day as the mosque bombings, al-Qaeda militants captured the provincial capital of Lahij, Al Houta District, after killing about 20 soldiers, before being driven out several hours later.

On 21 March 2015, after taking over Sanaʽa and the Yemeni government, the Houthi-led Supreme Revolutionary Committee declared a general mobilization to overthrow Hadi and further their control by driving into southern provinces. The Houthi offensive, allied with military forces loyal to Saleh, began on the next day with fighting in Lahij Governorate. By 25 March, Lahij fell to the Houthis and they reached the outskirts of Aden, the seat of power for Hadi's government;  Hadi fled the country the same day. Concurrently, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched military operations by using airstrikes to restore the former Yemeni government; the United States provided intelligence and logistical support for the campaign. According to the UN and other sources, from March 2015 to December 2017, 8,670–13,600 people were killed in Yemen, including more than 5,200 civilians, as well as estimates of more than 50,000 dead as a result of an ongoing famine due to the war. The conflict has widely been seen as an extension of the Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy conflict and as a means to combat Iranian influence in the region. In 2018, the United Nations warned that 13 million Yemeni civilians face starvation in what it says could become "the worst famine in the world in 100 years

The international community has sharply condemned the Saudi Arabian-led bombing campaign, which has included widespread bombing of civilian areas. The bombing campaign has killed or injured an estimated 17,729 civilians as of March 2019 according to the Yemen Data Project. Despite this, however, the crisis has not gained as much international media attention compared to the Syrian civil war until recently

Hadi reiterated in a speech on 21 March that he was the legitimate president of Yemen and declared, "We will restore security to the country and hoist the flag of Yemen in Sanaʽa, instead of the Iranian flag. He also officially declared Aden to be Yemen's "economic and temporary capital" due to the Houthi occupation of Sanaʽa, which he pledged would be retaken. In Sanaʽa, the Houthi Revolutionary Committee appointed Major General Hussein Khairan as Yemen's new defence minister and placed him in overall command of the military offensive.

Outside support

 The Houthis have long been accused of being proxies for Iran, since they both follow Shia Islam(although the Iranians are Twelve-Imam Shias and the Houthis are Zaidi Shia). The United States and Saudi Arabia have alleged that the Houthis receive weapons and training from Iran.The Houthis and the Iranian government have denied any affiliation. The African nation of Eritrea has also been accused of funneling Iranian material to the Houthis,^[ as well as offering medical care for injured Houthi fighters.^[ The Eritrean government has called the allegations "groundless" and said after the outbreak of open hostilities that it views the Yemeni crisis "as an internal matter".

The Yemeni government, meanwhile, has enjoyed significant international backing from the United States and Persian Gulf monarchies. U.S. drone strikes were conducted regularly in Yemen during Hadi's presidency in Sanaʽa, usually targeting Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The United States was also a major supplier of weapons to the Yemeni government, although according to the Pentagon, hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of that material has gone missing since it was delivered. Saudi Arabia provided financial aid to Yemen until late 2014, when it suspended it amid the Houthis' takeover of Sanaʽa and increasing influence over the Yemeni government^. According to Amnesty International, the United Kingdom also supplied weaponry used by Saudi-led coalition to strike targets in Yemen

 Dynamics of the War

Houthi forces backed by troops loyal to Saleh entered Taiz, Yemen's third-largest city, on 22 March and quickly took over its key points. They encountered little resistance, although one protester was shot dead and five more were injured. Western media outlets began to suggest Yemen was sliding into civil war as the Houthis from the north confronted holdouts in the south.  

On 23 March 2015, Houthi forces advanced towards the strategic Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a vital corridor through which much of the world's maritime trade passes. The next day, fighters from the group reportedly entered the port of Mocha. On 31 March, Houthi fighters entered a coastal military base on the strait after the 17th Armoured Division of the Yemen Army opened the gates and turned over weapons to them

On 2 April, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti, said the Houthis placed heavy weapons and fast attack boats on Perim and a smaller island in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. He warned that the weapons posed "a big danger" to his country, commercial shipping traffic, and military vessels.

Houthi forces seized administrative buildings in Dhale (or Dali) amid heavy fighting on 24 March, bringing them closer to Aden.^[ However, Houthi fighters were swiftly dislodged from Ad Dali' and Kirsh by Hadi-loyal forces. Fighting over Dhale continued even as the Houthis advanced further south and east. On 31 March, Hadi loyalists clashed with the Houthis and army units loyal to Saleh.  The next day, a pro-Houthi army brigade was said to have "disintegrated" after being pummeled by coalition warplanes in Ad Dali. The commander of the 33rd Brigade reportedly fled, and groups of pro-Houthi troops withdrew to the north.  

In the Lahij Governorate, heavy fighting erupted between Houthis and pro-Hadi fighters on 24 March. The next day, Al Anad Air Base, 60 kilometers from Aden, was captured by the Houthis and their allies. The base had recently been abandoned by United States of America US SOCOM troops. Defence Minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, one of Hadi's top lieutenants, was captured by the Houthis in Al Houta and transferred to Sanaʽa. Houthi fighters also advanced to Dar Saad, a small town, 20 km north of Aden  On 26 March, after clashes erupted in Aden, Hadi loyalists counterattacked as a Saudi-led military intervention got underway. Artillery shelled Al Anad Air Base, forcing some of its Houthi occupants to flee the area. Saudi airstrikes also hit Al Anad.  Despite the airstrikes, the southern offensive continued.  

In Aden, military officials said militias and military units loyal to Hadi had "fragmented" by 25 March, speeding the Houthi advance. They said the Houthis were fighting Hadi's troops on five different fronts. Aden International Airport suspended all flights.  Fighting reached Aden's outskirts on 25 March, with pro-Saleh soldiers taking over Aden International Airport and clashes erupting at an army base.  Hadi reportedly fled his "temporary capital" by boat as the unrest worsened.  The next day, he resurfaced in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, where he arrived by plane and was met by Saudi Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud

Over the following days, Houthi and allied army forces encircled Aden  and hemmed in Hadi's holdouts, although they encountered fierce resistance from the embattled president's loyalists and armed city residents. They began pressing into the city center on 29 March despite coalition airstrikes and shelling from Egyptian Navy warships offshore  On 2 April, the compound that has been used as a temporary presidential palace was taken by the Houthis,  and fighting moved into the central Crater and Al Mualla districts. Small contingents of foreign troops were reportedly deployed in Aden by early May, fighting alongside anti-Houthi militiamen in the city. Saudi Arabia denied the presence of ground troops,^[  while Hadi's government claimed the troops were Yemeni special forces who had received training in the Persian Gulf and were redeployed to fight in Aden.  

Forces loyal to Hadi recaptured Aden with support from Saudi Arabia on 21 July in Operation Golden Arrow after months of fighting. This allowed supplies to finally reach the port city giving civilians desperately-needed aid. On 22 July a Saudi military plane landed in Aden international airport filled with relief aid. On 21 July, a UN ship docked in Aden carrying much-needed relief supplies, the first UN vessel to reach the city in four months. Another ship sent by the UAE also delivered medical aid. On 21 July a UAE technical team had arrived to repair the tower and passenger terminal at Aden international airport, heavily damaged in clashes. On 24 July a military plane from the UAE arrived filled with relief aid.  On 4 August, Houthi forces were pushed back from the Al-Anad airbase, by Pro-Hadi forces.  On 17 October, Saudi Arabia confirmed the arrival of Sudanese troops into Aden for the purpose of bolstering the Saudi-led coalition.  In January 2016, new conflict began in Aden, with ISIL and AQAP controlling neighborhoods in the city.  

The Houthis racked up a series of victories in the Abyan Governorate east of Aden in the days following their entrance into Hadi's provisional capital, taking control of Shuqrah and Zinjibar on the coast and winning the allegiance of a local army brigade, but they also encountered resistance from both pro-Hadi army brigadiers and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militants.^[  Zinjibar and  Jaar were recaptured by AQAP on 2 December.  In 20 February 2016 the southern Abyan also captured by AQAP linked them with their headquarters in Mukalla. As of February 2016, pro-Hadi forces managed to enter Sanaʽa governorate by capturing the Nihm District killing dozens of Houthi fighters. They continued their advance, capturing some cities and villages.  

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula took control of Mukalla in the eastern Hadhramaut Governorate on 2 April, driving out soldiers defending the city with mortar fire and springing some 300 inmates from prison, including a local al Qaeda leader.  Local tribal fighters aligned with Hadi surrounded and entered Mukalla two days later, retaking parts of the city and clashing with both al-Qaeda militants and army troops.  Still, the militants remained in control of about half of the town. In addition, al-Qaeda fighters captured a border post with Saudi Arabia in an attack that killed two soldiers.  On 13 April 2015, Southern militia said they took control of the army base loyal to the Houthis near Balhaf Mukalla City was recaptured from AQAP in late April 2016, after UAE and Hadi loyalists troops entered the city, killing some 800 AQAP fighters . Although the Houthis took control of Lahij on the road to Aden, resistance continued in the Lahij Governorate. Ambushes and bombings struck Houthi supply lines to the Aden front, with a landmine killing a reported 25 Houthi fighters on their way to Aden on 28 March  

Fighting also centered on the Shabwa Province, in the oil-rich Usaylan region, where Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar al-Sharia hold sway. On 29 March, 38 were killed in fighting between the Houthis and Sunni tribesmen. Tribal sources confirmed the death toll, and claimed only eight of them were from their side, with the other 30 either Houthis or their allies from the Yemeni military .On 9 April, the Houthis and their allies seized the provincial capital of Ataq. The takeover was facilitated by local tribal chiefs and security officials.^[236] AQAP seized Azzan, and Habban in early February 2016  

In the province of Ma'rib, six members of pro Hadi tribes were killed during fighting against Houthis on 22 March.  The next day, 15 Houthis and 5 tribesmen were killed in clashes in the Al Bayda Governorate.  During fighting between Hadi loyalists and Houthi militiamen in Sanaʽa, the Ethiopian embassy was reportedly struck by shelling on 3 April. The Ethiopian government said the attack appeared to be unintentional. No injuries at the embassy were reported.

Armed tribesmen drove off Houthis who had set up a makeshift camp in southern Ibb Governorate and seized their weapons on 7 April Between 17 and 18 April, at least 30 people were killed when the Houthis and allied army units attacked a pro-Hadi military base in Taiz. The dead included 8–16 pro-Hadi and 14–19 Houthi fighters,  as well as three civilians.  Another report put the number of dead at 85.  On the morning of 19 April, 10 more Houthi and four pro-Hadi fighters were killed.

A pro-Hadi official claimed 150 pro-Houthi and 27 tribal fighters had been killed in fighting in Ma'rib province between 2 and 21 April.  On 4 September a Houthi missile hit an ammunition dump at a military base in Ma'rib killing 45 UAE, 10 Saudi and 5 Bahraini soldiers.  On 16 October, Houthis and allied forces reportedly seized control of a military base in the town of Mukayris, pushing opponents out of southern Bayda.  On 6 January 2016, Hadi loyalists captured the strategic port of Midi District, but insurgents backed by the Houthi government continued making attacks in and around the city.

Saudi-led intervention in Yemen  

Along with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates has conducted airstrikes on Yemeni soil. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Sudan, Jordan and Egypt have also contributed to the operations. The United States and the United Kingdom have both provided logistical support and intelligence to the Saudi-led coalition.

In response to rumours that Saudi Arabia could intervene in Yemen, Houthi commander Ali al-Shami boasted on 24 March 2015 that his forces would invade the larger kingdom and not stop at Mecca, but rather Riyadh .The following evening, answering a request by Yemen international recognized government, Saudi Arabia began a military intervention alongside eight other Arab states and with the logistical support of the United States against the Houthis, bombing positions throughout Sanaʽa. In a joint statement, the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (with the exception of Oman) said they decided to intervene against the Houthis in Yemen at the request of Hadi's government.  King Salman of Saudi Arabia declared the Royal Saudi Air Force to be in full control of Yemeni airspace within hours of the operation beginning.  The airstrikes were aimed at hindering the Houthis' advance toward Hadi's stronghold in southern Yemen. Al Jazeera reported that Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a Houthi commander appointed in February as President of the Revolutionary Committee, was injured by an airstrike in Sanaʽa on the first night of the campaign.

Reuters reported that planes from Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain are also taking part in the operation.  Iran condemned the Saudi-led airstrikes and urged an immediate end to attacks on Yemen.  Saudi Arabia requested that Pakistan commit forces as well, but Pakistan's parliament officially voted to remain neutral.  However, Pakistan agreed to provide support in line with a United Nations Security Council resolution, dispatching warships to enforce an arms embargo against the Houthis.

The bombing campaign was officially declared over on 21 April 2015, with Saudi officials saying they would begin Operation Restoring Hope as a combination of political, diplomatic, and military efforts to end the war.  Even still, airstrikes continued against Houthi targets, and fighting in Aden and Ad Dali' went on.

The United Arab Emirates has also spearheaded an active role against fighting AQAP and ISIL-YP presence in Yemen through a partnership with the United States. In an Op-Ed in The Washington Post Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE ambassador to the United States, described that the intervention has reduced AQAP presence in Yemen to its weakest point since 2012 with many areas previously under their control liberated.  The ambassador claimed that more than 2,000 militants have been removed from the battlefield, with their controlled areas now having improved security and a better delivered humanitarian and development assistance such as to the port city of Mukalla and other liberated areas.  An Associated Press investigation outlined that the military coalition in Yemen actively reduced AQAP in Yemen without military intervention, instead by offering them deals and even actively recruiting them in the coalition because "they are considered as exceptional fighters".  UAE Brigadier General Musallam Al Rashidi responded to the accusations by stating that Al Qaeda cannot be reasoned with and cited that multiple of his soldiers have been killed by them  The UAE military stated that accusations of allowing AQAP to leave with cash contradicts their primary objective of depriving AQAP of its financial strength.  The notion of the coalition recruiting or paying AQAP has been thoroughly denied by the United States Pentagon with Colonel Robert Manning, spokesperson of the Pentagon, calling the news source "patently false".  The governor of Hadramut Faraj al-Bahsani, dismissed the accusations that Al Qaeda has joined with the coalition rank, explaining that if they did there would be sleeper cells and that he would be "the first one to be killed". According to The Independent, AQAP activity on social media as well as the number of terror attacks conducted by them has decreased since the Emirati intervention.

A certification and assurance was announced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stating that maximum efforts are being taken by the Saudi-led coalition to avoid civilian casualties in order to legally authorize American military to refuel coalition military aircraft and has affirmed to continued its support  The Spanish government initially cancelled the sale of 400 laser-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia, however they have since reversed the decision  In Egypt, the Yemeni foreign minister called for an Arab League military intervention against the Houthis.  Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi floated the idea of a unified military force. The Arab League announced the formation of a unified military force to respond to conflict in Yemen and Libya

Since the mid-2000s, the United States has been carrying out targeted killings of Al-Qaeda militants in Yemen, although the U.S. government generally does not confirm involvement in specific attacks conducted by unmanned aerial vehicles as a matter of policy. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism documented 415 strikes in Pakistan and Yemen by 2015 since the September 11 attacks, and according to the organization's estimates, between 423 and 962 deaths are believed to have been civilians. However, Michael Morell, former deputy director of the CIA, affirmed that the numbers were significantly lower.

During the civil war in Yemen, drone strikes have continued, targeting suspected leaders of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Ibrahim al-Rubeish and Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, two leading AQAP figures, were killed by U.S. drone strikes in the vicinity of Mukalla in 2015. Approximately 240 suspected AQAP militants have been killed by American drone strikes since the civil war began . In 2013 Radhya Al-Mutawakel and Abdelrasheed Al-Faqih, Directors of Mwatana, published a joint report with Open Society Foundations titled 'Death by Drone', detailing evidence of civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects in nine US drone strikes.

Daesh 

Daesh   has proclaimed several provinces in Yemen and has urged its adherents to wage war against the Houthi movement, as well as against Zaydis in general  ISIS militants have conducted bombing attacks in various parts of the country, particularly against mosques in Sanaʽa. On 6 October 2015, IS militants conducted a series of suicide bombings in Aden that killed 15 soldiers affiliated with the Hadi-led government and the Saudi-led coalition. The attacks were directed against the al-Qasr hotel, which had been a headquarters for pro-Hadi officials, and also military facilities. Yemeni officials and UAE state news agency declared that 11 Yemeni and 4 United Arab Emirates soldiers were killed in Aden due to 4 coordinated Islamic State suicide bombings. Prior to the claim of responsibility by the Islamic State, UAE officials blamed the Houthis and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, for the attacks

May 2015 truce

A five-day ceasefire proposed by Saudi Arabia was accepted by the Houthis and their allies in the military on 10 May 2015. The ceasefire was intended to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to the country. The temporary truce began on the night of 12 May to allow the delivery of food, water, medical, and fuel aid throughout the country. On the fourth day of the truce, the fragile peace unraveled as fighting broke out in multiple southern governorates. At least three civilians in Aden and 12 in Taiz were killed on 16 May, despite the ceasefire Agence France-Presse reported that "dozens" were killed in southern Yemen by the clashes, including 26 Houthi and 12 pro-Hadi fighters.  

Around the same time reports surfaced in the media suggesting that Oman, which is the only Middle Eastern Monarchy not taking part in the coalition and has a border with Yemen, has presented a 7-point plan to both Houthis and Saudi Arabia. The Houthis accepted the peace talks and the 7-point plan while Saudi Arabia and Hadi government refused negotiations with the Houthis. It has also been suggested that Oman was responsible to mediate a 24-hour ceasefire although analysts doubted if Oman could help bring about more rigid negotiations

The following parts constituted the planned initiative:

·         The withdrawal of the Houthis and forces loyal to deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh from all Yemeni cities and the return of military hardware and munitions seized from the Yemeni Army.

·         The restoration of the president Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the government of Khalid Bahah.

·         Early parliamentary and presidential elections.

·         An agreement signed by all Yemeni parties.

·         The conversion of Ansarullah into a political party.

·         An international aid conference attended by donor states.

·         Yemen entering the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Misc. interventions

On Saturday, 20 August 2016, there were demonstrations at Satin Sanaʽa's Sabeen square to show support for the Higher Political Council, the Shia Houthi governing body and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. The head of council pledged to form a full government within days. The crowd size was variously placed at tens of thousands  and hundreds of thousands. The crowd's demands were "quickly rejected by the United Nations and the country's internationally recognized government."^[ Meanwhile, Saudi planes roared above the population and bombed nearby leaving an unknown number of casualties.  

On 29 January, the Yakla raid occurred. U.S. Navy SEALs executed a raid, President Barack Obama’s national security aides had reviewed the plans for a risky attack. Mr. Obama did not act because the Pentagon wanted to launch the attack on a moonless night and the next one would come after his term had ended. With only 5 days in Office President Trump was given the task; the raid caused several civilian casualties, with "a chain of mishaps and misjudgments" leading to a 50-minute shootout that led to the killing of one SEAL, the wounding of three other SEALs, and the deliberate destruction of a $75 million U.S. MV-22 Osprey aircraft that had been badly damaged on landing. The U.S. government reported that 14 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters were killed and acknowledged that "civilian noncombatants likely were killed" as well. Human Rights Watch, citing witness statements, reported the death of 14 civilians, including nine children.

From 1 to 8 March 2017, the US conducted 45 airstrikes against AQAP, a record amount of airstrikes conducted against the group by the US in recent history. The airstrikes were reported to have killed hundreds of AQAP militants.

On 25 March 2017 a court in the Houthi-controlled Sanaʽa sentenced Hadi and six other government officials to death in absentia for "high treason" in the form of "incitement and assistance to Saudi Arabia and its allies".  The sentence was announced by the Houthi-controlled Saba News Agency.  In May 2017, ISIL's Wilayats in Yemen released their videos, claiming attacks upon both government, Houthi and AQAP targets. One, they recorded their attack upon a Houthi target, then assassinating government troops and tribal members. Then posting their suicide attacks.

On 22 July 2017, Houthis and forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh launched a retaliation missile (called Volcano H-2) on Saudi Arabia targeting the oil refineries in the Yanbu Province of Saudi Arabia. Houthis and Ali Saleh media have claimed that the missile hit its target causing a major fire, while Saudi Arabia has claimed that it was due to the extreme heat that caused one of the generators to blow up. On 27 July 2017, Houthis and forces loyal to Ali Abdullah Saleh launched approximately 4 Volcano 1 missiles at King Fahad Air Base, the Houthis and Saleh said that the missiles had successfully hit their targets, whereas Saudi Arabia said that it was able to shoot down the missiles claiming that the Houthis real goal was to hit Mecca.

CNN reported that on 1 October 2017, a US MQ-9 Reaper drone was shot down north of Sanaa, the Houthi-controlled Defense Ministry said that it had "downed" the drone. Also, sometime in late 2017, in a gradual escalation of U.S. military action, a group of U.S. Army commandos arrived to seek and destroy Houthi missiles near the Saudi Arabian border. In public statements, the U.S. government has tried to keep secret the extent of its involvement in the conflict since the Houthis pose no direct threat to America.

CNN reported that on 16 October 2017, the US carried out its first airstrikes specifically targeting ISIS-YP, the strikes targeted two ISIS training camps in Al Bayda Governorate. A US Defense official told CNN that there were an estimated 50 fighters at the camps, the Pentagon said in a statement that the camps’ purpose was to "train militants to conduct terror attacks using AK-47s, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and endurance training." strikes disrupted the organization's attempts to train new fighters; the strikes were carried out in cooperation with the government of Yemen

On 2 December 2017, Ali Abdullah Saleh formally split with the Houthis, calling for a dialogue with Saudi Arabia to end the civil war. Clashes in Saana ensued. On 4 December 2017, Saleh was attacked and later killed by Houthi fighters while trying to flee Sanaa.^[ Shortly after his death, Saleh's son, Ahmed Saleh, called for Saleh's forces to split from the Houthis. On 7 December 2017, troops loyal to Hadi captured the strategic coastal town of Al-Khawkhah in western Yemen (115 km south of Al Hudaydah) from the Houthis. It was the first time in 3 years forces loyal to Hadi had entered the Al Hudaydah Governorate  On 16 December 2017, troops loyal to Hadi captured the cities of Beihan and Usaylan, officially ending Houthi presence in any major city that is a part of the Shabwah Governorate.The Saudi-led coalition placed the number of enemy fighters killed at 11,000 as of December 2017.

2018

The southern separatists represented by the Southern Transitional Council were backing the Hadi government against the Houthis, but tensions erupted in January 2018 with the separatists accusing the government of corruption and discrimination. Gun battles erupted in Aden on 28 January 2018 after the deadline set by the separatists for Hadi to dismiss his cabinet elapsed. Pro-STC forces seized a number of government offices, including the Hadi government's headquarters. By 30 January, the STC had taken control of most of the city

On 3 March 2018, fighting between Yemen's Houthi Ansarullah movement and Saudi-backed troops left over 55 people dead in the Nihm District in Yemen's north, with many more wounded; on the same day, fighting between the opposing groups killed at least 25 people along the western coast of Yemen. Also in early March 2018, Houthi fighters killed four Saudi "sharpshooters" in retaliation for Saudi Arabia's numerous attacks on Yemen  On 8 March 2018, the Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes across Yemen that left 9 Yemeni civilians (including women and children) dead.^[ The following day, Houthi rebels launched an attack on a military site in Jizan.. On 2 April 2018, the Saudi-led coalition bombed a residential housing area in Al Hudaydah, killing at least 14 civilians and wounding nine  .On 7 April 2018, according to pro-Houthi Shiite News, dozens of Sudanese troops were ambushed and killed by Houthis which led to calls for Sudan to stop fighting in the war in Yemen

On 9 April 2018, another series of airstrikes by Saudi Arabia killed at least 22 civilians in Yemen, with more injured. A few days later, on 12 April, Saudi Arabia bombed the set of a TV series in western Yemen, killing two people.^[ Another series of airstrikes by Saudi Arabia hit Yemen on 16 April, which left at least six civilians (including at least one child) dead, with several others wounded. On 19 April 2018, another series of Saudi killed at least five civilians and injured several others.  In response to Saudi Arabia's aggression against Yemen, Houthi forces hit a "mercenary camp" in Saudi Arabia with artillery and rocket fire (which killed and wounded some people at the mercenary camp), targeted a power plant in the Najran region of Saudi Arabia, and targeted an airport in Jizan. ^] Saudi Arabia later carried out a series of airstrikes in northwestern Sa'ada that destroyed three houses, as well as an aerial attack in southwestern Yemen that left 20 people dead. The same day, two leaders of Al-Qaeda in Yemen were killed on Thursday after a security raid was carried out by Yemeni forces in the province of Abyan. The security sources said that the leaders of al-Qaeda in Yemen, Murad Abdullah Mohammed al-Doubli, nicknamed "Abu Hamza al-Batani" and Hassan Baasrei were killed after a raid by security forces in the Al-Qaeda stronghold. Also known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or AQAP, Al-Qaeda are primarily active in Yemen. The U.S government believes AQAP to be the most dangerous al-Qaeda brands.

On 22 April 2018, the Saudi-led coalition carried out airstrikes on a wedding in Hajjah, a town in northwestern Yemen; the airstrikes left at least 33 people dead and 41 wounded. The attack consisted of two missiles that hit several minutes apart. Most of the people killed were women (including the bride at the wedding) and children. Ambulances were not able to get to the site of the attack at first, because, as jets were continuing to fly overhead after the attack, there were concerns about further airstrikes

Houthi media outlets announced on 23 April 2018 that a Houthi political leader had been killed in an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition the previous week. Also on 23 April, an aerial attack by Saudi Arabia in Hajjah killed 18 people and wounded 13 others, while another airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition in Saada killed at least three people and wounded two others. The same day, Yemen announced that it had fired two missiles at an oil facility in Jizan, a Saudi province near the Saudi-Yemeni border.

On 25 April 2018, Houthi forces destroyed a tank of the Saudi-led coalition on the western coast of Yemen. It was also reported by Yemen's official news agency that 13 Saudi led troops had been killed or wounded in several parts of Yemen.^[ Later in April 2018, another series of Saudi airstrikes across a period of 24 hours killed at least eight civilians across Yemen, seven of whom were women and children. At least 10 other civilians were injured as a result of the airstrikes

On 6 May 2018, a Yemeni ballistic missile hit Saudi military positions in Asir. Two Saudi troops were also killed by Houthi snipers in the Haskul military base in Jizan. At around the same time, Saudi Arabia was bombing various parts of northern Yemen: a Saudi bombing in Sa'ada killed five members of a family, and Saudi air raids in Hudaydah left two civilians killed. Saudi Arabia also bombed Hajjah, which ended up being bombed 10 times over a 24-hour period

On 7 May 2018, airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition hit Yemen's presidency building. The attack left at least 6 people dead, all of whom were civilians. 30 people were also wounded in the airstrikes. The following day, clashes between the Houthis and pro-Hadi forces in Taiz allegedly left dozens of Hadi militants killed, with several others wounded

On 9 May 2018, Houthi forces fired ballistic missiles at "economic targets" in Riyadh. According to Colonel Aziz Rashed, a military spokesman for the Houthi movement, the missile attack was revenge for Saudi Arabia's airstrikes in Yemen

On 10 May 2018, separate Saudi-led airstrikes on Yemeni residential areas killed two entire families. One of the airstrikes, which targeted a house in Sanaʽa, killed a father, mother, and two children from the same family, as well as two other civilians, in addition to wounding six people (including three children). Also on 10 May, Houthi forces claimed to have destroyed two Abrams tanks of the Saudi Army in Jizan.

On 11 May 2018, it was reported that cluster bombs made by the United States were being used by Saudi Arabia on their airstrikes that were targeting civilians. ^]Also on 11 May, the United Nations Human Rights office reported that April had been the deadliest month to date in 2018 in Yemen, with 236 civilian deaths and 238 civilian injuries in April alone; this was an increase from the 180 civilian casualties in March of that year. On 14 May, the Houthis fired a ballistic missile (that had been domestically manufactured) at a Saudi Aramco oil facility in Jizan. Pro-Houthi forces also shot down a Saudi reconnaissance drone in Jizan (in southwestern Saudi Arabia). ^]On 17 May, Houthi forces fired another ballistic missile at a military base in Lahij, in southwestern Yemen, that was run by Saudi soldiers. Also on 17 May, Amnesty International said that heavy fighting near Al Hudaydah has displaced tens of thousands of people. It also warned that "the worst could be yet to come," as Saudi-backed militants were advancing towards the Houthi-controlled area. Amnesty International also said that clashes along the western coast of Yemen had displaced around 100,000 people in recent months, with most people from Al Hudaydah Governorate. It added that it was "a glimpse of what potentially lies in store on a wider scale if the fighting encroaches on the densely populated port city. On 18 May, another Houthi missile was fired into Jizan, in southwestern Saudi Arabia. The missile was reported to have struck Jazan Economic City. Also on 18 May, over a dozen Saudi soldiers were killed and injured by Houthi snipers and their allies. On 21 May, Houthi forces fired a ballistic missile targeting Jizan Airport. ^]Also on 21 May, the Saudi-led coalition launched 11 airstrikes on the Kitaf district of Saada, in northern Yemen. Saudi rockets and artillery shells also hit several border areas, which inflicted heavy casualties on houses and farms of citizens. Further, on the night of 21 May, clashes were reported to have started between forces of the UAE and Qatar in the Taiz province of Yemen.

On 22 May, 10 Saudi soldiers and five Saudi commanders were allegedly killed in an attempt to restore a series of mountains in Jizan. On 24 May, it was reported that a Houthi missile targeted a Saudi port in Jizan, at dawn on 25 May, Yemeni forces fired a ballistic missile at a Saudi military camp in Najran. It was also reported on 25 May that airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition killed 7 civilians, in addition to injuring some other civilians, in the Taiz and Saada provinces of Yemen. On 26 May, Houthi forces announced that military drones had bombarded a Saudi airport in Asir for the second time in over a month. The attack led to the suspension of flights to and from the airport. Also on 26 May, a Saudi bulldozer near the Alab border crossing was destroyed by Houthi artillery fire.^{[ ]}Further, also on that day, eight airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition hit Al Hudaydah Governorate, while another airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition on a gas station in Sanaʽa killed at least four people and wounded at least 10 others.^[346] Also towards the end of May 2018, dozens of pro-Hadi troops were killed and injured along Yemen's western coast. On 28 May, a Saudi commander was killed in Jizan, and a military vehicle with troops in Najran was destroyed. ^]On 30 May, Houthi air forces downed a spy plane in Asir. Also on 30 May, Houthi fighters destroyed Saudi military vehicles.

In late May 2018, pro-Hadi troops prepared to launch a siege on Hudaydah. Colonel Sadiq Duwaid of the pro-Hadi forces stated, "First, we will cut off supply lines, especially between [the capital] Sanaʽa and Hudaydah, then we will place the Houthis under siege." The spokesperson of the United Nations Secretary-General warned that "increased fighting would unleash even more internally displaced people," and Amnesty International warned that fighting near the port of Hudaydah had already displaced tens of thousands of people. It also warned against clashes spreading to urban areas

On 1 June 2018, Houthi forces shot down a Saudi helicopter gunship of the Saudi army in an attack that killed all those on board. Also on 1 June, the spokesman for the pro-Houthi forces warned the United Arab Emirates that Abu Dhabi was no longer safe from retaliatory missiles. ^]On 4 June, the leader of Houthi movement claimed that Israeli warplanes had been detected flying over Hudaydah.

On 4 June 2018, Yemen's Red Sea Ports Corporation said that a vessel used by the United Nation's World Food Programme was attacked after it delivered a shipment in Hudaydah, which is under a blockade by the Saudi-led coalition. Mark Lowcock, the United Nations OCHA aid chief, said that no one was injured, but criticized anyone who was attempting to disrupt aid delivery in Hudaydah. The suspect was not known at the time

On 8 and 9 June 2018, heavy fighting began in al-Durayhmi and Bayt al-Faqih, 10 and 35 kilometers from the port city of al-Hudaydah, respectively. The United Nations warned that a military attack or a siege on the city could cost up to 250,000 lives On 10 June, it was reported that the United Nations had withdrawn from Hudaydah. Also on 10 June, it was reported that so far, 600 people had died in recent days as the battle intensified. Further, also on 10 June, Al Jazeera published an article containing reports of alleged torture in Houthi prisons in Yemen.

On 12 June, it was reported that an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition hit a Doctors Without Borders building. This was despite markings on the roof of the building identifying it as a building of health care and despite the fact that its coordinates had been shared with the coalition. No one was hurt in the attack, but the newly constructed building suffered significant damage.

On 4 July 2018, a United Nations report stated that over 121,000 Yemenis had fled Hudaydah due to the attack on the port city by the Saudi-led coalition. In 6 July, Houthi forces fired a domestic ballistic missile at a "strategic economic target" in Jizan in southwestern Saudi Arabia.

On 9 August, a Saudi airstrike on a school bus in a crowded market in Dahyan killed 40 young school children and 11 adults. The 227 kg (500 lb) laser-guided Mk 82 bomb used in the attack was made by Lockheed Martin and purchased by Saudi Arabia from the US.

On 13 December, a truce was called in Hudaydah, a port city in Yemen. Warring parties agreed to have a ceasefire in the crucial place, which is a lifeline for half the country. The Houthis agreed to have all forces withdraw from Hudaydah in the following days, same as those from the Yemeni government alliance who were fighting them there, both being replaced by United Nations-designated "local troops".

2019

On January 8, 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations listed this conflict as a conflict to watch during 2019. Similarly, the Italian Institute for International Political Studies also claimed it to be a conflict to watch in 2019. Sporadic exchanges of fire and other ceasefire violations have been reported between Houthi forces and coalition troops around Hudaydah in January.

Humanitarian situation

CNN reported on 8 April 2015 that almost 10,160,000 Yemenis were deprived of water, food, and electricity as a result of the conflict. The report also added per sources from UNICEF officials in Yemen that within 15 days, some 100,000 people across the country were dislocated, while Oxfam said that more than 10 million Yemenis did not have enough food to eat, in addition to 850,000 half-starved children. Over 13 million civilians were without access to clean water  A medical aid boat brought 2.5 tonnes of medicine to Aden on 8 April 2015. ^]A UNICEF plane loaded with 16 tonnes of supplies landed in Sanaʽa on 10 April. The United Nations announced on 19 April 2015 that Saudi Arabia promised to provide $273.7 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Yemen. The UN appealed for the aid, saying 7.5 million people had been affected by the conflict and many were in need of medical supplies, potable water, food, shelter, and other forms of support.

On 12 May 2015, Oxfam warned that the five days a humanitarian ceasefire was scheduled to last would not be sufficient to fully address Yemen's humanitarian crisis.  has also been said that the Houthis are collecting a war tax on goods. The political analyst Abdulghani al-Iryani affirmed that this tax is: "an illegal levy, mostly extortion that is not determined by law and the amount is at the discretion of the field commanders". As the war dragged on through the summer and into the fall, things were made far worse when Cyclone Chapala, the equivalent of a category 2 Hurricane, made landfall on 3 November 2015. According to the NGO Save the Children, the destruction of healthcare facilities and a healthcare system on the brink of collapse as a result of the war will cause an estimated 10,000 preventable child deaths annually. Some 1,219 children have died as a direct result of the conflict thus far. Edward Santiago, the NGO's Yemen director, asserted in December 2016:

Even before the war tens of thousands of Yemeni children were dying of preventable causes. But now, the situation is much worse and an estimated 1,000 children are dying every week from preventable killers like diarrhoea, malnutrition and respiratory tract infections. On March 2017, the World Food Program reported that while Yemen was not yet in a full-blown famine, 60% of Yemenis, or 17 million people, were in "crisis" or "emergency" food situations

In June 2017 a cholera epidemic resurfaced which was reported to be killing a person an hour in Yemen by mid June. News reports in mid June stated that there had been 124,000 cases and 900 deaths and that 20 of the 22 provinces in Yemen were affected at that time  UNICEF and WHO estimated that, by 24 June 2017, the total cases in the country exceeded 200,000, with 1,300 deaths

On 7 June 2018, it was reported that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had pulled 71 of its international staff out of Yemen, and moved the rest of them to Djibouti, with some 450 ICRC employees remaining in the country. The partial evacuation measure came on the eve of an ICRC worker, a Lebanese national, being killed on 21 April by unknown gunmen in the southwestern city of Taiz. The ICRC stated "our current activities have been blocked, threatened and directly targeted in recent weeks, and we see a vigorous attempt to instrumentalise our organisation as a pawn in the conflict." In light of the serious security deterioration for ICRC personnel, the international organisation has called for all parties of the conflict "to provide it with concrete, solid and actionable guarantees so that it can continue working in Yemen

The International Rescue Committee stated in March that at least 9.8 million people in Yemen were acutely in need of health services. The closure of Sanaʽa and Riyan airports for civilian flights and the limited operation of civilian airplanes in government-held areas, made it impossible for most to seek medical treatment abroad. The cost of tickets provided by Yemenia, Air Djibouti and Queen Bilqis Airways, also put traveling outside Yemen out of reach for many

Refugees

Djibouti, a small country in the Horn of Africa across the Bab-el-Mandeb strait from Yemen, has received an influx of refugees since the start of the campaign. Refugees also fled from Yemen to Somalia, arriving by sea in Somaliland and Puntland starting 28 March. On 16 April 2015, 2,695 refugees of 48 nationalities were reported to have fled to Oman in the past two weeks  According to Asyam Hafizh, an Indonesian student who was studying in Yemen, Al-Qaeda of Yemen has rescued at least 89 Indonesian civilians which trapped in the conflict. Later on he arrived in Indonesia and he told his story to local Media. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in August 2015 that a total of almost 100,000 people fled Yemen, especially to regional countries, like Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. In September 2016, UNHCR estimated displacement of 2.4 million Yemenis within the country and 120,000 seeking asylum.

The Royal Saudi Navy evacuated diplomats and United Nations staff from Aden to Jeddah on 28 March 2015. Pakistan dispatched two specialbPIA flights to evacuate some 500 stranded Pakistanis on 29 March 2015. Several UN staff members and Arab diplomats were also evacuated following the airstrikes .The Indian government responded by deploying ships and planes to Yemen to evacuate stranded Indians. India began evacuating its citizens on 2 April by sea. An air evacuation of Indian nationals from Sanaʽa to Djibouti started on 3 April, after the Indian government obtained permission to land two Airbus A320s at the airport The Indian Armed Forces carried out rescue operation codenamed Operation Raahat and evacuated more than 4640 overseas Indians in Yemen along with 960 foreign nationals of 41 countries. The air evacuation ended on 9 April 2015 while the evacuation by sea ended on 11 April 2015.^[ The United States has assets in the region, but through its Yemen diplomatic mission website, instructed its citizens to evacuate using Indian assistance

A Chinese missile frigate docked in Aden on 29 March to evacuate Chinese nationals from Yemen. The ship reportedly deployed soldiers ashore on 2 April to guard the evacuation of civilians from the city.  Hundreds of Chinese and other foreign nationals were safely evacuated aboard the frigate in the first operation of its kind carried out by the Chinese military.^[ The Philippines announced that 240 Filipinos were evacuated across the Saudi border to Jizan, before boarding flights to Riyadh and then to Manila.

The Malaysian government deployed two Royal Malaysian Air Force C-130 aircraft to evacuate their citizens. On 15 April, around 600 people were evacuated by Malaysia, also comprising citizens of other Southeast Asian countries such as 85 Indonesians, 9 Cambodians, 3 Thais and 2 Vietnamese. The Indonesian Air Force also sent a Boeing 737-400and a chartered aircraft to evacuate Indonesian citizens.

The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry said it would airlift its citizens out of Yemen if they requested to be evacuated. There were reportedly more than 50,000 Ethiopian nationals living and working in Yemen at the outbreak of hostilities.^[429] More than 3,000 Ethiopians registered to evacuate from Yemen, and as of 17 April, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry had confirmed 200 evacuees to date

Throughout April, Russian military forces evacuated more than 1,000 people of various nationalities, including Russian citizens, to the Chkalovsky Airport, a military air base.

Impact on citizens

Yemeni refugee female and children are extremely susceptible to smuggling and human trafficking. NGOs report that vulnerable populations in Yemen were at increased risk for human trafficking in 2015 because of ongoing armed conflict, civil unrest, and lawlessness. Migrant workers from the Somalia who remained in Yemen during this period suffered from increased violence, and women and children became most vulnerable to human trafficking. Prostitution on women and child sex workers is a social issue in Yemen. Citizens of other gulf states are beginning to be drawn into the sex tourism industry. The poorest people in Yemen work locally and children are commonly sold as sex slaves abroad. While this issue is worsening, the plight of Somali's in Yemen has been ignored by the government. Children are recruited between the ages of 13 and 17, and as young as 10 years old into armed forces despite a law against it in 1991. The rate of militant recruitment in Yemen increases exponentially. According to an international organization, between 26 March and 24 April 2015, armed groups recruited at least 140 children. According to the New York Times report, 1.8 million children in Yemen are extremely subject to malnutrition in 2018 

The civil war in Yemen severely impacted and degraded the country's education system. The number of children who are out of school increased to 1.8 million in 2015–2016 out of more than 5 million registered students according to the 2013 statistics released by the Ministry of Education. Moreover, 3600 schools are directly affected; 68 schools are occupied by armed groups, 248 schools have severe structural damage, and 270 are used to house refugees. The Yemen government has not been able to improve this situation due to limited authority and manpower. Some of the education system's problems include: not enough financial resources to operate schools and salaries of the teachers, not enough materials to reconstruct damaged schools, and lack of machinery to print textbooks and provide school supplies. These are caused by the unstable government that cannot offer enough financial support since many schools are either damaged or used for other purposes. Due to warfare and destruction of schools, the education ministry, fortunately, was able to send teams to oversee primary and secondary schools' final exam in order to give students 15-16 school year certificates. Currently, UNICEF is raising money to support students and fix schools damaged by armed conflicts.

The Yemeni quality of life is affected by the civil war and people have suffered enormous hardships. Although mines are banned by the government, Houthi forces placed anti-personnel mines in many parts of Yemen including Aden.^[ Thousands of civilians are injured when they accidentally step on mines; many lose their legs and injure their eyes. It is estimated that more than 500,000 mines have been laid by Houthi forces during the conflict. The pro-Hadi Yemen Army was able to remove 300,000 Houthi mines in recently captured areas, including 40,000 mines on the outskirts of Marib province, according to official sources.^[ In addition, the nine-country coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched many airstrikes against Houthi forces; between March 2015 and December 2018 more than 4600 civilians have been killed and much of the civilian infrastructure for goods and food production, storage, and distribution has been destroyed. Factories have ceased production and thousands of people have lost their jobs. Due to decreased production, food, medicines, and other consumer staples have become scarce. The prices of these goods have gone up and civilians can no longer afford them for sustenance.

United Nations  

The United Nations representative Baroness Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said on 2 April that she was "extremely concerned" about the fate of civilians trapped in fierce fighting, after aid agencies reported 519 people killed and 1,700 injured in two weeks. The UN children's agency reported 62 children killed and 30 injured and also children being recruited as soldiers.

Russia called for "humanitarian pauses" in the coalition bombing campaign, bringing the idea before the United Nations Security Council in a 4 April emergency meeting. However, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United Nations questioned whether humanitarian pauses would be the best way of delivering humanitarian assistance

On 14 April 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution placing sanctions on Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and Ahmed Ali Saleh, establishing an arms embargo on the Houthis, and calling on the Houthis to withdraw from Sanaʽa and other areas they seized. The Houthis condemned the UN resolution and called for mass protests

Jamal Benomar, the UN envoy to Yemen who brokered the deal that ended Ali Abdullah Saleh's presidency during the 2011–12 revolution, resigned on 15 April. Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, formerly the head of the UN's Ebola response mission, was confirmed as the new UN Envoy to Yemen on 25 April. The Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by the Security Council, UN submitted a 329-page report to the latter's President on 26 January 2018 denouncing the UAE, the Yemeni government and the Houthis for torturing civilians in the Yemeni conflict

In December 2018, UN-sponsored talks between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government were expected to start. The UN has also started using its jets to carry wounded Houthi fighters out of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, to Oman, paving the way for planned peace talks after nearly four years of civil war

Calls for ceasefire

On 4 April 2015, the International Committee of the Red Cross called for a 24-hour ceasefire to deliver aid and supplies after the Saudi-led coalition blocked three aid shipments to Yemen. On 5 April, Reuters quoted a Houthi leader as saying the group would be willing to sit down for peace talks if the airstrikes stopped and a neutral party acted as mediator. On 7 April, China added its support of a ceasefire in Yemen, following an appeal by the ICRC and Russia for a humanitarian pause

Despite Saudi Arabia asking for Pakistan's support to join the coalition, the Pakistan government has also called for a ceasefire in order to help negotiate a diplomatic solution. Alongside Turkey, Pakistan has taken initiatives to arrange a ceasefire in Yemen. According to analysis written in U.S. News, Pakistan's strategic calculations firmly believes that if the Saudis enter into a ground war in Yemen – with or without Pakistani military– it will become a stalemate; therefore, Pakistan is increasing its efforts to potentially help engineer a face-saving solution to achieve a ceasefire and end the war

On 12 April, Saudi Arabia rejected Iran's request about a ceasefire in Yemen  Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said in the Saudi capital,Riyadh, at a news conference with his French counterpart Laurent Fabius, that "Saudi Arabia is a responsible for establishing legitimate government in Yemen and Iran should not interfere. Australia called for the ceasefire in Yemen, because of the civilian casualties numbers On 16 April, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon requested an immediate ceasefire in Yemen. Also he said all parties must stop war as soon as possible.

Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif submitted four-point Yemen peace plan to United Nations. In this letter he pointed to enormous civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. He said the only way to stop the war is to require that Yemeni parties form a national unity government without any foreign military intervention Furthermore, since 21 April 2016, peace talks have started in Kuwait at the Bayan Palace. In June 2015, a solution to ending the Saudi intervention in Yemen sought the participation of a Yemeni delegation to the Geneva peace talks; the delegation came under attack in the Geneva peace talks

In 10 April 2016, cease fire agreement reached in Yemen, after months of negotiation, but peace talks were suspended on 6 August. Second Yemeni ceasefire attempt on 21 November 2016, collapsed within 48 hours The U.S. and U.K. have put immense pressure on Saudi Arabia following the bombing campaign in Yemen , a Washington Post journalist. On 30 October 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said "It is time to end this conflict, replace conflict with compromise, and allow the Yemeni people to heal through peace and reconstruction." Pompeo emphasized that the Houthi rebels must stop firing missiles at Saudi and the UAE, but he also added that "subsequently, coalition airstrikes must cease in all populated areas in Yemen," aiming at Saudi Arabia. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said all the parties involved in the war need to take part in peace talks initiated by the UN within 30 days.^[469] On November 10, 2018, the U.S. announced it would no longer refuel coalition aircraft operating over Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition issued a statement confirming the decision, saying the cessation of aerial refueling was made at the request of the coalition due to improvements in their own refueling capabilities. The move was expected to have minimal impact on the Saudi effort. The U.S. still provides support for the Saudi-led intervention via weapons sales and intelligence sharing.  On 13 March 2019, the U.S. Senate voted 54–46 in favor of ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen and calling on the President to revoke U.S. forces from the Saudi-led coalition.

Socio economic impacts 

In Yemen's "forgotten war," the civilian population has lost the most. According to the United Nations, the death toll surpassed 10,000 at the beginning of 2017, with at least 40,000 wounded. Coalition airstrikes and a naval blockade imposed by coalition forces in 2015 have pushed Yemen - where over 80 percent of food is imported - to the brink of famine.  Yemen has also been hit by a cholera outbreak deemed the worst in the world by the UN. It estimates that roughly 600,000 people have contracted the disease since last year and more than 2,000 people have died from it. Officials have also sounded the alarm amid medical supplies shortages. Doctors without Borders suspended its aid after two years, threatening the daily operations of Yemen's national blood bank. The EU this year called it the "worst humanitarian crisis in the world

Water availability in Yemen has decreased. Water scarcity with an intrinsic geographical formation in highlands and limited capital to build water infrastructures and provision service caused a catastrophic water shortage in Yemen. Aquifer recharge rates are decreasing while salt water intrusion is increasing After the civil war began in 2015, the water buckets were destroyed significantly and price of water highly increased. Storing water has demolished by war and supply chains have been occupied by military personnel, which make the delivery of water far more difficult. In 2015, over 15 million people need healthcare and over 20 million need clean water and sanitation—an increase of 52 percent since the intervention, but the government agencies cannot afford to deliver clean water to displaced Yemeni citizens  

The Yemen civil war resulted in a severe lack of food and vegetation. Agricultural production in the country has suffered substantially leaving Yemen to face the threat of famine. Yemen is currently under blockade by land, sea and air which has disrupted the delivery of many of the countries resources. In a country where 90% of the food requirements are met through imports, this blockade has had serious consequences concerning the availability of food to its citizens. ^]It is reported that out of the population of 24 million in Yemen, everyday 13 million are going hungry and 6 million are at risk of starvation. According to reports there is strong evidence suggesting that Yemen's already limited agricultural sector is being deliberately destroyed by warring factions, exacerbating the food shortage and leaving the country dependent solely on imports to meet the food requirements of its    

."

Houthis 

The war in Yemen is often misunderstood, and the consequent ongoing humanitarian crisis is disregarded. Many analyses reduce the conflict to a proxy war between the Arab coalition—led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—and Iran. However, the proxy war is only one layer of a multidimensional conflict that includes many factions, some of which are uncomfortable partnerships. One of the most misunderstood and most central parties to the conflict is the Houthis. In the past decade, they have grown in power from an isolated religious movement into a considerable militant faction that controls the Yemeni capital, Sana’a. However, with this success have come new internal divisions and external threats that will influence how the devastating war will end and what might follow.

The Houthis emerged in Yemen as an opposition movement in the early 1990s; however, they did not present a significant military threat to the Yemeni state until the early 2000s. The group originally organized as the “Believing Youth Group,” claimed to “revive” Zaydism, a branch of Shiite Islam, and aimed to counter the increasing presence of Sunni Wahhabi schools in Sa’dah, the Northern Province of Yemen, and particularly in the city of Dammaj. As the organization grew, it planned insurgencies against the state and became known as “the Houthis,” a reference to the family that led the movement. The Houthis fought six wars, called the Sa’dah wars, with the government between 2004 and 2010. These conflicts gave the rebel group combat experience and compelled them to build a military organization. However, their true rise to power occurred during and after the Arab Spring in 2011.

When the protests in Yemen began, the Houthis were present in “Change Square.” After President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down and initiated a political transition after months of pressure, the Houthis participated in Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC), where one of the eight committees formed was dedicated exclusively to addressing their grievances. The political process was fraught. Sana’a had never been host to so many dissenting groups in its modern history and the transition championed by the NDC was an unpopular departure from Yemen’s traditionally decentralized, consociational mode of governance. In the absence of state control, a vacuum emerged that politically ambitious groups in the capital, including the Houthis, worked to exploit.

Eventually, in September 2014, the Houthis seized Sana’a, but this turn of events was anything but sudden. In the months before Houthi forces entered the capital, its militia threaded through the mountainous regions of Arhab and Amran, fighting several battles against rival military units headed by General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, the tribal and Islamist political coalition Islah, and independent Salafi fighters. When the Houthis entered Sana’a, it was reported that “not a single shot was fired.” The takeover was slow moving and cushioned with political settlements, not only with the government but also with the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), a coalition of opposition political parties created in 2005.

The civil war expanded into a regional war with the intervention of the Arab coalition in 2015. Despite this increased pressure, the Houthis’ political ambitions proved greater than expected and they quickly gained several advantages over other competing factions. They had already captured the capital of Sana’a, where they seized control of all existing state institutions. They also benefited from the accumulated experience of Saleh, the ousted president of 33 years and the Houthis’ former enemy. Saleh, became an unlikely ally who joined forces with the Houthis to retain his influence  Today  the Houthis have complete control of the capital and the governorates of Amran, Dhamar, Rima, Ibb and al-Mahweet. They also control much of the northwest province of Hajjah, except near the Saudi border, and are present in the central province of al-Bayda. The war has devastated Sa’dah, the northern stronghold of the Houthis, but the province remains almost exclusively under their control.

The Houthis, who prefer the term Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), are generally defined as followers of Abdel Malik and Hussein al-Houthi’s religious and political agenda and the adherents of the philosophy inspired by Badr al-Din al-Houthi. This ideology is inspired by Zaydism, a branch of Shi’ism with similar religious practices to the Sunni Shafi’i sect in Yemen. However, the current conflict in Yemen has produced a new breed of “Houthi.” Today, the Houthi crowd is a broad spectrum of groups—an unruly quasi-coalition spanning religious, geographic and political spaces and hierarchies allied in their opposition to the Saudi-led intervention.

Authority resides in the “Sa’dah Core,” who survived the Sa’dah wars and whose ideologies lean closer to Twelver Shi’ism, which is practiced in Iran but historically alien to Yemen. Twelver Shiite practices that are novel to Yemen are increasingly being incorporated into religious practice; for example, the commemoration of Ashura was publicly celebrated by Houthi supporters en masse for the first time in 2017, and Yemeni Shiites now openly observe Eid al-Ghadir, a Shiite religious celebration rumored to have been practiced mostly in secret previously. Of all the Houthi factions, the Sa’dah Core has the closest ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which advise the Houthi leadership. This inner cabal has been described as “paranoid” and extremely “secretive.”

Another faction are the Houthi jihadis, who constitute the majority of the Houthis’ fighters in the war and who are motivated by a radical religious interpretation analogous to Salafi jihadis. They are inspired by the Sa’dah Core and the historical references to the martyrdom of Hussein, the early Shiite imam whose death was foundational to the Sunni-Shiite split. Religious extremists on both sides of the conflict consider the war over—a matter of life or death for their faiths. This framing of the conflict, perpetuated by both Houthi jihadis and Salafi jihadis, has produced widespread sectarianism throughout the country.

Additionally, there are the Zaydi dogmatists. Like the Salafis, they believe that they are practicing a purer form of Islam perfected by their ancestors. Within this religious spectrum, there are also some Zaydi-Hashemites who hope to revive the ancient Yemeni Mutawakkilite kingdom, which vested authority in imams who claimed to have been descendants of the prophet Muhammad. However, none of those calling for the return of the imamate have close dynastic ties to the ruling family that was ousted from power in 1962 or its predecessors.

In addition to the ideological division, the Houthis are also driven by geographic divides that are dictated by existing tribal groupings. The Houthis have the broad support from the Hashed, Bakeel and Khawlan tribes, but there is some dissent within these groups. The tribal dynamic, which preceded 2011, played to the favor of the Houthis, as many northern tribes objected to the ruling Hashed hierarchy. However, as a result of the Houthis’ emerging power, the Sa’dah tribes have become dominant over the north for the first time in decades. The Sa’dah Core has rearranged the geographic social strata by reigning over the regions of Sana’a and Thamar.

Throughout the current conflict, the Houthis have used traditional tribal arbitration methods to secure noninterference from northern tribes that might otherwise have fought against them and succeeded by strategically allowing powerful tribes significant autonomy in their respective regions. The Houthis have also benefited from missteps by the Arab coalition and the Yemeni government. The Arab coalition’s negligent targeting of airstrikes against previously unaligned tribes has given the Houthis new allies, and the government’s discrimination against Yemenis living in Houthi-controlled territories has further alienated parts of the Yemeni public.

The Houthis have failed to mobilize politically as they have militarily. After their initial success sweeping into Sana’a, a number of political parties sided with the Houthis, including the Union of Popular Forces and al-Haq Party, but their motives were complicated—while they were influenced by the legitimacy of the Houthis’ Zaydi identity, they also had to consider their own viability and safety under Houthi rule.

Despite forming political alliances, the Houthis have struggled to manage their supporters effectively, while also grappling with the loss of senior leaders. As early as 2013, the Houthis’ opponents had begun assassinating many prominent Houthi political figures, such as Ahmed Sharaf al-Din and Abdel Karim Jadban. These organizational failures and setbacks have hindered the Houthis’ political efforts, and the political wing that represents the Houthis in international negotiations is their weakest link.

Many Houthi supporters are politically or religiously agnostic pragmatists whose support for the group is based on immediate interests. This category includes former members of the General People’s Congress (GPC) who sided with Saleh in 2012, some northern tribesmen, individuals whose livelihoods were negatively affected by the mistakes of the Arab coalition, and those previously marginalized by the Yemeni government. These pragmatists make up the most substantial fraction of the Houthi organization and are likely to switch sides quickly if the balance of power shifts. Many pragmatists who once tolerated Houthi rule did exactly that when Saleh broke with his Houthi partners in late 2017, prompting fighting between Houthis and loyalists to Saleh that resulted in Saleh’s death.

The infighting between the Houthi and pro-Saleh factions reinforced perceptions that the conflict is primarily between Saudi and Iranian proxies, and after Saleh was killed outside Sana’a some pragmatists proclaimed their dissent and fled Houthi-controlled territory. Executing Saleh was a double-edged sword for the Houthis. It provided the group with a large boost in morale but cost many supporters who idolized Saleh. Some of these supporters have now allied themselves to Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government, including an effective armed faction, the Guards of the Republic, under the leadership of Saleh’s nephew, Tariq. The most influential component of the Houthi group is its militant bloc, represented by the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, which is structured similarly to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The Houthi military bloc is formidably armed, including with weapons it seized from government forces in the north.

The Houthi military wing provides the only significant female representation within the organization. Women participate in a special militia and are called “al-Zaynabiyat,” after Zaynab, the daughter of the fourth caliph, Ali, who is revered by Shiites. The Zaynabiyat violently perpetuate Houthi political, military and social ambitions by performing physically laborious and culturally sensitive tasks under the guidance of the Revolutionary Committee, including participating in combat, facilitating home searches and guarding female detainees.

The Houthis are waging battles on many fronts, including internally. The military branch appears to be fighting with the political branch and desires absolute control over the Houthi movement. In April 2018, Saleh al-Sammad, the president of the Houthi state and head of its political council, was killed by a coalition airstrike that required sophisticated intelligence obtained from infiltration of the Houthi leadership. It’s possible that members of the military wing provided that information to remove Sammad. Further evidence of the breakdown in internal Houthi dynamics can be found in recent credible reports of mounting tensions between Mahdi al-Mashat, Sammad’s replacement, and Mohammed al-Houthi, head of the Revolutionary Committee, and allegations that Houthi attempted to assassinate Mashat.

The military branch of the Houthi movement could easily take advantage of its powerful wartime role to crush its rivals in the political arm. Doing so, however, would hinder the possibility of reconciliation with other Yemeni groups postwar and would complicate the possibility of peace. If the war were to end tomorrow, though, the tensions within the Houthi bloc would be left unresolved and would likely weaken the movement from within. As long as the divisions persist, they will present opportunities for outside groups—including current enemies. The Houthis’ military wing is eager for Saudi support, and it might be a shrewd move for the Saudis to deliver and draw some of the Houthis to their side while weakening the movement as a whole.

Yemen’s war is a gift to Iran; Iran’s quiet manipulation of the war has reinforced its opponents’ fears that it is a menacing power in the Arabian Peninsula. Due to the mismanagement of the conflict, what was initially an inflated threat is now becoming a reality. Iran has received this reputational boost at low cost. In contrast to the Arab coalition, which spends $5-6 billion each month on the Yemen war, Iran is estimated to spend dramatically less on the conflict—perhaps only several million dollars each year in Yemen. This support has bolstered the Houthis and lengthened the conflict. Over the past five years, Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, have increased their military and technical support to the Houthis and helped them survive the Arab coalition’s onslaught. When the Arab Spring swept Yemen, Iran’s outreach to the Houthis was not exclusive. Iran was interested in forming relationships with any group open to accepting its patronage. Nor was Iran alone. Yemeni political blocs, and even civil society groups, received new interest from Gulf countries, Turkey and other foreign entities. Like other regional powers, Iran offered workshops and training for independent female activists and grassroots nongovernmental organizations. At one time, Iran also supported a branch of Yemen’s Southern Separatist Movement, which is now allied with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran has lost its influence over other Yemeni groups since the outbreak of the conflict, but it remains the Houthis’ most significant foreign supporter.

While the idea that Iran is the mastermind behind the Houthi movement is widespread, the evolution of the Houthi organization suggests that they sought out Iran, not the other way around. Yemeni scholars on the Houthi movement have argued that the Houthis were impressed by the organization and discipline of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Lebanon’s Hezbollah and solicited their advice. These experts have also suggested that cooperation is based on political ambition rather than shared religious beliefs.

Iran’s ideological influence on the Houthis may have begun when Hussein Badr al-din al-Houthi visited the Iranian city of Qom in the early 1990s, but Iran’s direct tactical guidance was not evident until the sixth Sa’dah War, when Saudi Arabia increased its involvement in the Saleh government’s wars against the Houthis. In October 2009 and January 2013, two large shipments of weapons from Iran were intercepted by the Yemeni government and the USS Farragut, respectively. These intercepted shipments indicated how important access to the Midi and Salif ports in Hodeidah province are to the Houthis’ war effort. Iran also allegedly transported supplies to the Houthis by air, delivering daily flights to Sana’a airport for three weeks until access was blocked by the Saudi air campaign. A U.N. Security Council report published in January 2019 revealed that Iran is also providing the Houthis with an estimated $30 million worth of fuel each month.

This support is not the same thing as control. In fact, at times the Houthis appear to have acted against the advice provided by their Iranian backers. It was even reported that Iran advised the Houthis against the capture of the city of Sana’a and counseled them to withdraw their forces from specific parts of Yemen—presumably to protect the negotiation and implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Houthis’ rejection of Iran’s direction revealed that the relationship between Iran and the Houthis, though it had its roots in the 2009 Sa’dah war, was still nascent in 2015. The successful capture of Sana’a was a surprise to everyone who doubted the Houthis’ capabilities, including Iran. It also suggests that Iran was not prioritizing its influence in Yemen at the time. It was the Houthis, not their foreign patrons, who asserted their own will to power and proceeded with their agenda. However, their poor planning and limited political experience prevented them from anticipating the Arab coalition’s coordinated retaliation and since then they have come to rely more on Iranian support.

The Trump administration has sought to amplify the perception of Iranian influence in Yemen, especially since its withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. In December 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley delivered a speech in which she presented evidence that the Houthis had used Iranian weapons against Saudi Arabia and called for international condemnation. As the Trump administration works to increase Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation, Iran is likely to increase its presence and involvement in Yemen to cement the increased influence it has developed there in recent years. An increased Iranian role would prove even more devastating to the Yemeni people and would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.

Since the early 2000s, and especially in the past four years of conflict, the Houthis have transformed from a small-scale rebel group warring in Yemen’s extreme north to central participants in perhaps the most significant regional conflict in the history of the modern Arabian Peninsula and the world’s deadliest war today. Since 2011, they have risen from controlling Sa’dah, a single marginalized governorate, to the majority of Yemen’s north, including the country’s capital and its (failing) institutions. Today, the Houthis are taking on the Arab coalition, which is flush with Western weapons and oil money.

Conclusion

It will be challenging to convince the Houthis to view a state of peace as preferable to a state of war. The Houthis, like many other parties to the conflict in Yemen, understand that peace represents the diminution and transformation of their influence in Yemen. Some peace proposals would require the Houthis to hand over their heavy weaponry and withdraw from power centers throughout the country. Forced to transform into a political party, the Houthis would lose exclusive power and privileges across Yemen’s north as they shed their military wing and limit their political participation to peaceful democratic processes.

The Stockholm Treaty signed in December 2018 remains in force but has faltered in its implementation and needs reinforcement. Though it was criticized as vague and insubstantial, the treaty was nevertheless welcomed as a first, albeit tentative, step toward peace. The peace process initiated in Stockholm has faced hurdles in the months since; the head of the U.N. peace monitoring forces has already been replaced amid continuing conflict between the Houthis and their opponents. Monitoring the technical details of the treaty matters, but more important now is finding the political will for peace. Convincing the Houthis to accept peace will require pressure coupled with political incentives to curb their further expansion in Yemen and to ameliorate the world’s worst human-made humanitarian crisis.

As an incentive for peace, disarmament needs to include all non state actors at war in Yemen, including the elite forces that support the government. The Arab coalition will need to engage Houthi representatives and form a functional relationship with them as a show of good faith—as the Arab coalition already has with other Yemeni parties.

The United States will also need to reopen its channels of communication with Yemen’s warring parties and former political figures to end their heavy reliance on their Arab coalition partners and finally play a significant role as mediator. The U.S. relationship with Iran will determine the extent and direction of Iranian involvement and influence on the Houthis in Yemen.

 Focusing on the needs of the Houthis , in isolation from the needs of rebuilding Yemen as a whole will only lead to failed peace attempts and could empower the Houthis further. If Yemen is to remain a unitary state, the grievances of all Yemenis will need to be addressed. To ensure this happens, international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union, and countries with regional credibility and legitimacy such as Oman, should step up to act as primary partners for peace with the support of the United States, Britain and other powerful countries.

If the Houthis fail to uphold their end of the peace bargain, the United Nations and other peace brokers should pressure the Houthis with exclusion in post conflict arrangements or the peace-building process—especially if the other political and military factions in Yemen can agree. But this should be a last resort. The Houthis are a powerful faction, and even if they have struggled to govern the country, they have demonstrated the capacity to stoke conflict and spoil political cooperation. This will remain true whenever the war ends.

Parliament: Apr., 1 ,2019: Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who lives in Saudi Arabia while rival Houthi forces control the capital Sanaa, made a rare visit to his country on Saturday for a meeting of the divided parliament in a loyalist southern province.In Sanaa, however, the Houthis have started to organise elections to fill 24 vacant seats in the same parliament  Both sides are under pressure from international players to implement a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire deal agreed last year in Sweden and to prepare for a wider political dialogue that would end the four-year-old war. Lawmakers from both sides would ultimately meet to agree on a political framework. Hadi’s Riyadh-backed government, which is still recognised internationally, has been based in the southern port city of Aden since 2015 and Hadi has not set foot there since a visit last August. Hadi-aligned parliamentarians gathered in Sayun, Hadramout  province on Saturday elected Sultan al-Burkani of the General People’s Congress (GPC) of late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh as their new speaker.

   

Peace Talks: Apr., 15, 2019: More than four years after a brutal civil war in Yemen that has claimed thousands of lives and has pushed millions to the brink of starvation, Houthi rebels are ready to establish relations with the United States The conflict in Yemen started in 2015 and escalated into a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia when a Saudi-led coalition intervened to help the internationally recognized government roll back Iran-aligned Houthi rebels. The United States also became involved by providing the Saudi-led campaign aircraft refueling and some intelligence support. In an exclusive interview with the Voice of America, Hisham Sharaf Abdullah, the foreign minister of the Houthis' self-proclaimed National Salvation Government, said the group wishes to build relations with the U.S. as the warring sides seek to find a solution in the U.N.-led peace talks
"Surely we are interested in having a good relationship with the United States. Everyone should know that," Abdullah told VOA Thursday in a phone interview from the capital Sanaa. U.S. lawmakers last week voted on a resolution forcing an end to U.S. military support for the Saudi-led campaign. In turn, the White House condemned the measure and warned it would harm U.S. relations with its allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia. .The Trump administration has been considering whether to designate Yemen's Houthi rebels a terrorist organization due to its close ties with Iran, according to a report by The Washington Post last year. Officials in Washington accuse Houthis of getting direct military and financial support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran's elite force that will be labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S., effective Monday .But Houthi leaders are denying those allegations, maintaining that their relations with Tehran are diplomatic to gain humanitarian support for affected civilians in Yemen  The Houthi movement consists mostly of the Shiite sect known as the Zaidis, which account for nearly 35 percent of Yemen's nearly 30 million population. The group has accused the majority Sunni sect of marginalization in the past . Since the 2015 conflict, the Houthis have transformed themselves from an isolated group in northeastern governorate of Saada to a local de facto state ruling a bulk of Yemen's key areas in the north, including the capital Sanaa.  Their control has come at a heavy cost, however, with tens of thousands killed on both sides of the conflict and has caused what the United Nations said is the world's most urgent humanitarian crisis. The U.N. warns that two-thirds of all districts in the country are in a "pre-famine" state and an estimated 80 percent of the population are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. A U.N.-sponsored initiative began in early December, when representatives from the warring sides came face-to-face in Sweden to discuss a peace process and agreed on a truce. But the effort has remained fragile as violence continues and each side blames the other for exploiting the process to prepare for war .Human right activists, meanwhile, are raising concerns over human rights violations by Houthis, including allegations of arbitrary detentions, torture and kidnapping.  there are accusations that Houthis are blocking access to the delivery of much-needed food and medicine to civilians in Yemen.

 Yemen civil war ceasefire: May, 11, 2019: 
Yemen's Houthi group has unilaterally agreed to withdraw forces from three key ports, the United Nations said on Friday, a move needed to pave the way for political negotiations to end the country's four-year war. The group will redeploy its fighters from the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Isa over four days, starting on Saturday, said the UN mission to support a peace deal brokered in Sweden last December.  The move should allow the UN to take "a leading role in supporting the Red Sea Ports Corporation in managing the ports" and to enhance UN checks on cargoes. Under the agreement, pro-government forces are also expected to leave positions around the outskirts of Hodeidah in the initial redeployment, before a second phase in which both sides pull back further. The coalition alleges the Houthis use Hodeidah as a landing point to smuggle weapons supplied by Iran into Yemen, a charge the Houthis have denied. Humanitarian officials have long pleaded with Yemen's warring sides to spare the port, which serves as the entry point for the bulk of Yemen's commercial imports and a lifeline for aid supplies. 

Houthis capture Saudi posts: June, 6, 2019:

 Yemen’s Houthi rebel group on Wednesday claimed to have captured 20 military positions inside Saudi Arabia’s southwestern Najran province  Houthi spokesman Yahya Sarei said the sites were captured in a “surprise” offensive carried out over the last 2 hours. Earlier Wednesday, the Houthi-run Al-Masirah television channel reported that Houthi fighters had launched multiple attacks on several Saudi military positions in Najran, which is located adjacent to the Yemeni border. According to Sarei, Houthi fighters overwhelmed the positions in a “surprise attack carried out along three separate axes”. The spokesman went on to assert that more than 200 personnel affiliated with a Saudi-led military coalition had been killed or wounded, while numerous others were captured along with large quantities of military equipment

Houthi drone attack: June, 10, 2019:

Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement launched multiple drone attacks targeting Jizan airport in Saudi Arabia near the border with Yemen, a tweet on Sunday by the group’s TV Al-Masirah said. The attacks targeted Saudi drone bunkers and stations in the airport, it added.There was no Saudi confirmation of the attacks.

The Houthis, who overthrew the Saudi-backed internationally recognised government from power in the Yemeni capital Sanaa in late 2014, have stepped up missile and drone attacks on Saudi cities in the past two weeks. Last Thursday, the rebel group said they had targeted the airport in the Saudi Arabian city of Najran with a drone strike. The kingdom said the attack was intercepted by its air defenses and destroyed.

Airport Attack: June, 13, 2109:

Yemen's Houthis have fired a missile at Saudi Arabia's Abha airport, wounding 26 civilians in the building's arrivals hall, according to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition fighting the rebels.  A projectile hit the arrivals hall at Abha airport, causing material damage. Three women and two children were among the wounded, and were of Saudi, Yemeni and Indian nationalities, it said. Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV reported that the Houthi forces launched a cruise missile attack on Abha airport, which is about 200km north of the border with Yemen and serves domestic and regional routes     

Houthi drone attack: June, 19, 2019: Yemen's Houthi movement launched a new drone attack targeting the Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia, the group's Al Masirah TV said on Monday. There was no immediate confirmation of the attack from Saudi Arabia, which on Saturday launched air attacks on Houthi rebel forces in Yemen's capital Sanaa, part of an escalation of tit-for-tat attacks that has stoked regional tensions.

The Houthis have stepped up drone and missile attacks on cities in neighbouring Saudi Arabia in recent months as tensions have risen between Iran and Gulf Arab states allied with the United States further afield across the Middle East.  southern regions of Saudi Arabia, including Abha, Khamis Mushait and Jizan.

Since the Western-backed coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began their military campaign nearly four years ago, more than 10,000 people have been killed. The civil war has pushed the impoverished country to the verge of famine, according to the United Nations and aid agencies.

The Yemen conflict is widely seen in the region as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Attacks on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz has raised tensions, with the US and Saudi Arabia pointing the finger at Tehran.     

"We also call on airline companies and civilians to stay away from airports and military sites as they have become legitimate targets," spokesman Yahya Sariee said in a Facebook post.

Drone shot down: June, 20, 2019: Saudi air defenses on Wednesday shot down a drone launched by Houthi rebels from Yemen, according to a spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition."The drone was intercepted over [Yemen's] Hajjah province before entering the Saudi airspace," Colonel 

Turki Al-Malki said in a statement cited by the official SPA news agency.  

Houthis attack : June, 27,2019: Yemen’s Houthi group attacked military positions and aircraft hangars at Saudi Arabia’s Abha and Jizan airports, the group’s Al Masirah TVsaid on Tuesday, citing a military spokesman. There was no immediate confirmation from Saudi authorities.

US missile: June, 30, 2019: Military officials with Libya's United Nations-recognised government say they have seized United States-made weapons at a base they captured from forces loyal to renegade General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, prompting an investigation by the US State Department.

The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) on Wednesday retook Gharyan, a strategic town south of the capital, from Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). The GNA said that among the weaponry its forces had seized were a number of US-made Javelin anti-tank missiles packed in wooden crates marked "armed forces of the United Arab Emirates" (UAE). Libyan media also aired footage that appeared to show markings that indicated that the US-made weapons were originally sold to the UAE - a major buyer of US weapons and one of Haftar's main international supporters -in 2008.

UAE withdraw: July, 13,2019:

 - Military forces of the United Arab Emirates have started a withdrawal from the conflict in Yemen, Emirati officials said, leaving Saudi Arabia to fight Houthi rebels. For four years, the UAE has provided weapons, funding, training and at least 5,000 troops to a cause which props up Yemen's government but has killed thousands of civilians but resulted in a massive humanitarian crisis. In the past month, the Emerati deployment at rebel-held Hodeidah, Yemen's major port, has been reduced from 750 to 150, and helicopters and heavy artillery have been removed

Houthis threaten to attack SA: July, 23, 2019:   The Houthis yesterday announced that Saudi soldiers had been killed in an offensive operation launched by the movement’s militants in the Jazan region, southwest of Saudi Arabia. The Houthis’ Al-Masirah channel quoted an unnamed military source saying that the movement has launched an offensive operation east of Jahfan Mountain on the Jazan Front. A number of Saudi soldiers were killed and wounded during the attack.  The Houthi group has recently increased its drone and medium-range missile attacks on Saudi targets, especially at Jazan and Abha airports. The movement also announced the death of Saudi soldiers during clashes near the Yemeni border.

India’s Deepening Poverty Crisis By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 158 SS 39)

India’s Deepening Poverty Crisis By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 158 SS 39)

Poverty which creates other related crises is said to be a curse. Poverty is one of the major problems of the Third World. Poverty reflects a condition in which an individual fails to maintain a living standard sufficient for his physical and mental existence. Famous economist, Adam Smith remarks, “Man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessities, the conveniences and the amusements of human life.”

On the one hand, India has rapidly been making progress in modern technologies-especially arms and ammunition with the help of the Western countries, while on the other, it has world’s largest number of poor people.

According to a report, “Of its more than 1 billion inhabitants, nearly 260.3 million are below the poverty line, of which 193.2 million are in the rural areas and 67.1 million are in urban areas. More than 75% of poor people reside in villages. Poverty level is not uniform across India. It is below 10% in states like Delhi, Goa, and Punjab etc. whereas it is below 50% in Bihar 43% and in Orissa 47%. It is between 30-40% in Northeastern states of Assam, Tripura, and Mehgalaya and in Southern states of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.”

In this regard, by exposing the statistics highlighting poverty, unemployment farmer’s suicides and health, under the caption “Incredible and Shining India a Myth”, published on the Kashmir Media Watch and the KMW News on March 29, 2019 Dr. Arif Javid Wrote: “Imagine a country where extremist parties (BJP and Sangh Parviar) got vacated 72 villages (having a population over One lac people) to build a statue of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel at Kevadiya in Gujarat with a staggering cost of INR 2,979 crores under title of “ Statue of Unity”. Reportedly, apart from dislocating such a huge population, the Gujarat government is concerned about the fate of tourists at its newest tourist attraction as 500 mugger crocodiles are also to be relocated. In a related development, recently, Maharashtra Cabinet approved the allocation of Rs 100 crore for construction of a memorial in Mumbai dedicated to Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray.”

Dr. Arif elaborated: “India has estimated population of about 1.2 billion people. As per SOS statistics, More than 800 million people in India are considered poor. 68.8% of the Indian population lives on less than $2 a day. Over 30% even have less than $1.25 per day available. India is one of the world’s top countries with regard to malnutrition. More than 200 million people don’t have sufficient access to food, including 61 million children. 7.8 million infants were found to have a birth weight of less than 2.5 kilograms-alarming figures for a country commonly referred to as the emerging market.”

Although child labour for children under the age of 14 in India is prohibited by law, according to official figures, 12.5 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 are working. Aid agencies assume that in reality, there are many more estimating that 65 million children between 6 and 14 years do not go to school. 2.7 million Indians are infected with the HIV virus; about 220,000 of them are children, with the tendency rising. India added 18 new billionaires to the list just last year, taking the total number of billionaires in the country to 119. Their total wealth is higher than the Union budget of India for 2018-2019 (Rs 24,422 billion), the report says. The country’s combined revenue and capital expenditure of the Centre and states for public health, sanitation and water supply is less than the wealth of India’s richest billionaire Mukesh Ambani. Inequality in India is based not just on class but caste, sexuality and gender as well. “A Dalit woman can expect to live almost 14.6 years less than one from a high-caste,” the report says, asserting that this inequality costs India its human potential. Latest employment data reinforces the distress about the job situation in India. The Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy reported a loss of 1.1 crore jobs in 2018 and estimated that the unemployment rate reached a 15-month high of 7.4% in December 2018.The Labour Bureau also recorded a continuous rise in unemployment from 3.4% in 2014 to 3.7% in 2015 and 3.9% in 2016-17. Debt and draught continue to overwhelm farmers all around India. As per recent figures, Four hundred thirty farmers and farm labourers committed suicide during last year in agriculture rich Punjab alone. As per Guardian report, nearly 60,000 Indian farmers and farm workers committed suicide over the past three decades. In 2015, about 12,602 farmers committed suicide across India. As per World Health Org statistics, around 2 lakh leprosy cases continue to be reported every year in the world, with India accounting for more than half of them.”

Dr. Arif Javid maintained: “Above statistics (covering few sectors is tip of iceberg), however, amply busts the myth of “Incredible and Shining India” as it’s the “mask of media propaganda” that projects India in a hyper exaggerated manner.”   

It is notable that one can note great socio-economic disparities between urban and rural regions of India. People of rural areas are forced to move out of villages to seek some subsistence living in the cities. In this process, they even lose some little saving what they had in their native villages. In the cities, they have to live without food and other basic amenities of life. Thus they are compelled to adopt the profession of begging in the urban areas.

It is misfortune of India that a select few families have good standards of living, one can compare them to the richest in the world, but the majority cannot get two meals a day.

However, dimensions of rural and urban poverty in India are manifold such as lack of facilities or poor arrangement in the fields of heath, education, sanitation, nutrition etc. including low income. The overdependence on monsoon with non-availability of irrigational facilities often culminate in crop-failure and low agricultural productivity, forcing farmers in the vicious circle of debt-traps.

According to an Indian study, “our economic development since Independence has been lopsided. There has been increase in unemployment, creating poverty. Population is growing at an alarming rate. The size of the Indian family is relatively bigger averaging at 4.2.The other causes include dominance of caste system which forces the individual to stick to the traditional and hereditary occupations.”

And Public health system in India suffers from many problems which include insufficient funding and shortage of facilities. In one of its reports, Indian Planning Commission has admitted that the “country has a shortfall of six lakh doctors, 10 lakh nurses and two lakh dental surgeons. This has led to a dismal patient-doctor ratio in the country. For every 10,000 Indians, there is just one doctor.” In this respect, in the past, the much publicized National Urban Health Mission aimed at providing accessible, affordable and effective basic health care facilities especially to the urban poor badly failed in its objectives.

Nevertheless, acute poverty has added to psychological problems, noted among these Indians like emotional disturbances and depression. Particularly, emotional abuse is due to the neglect and maltreatment of children and women. It involves a disregard of the physical, emotional, moral and social requirements of the children and women.

Owing to poverty, there are other social abuses of children like kidnapping and forcing them to beg in streets including murder. According to National Crime Records Bureau, “crimes against children have increased by 3.8% nationally-14,975 cases in 2005 from 14,423 in 2004.” And latest estimate shows 20% percent increase in these crimes.

As regards women and the young ladies, in a gender-biased society of India, apart from other poverty-related sufferings, working women have to face a number of problems such as injustice of unequal salaries and wages for the same job—adductions and rapes. Recently, there have been several cases of sexual harassment involving even the senior women officials, working in civil and military establishments. The psychological pressure of all this easily leads to a woman to quit her job, making her vulnerable to crime or suicide. In some cases, this deteriorating situation has compelled Indian women to take relief through alcohol and smoking. In this context, the third edition of the Tobacco Atlas released in Dublin by the American Cancer Society and World Lung Foundation points out: “More women in India are turning smokers and oral users of tobacco. India has the third highest number of female tobacco users in the world.”

So far as crimes are concerned, even foreigners are not spared. Theft, robbery and rape which have become routine matter in India have also been conducted against the Western nationals form time to time.

Nonetheless, there are several laws in India to control various anti-social activities and crimes which emanate from poverty, but the same have failed owing to their non-implementation. Meanwhile, from time to time a number of plans and schemes have been launched by the Indian subsequent governments to improve the poor standard of living by ensuring food security, promoting self-employment, increasing wage employment and improving access to basic social services including raising the status of women, but all these proved unsuccessful due to ineffective implementation coupled with high corruption among the officials which also includes country’s top officials. Notably, in 2017, Indian government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced economic reforms, claiming that the country’s economy was in a strong position. But, this plan badly failed.

Undoubtedly, we can conclude that directly or indirectly, India’s deepening poverty crisis has resulted into violence of various forms—social strife, economic crisis and political instability.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations

Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Black Day in Balochistan: Baloch Sub-Nationalists Distort History By Sajjad Shaukat (JR 157 SS 38)

Black Day in Balochistan: Baloch Sub-Nationalists Distort History By Sajjad Shaukat (JR157SS38)

Every year, Baloch Sub-Nationalists (BSNs) observe March 27 as a black day on alleged annexation of Kallat state with Pakistan in 1948. During this very day, shutter down strikes in small and far-flung areas of the Balochistan province and demonstrations of small attendance by exiled BSNs take place. For this purpose, they also launch active social media campaign.

As in pursuance of the foreign agenda of the anti-Pakistan countries, these hostile elements distort the historical facts to pollute the minds of the patriot people of the Balochistan against the federation of Pakistan; the Baloch must need to know the actual perspective about accession of Kallat state with Pakistan.

No doubt, Baloch leaders and people of Balochistan played a vital role in creation of Pakistan, and ultimately succeeded under the leadership and guidance of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in achieving Pakistan as an independent state. In fact, Balochistan is an integral part of Pakistan with a history of supporting Resolution of Pakistan-1940, which envisaged creation of a separate homeland for Muslim majority areas of the Sub-continent, as the Baloch had strongly opposed plan of the united India.

Unfortunately, there are still been certain dissident elements which not only oppose the idea of Two Nation Theory-the fundamental ideological base for creation of Pakistan, but also leave no stone unturned in misguiding the innocent Baloch by distorting the history of Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan.

In reality, before the independence of Pakistan, the territories which are now consolidated into the province of Balochistan did not constitute a settled province. Apart from Quetta District that was administrated under civil law, the rest of the territory was under Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The then government of British India constituted a special body of tribal elders known as “SHAHI JIRGA” for consultation by Assistant Governor General (AGG) on local issues relating to British Balochistan. On June 29, 1947, “SHAHI JIRGA” of the British Balochistan as representative body of AGG along with elected members of Quetta Municipal Body unanimously passed a resolution of forming part of Pakistan. The State of Kalat had customary over lordship on the princely states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbela. As these three states decided to join Pakistan in March 1948, the Khan of Kalat (KoK) also acceded with Pakistan on March 27, 1948. The brother of KoK Shehzada Abdul Karim of Kakat having mustered 130 tribesmen started insurgency in 1948 which never took off ground and the matter was brought under control.

Regretfully, Baloch Sub-Nationalists (BSNs) distort history of accession of Kalat with Pakistan and give reference of the so-called insurgency of 1948 by brother of KoK, whereas the document of accession of State of Kalat with Pakistan was signed by KoK himself as legitimate ruler of State of Kalat.

Notably, as a result of the general elections 2013, the government led by the nationalist leader Chief Minister Balochistan Dr Abdul Malik Baloch was established in Balochistan, while on December 7, 2013; local bodies elections were largely held in a peaceful manner in the province. Again, in the general elections 2018, a majority of the Baloch cast their votes. However, these elections proved that majority of the Baloch are loyal to the federation, and do not favour separation of the Balochistan, as they have rejected the case of separatists, being projected by anti-Pakistan powers.

Even a Gallup survey of the UK official body, DFID, conducted on July 20, 212, had disclosed that the vast majority of the Baloch people oppose the idea of an independent Balochistan. This survey has also proved that some external entities have been conducting acts of sabotage in the province by backing the minority groups.

As regards the deteriorating situation of Balochistan and the missing persons, everyone knows that Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Salvation Front (BSF) and their affiliated outfits, including another group, Jundollah (God’s soldiers) which have been fighting for secession of the province gets logistic support from American CIA, Indian RAW, and Israeli Mossad. In the past few years, these militants kidnapped and killed many innocent people and the security personnel in the province. They also massacred many persons through suicide attacks, bomb blasts, targeted killings and sectarian violence. Therefore, they are responsible for dumped bodies and extrajudicial killings in the province. On a number of occasions, these insurgent groups claimed responsibility for their subversive acts. A majority of the disappeared individuals are also in the detention centers (Farrari Camps) which are being run by foreign-assisted Baloch feudal lords (Sardars) who want to continue old system of feudalism in the province so as to maintain their status, prestige and influence at the cost of people of the province.

It is mentionable that India, the US and Israel have been internationalizing the Balochistan issue in accordance with their secret goals. In this respect, in connivance with the Baloch separatist leaders who have taken refuge in Switzerland, Sweden, US and London, these foreign elements use media, various NGOs and human rights organizations for false propaganda against Pakistan’s security  agencies in relation to extrajudicial killings, mutilated bodies and the missing persons.

Nevertheless, during this vary day, it is also of particular attention that since the government of the Balochistan province announced general pardon and protection to the Baloch militants as part of reconciliation process, many militants and their leaders have surrendered their arms and decided to work for the development of Pakistan and the province.

Besides, Pakistan’s Armed Forces have broken the backbone of the foreign-backed terrorists by the successful military operation Zarb-e-Azb which has also been extended to Balochistan where peace has been restored. But, it is misfortune that based in Afghanistan; external secret agencies such as CIA, RAW and Mossad have, again, started subversive activities in Balochistan. As part of the double, game, these agencies are using the separatist elements and terrorist organizations like the Islamic State group (Also known as Daesh, ISIS, ISIL), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ur-Ahrar (TTP-JA also known as JuA), including other similar outfits in creating unrest in Balochistan, as recent terror attacks in the province has proved. Now, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is their special target.

Taking cognizance of historical facts, the idea of observing black day must be denounced by all the segments of society, while the majority of the Baloch has already rejected the call for shutter down strike. But, these anti-Pakistan aims of the separatist elements also needs to be countered by our own historians, analysts and media persons by giving true perspective of history which is being distorted by the BSNs to advance their vested interests and those of the foreign enemies.

These internal entities of Pakistan must point out that People of Balochistan, especially the youth are very loyal and patriotic Pakistanis who believe in unity and sovereignty of the country. They cannot be misled by elusive designs of greedy leaders who plan to observe March 27 as black day.

Particularly, media must proactively project the role of Baloch leaders in creation of Pakistan and in defending the state of Pakistan. For the purpose, talk shows must be held giving correct perspective of historical records by explaining the process of accession of State of Kalat with Pakistan and internal rift between KoK and his brother. Social media should also be used for this purpose.

Our own intellectuals must indicate that insurgency of 1948 which started by Shehzada Abdul Karim of Kakat never took off, because it was not supported by other realist Baloch leaders, and it was based on misguided thoughts, suggested by few Indian Congress leaders. The aim was to destabilize Pakistan by creating militancy in Balochistan.

We can conclude that Baloch Sub-Nationalists called for a shutter down strike in Balochistan on March 27 to observe it as black day. Since it is the date of legal accession of State of Kalat with Pakistan, therefore, the strike call was based on negative contemplation and wicked designs to misguide the Baloch, especially the youth. In order to obtain the foreign agenda against Pakistan, these hostile elements who distort the history, want that every year, this black day should be observed.

The brutality and savagery of Gujarat massacres (Chachi) by Nishrin Jafri Hussain (JR 156 NH 03)

The brutality and savagery of Gujarat massacres (Chachi) by Nishrin Jafri Hussain (JR156NH03)

 On the eve of Indian elections

In 2015, after my third cup of delicious ginger tea at Sanjiv Bhatt’s house, he had convinced me that I should write, that if no one else he will read and yes will ignore the grammar. So here is one such truth. Tragic but it will make you think of the system, the evils of our society and if this is how we want us to be and if so, for what.

Kaun Banega Crorepati:

I didn’t get to watch Kaun Banega Carorepati, also known as KBC that started in 2000 I believe until very late after few seasons had passed. But when I started watching it, at every episode there was only one person on my mind, “Chachi” (Aunty). At every episode I imagined I was entering the KBC stage holding Chachi’s hand, helping her to the tall chair facing Mr. Amitabh Bachchan preparing her so she can tell her story. Story of her love, courage, life and what she lost.

I honestly don’t know her name to-date. I just know her as Chachi, she was Anwar Mamu ki biwi, (Anwar Uncle’s wife). My childhood friend Salma though called her “Mumani” as she was related to her. She was just a neighbor to us, I have always known them to be in that house. Their three-story bungalow was right next to ours in Gulberg Society, simply separated by a small alley and a Neem Tree that is still standing tall and green after 18 years today since 2002.

Her story defies all rules of “you get what you deserve”.

I have always known her to be in that house. It’s not like I could write she married and came to live here. She was already living in that house with Anwar Mamu and her in-laws, a big family. She had a room and kitchen in her possession on the ground floor of the house. She kept it very neat and clean, including the front and back yard. I went to the house now and then to give or bring something on Ammi’s orders.

A lot went through my mind when once in 2017 Raveena Tandon tweeted on how those who wear Saree in India are true Indians. Chachi could have received special consideration had the Hindutva mob that surrounded her house on that day known she had never worn anything but a saree all her life. Never a Punjabi or a nighty that most house wives commonly wore. A true national in one sense. But that didn’t help.

I didn’t know much about her but from Ammi I knew she was the only child, her parents loved her dearly, she was all they had. I had seen her parents now and then. They also lived in Ahemedabad and were very humble people. They didn’t visit her much, maybe once or twice in a year and she didn’t visit them much either. I had heard that they had put in their entire retirement money in completing this house for her. She lived a simple life. Anwar Mamu was a tailor and had lost one leg on the train tracks a long time ago. She was also mother of three kids, two boys and a girl. The reason I was called “Jafri Saheb ki Nargis” (my house name is Nargis, Nishrin is official school name) was because we had two other Nargis in Gulberg Society, her daughter and also Mohammed Kaka’s daughter who was also Nargis, whom we called “Nargis Ben”. Chachi loved Nargis dearly, but Akhtar, her youngest was her star. Her older Son Aslam was a trouble maker, for her and for others in the Society. But Akku, as she and we all called him was her darling. I often played with him. I grew up playing marbles, “gilli danda” (not sure what it is called in English) with the society boys. Sometimes we made a fire and sat around outside throwing paper and twigs in the fire until I was called inside. At a young age Akku had started spending time at his father’s shop and was learning the trade of tailoring. He was soft spoken and hard working. After I left home and when I visited in summers with my little boys, I often sat on the swing outside in the backyard and starred at their backyard. Ammi would fill me in by saying how finally Chachi has found peace in her life. That is because Chachi’s married life was a painful one. But she always looked contained. She kept herself busy with her house work. She did go to a movie or two with my Aunt Suraiya and her sister-in-law Najma once in a blue moon. Otherwise she never went out not even to Dargah’s. I don’t remember her doing any religious rituals such as Niyaz or mujlis. But even in this simplest of life in this corner of the world of the 80’s with no TV or YouTube she had a secret, something or someone she dearly loved besides her son Akhtar. And I was one of the few that knew this secret.

She took pride in taking care of her house and family. Her kitchen had few utensils, all shiny steel vessels and a kerosene stove. Her room had one bed made of iron frame, always covered with a neat bed sheet. Under this bed was a green metal trunk or like we called it “patre ki peti”. This I believe was her only possession and no one was allowed to touch it. Not sure if it had a lock. But for whatever reason she had opened the trunk in front of me several times. I would sit comfortably with my legs folded neatly on the floor spreading my frock and covering my knees with it as she would open the trunk. And their he was, Mr. Amitabh Bachan. Small and large photos stuck on the inside of the trunk, almost every inch of it was covered with his photos. I also had contributed to her collection now and then when I found some pictures in some magazines as I knew she collected them, though in those days we had few filmy magazines. Large photos of Mr. Bachan were kept at the bottom and several of them neatly straitened under her neatly folded sarees. She had to spread a newspaper first on the floor, remove all her Saree’s to get to them. But we always had time. Some very large posters were rolled and kept. Ah the times and situations. I never questioned why she never displayed her love and passion on the empty walls of her room. As if I knew without anyone had said or explained to me that in her situation it was not possible. I just knew that this was a secret. I don’t think I ever told this to Ammi or anyone. She called Mr. Bachan “lambu” out of love, just in front of few chosen people, one of them was me. Can you imagine the times, the situations, the surroundings and the people?

So here I question as to which God Almighty had an issue with her and her life. What sins she had done that she was so dearly punished for.

On March 1st, 2002 when I called, I was told Anwar Mamu was beheaded. Nani was also found burned and dead in her room. Akhtar and his wife were found in pieces in my backyard, they tried to hide in the bathroom in the back of our house but were pulled by the Mob and cut to pieces by the swords. And Chachi? Chachi’s body was not found. This is reality I am writing, this is no fiction, no story. This was in Ahemedabad, Gujarat the model city and state of India. Several days later they found Chachi, alive. She was but some 50 kgs., not sure how she survived the burns. The Mob thought she was dead as she lay with her burned back in the back yard of her house among other dead bodies.

On February 28th, 2019, on 18th death Anniversary of her husband and beloved son Akku, I finally met her at Gulberg Society. She was as slim as she was always, wearing a neat saree. Our eyes met, we didn’t say anything, she smiled and hugged me tight as if we could hear each other, as if she was asking me “how are you, you must miss Abba so much” and as if I was asking “how did you learn to live without Akku”.

She sat next to me holding my hand and slowly we walked towards our houses, still smelling of our loved ones among the ruins. We entered her room from the front verandah. She glanced through the room and said, “There I had my trunk under the bed, you remember” without looking at me. “I do remember" I said, "and I also remember what was in the trunk”, she immediately looked at me, “sab “lambu” ki photo bhi jal gayi” (All Mr. Bachans photo’s burned too).

My countries, my people, my friends, close your eyes and think for a moment:

What have we become?
What have we done?
How did we play God?
Who are we?
And Why?
Again, for what?