Iranian Imperialism

Iranian Imperialism

Introduction

At the core of Iran’s strategy is its revolutionary ideology, or what it terms Islamic Resistance—the belief that it is leading an existential fight against the forces of imperialism and religious extremism. Iran has manicured an image of resistance and independence that transcends ethnic divides and resonates with popular anti-U.S., anti-Zionist, and anti-extremist attitudes in the region. Despite taking a reputational hit due to the increasingly sectarian nature of the regional unrest, Iran remains the most logical ally for the significant numbers of Arabs who despise the United States, distrust the Gulf States, and desperately require arms to fight Sunni extremists.

Coupled with its revolutionary ideology is the fact that Iran has proven incredibly adept at responding to regional crises. Where others have failed, Iran has stepped in with military and political solutions that quickly fill power vacuums and bring relative success to its allies. In Iraq for example, Iran responded immediately to the fall of Mosul by providing unconditional military and logistical support to Baghdad. Iran also assisted in the development of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the umbrella movement of predominantly Shia militias who now number over 100,000 men and have a string of battlefield successes to their name—a feat that leaves the multibillion dollar, U.S.-trained Iraqi Security Forces struggling to remain relevant.

The sheer pull of Iran’s soft power is in stark contrast to the country’s financial fortunes. Iran has weathered more than three decades of harsh sanctions and international isolation. It was in the midst of the devastating Iran-Iraq war that Iran nurtured Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has become the most formidable non-state actor in the Middle East. In Iraq, Iran’s influence today far outstrips that of the United States, despite the vast differences in resources available to the two of them.

This is not to say that Iran does not spend money. It does, particularly in Syria, where the Assad regime is overstretched and on the back foot. Latest reports suggest that Iran spends up to $6 billion a year on sustaining Assad. What is less discussed, however, is that Iran has also been a net beneficiary from the civil strife in the region, with reports that Iran has received up to $10 billion of payments from Baghdad.

Even if we were to accept that Iran uses its wealth to win influence, the argument that sanctions relief will result in increased Iranian intervention still falls short. Not only does it fail to consider how the Iranian system itself operates, but it also overlooks even the basic strategic nuances of Iran's regional policy.

The money devoted to Iran’s regional foreign policy is managed by the same organization responsible for executing it, namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC’s control of both revenue sources and strategic decision-making has sheltered Iranian foreign policy from the broader effects of international sanctions, giving the organization a large level of autonomy to spend funds on foreign operations as it sees fit. Indeed, it is specifically because of sanctions that Iran has had to rely so heavily on the organization. As President Obama explained to Goldberg: “[W]hat is also true is that the IRGC right now, precisely because of sanctions, in some ways are able to exploit existing restrictions to have a monopoly on what comes in and out of the country, and they’ve got their own revenue sources that they’ve been able to develop, some of which may actually lessen as a consequence of sanctions relief...It is not a mathematical formula whereby [Iranian leaders] get a certain amount of sanctions relief and automatically they’re causing more problems in the neighborhood.”

More importantly, the low-cost of that strategy has always meant that only rarely would the IRGC need to step outside of its own means to find appropriations. This is another point raised by President Obama: “[In] the discussion with the GCC countries, we pointed out that the biggest vulnerabilities that they have to Iran, and the most effective destabilizing activities of the IRGC and [Iran’s] Quds Force are actually low-cost.”

Iranian imperialism some examples

Aside from Russia, Iran is the world’s most imperialist country today. It may not engage in formal empire building, unless Kayhan editor (and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointee) Hossein Shariatmadari’s dreams of annexingBahrain come true. When it comes to informal empire, however, the Islamic Republic is on the march.

Despite then-Iranian UN Ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif’s pledge to credulous American diplomats in 2003 that Iranian forces would stay out of Iraq, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  infiltrated thousands of militiamen and its own forces into Iraq almost immediately; they never left. Iraqis certainly do not like the Iranian presence. Some politicians will take advantage of Iranian backing but Iraqi nationalists—even Iraqi Shi’ites—view those in Iran’s pocket as quislings. In historiography, the notion of informal empire was largely economic. Iran fits the bill here, as Iraqis—especially those in southern Iraq and Baghdad—complain how Iran dumps cheap manufactured goods on Iraq, eviscerates Iraqi industry, and seeks to establish a monopolistic dependency on the Islamic Republic.

Syria, too, has become part of Iran’s imperial design. Analysts can point out how Iran needs Syria as a hub to support and supply Hezbollah. They can also rightly point out Bashar al-Assad’s sectarian solidarity with Iran, or Syria’s legacy as the only Arab state that supported Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Still, there’s something more going on when Iran dispatches thousands of “volunteers” and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corpsmen to fight in Syria. If Assad remains on top when the dust settles, he will no longer be a partner of Iran. Rather, he will be a clear subordinate. The real leadership inside Syria will be just as much in the Iranian embassy which, not by coincidence, is traditionally headed by a member of the Qods Force, the unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps charged with export of the revolution.

Southern Lebanon has been under de facto Iranian suzerainty for decades and, with then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s acquiescence to the Doha Agreement in 2008, Hezbollah now has effective veto power over the rest of Lebanese society.

Iranian authorities never dreamed they would also be in de facto control of the Yemeni government through their client Houthis. Put aside Saudi errors in its military campaign—none of that justifies Iran’s presence in the country. Nor is there popular support: The Houthis simply seized power and, with Iranian backing, used brutal force to consolidate it over areas that were never traditionally Houthi. Indeed, the Houthis represent perhaps the clearest example of Iranian imperialism. The Zaydi Shi’ism practiced by the Houthis is theologically closer to Sunni practice than the Twelver Shi’ism practiced in Iran. And yet part of the Iranian presence seems to be for the purpose of ‘returning the Houthis to the fold’ by proselytizing the Iranian brand of Shi‘ism.

That Iran was a “regional power” was once a staple of Iranian rhetoric. In recent years, Iran began talking about itself as a “pan-regional power.” Now it describes its strategic boundaries as the Eastern Mediterranean and Northern Africa. Make no mistake: The Islamic Republic is an imperial power, little different in its quest for political and economic domination of poorer states as its tormentors were in the nineteenth century.

On May 1, 2018, Morocco announced it was severing relations with Iran on the grounds that it and Hizbullah were aiding the Polisario, a movement acting to establish an independent state in the Western Sahara, in territory claimed by Morocco. In a press conference, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said that Iran had extended military aid to the Polisario via the Iranian embassy in Algeria, and that Hizbullah had been training Polisario militants. He added that Morocco would soon close down its embassy in Tehran and expel the Iranian ambassador from Rabat, because Iran's actions were detrimental to Morocco's security and supreme interests. According to Bourita, the ties between the Polisario and Hizbullah began in 2016, when a Committee for the Support of the Sahrawi People was established in Lebanon with Hizbullah sponsorship. Subsequently a Hizbullah military delegation visited the Polisaro training camps in Tindouf, Algeria. "The turning point," he said, "came in March 12, 2017, when [a Lebanese national], Qassem Muhammad Taj Al-Din, was arrested at the Casablanca airport on an international warrant for alleged fraud, money laundering and terrorist activities; he is a senior operative in Hizbullah's financing apparatus in Africa." Bourita added that "Hizbullah started threatening to take revenge [on Morocco] for that arrest, and dispatched arms to Tindouf, as well as military operatives to train the Polisario militants in waging guerilla warfare, forming commando units and planning violent operations against Morocco." In an interview with the French magazine Jeune Afrique Bourita accused Algeria of hosting meetings between Hizbullah and Polisario representatives, in coordination with Iran. Several meetings took place in a secret location known to the Algerian security apparatuses, he said. He claimed further that the culture attaché at Iran's embassy in Algeria, Amir Moussavi, "known [to be in charge of] supervising the spread of Shi'a in the Arab world and in Africa," served as the liaison between Hizbullah, Algeria and the Polisario. Bourita added that he had given his Iranian counterpart Zarif the names of the Hizbullah officials who had participated in the meetings with the Polisario and had supervised the training and the building of training facilities, including Haidar Subhi Hadid, 'Ali Moussa Daqduq and Al-Hajj Abu Wael Zalzali."

In an interview with Fox News, Bourita said that Morocco had received intelligence in April 2018 that Hizbullah had supplied the Polisario with SAM-11, SAM-9 and Strela surface to air missiles." According to the Elaph Morocco website, the Hizbullah-Polisario cooperation had also included the excavation of tunnels and trenches in the Sahara.

Following reports about this affair, Khairallah Khairallah, a columnist for the Lebanese Al-Mustaqbal daily, wrote in support of the Moroccan position, stating that Iran was acting to spread its influence not only in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East but also in North Africa. He also blasted Hizbullah as a "sectarian militia" and a "division of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps" that is acting on Iranian orders and serving its interests, in complete disregard of the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

The following are translated excerpts from his column:

"There is no need to stress that Morocco does not take any decision without examining the matter in depth. When it severed relations with Iran, it did so after comprehensive consideration, and after obtaining tangible proof that justified this sovereign decision, which can be described as [a move in] defense of [Morocco's] sovereignty and [in defense] of the soil of the homeland, including the Moroccan Sahara. That is what Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said when he explained the reasons for his country's decision to expel the Iranian ambassador from Rabat.

"Morocco knows exactly what it is doing. After accusing Hizbullah of training and arming the Polisario, it did not direct its response at Lebanon, being well aware of the sensitive situation in that helpless country. It directed its response at Iran, knowing full well that Hizbullah does nothing without orders from [Tehran]. It is no secret that Hizbullah is taking part in the war against the Syrian people for purely sectarian reasons. It is also deeply involved in [assisting] the Houthis in Yemen, and is active in Iraq, as well as in Bahrain, which is [another] kingdom it is acting to destabilize – and [all] this is just a drop in the ocean.

"Ultimately, Hizbullah is nothing but a sectarian militia and a division of Iran's Revolutionary Guards [Corps]. More explicitly, Hizbullah is a tool of Iran, inside and outside Lebanon, just as the Polisario is an Algerian tool. [Algeria] is using [this tool] in its war of attrition against Morocco, which regained its sovereignty over the [Western] Sahara in 1975 after the withdrawal of the Spanish imperialism.

"It should also be noted that Hizbullah could not train and arm the Polisario without the consent of Algeria and without a green light from Iran. More importantly, Morocco is well familiar with Iran's mode of operation in the region, even in the countries of North Africa, whereas Iran knows nothing about the character of the [North African] countries and societies. It thinks it can exploit the [Western] Sahara issue, which is a conflict between Morocco and Algeria alone, to infiltrate this region.

"Algeria is oblivious to the danger of Iran's actions, [although] it itself complains about sectarian [i.e., Shi'ite] activity within its borders that is directed from Tehran, and which is aimed against the Algerian people, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni. However, it seems that Algeria will happily tolerate anything that causes harm to Morocco. Algeria is suddenly pretending to have forgotten the extent of the danger it is in, and the extent of the Iranian threat to [its] national unity, considering the deep political crisis in the country. Hizbullah has become a welcome presence in Algeria, as long as its presence is directed against Morocco.

"Morocco severed relations with Iran in the past, in March 2009, for reasons involving Iran-directed sectarian [Shi'ite] activity within its borders. The relations were renewed in the fall of 2016, which means that the disconnect lasted seven years. Morocco [apparently] hoped that Iran had learned its lesson [and had realized that] the Moroccan authorities would not take lightly any activity undermining the national unity in [Morocco], most of whose citizens are Sunnis of the Maliki school. This time the severing of relations was due to a different factor, namely the Polisario, meaning Algeria. This happened after Algeria acted to build an infrastructure for the Polisario in the Moroccan Sahara, taking advantage of the Bir Lehlou demilitarized zone, which is under the oversight of the UN forces known as MINURSO...

"It is no secret that Iran is currently striving to obtain as many trump cards as possible, in order to use them in contexts that are known to all – for instance to show that it is a regional power that plans to expand from the Arabian Gulf across the Middle East, all the way to North Africa. It is also no secret that this Iranian activity is not confined to Morocco – which knew enough to restrain Iran at an early stage – but also exists in Algeria and Tunisia. Another [fact] that cannot be ignored is that, not so long ago, Iran engaged in sectarian activities in Egypt and Sudan [as well], using the Muslim Brotherhood in those countries...

"Morocco has done Lebanon and the Lebanese nothing but good, as evident from the history of the relations between the countries. So why is Hizbullah, which considers itself part of Lebanon, involved in a war against Morocco? That is a strange thing to do. But since when has Hizbullah considered the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese? Does it have any goal, other than to serve Iran...?

Defending Iranian stance

 US experts recommend to avoid an  agreement   this can be found   in an opinion piece by Soner Cagaptay, James Jeffrey, and Mehdi Khalaji, all of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The WINEP authors state that Iran is “a revolutionary power with hegemonic aspirations” and liken it to “hegemonic powers in the past”: Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and Britain—powers that “pushed the world into war” in 1914 and 1939.

Let us recall what those hegemonic powers did. The Russians used their armies to build an empire that encompassed much of the Eurasian land mass and whose successor state still spans eleven time zones. Britain dominated the oceans with the Royal Navy and used its power to build an empire on which the sun never set. France also captured and colonized vast parts of Africa and Asia and, when it had an emperor with sufficient talent, overran most of Europe as well. Japan used military force to seize control of huge parts of the eastern hemisphere. And as for Germany, the WINEP authors themselves—as part of the near-obligatory reference to Nazis in any anti-agreement writing about Iran—remind us that “Nazi Germany sought to dominate Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Volga River, reducing other countries to vassal states and establishing complete military, economic and diplomatic control.” Actually, it didn't just seek to do that; Nazi Germany used its preeminent military power to accomplish that objective, at least for a while.

Iran represents nothing that is even remotely akin to any of this, as a matter of accomplishment, capability, or aspiration. Certainly the current Islamic Republic of Iran does not come close, and one would have to reach far back into Persian history to start to get a taste of imperialism even at the reduced scale of the Persians' immediate neighborhood. The twist of the WINEP piece is that the authors reach back in exactly that way. They tell us that “Iran's hegemonic aspirations actually date back to the Safavid Dynasty of the 16th century.” You know that there is a lot of argumentative stretching going on when references to Safavids in the 16th century are used as a basis for opposing an agreement with someone else about a nuclear program in the 21st century.

The Safavid Dynasty faded out before anyone could judge what would have been its willingness to behave as a respectable member of the modern state system. Those other hegemonic powers named in the piece evolved into respectable members of the current international order (although debate related to the Ukraine crisis continues about the attitudes of the Russian government). So the WINEP authors, in trying to argue that Iran never could become a respectable, well-behaving member of the same order, contend that what sets Iran apart is not only that it has hegemonic aspirations but that it is “a revolutionary power with hegemonic aspirations.” And, they say, “Revolutionary hegemonic powers combine the imperialist lust for 'lebensraum' seen in Wilhelmine Germany”—gotta get in those comparisons to the Nazis—“with a religious or millennial worldview that rejects the principles of the classic international order.”

How far divorced from reality this line of argument is emerges from the authors' reference to yet another power whose strengths and ambitions are way out of Iran's league: China, which the authors want us to see as hegemonic but not revolutionary like Iran. They write, “Even today, countries with hegemonic tendencies, like China, acknowledge the legitimacy of this international order.” That is a remarkable statement in view of how much China's international behavior can be explained, and has been explained by innumerable analysts, in terms of China's rejection of aspects of the international order that were established by the West without Chinese participation. A recent example of this aspect of Chinese policy involves the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other Chinese-created mechanisms as alternatives to Western-dominated international financial institutions.

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Theological basis of Iranian revolution

The Shia political ideology underwent a significant transformation in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s as a result of scholarly efforts of Khomeini and his close circle of clerical followers, and the religious lay intellectuals. Khomeini reinterpreted the mainstream Shia political thought and proposed a novel Islamic theory of state: The Guardianship of the Jurist. He explicitly declared the inconsistency of the institution of monarchy with Islam and emphasized the necessity to establish an “Islamic state” as a religious duty. This ideology could be summarized as follows:  

1.    Islam has laws for every aspect of private and public life.

2.    These laws are for all times and places, and must not be abandoned.

3.    The nature of many of Islamic laws requires enforcement by a state.

•   Therefore, the devout must struggle to establish an Islamic state.

4.    Those at the top of the Islamic state hierarchy must know the Islamic law in order to enforce it. They also must be just and fair for otherwise they manipulate the law and lead to tyranny.

5.    Those who know the Islamic laws are the jurists (foqaha: the plural of faqih).

•   Therefore, the Islamic state should be controlled by just jurists.

Khomeini was not just a theologian who was interested in theory; he was also a serious activist with a plan. Upon establishing his theory of the Islamic state, he goes on to offer a program of struggle to establish the Islamic state: “We are required [by the Islamic law] to struggle for establishing the Islamic state. Propaganda/education constitutes our first activity in this path [of establishing the Islamic state].... Now, you do not have a government or an army; but you can educate.... Our [religious] duty is that from right now work/struggle to establish a righteous Islamic state; spread the word; educate; make similar-minded people; create a propaganda and intellectual wave in order to create a social current, and slowly the knowledgeable and responsible and religious masses organize as an Islamic movement, rise and establish the Islamic state.... People do not know Islam. You should introduce yourselves, your Islam, examples of Islamic leadership and government, to the people of the world. Particularly, the university class and educated class. The eyes of university students are open. Be sure that if you introduce to universities these [Islamic] beliefs as they [really] are, university students will welcome it.... You should tell what kind of state we want; and who should be the ruler and [who should be] those in charge of the government [government officials], and what kind of behavior and policies they should conform to.... Build devotee [people willing for die for a cause] and fighters for Islam.... Build fighters from the people on the street and bazaar, from these workers and peasants and students.... Struggle for freedom and salvation needs religion. Make Islam...available to people so that they correct their beliefs and manners accordingly, and become a fighting force, topple this colonizing and tyrant political system and establish the Islamic state.”

The central theme in many of Shari‘ati’s works is that Third World countries such as Iran need two interconnected and concurrent revolutions: a national revolution that would end all forms of imperial domination and would vitalize -- in some countries revitalize -- the country’s culture, heritage and national identity; and a social revolution that would end all forms of exploitation, eradicate poverty and capitalism, modernize the economy, and, most important of all, establish a “just,” “dynamic,” and “classless” society. According to Shari‘ati, the task of carrying forth these two revolutions is in the hands of the intelligentsia. For it is the intelligentsia that can grasp society’s inner contradictions, especially class contradictions, raise public consciousness by pointing out these contradictions, and learn lessons from the experiences of Europe and other parts of the Third World. Finally, having charted the way to the future, the intelligentsia must guide the masses through the dual revolutions.

The Iranian intelligentsia, Shari‘ati added, was fortunate in that it lived in a society whose religious culture, Shi‘ism, was intrinsically radical and therefore compatible with the aims of the dual revolution. For Shi‘ism, in Shari‘ati’s own words, was not an opiate like many other religions, but was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, including politics, and inspired true believers to fight all forms of exploitation, oppression, and social injustice. He often stressed that the Prophet Muhammad had come to establish not just a religious community but an umma in constant motion towards progress and social justice. The Prophet’s intention was to establish not just a monotheistic religion but a unitary society that would be bound together by public virtue, by the common struggle for “justice,” “equality,” “human brotherhood” and “public ownership of the means of production,” and, most significant of all, by the burning desire to create in this world a “classless society.”

Furthermore, the Prophet’s rightful heirs, Hussein and the other Shi‘i Imams, had raised the banner of revolt because their contemporary rulers, the “corrupt caliphs” and the “court elites,” had betrayed the goals of the umma and the nezam-e tawhid. For Shari‘ati, the Moharram passion plays depicting Hussein’s martrydom at Karbala’ contained one loud and clear message: All Shi‘is, irrespective of time and place, had the sacred duty to oppose, resist and rebel against contemporary ills. Shari‘ati listed the ills of contemporary Iran as “world imperialism, including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class exploitation, class oppression, class inequality and intoxication with the West).

Shari‘ati denounced imperialism and class inequalities as society’s main long-term enemies, but he focused many of his polemics against two targets he viewed as immediate enemies. The first was “vulgar Marxism,” especially the “Stalinist variety” that had been readily accepted by the previous generation of Iranian intellectuals. The second was conservative Islam, notably the clerical variety, which had been propagated by the ruling class for over twelve centuries in order to stupefy the exploited masses. Thus many of Shari’ati’s more interesting and controversial works deal precisely with Marxism, particularly the different brands of Marxism, and with clericalism, especially its conservative misinterpretations of Shi‘ism.

Post Nuclear Deal scenario

Unshackled from the United Nations Security Council sanctions, Iran is only warming up to fully exert its influence in the region, change the political chessboard of the Middle East further, and tip the regional balance of power in its favor. For over three decades, the Islamic Republic preferred to employ soft power rather than hard power, in order to insert its influence in other Sunni Arab nations. Over the three decades, Iran infiltrated almost every Middle Eastern country by building alliances with the Shiitte communities, or by arming, training, financing and giving birth to Shiite militias or oppositional groups.

Iran’s foreign policy has been unique in that regard; Iranian leaders’ geopolitical, ideological and regional hegemonic ambitions have been consistent since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, having been previously alienated regionally and globally as well as chained with the shackles of international sanctions, Iran’s ruling clerics did not have any option other than to hide their imperialistic intentions, employ soft power and deny any intervention in other nations.

Liberation, Imperialism, and the West’s Confinement

Through the nuclear deal, once Iran is liberated from the confining bars of international sanctions, there is no need for Iranian leaders to hide their intentions anymore. This is due to the notion that the nuclear deal not only meant the liberation of Iran’s ruling clerics, but also the confinement of the US and Western powers to re-punish Iran. As the Persian saying goes:  We tied their hands and feet together. As a result, it is not Iran that is chained anymore by its nuclear program, but it is the US that is being handcuffed with the nuclear deal.

From the perspectives of the Iranian leaders, it does not make sense anymore to geopolitically and ideologically employ soft power rather than hard power. The Islamic Republic is cognizant of the fact that, first of all; Tehran has the West off its back- because the West want to do business with Iran (mainly oil and gas), fight the Islamic State through Iran, and the West knows that it cannot anymore reverse the nuclear deal due to Russia and China’s veto power in the United Nations Security Council.

Secondly, the cash is flowing in Tehran and Iran is aware that it enjoys the support of two major global powers, Russia and China. Third, Tehran knows that its children, the Shiite militia across the region, are being empowered day by day, and they are absolutely loyal to the ideological principles of the Islamic Republic, and that they will fight for Iran to the end, in any country including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, etc.

The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, and the senior cadre of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) analysis indicates that it is totally in their interest to show the region Iran’s military capabilities, such as Iran’s Quds force, on the ground in other Arab countries. For the ruling Iranian politicians, it is currently in their interests to shift tactics and publicly launch ballistic missiles, in violation of the UN resolution, to publicly support Bashar Al Assad who has killed tens of thousands of his own citizens, and to publicly acknowledge the IRGC role in Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.

Being cognizant of all the aforementioned assets, Iranian politicians view it in their parochial interests to publicly pursue their Islamic-Persian imperialistic ambitions, regional hegemonic and ideological objectives by ostentatiously and overtly attempting to tip the regional balance of power in its favor, by publicly provoking other countries in the region, and by challenging other nations.

Oil Revenues

 The Islamic Republic also blatantly rejected the regional proposal by OPEC members and other major oil-producing nations to join and freeze oil output in order to address a global surplus. Iran will not accept such proposals to cut oil output in order to rebound oil prices anytime soon. In fact, according to Oil Minister Bijan  Zangeneh, Iran has the total potential to ramp up oil export to 4 million barrels a day. This will have a significant negative impact on oil prices, not only impacting the regional countries’ revenues, but also the global market.

For Iran, the cash is flowing. Iran’s oil revenue has currently increased approximately 90%, in only a few months after sanctions were lifted, from $12 billion per year to $21 billion per year. This revenue is based on the current low prices of oil, and selling roughly 1.7 million barrels a day. Approximately 29% of Iran’s crude oil is being exported to European countries including Spain, Greece, and France. The export to European nations will definitely increase as Iran expands its output. This means that, even at the current low oil prices, Iran’s oil revenues will be around $50 billion a year, almost 500% of Iran’s oil revenue of pre-sanctions.  

 Current situation

Iranian influence in Syria is in no danger of dissipating as its civil war rages on and millions more of its citizens may soon be fleeing their homes in a new round of fighting, a panel of Middle East experts said this week.

“The Iranians are playing the long-game here” through its power base of Hezbollah in Lebanon and strong influence in Shia-controlled Iraq, Charles Lister, director of the Extremism and Counterterrorism Program at the Middle East Institute, said at the Hudson Institute on Wednesday. Tehran has 70,000 to 100,000 fighters in Syria through its own forces and proxies backing the Bashar al Assad regime. Russia is acknowledging internationally “we cannot do what you want us to do in Syria” when it comes to controlling Iran.

“The U.S. is coming to realize no one will be pushing [Iran] out,” said Randa Slim, the director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute.“[Bashar al Assad] is a hostage of Iran,” Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian civil servant, said. Add Russian air and naval power to keeping Assad in power, R.J. Brodsky, a senior fellow at the Security Studies Group said, “Assad will be a puppet of Iran and Russia” for years to come.

Emphasizing that point in recent days is the build-up of Russian naval forces off the Syria coast, regime soldiers and Iranian-backed militias now in place on the ground poised to attack the city of Idlib, close to the Turkish border. It is one of the last strongholds of opposition groups backed by the United States and those supporting what had been the Islamic State.

Idlib could push another 3 million Syrians out of their residences toward Turkey, putting more pressure on Ankara and also on countries like Greece on the periphery of Europe with a new refugee crisis.

Turkey, with millions of displaced Syrians already inside its borders, has made clear that it does not want more refugees and is taking steps to close off entry points. Lister said that Turkish forces inside Syria have transformed their initially small presence into larger fortified forward operating bases with anti-air missile emplacements and armor support. It also provides staging points, if needed, to contain anti-Assad Kurdish forces that Ankara considers terrorists.

Iran, Russia and Turkey “look at the regime not as an equal partner” and discuss among themselves ways to de-conflict military operations and the next steps forward for Syria without consulting Assad, Barabandi said.

For Russia, this demonstration of military force far from its borders shows “the U.S. we are the super power in the area,” he added. But Moscow’s attempted reach to achieve super power status goes further. It includes visits by President Vladimir Putin to Berlin and regular diplomatic talk from Moscow in the U.N. and elsewhere of the need to rebuild Syria so that refugees are willing to return. In short, Moscow is trying to project an image of Syria as a secure nation with political stability because it has allied itself with Russia and is now open to investors. But neither Moscow nor Tehran has the cash to rebuild Syria, the panelists agreed. “We need money” that neither has because of U.S. and European Union economic sanctions on both countries to rebuild, the panelists said.

So Russia, especially, is turning to the West and to the Gulf States for reconstruction money, Lister said. But Assad “will make the decision where the money will go,” likely into large infrastructure projects ripe for cronyism in regions of the country that backed the regime. Areas like Homs where the revolt was strongest and then destroyed are not targeted for new projects. Although Russia is saying publicly and calling for conferences at Geneva into how to take care of millions of returning Syria, “I don’t think Assad can absorb all the refugees coming back” nor does he want to, Barabandi said.

“Syria is playing a different game” on refugees, Lister said, noting that Assad’s intelligence chief has said half of them are suspected terrorists and would be arrested if they returned. Many of the refugees and opposition fighters still in Syria are Sunni. Assad and many in his regime are Alawite or Shiia, on the other side of an Islamic sectarian divide.

Assad says, “he wants businessmen,” Brodsky added but he wants them under conditions of acceptability. The reason he says he wants this return of persons with capital comes down to: “his oligarchs and businessmen are already under sanctions” and cannot attract international investments or World Bank loans. By bringing in new players they can attract investment and also become “part of his game” to stay in power.

“There are not many points of convergence” between Russia and the United States when it comes to Syria beyond military deconfliction, Lister said. While Israel has made clear to Moscow what it considers to be “red lines” in Syria, especially when it comes to Iranian-backed ground operations, Washington has not, the panelists said.

“The United States and other actors [the European Union primarily] don’t have a comprehensive approach” to dealing with the Syrian civil war on the diplomatic, political and economic fronts. Slim cited chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford’s comments Tuesday that the American objective is, ending the Assad regime’s hold on power. That was the goal of the Obama administration when it began funneling military aid to groups fighting the Islamic State that then controlled large sections of Syria and Iraq.“Is this the old-slash-new objective?” she asked rhetorically.  

Two events in the last month have underscored the growing reach of Iranian influence in the Middle East. The first was the abrupt and unexpected resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister, later rescinded, Saad Rafik al-Hariri. The second was the announcement that Fatah, which controls the Palestinian Authority and the territory on the West Bank, would share administrative jurisdiction with the Hamas controlled government in Gaza. Both events, seemingly unrelated, underscore a new phase in Tehran's growing Middle Eastern clout.

HARIRI'S RESIGNATION DESTABILIZES LEBANON

On November 4, 2017, Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri announced, via Saudi TV, that he intended to step down. At the time, he was on an official state visit to Riyadh. Hariri cited the growing power of Iran in the Middle East, in general, and the increasing influence of Hezbollah, an Iranian funded proxy, in Lebanese affairs as reasons for his resignation. He also cited fears for his personal safety. Hariri's father, Rafic Hariri, was assassinated in 2005, in what is widely believed to have been a Hezbollah orchestrated attack.

His resignation announcement precipitated a political crisis in Lebanon, which many saw as a deliberate Saudi attempt to isolate Tehran and underscore Hezbollah's, and by extension Iran's, growing influence in the country. Hezbollah, a militant Shia Islamist political organization based in Lebanon that was organized by Iran in 1985, has been funded by Tehran since its inception.

The group's political arm, Loyalty to the Resistance, is the third largest political party in the Lebanese parliament. The group, along with Amal (Hope Movement), another Lebanese political party associated with the Shiite community, dominates the March 8 Alliance, which currently holds power in Lebanon.

The alliance has 24 of the alliance's 63 parliamentary seats. The balance of 65 seats is held by a smattering of other parties, including 59 seats by the March 14 alliance -- the official opposition. Hezbollah holds two of the thirty cabinet seats in the Lebanese government.

Hezbollah's paramilitary wing is the Jihad Council. Originally set up by a contingent of 1,500 troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the group has long clashed with Israeli forces along the Lebanon border. In 2006, Israel and Hezbollah fought a full-scale war that saw Hezbollah fire thousands of short-range missiles into Israeli territory and led to the capture of several Israeli soldiers. Additionally, Hezbollah fighters continue to be deployed in Syria in support of the Assad government in Damascus.  

It's unclear what specific events triggered Hariri's resignation, although it was widely believed to have been in response to Hezbollah's possible attempts to increase the number of cabinet seats it controls in the Lebanese government.

Currently, Hezbollah represents around 20 percent of the parliamentary seats in the government coalition, but has only about six percent of the cabinet positions. It may also have simply been a useful pretext by Riyadh to highlight Hezbollah's growing influence in the country.

After announcing a series of trips to the Gulf Emirates and Bahrain, later cancelled, Hariri traveled to France, accompanied by his wife and children, for a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. Hariri is also a French citizen and holds both Lebanese and French nationality.

It is believed that his wife and children remained in France for their protection. On November 21, Hariri announced that at the request of Lebanese president Michel Aoun, he had agreed to put his resignation "on hold ahead of further consultations."

HAMAS AND FATAH MOVE TO RECONCILE

In the meantime, on October 13, 2017, Hamas and Fatah announced that they had agreed to an Egyptian government brokered agreement to reconcile, after more than a decade of bitter infighting, and establish a national unity government. The agreement, which is still far from complete, calls for the two sides to integrate the Hamas administration of Gaza into the broader Palestinian Authority (PA) government of Fatah.

Several hundred Fatah administrators will be transferred to Gaza to work with the Hamas government there and pave the way for the eventual integration of the two government's administrations.

In addition, Hamas agreed that the Gaza police force would be rebuilt and that it would include 3,000 officers drawn from the Palestinian Authority police force. Hamas also agreed to turn over control of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt to the Palestinian Authority.

That border crossing had been closed by the Egyptian government, preventing the transit of goods and people between Gaza and Sinai, and further isolating the Hamas government in Gaza.

As part of the reconciliation announcement, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas announced that he would make a visit to Gaza for the first time since Hamas had ousted the Palestinian Authority from there in 2007.

Significantly, the most contentious issues were set aside for the moment. These included the ultimate disposition of the 25,000-strong armed wing of Hamas, control of the tunnel networks that Hamas has built under the Israeli-Gaza border and the reform of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

The latter is widely seen by Palestinians as corrupt and riddled with cronyism, especially as it relates to the allocation and spending of financial aid given to the Palestinian Authority by various governments.

The most significant issue is the question of national elections. It was Hamas's upset victory in 2007 that led to the split with the PA. Most intelligence agencies believe that if national elections were held today PA President Mahmoud Abbas, or any of his likely successors, would lose to Hamas leader Ismail Haniya.

It's not clear that Hamas wants to take responsibility for the governance of the Palestinian territory. On the other hand, Hamas has received significant aid from Iran and a Hamas takeover of the PA would be widely seen as a victory for Iran and further proof of Tehran's growing clout in the region.

PERSIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST

The reconciliation agreement underscores some important changes taking place in the Middle East and marks the confluence of several different issues, some purely local, while others are more regional in scope. The core issue is the growing reach of Iranian influence, a topic that the Arab press sometimes refers to as a reassertion of historic Persian imperialism in the region.

Persian imperialism is in fact, nothing new to the Middle East. It has waxed and waned over the millennia, from the empire of Cyrus the Great to the present "Shite arc of influence," which stretches from Iran across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.

When strong regional powers or super states existed, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the various Sunni Muslim and later Ottoman empires, to most recently Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the reach of Persia or its Iranian namesake has been constrained and contained. In the absence of such countervailing powers, historic Persian imperialism cut a wide swath across the Middle East, including Arabia. Many Sunni Arab governments, especially those in the Gulf, fear that Tehran is in the process of another such flexing of historic Persian power.

THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: DOES IT STILL MATTER?

There is also a large issue in play here. The messy Israeli-Palestinian issue is no longer one of the defining pillars of Arab foreign policy in the region. It has been subsumed by the larger issues of Iran's growing regional clout.

From the standpoint of the Saudis and their Gulf allies, long-time primary financiers of the "frontline states" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not to mention the actual front-line states like Egypt and Jordan, the Palestinian issue is one they would like to see go away as it distracts from the problem of dealing with Iranian imperialism.

A continuation of the Palestinian issue serves to give Tehran additional opportunities to aggravate tensions in the region and to destabilize moderate Arab regimes there. Moreover, it makes security cooperation with Israel harder to implement.

That's one reason why the PA's Arab state supporters and bankers are pressuring them to cooperate with the Trump Administration's Mideast peace initiative; even threatening to withdraw or withhold financial aid if they prove recalcitrant.

That's a dangerous strategy, especially given Abbas's and the Palestinian Authority's lack of political support. That strategy may well push the PA toward a de facto alliance with Hamas and its Iranian backers; a strategy that would significantly diminish the chances of a comprehensive peace accord and embolden Tehran supported proxies on Israel's borders.

Abbas has not been afraid to push back against Arab and American pressure to get onboard the latest peace process, dropping subtle hints that a potential Iranian sugar daddy is waiting in the wings should his Arab benefactors withhold financial support or an unpopular peace accord be forced on the Palestinian Authority.

Tehran has long maneuvered to position itself as a frontline state in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Should Hamas end up by default supplanting the PA, Iranian proxies will find themselves on four of Israel's frontiers: Gaza, Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Moreover, with de facto Iranian military bases in Iraq and Syria, and the defeat of Islamic State, Tehran's ability to directly supply its proxies with arms has improved substantially.

It used to be that all issues in the Middle East, however benign, were invariably subsumed to the larger issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an issue that even defined the boundaries of U.S.-Soviet relations in the region during the Cold War. Today, it is the rise of Iran and the reach of Persian imperialism that have subsumed all other issues in the Middle East, including the one of Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Update: Mar., 20, 2019:

 Musa Ghazanfarabadi, head of the Tehran Islamic Revolution Courts, told religious students in Qom this month that his government could use foreign fighters to crack down on potential popular uprisings in Iran. "If we don't support [our] revolution, the Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi, the Afghan Fatemiyoun [Brigade], the Pakistani Zainebiyoun and Yemeni Houthis will come and support the revolution," he said. Ghazanfarabadi was referring to Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen that have been formed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These armed groups have played a major role in conflicts in Iraq and Syria, supporting the governments of both countries. In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthis have been fighting Saudi-backed government forces for years. Some analysts say the Iranian regime is considering the foreign fighters backed by Tehran as a potential reserve force for emergency use. Saeed Bashirtash, a Belgium-based Iranian affairs analyst, believes that the presence of IRGC-controlled foreign militia could threaten any national movement seeking democratic change in Iran. Seeking help from non-Iranian groups is not unprecedented in Iran. In the protests during the 2009 presidential election, also known as the Green Revolution, Tehran reportedly brought foreign agents to persecute Iranian protesters in Tehran and elsewhere in the country. Iran has sent thousands of Shiite Afghan refugees to Syria to fight alongside other Iranian-backed forces in support of the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran's army recruits them with promises of citizenship and improved living standards for their families. Analysts say Ghazanfarabadi's comments could be a hint at the possibility of returning those fighters to Iran once the conflict in Syria is over. "That might apply to Afghans who fought in Syria in return for promises of legal residence in Iran," Slavin said. "I doubt it applies to the others."

Update Mar.,21,2019:

 Afghan’s government officials condemned the Islamic Republic for recruiting Afgan citizens to fight in Syria with the Fatemiyoun Brigade last year.

A study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy declared, “The Afghan government outlawed the group and worked to suppress it, largely in order to avoid further sectarian strife and proxy warfare in the war-ravaged country.” It added that recruitment by the Revolutionary Guards has continued, but it had gone “underground.”

The Fatemiyoun Brigade was set up by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 2014 to send Shia Afghan immigrants and refugees in Iran to fight in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Guards’ officials have confirmed this fact. Zahir Mojahed, spokesperson for the Fatemiyoun Brigade, claimed in January 2018, that more than 2,000 members of the Afghan militia had been killed in Syria and more than 8,000 had been injured.

According to Afghan officials, the IRGC lures Afghan immigrants with promises such as fixed salaries and residency permits for their families. Interviews with the family members of those killed in action and the survivors confirm this. Religious loyalties of the potential recruits are also used, as they are made to believe that they will be defending Shia holy shrines in Syria.

The US Department of Treasury accused Iran of recruiting, training, and deploying child soldiers, which is a war crime, in October 2018. Recruitment of Afghan nationals to fight in Syria may amount to a violation of their human rights under both international law and the laws of both countries. In fact, recruiting Afghan nationals violates Article 145 of the Iranian constitution, which says, “No foreigner will be accepted into the army or security forces of the country.”

There are also documented cases of the Guards recruiting Afghan children to fight in Syria. In October 2017 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, “Afghan children as young as 14 have fought in the Fatemiyoun division.” Allegedly, when Human Rights Watch researchers reviewed photographs of tombstones in Iranian cemeteries where the authorities buried combatants killed in Syria, they identified eight Afghan children.

As well, a 15-year-old Afghan boy said in an interview in January 2019 that he was tricked into fighting in Syria by the false promise that he would be given a job in a holy shrine.

According to Article 2 of the National Conscription Law, only individuals over 18 can be conscripted to serve in the military. Recruitment of children under 18 is also banned under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Iran is a signatory to both.

Abdulvahid Farzei, vice president of the Afghan Bar Association, says that the Islamic Republic’s actions violate international conventions and laws because Article 7 of the Afghan constitution states that the government “shall observe the United Nations Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The state shall prevent all kinds of terrorist activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and production and use of intoxicants.” Farzei says that since both Iran and Afghanistan have signed up to this declaration and other human rights conventions, they must follow and observe them.

Iran has violated the rights of young Afgans, and sacrificed them for its own interests, according to Farzei. One must turn to international law, he emphasizes, to stop Tehran because Afghanistan is mired in a deep crisis and dealing with a range of serious problems including challenges to national security. “the government is weak and, as a result, nothing in this regard has been done,” he said.

Iran’s conduct is wrong on multiple levels, Najla Rahal, a lawyer based in the Afghan capital of Kabul, insists. “Sending Afghan immigrants to the war not only violates Iranian laws, but it also exploits the destitute by deceiving them,” she says.

“This is not only unacceptable from a legal point of view, it is also morally wrong.” She adds that Afghan nationals have gone to live in Iran seeking refuge from the Taliban, the war in Afghanistan, insecurities, and unemployment. Legally, the Islamic Republic has no right to exploit these refugees’ situation, and Kabul is by law allowed to take action to put an end to this.

Rahal also believes that because Afghans were used to fight ISIS in Syria, ISIS has launched terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in revenge.

Afghan Refuges: Mr., 31, 2019: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has praised the Afghan fighters, called the Fatemiyoun Brigade, who fought Daesh in Syria, and said the Afghan fighters showed more resistance on the battlefields than other fighters. Khamenei met some families of fallen Fatemiyoun fighters on Thursday, March 28, where he said the Afghan fighters were very motivated. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), meanwhile, said that using Afghan refugees as soldiers and sending them to battlefields in Syria is in contravention of the international laws.   Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) said Iran’s move to send Afghan refugees to Syrian war is a serious human rights violation.“Misusing from the people’s poverty is obviously a human rights violation,” the AIHRC chairperson Sima Samar said. Reports indicate that dozens of Afghans have been killed in battle in Syria and their bodies were buried in Iran.

Iranian Proxies: Apr.,2,2109:  US imposes fresh Iran-related sanctions against Shia militias in Syria, airline companies The US Treasury Department has issued a new batch of sanctions against four entities that it says have ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and airlines that are already on Washington’s black list. The new ‘Iran-related’ sanctions list published by the Treasury on Thursday contains only one Iranian entity – a cargo airline based in the southern town of Qeshm – Qeshm Fars Air. The company was subjected to US punitive measures over its ties to another Iranian airline, Mahan Air, which was already sanctioned by the US. Armenia-based Flight Travel LLC also landed on Washington’s list for the same reason. Two more entities added to the blacklist are both Shia militias, which are fighting in Syria on the government‘s side. Known as the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Zainebiyoun Brigade, the groups were formed by Afghan and Pakistani Shiites, and are trained and equipped by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – a fact that landed them both on the sanctions list.     

Iranian imperialism: Apr., 2, 2109: Tens of thousands of Afghans recruited, paid and trained under the Fatemiyoun Liwa (Fatemiyoun Brigade) by Iran to fight in support of Tehran’s ally President Bashar Assad are returning to their homeland, as the 8-year war in Syria winds down. Afghan veterans returning from Syria are threatened from multiple sides. They face arrest by security agencies that view them as traitors. According to some statistics, Iran has sent over 50,000 Afghan fighters under the Fatemiyoun Brigade to fight in Syria.

IRGC: Apr., 7, 2019: The US is expected to designate Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards Corps a foreign terrorist organization the announcement would come ahead of the first anniversary of President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of a 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran and to reimpose sanctions that had crippled Iran’s economy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran’s elite military force whose primary function is not to defend Iran against foreign aggression but to protect the regime from internal and external threats. A 125,000-man force, the IRGC was established at the end of Iran’s 1979 revolution as an elite armed militia whose role was sustain and protect the shaky clerical government that took over after the fall of the Shah’s regime. The new rulers saw many of the generals of the traditional Iranian military – known as the Atresh – as still being loyal to the exiled Shah.  The Quds Force is the foreign operations unit of the IRGC, and is led by Brigadier General Qassem Sulaimani, who has emerged as one of the most powerful figures inside Iran. It was established during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988). To this day, its biggest undertaking is helping establish Hezbollah as a formidable fighting force in Lebanon, following the 1982 invasion by the Israeli regime. The force has been Iran’s primary military actor in neighbouring states, particularly Syria, where it helped prop up the regime of Bashar Al Assad, and Iraq, where it supports a coalition of powerful Shiite militias collectively known as Hashd Al Shaabi. It also backs Al Houthis in Yemen. In 2007, the US Treasury designated the Quds Force as a terror organisation.  The ‘Basij Resistance Force’ is a volunteer paramilitary organisation operating under the aegis of the IRGC. It is an auxiliary force that is entrusted with helping sustain internal security, law enforcement, and special religious or political events and morals policing. The Basij, numbering 90,000, have branches in virtually every city and town in Iran. The Khatam Al Anbiya is an extraordinarily powerful conglomerate that has often been seen as the economic arm of the IRGC. Some have even referred to it as an armed business enterprise. It is a giant holding company with control of at least 800 firms both in Iran and abroad, and it is the recipient of billions of dollars worth of government contracts, often without a tender system.

Iraq: Apr.,10,2019: The Hashd al-Shaabi, a Shia fighting force affiliated with the Iraqi army, is hindering efforts to expel PKK terrorist elements from Iraq’s northern Nineveh province, according to a local official.“Efforts by the Iraqi army to expel the PKK and affiliated factions from Sinjar are being impeded by the Hashd al-Shaabi,” Veyis Nevaf, chairman of Mosul’s municipal council, said in a Monday statement. A predominantly Shia fighting force, the Hashd al-Shaabi was drawn up in 2014 with the express purpose of fighting the Daesh terrorist group. In 2017, the Hashd al-Shaabi was incorporated into the Iraqi army. What’s more, according to Nevaf, some 3,000 Ezidi youth from the region have been forcibly recruited by the terrorist group.In the early 1980s, the PKK had maintained camps in Syria and Lebanon before relocating to Iraq’s northern Qandil Mountain region, where the group continues to maintain a presence today. In late 2017, Baghdad sent federal troops into parts of northern Iraq “disputed” between it and the KRG — including Sinjar. After federal forces moved into Sinjar, the PKK falsely claimed to have withdrawn from the area. The people of the region, and the KRG itself, have repeatedly complained of the continued PKK presence. Nevertheless, the terrorist group still maintains an active presence in both Sinjar and Qandil. In its more than 30-year terror campaign against Turkey, the PKK — listed as a terrorist organization by both the U.S. and the EU — has been responsible for the death of nearly 40,000 people.

IRGC: Apr., 12, 2019: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC), which the U.S. this week dubbed a “foreign terrorist organization”, is not a purely military institution, but also boasts considerable political and economic clout.Through its many corporate holdings, the RGC maintains considerable influence over Iranian foreign policy, income sources and strategic expenditures. Established on May 5, 1979, the RGC was established on the orders of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the late leader of the Iranian revolution. Functioning independently from the Iranian military, the RGC was drawn up with the express purpose of ensuring the security of Iran’s post-revolution regime. Roughly 150,000 personnel currently operate under the RGC’s auspices. The RGC also has an affiliated militia (Basij) consisting of millions of volunteers.The RGC’s Quds Force, led by Major-General Qasem Soleimani, runs military-intelligence operations abroad, while also being responsible for Iran’s formidable ballistic missile program. The Quds Force is answerably directly to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and operates independently from Iran’s Foreign Ministry. The RGC accounts for the lion’s share of Iran's defense budget. It also generates revenue through its various corporate holdings, especially those in the energy, infrastructure and telecommunications sectors.These holdings include Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters, Iran’s largest engineering firm; Mahan Air, a Tehran-based airline company; the Ansar Banking Corporation; and Oriental Oil Kish, an energy concern. Khatam-al Anbiya was established by Khamenei in 1989 to rebuild infrastructure damaged during Iran’s devastating war with Iraq in the 1980s. It is currently involved in numerous projects across the country.  It is believed to have more influence on Iranian foreign policy -- especially as it pertains to the Middle East -- than the Foreign Ministry itself.This influence frequently comes in for criticism, especially given the fact that the RGC is answerable only to the supreme leader, putting it outside the control of state institutions. The RGC’s ascendancy over the Foreign Ministry was made evident in February when Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad visited Tehran -- a visit the Foreign Ministry was not informed of in advance. Along with maintaining a presence in Iraq and Syria, the RGC also enjoys considerable influence in Lebanon through the Shia Hezbollah group.

Baluch terrorists: Apr., 21, 2019: The Baloch insurgents who killed 14 people along Pakistan’s coast this week are based in neighboring Iran, Pakistan’s foreign minister said on Saturday, heightening tensions ahead of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s trip to Tehran on Sunday.  The militants checked the identity cards of passengers, singled out some of them, and then kidnapped and killed them. The Baloch Raji Aajoi Saangar (BRAS) umbrella group said it targeted Pakistani navy and Coast Guard officials travelling on buses. “The training camps and logistical camps of this new alliance…are inside the Iranian border region,” Qureshi told reporters in Islamabad. Pakistan has decided to fence the border, just as it has started fencing its frontier with Afghanistan.“The work has already started from the points that are frequently misused,” Qureshi said. “We intend to seal this whole border which spreads to 950 kilometers, gradually.”

Apr., 22,2019:

  

#IRGC Commanders replaced: Apr., 22,, 2019: Supreme Leader Ayatollah #Khamenei removes Commander #IRGC Gen. Mohammed Ali Jaafari from position as Commander-in-chief of the religious militia without giving reasons.

https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Irans-Ayatollah-Khamenei-replaces-commander-of-IRGC-587507

(News agencies report that the supreme leader appointed Mohammad Ali Jafari (also known as Aziz or Ali Jafari) to succeed Yahya Rahim-Safavi as IRGC commander. Observers appear to regard Jafari as principally a tactician, organizer, and "technical" military man. His appointment appears to be more a response to perceived external threats than a reflection of domestic politics.  Jafari spoke to the press on September 3 and said the IRGC's role is to "expand" the deterrence capability against "the enemies of Iran and the revolution" without an exclusively military role. He said the IRGC will "hasten" to help other institutions in Iran "where necessary," ISNA reported. Jafari added that Iran's "environmental conditions" have changed, and the IRGC needs to be flexible in facing new threats to Iran. The new commander assured reporters that the IRGC is better prepared than in the past to face these threats, and with the necessary intelligence on "enemies" and a considerable ballistic capability. He urged "the enemies" to leave the Middle East region and choose instead an "interaction" with Islamic states, ISNA reported. Observers have speculated on the domestic and foreign-policy significance of the reshuffle. Radio Farda said on September 2 that Jafari is or was thought to be close to the Expediency Council's Rezai, who used to head the IRGC, and to Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, another former IRGC guardsman and currently the mayor of Tehran. The move might be interpreted as a stimulus from Khamenei to the Rezai-Qalibaf clique -- a conservative subfaction thought to be a counterweight to the radicalizers around President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Radio Farda observed that Rahim-Safavi is perceived to have become too openly sympathetic to the Ahmadinejad government, when officers are obliged to shun  )

 This happens a day before meeting visiting #Pakistani PM #ImranKhan. In Pakistan, the IRGC is suspected of involvement in #Ormara terror attack where 14 #Pakistan soldiers were killed execution style after being offloaded from buses.

The removal of IRGC chief could be a goodwill signal to Pakistan.

#Khamenei's calculations are definitely bigger than just #Pakistan. But the replacement of #IRGC leadership gives him room to maneuver when Pakistani PM will raise #OrmaraMassacre, as he is expected to do, privately. Khamenei will tell #Pakistan PM #ImranKhan that #Tehran is acting on the conclusive evidence of IRGC involvement in executing Pak Navy & Air Force soldiers, and that IRGC removal is a sign of introspection.

Another interesting point is that Foreign Minister SMQ, who condemned #IRGC involvement in executing #Pakistani soldiers, and ordered that #Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan be summoned to MFA for a formal protest, did not accompany the PM in his Iran stopover. SMQ left for #Japan, then to #China where he'll rejoin PM #ImranKhan. PM Khan has stopped in Iran en route to China. Observers in Pakistan are closely watching the changes at IRGC, which is considered India's ally in Iran. It is involved Indian RAW's #KulbhashanJhadav network at #Chabahar.

The IRGC is wrongly considered Iran's army. Iran Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Airforce) are separate from IRGC, which is a religious militia not answerable to the government or the armed forces, and only answerable to Khamenei. As such, the IRGC is the main force responsible for protecting the Khomeinist order in Iran. It is also Iran's only force that is involved in wars and conflicts inside other countries in the region.

Iran role in Baluchistan: May ,20,209: The recent wave of high-impact attacks by Baloch insurgent groups suggests the latter have not only changed their tactics, but have also considerably strengthened their operational capabilities. Apparently, they are consolidating their strength in and around the Makran region, where the Gwadar port lies as the starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This renewed wave of violence comes at a time when the geopolitical landscape of the Persian Gulf is dramatically changing and CPEC is about to enter its second phase.

It is tricky business to try and establish an empirical link between the Baloch insurgency and regional geopolitics, but the evolving dynamics provide some clues about their probable correlation. One such clue can be discerned from the states’ complicit or inattentive attitude towards those non-state actors that, though not creating trouble on their own soil, are hurting others, mainly in the neighbourhood. Some even argue that the states in our region have lost the ability to resolve issues through diplomacy and have let them go adrift propelled by regional geoeconomics and geopolitical impulses.

Most regional actors with strategic or economic interests in Balochistan have a long history of using militant proxies. Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have had their own regional geostrategic contexts to nurture such proxies, but Iran and Saudi Arabia have added sectarian dimensions to it. Iran claims that the Sistan-based Jaishul Adl is using Pakistani soil. Many in Pakistan believe Tehran is supporting the Pakistani Baloch insurgents.

Baloch insurgents from Pakistani Balochistan hold Iran responsible for the oppression of the Baloch on its territory. Iran has remained tough on secular insurgent groups on its side, which had links with Pakistan-based groups. Many nationalist leaders in Balochistan believe that during the 1980s and 1990s, Iranian agents killed several nationalist Baloch leaders from Iranian Sistan-Baluchestan in Karachi.

While it may not have been an easy option for Pakistani Baloch insurgent groups to get support from Iran, places for refuge were few, apart from Iran and Afghanistan. According to locals, the families of many Baloch insurgent leaders have relocated to Iran, which have in a way made them dependent on Iran. This has given Iran clout over these insurgent groups.

The Baloch insurgency has gradually been slipping out of the control of exiled Baloch leaders, including Harbiyar Marri, Brahmdagh Bugti and Bakhtiar Domki. While living mostly in Europe, these leaders have lobbied for the Baloch nationalist cause in the West where an Iranian label could damage their case.

Drones as weapon of war: July, 20, 2019:

Iran is quietly building up an arsenal of locally-produced drones that it is exporting to its allies in the region and testing against enemies in Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia. On July 10, Iranian drones reportedly were used to attack a Kurdish dissident group in northern Iraq, after Iran accused the group of killing members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iranian media said that a new IRGC drone unit was used during the attack, which comes three weeks after Iran downed a sophisticated American drone over the Gulf of Oman.

The Iranian drone threat is not confined to waters off Iran’s coast, or to neighboring states. It is becoming a regional threat against U.S. allies. Iran’s allies, from the Houthi rebels in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon, are benefiting from Iran’s technical drone know-how. For example, the U.S. believes that a drone attack on Saudi oil facilities was launched by pro-Iranian groups in Iraq in May.

In Yemen, the Houthi rebels have been launching drone attacks on Saudi Arabian airports near the Yemen border. Nine were injured in early July in Abha. The Houthis use a drone called a Qasef-2K, which is based on Iran’s Ababil T drone. Taken as a whole, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, using drone technology from Tehran, represent a major stepping stone for Iran in its ability to threaten the U.S. and its allies. Iran’s drone technology also appears to be growing more sophisticated. Since the 1980s, Iran sought to build up a force of locally produced drones.

In January, Iran put on display a plethora of new UAVs. These included its Shahed-171 “stealth drone” with precision-guided missiles and its Kaman 12 drone, which supposedly can fly to a range of 200 kilometers for up to 10 hours, according to Iranian media. Some Iranian drones are basically reverse-engineered copies of American drones. The Iranian Saegheh and Shahed 171 are copies of the Sentinel RQ-170 Iran captured in 2011. The Shahed 129 is similar to the U.S. MQ-1 Predator Iran is quietly building up an arsenal of locally-produced drones that it is exporting to its allies in the region and testing against enemies in Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia. On July 10, Iranian drones reportedly were used to attack a Kurdish dissident group in northern Iraq, after Iran accused the group of killing members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iranian media said that a new IRGC drone unit was used during the attack, which comes three weeks after Iran downed a sophisticated American drone over the Gulf of Oman.  

The establishment of a special UAV unit and its use against Kurdish groups on July 10 shows that the IRGC’s drone expertise can be easily linked to Iran’s role across the Middle East. The IRGC’s Quds Force has been behind Iranian UAVs sent to Syria during the civil war and to Iraq