Iranian Imperialism
Introduction
At
the core of Iran’s strategy is its revolutionary ideology, or what it terms
Islamic Resistance—the belief that it is leading an existential fight against
the forces of imperialism and religious extremism. Iran has manicured an image
of resistance and independence that transcends ethnic divides and resonates
with popular anti-U.S., anti-Zionist, and anti-extremist attitudes in the
region. Despite taking a reputational hit due to the increasingly sectarian
nature of the regional unrest, Iran remains the most logical ally for the
significant numbers of Arabs who despise the United States, distrust the Gulf
States, and desperately require arms to fight Sunni extremists.
Coupled
with its revolutionary ideology is the fact that Iran has proven incredibly
adept at responding to regional crises. Where others have failed, Iran has
stepped in with military and political solutions that quickly fill power
vacuums and bring relative success to its allies. In Iraq for example, Iran
responded immediately to the fall of Mosul by providing unconditional military
and logistical support to Baghdad. Iran also assisted in the development of the
Popular Mobilization Forces, the umbrella movement of predominantly Shia
militias who now number over 100,000 men and have a string of battlefield
successes to their name—a feat that leaves the multibillion dollar,
U.S.-trained Iraqi Security Forces struggling to remain relevant.
The
sheer pull of Iran’s soft power is in stark contrast to the country’s financial
fortunes. Iran has weathered more than three decades of harsh sanctions and
international isolation. It was in the midst of the devastating Iran-Iraq war
that Iran nurtured Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has become the most formidable
non-state actor in the Middle East. In Iraq, Iran’s influence today far
outstrips that of the United States, despite the vast differences in resources
available to the two of them.
This
is not to say that Iran does not spend money. It does, particularly in Syria, where
the Assad regime is overstretched and on the back foot. Latest reports suggest
that Iran spends up to $6 billion a year on sustaining Assad. What is less
discussed, however, is that Iran has also been a net beneficiary from the civil
strife in the region, with reports that Iran has received up to $10 billion of
payments from Baghdad.
Even
if we were to accept that Iran uses its wealth to win influence, the argument
that sanctions relief will result in increased Iranian intervention still falls
short. Not only does it fail to consider how the Iranian system itself
operates, but it also overlooks even the basic strategic nuances of Iran's
regional policy.
The
money devoted to Iran’s regional foreign policy is managed by the same
organization responsible for executing it, namely the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC’s control of both revenue sources and strategic
decision-making has sheltered Iranian foreign policy from the broader effects
of international sanctions, giving the organization a large level of autonomy
to spend funds on foreign operations as it sees fit. Indeed, it is specifically
because of sanctions that Iran has had to rely so heavily on the organization.
As President Obama explained to Goldberg: “[W]hat is also
true is that the IRGC right now, precisely because of sanctions, in some ways
are able to exploit existing restrictions to have a monopoly on what comes in
and out of the country, and they’ve got their own revenue sources that they’ve
been able to develop, some of which may actually lessen as a consequence of
sanctions relief...It is not a mathematical formula whereby [Iranian leaders]
get a certain amount of sanctions relief and automatically they’re causing more
problems in the neighborhood.”
More
importantly, the low-cost of that strategy has always meant that only rarely
would the IRGC need to step outside of its own means to find appropriations.
This is another point raised by President
Obama: “[In] the discussion with the GCC countries, we pointed out that the
biggest vulnerabilities that they have to Iran, and the most effective
destabilizing activities of the IRGC and [Iran’s] Quds Force are actually low-cost.”
Iranian imperialism some examples
Aside
from Russia, Iran is the world’s most imperialist country today. It may not
engage in formal empire building, unless Kayhan editor
(and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointee) Hossein Shariatmadari’s dreams of annexingBahrain come true. When it comes to informal empire, however,
the Islamic Republic is on the march.
Despite then-Iranian UN Ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif’s pledge to credulous
American diplomats in 2003 that Iranian forces would stay out of Iraq, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps infiltrated thousands of militiamen and its
own forces into Iraq almost immediately; they never left. Iraqis certainly do
not like the Iranian presence. Some politicians will take advantage of Iranian
backing but Iraqi nationalists—even Iraqi Shi’ites—view those in Iran’s pocket
as quislings. In historiography, the notion of informal empire was
largely economic.
Iran fits the bill here, as Iraqis—especially those
in southern Iraq and Baghdad—complain how Iran dumps cheap manufactured goods
on Iraq, eviscerates Iraqi industry, and seeks to establish a monopolistic
dependency on the Islamic Republic.
Syria, too, has become part of Iran’s imperial design. Analysts
can point out how Iran needs Syria as a hub to support and supply Hezbollah.
They can also rightly point out Bashar al-Assad’s sectarian solidarity with
Iran, or Syria’s legacy as the only Arab state that supported Iran during the
Iran-Iraq War. Still, there’s something more going on when Iran dispatches
thousands of “volunteers” and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corpsmen to fight in
Syria. If Assad remains on top when the dust settles, he will no longer be a
partner of Iran. Rather, he will be a clear subordinate. The real leadership
inside Syria will be just as much in the Iranian embassy which, not by
coincidence, is traditionally headed by a member of the Qods Force, the unit of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps charged with export of the revolution.
Southern Lebanon has been under de facto Iranian suzerainty for decades
and, with then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s acquiescence to the Doha
Agreement
in 2008, Hezbollah now has effective veto power over the rest of Lebanese
society.
Iranian authorities never dreamed they would also be in de facto control of the
Yemeni government through their client
Houthis.
Put aside Saudi errors in its military campaign—none of that justifies Iran’s
presence in the country. Nor is there popular support: The Houthis simply
seized power and, with Iranian backing, used brutal force to consolidate it
over areas that were never traditionally Houthi. Indeed, the Houthis represent
perhaps the clearest example of Iranian imperialism. The Zaydi Shi’ism
practiced by the Houthis is theologically closer to Sunni practice than the
Twelver Shi’ism practiced in Iran. And yet part of the Iranian presence seems
to be for the purpose of ‘returning the Houthis to the fold’ by
proselytizing the Iranian brand of Shi‘ism.
That Iran was a “regional power” was once a staple of Iranian
rhetoric. In recent years, Iran began talking about itself as a “pan-regional
power.” Now it describes its strategic
boundaries as the
Eastern Mediterranean and Northern Africa. Make no
mistake: The Islamic Republic is an imperial power, little different in its
quest for political and economic domination of poorer states as its tormentors
were in the nineteenth century.
On May 1, 2018, Morocco announced it
was severing relations with Iran on the grounds that it and Hizbullah were
aiding the Polisario, a movement acting to establish an independent state in
the Western Sahara, in territory claimed by Morocco. In a press conference,
Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said that Iran had extended military
aid to the Polisario via the Iranian embassy in Algeria, and that Hizbullah had
been training Polisario militants. He added that Morocco would soon close down
its embassy in Tehran and expel the Iranian ambassador from Rabat, because
Iran's actions were detrimental to Morocco's security and supreme interests. According to Bourita, the ties between the Polisario and
Hizbullah began in 2016, when a Committee for the Support of the Sahrawi People
was established in Lebanon with Hizbullah sponsorship. Subsequently a Hizbullah
military delegation visited the Polisaro training camps in Tindouf, Algeria.
"The turning point," he said, "came in March 12, 2017, when [a
Lebanese national], Qassem Muhammad Taj Al-Din, was arrested at the Casablanca
airport on an international warrant for alleged fraud, money laundering and
terrorist activities; he is a senior operative in Hizbullah's financing
apparatus in Africa." Bourita added that "Hizbullah started
threatening to take revenge [on Morocco] for that arrest, and dispatched arms
to Tindouf, as well as military operatives to train the Polisario militants in
waging guerilla warfare, forming commando units and planning violent operations
against Morocco." In an interview with the French magazine Jeune
Afrique Bourita accused Algeria of hosting meetings between Hizbullah
and Polisario representatives, in coordination with Iran. Several meetings took
place in a secret location known to the Algerian security apparatuses, he said.
He claimed further that the culture attaché at Iran's embassy in Algeria, Amir
Moussavi, "known [to be in charge of] supervising the spread of Shi'a in
the Arab world and in Africa," served as the liaison between Hizbullah,
Algeria and the Polisario. Bourita added that he had given his Iranian
counterpart Zarif the names of the Hizbullah officials who had participated in
the meetings with the Polisario and had supervised the training and the
building of training facilities, including Haidar Subhi Hadid, 'Ali Moussa
Daqduq and Al-Hajj Abu Wael Zalzali."
In an interview with Fox News,
Bourita said that Morocco had received intelligence in April 2018 that
Hizbullah had supplied the Polisario with SAM-11, SAM-9 and Strela surface to
air missiles." According to the Elaph Morocco website, the
Hizbullah-Polisario cooperation had also included the excavation of tunnels and
trenches in the Sahara.
Following reports about this affair,
Khairallah Khairallah, a columnist for the Lebanese Al-Mustaqbal daily, wrote in support of the Moroccan
position, stating that Iran was acting to spread its influence not only in the
Gulf and throughout the Middle East but also in North Africa. He also blasted
Hizbullah as a "sectarian militia" and a "division of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps" that is acting on Iranian orders and
serving its interests, in complete disregard of the interests of Lebanon and
the Lebanese people.
The following are translated excerpts
from his column:
"There is no need to stress that Morocco does not
take any decision without examining the matter in depth. When it severed
relations with Iran, it did so after comprehensive consideration, and after
obtaining tangible proof that justified this sovereign decision, which can be
described as [a move in] defense of [Morocco's] sovereignty and [in defense] of
the soil of the homeland, including the Moroccan Sahara. That is what Moroccan
Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said when he explained the reasons for his
country's decision to expel the Iranian ambassador from Rabat.
"Morocco knows exactly what it is doing. After accusing
Hizbullah of training and arming the Polisario, it did not direct its response
at Lebanon, being well aware of the sensitive situation in that helpless
country. It directed its response at Iran, knowing full well that Hizbullah
does nothing without orders from [Tehran]. It is no secret that Hizbullah is
taking part in the war against the Syrian people for purely sectarian reasons.
It is also deeply involved in [assisting] the Houthis in Yemen, and is active
in Iraq, as well as in Bahrain, which is [another] kingdom it is acting to
destabilize – and [all] this is just a drop in the ocean.
"Ultimately, Hizbullah is nothing but a sectarian
militia and a division of Iran's Revolutionary Guards [Corps]. More explicitly,
Hizbullah is a tool of Iran, inside and outside Lebanon, just as the Polisario
is an Algerian tool. [Algeria] is using [this tool] in its war of attrition
against Morocco, which regained its sovereignty over the [Western] Sahara in
1975 after the withdrawal of the Spanish imperialism.
"It should also be noted that Hizbullah could not
train and arm the Polisario without the consent of Algeria and without a green
light from Iran. More importantly, Morocco is well familiar with Iran's mode of
operation in the region, even in the countries of North Africa, whereas Iran
knows nothing about the character of the [North African] countries and
societies. It thinks it can exploit the [Western] Sahara issue, which is a
conflict between Morocco and Algeria alone, to infiltrate this region.
"Algeria is oblivious to the danger of Iran's
actions, [although] it itself complains about sectarian [i.e., Shi'ite]
activity within its borders that is directed from Tehran, and which is aimed
against the Algerian people, the overwhelming majority of whom are Sunni. However,
it seems that Algeria will happily tolerate anything that causes harm to
Morocco. Algeria is suddenly pretending to have forgotten the extent of the
danger it is in, and the extent of the Iranian threat to [its] national unity,
considering the deep political crisis in the country. Hizbullah has become a
welcome presence in Algeria, as long as its presence is directed against
Morocco.
"Morocco severed relations with Iran in the past, in
March 2009, for reasons involving Iran-directed sectarian [Shi'ite] activity
within its borders. The relations were renewed in the fall of 2016, which means
that the disconnect lasted seven years. Morocco [apparently] hoped that Iran
had learned its lesson [and had realized that] the Moroccan authorities would
not take lightly any activity undermining the national unity in [Morocco], most
of whose citizens are Sunnis of the Maliki school. This time the severing of
relations was due to a different factor, namely the Polisario, meaning Algeria.
This happened after Algeria acted to build an infrastructure for the Polisario
in the Moroccan Sahara, taking advantage of the Bir Lehlou demilitarized zone,
which is under the oversight of the UN forces known as MINURSO...
"It is no secret that Iran is currently striving to
obtain as many trump cards as possible, in order to use them in contexts that
are known to all – for instance to show that it is a regional power that plans
to expand from the Arabian Gulf across the Middle East, all the way to North
Africa. It is also no secret that this Iranian activity is not confined to
Morocco – which knew enough to restrain Iran at an early stage – but also
exists in Algeria and Tunisia. Another [fact] that cannot be ignored is that,
not so long ago, Iran engaged in sectarian activities in Egypt and Sudan [as
well], using the Muslim Brotherhood in those countries...
"Morocco has done Lebanon and the Lebanese nothing
but good, as evident from the history of the relations between the countries.
So why is Hizbullah, which considers itself part of Lebanon, involved in a war
against Morocco? That is a strange thing to do. But since when has Hizbullah
considered the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese? Does it have any goal,
other than to serve Iran...?
Defending Iranian stance
US experts recommend to avoid an agreement
this can be found in an opinion piece by Soner Cagaptay, James Jeffrey, and Mehdi Khalaji, all
of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The WINEP authors state that
Iran is “a revolutionary power with hegemonic aspirations” and liken it to
“hegemonic powers in the past”: Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and
Britain—powers that “pushed the world into war” in 1914 and 1939.
Let us recall
what those hegemonic powers did. The Russians used their armies to build an
empire that encompassed much of the Eurasian land mass and whose successor
state still spans eleven time zones. Britain dominated the oceans with the
Royal Navy and used its power to build an empire on which the sun never set.
France also captured and colonized vast parts of Africa and Asia and, when it
had an emperor with sufficient talent, overran most of Europe as well. Japan
used military force to seize control of huge parts of the eastern hemisphere.
And as for Germany, the WINEP authors themselves—as part of the near-obligatory
reference to Nazis in any anti-agreement writing about Iran—remind us that
“Nazi Germany sought to dominate Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Volga
River, reducing other countries to vassal states and establishing complete
military, economic and diplomatic control.” Actually, it didn't just seek to do that;
Nazi Germany used its preeminent military power to accomplish that objective,
at least for a while.
Iran represents
nothing that is even remotely akin to any of this, as a matter of
accomplishment, capability, or aspiration. Certainly the current Islamic
Republic of Iran does not come close, and one would have to reach far back into
Persian history to start to get a taste of imperialism even at the reduced
scale of the Persians' immediate neighborhood. The twist of the WINEP piece is
that the authors reach back in exactly that way. They tell us that “Iran's hegemonic
aspirations actually date back to the Safavid Dynasty of the 16th century.” You
know that there is a lot of argumentative stretching going on when references
to Safavids in the 16th century are used as a basis for opposing an agreement
with someone else about a nuclear program in the 21st century.
The Safavid
Dynasty faded out before anyone could judge what would have been its
willingness to behave as a respectable member of the modern state system. Those
other hegemonic powers named in the piece evolved into respectable members of
the current international order (although debate related to the Ukraine crisis
continues about the attitudes of the Russian government). So the WINEP authors,
in trying to argue that Iran never could become a respectable, well-behaving
member of the same order, contend that what sets Iran apart is not only that it
has hegemonic aspirations but that it is “a revolutionary power with hegemonic
aspirations.” And, they say, “Revolutionary hegemonic powers combine the
imperialist lust for 'lebensraum' seen in Wilhelmine Germany”—gotta get in
those comparisons to the Nazis—“with a religious or millennial worldview that
rejects the principles of the classic international order.”
How far
divorced from reality this line of argument is emerges from the authors'
reference to yet another power whose strengths and ambitions are way out of
Iran's league: China, which the authors want us to see as hegemonic but not
revolutionary like Iran. They write, “Even today, countries with hegemonic
tendencies, like China, acknowledge the legitimacy of this international
order.” That is a remarkable statement in view of how much China's
international behavior can be explained, and has been explained by innumerable
analysts, in terms of China's rejection of
aspects of the international order that were established by the West without
Chinese participation. A recent example of this aspect of Chinese policy
involves the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other Chinese-created
mechanisms as alternatives to Western-dominated international financial
institutions.
.
Theological basis of Iranian revolution
The Shia political ideology underwent a significant transformation in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s
as a result of scholarly efforts
of Khomeini and his close
circle of clerical followers, and the religious lay intellectuals. Khomeini
reinterpreted the mainstream Shia political thought and proposed a novel Islamic theory of state: The Guardianship of the Jurist. He explicitly declared the inconsistency of the institution of monarchy with Islam and emphasized the necessity to
establish an “Islamic
state” as a religious duty. This ideology could be summarized as
follows:
1. Islam has laws for every aspect of private and public life.
2. These laws are for all times and places, and must not be abandoned.
3. The nature of many of Islamic
laws requires enforcement by a state.
•
Therefore, the devout must struggle to establish
an Islamic state.
4.
Those at the top of the Islamic state hierarchy must know the Islamic law in order to enforce it. They also must be just and fair for otherwise
they manipulate the law and lead to tyranny.
5. Those who know the Islamic laws are the jurists (foqaha: the plural of faqih).
• Therefore, the Islamic
state should be controlled by just jurists.
Khomeini was not just a theologian
who was interested
in theory; he was also a serious activist with a plan. Upon establishing his theory of the Islamic
state, he goes on to offer a program of struggle to establish the Islamic state:
“We are required [by the Islamic law] to struggle for establishing the Islamic state.
Propaganda/education constitutes our first activity in this path [of establishing the Islamic state].... Now, you do not have a government or an army; but you can educate.... Our [religious] duty is that from right now work/struggle to establish a righteous Islamic state;
spread the word; educate;
make similar-minded people; create a propaganda and intellectual wave in order to create a social current, and slowly the knowledgeable and responsible
and religious masses organize as an Islamic movement, rise and establish the Islamic state....
People do not know Islam. You should
introduce yourselves, your Islam, examples of Islamic
leadership and government, to the people of the world. Particularly, the university class and educated class. The eyes of university students are open. Be sure that if you introduce to universities
these [Islamic] beliefs as they [really] are, university students will welcome it.... You should tell what kind of state we want; and who should be the ruler and [who should be] those in charge of the government [government officials], and what kind of behavior and policies they should conform
to.... Build devotee [people willing for die for a cause]
and fighters for Islam.... Build fighters from the people on the street and bazaar, from these workers and peasants and students.... Struggle
for freedom and salvation needs religion. Make Islam...available
to people so that they correct their beliefs and manners accordingly, and become a fighting force, topple
this colonizing and tyrant political
system and establish the Islamic state.”
The central theme in many of Shari‘ati’s works is that Third World
countries such as Iran need two interconnected and concurrent revolutions: a
national revolution that would end all forms of imperial domination and would
vitalize -- in some countries revitalize -- the country’s culture, heritage and
national identity; and a social revolution that would end all forms of
exploitation, eradicate poverty and capitalism, modernize the economy, and,
most important of all, establish a “just,” “dynamic,” and “classless” society. According
to Shari‘ati, the task of carrying forth these two revolutions is in the hands
of the intelligentsia. For it is the intelligentsia that can grasp society’s
inner contradictions, especially class contradictions, raise public
consciousness by pointing out these contradictions, and learn lessons from the
experiences of Europe and other parts of the Third World. Finally, having
charted the way to the future, the intelligentsia must guide the masses through
the dual revolutions.
The Iranian intelligentsia, Shari‘ati added, was fortunate in that
it lived in a society whose religious culture, Shi‘ism, was intrinsically
radical and therefore compatible with the aims of the dual revolution. For
Shi‘ism, in Shari‘ati’s own words, was not an opiate like many other religions,
but was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, including
politics, and inspired true believers to fight all forms of exploitation,
oppression, and social injustice. He often stressed that the Prophet Muhammad
had come to establish not just a religious community but an umma in constant motion
towards progress and social justice. The Prophet’s intention was to establish
not just a monotheistic religion but a unitary society that would be bound
together by public virtue, by the common struggle for “justice,” “equality,”
“human brotherhood” and “public ownership of the means of production,” and,
most significant of all, by the burning desire to create in this world a
“classless society.”
Furthermore, the Prophet’s rightful heirs, Hussein and the other
Shi‘i Imams, had raised the banner of revolt because their contemporary rulers,
the “corrupt caliphs” and the “court elites,” had betrayed the goals of the umma and the nezam-e tawhid. For
Shari‘ati, the Moharram passion plays depicting Hussein’s martrydom at Karbala’
contained one loud and clear message: All Shi‘is, irrespective of time and
place, had the sacred duty to oppose, resist and rebel against contemporary
ills. Shari‘ati listed the ills of contemporary Iran as “world imperialism,
including multinational corporations and cultural imperialism, racism, class
exploitation, class oppression, class inequality and intoxication with the
West).
Shari‘ati denounced imperialism and class inequalities as
society’s main long-term enemies, but he focused many of his polemics against
two targets he viewed as immediate enemies. The first was “vulgar Marxism,”
especially the “Stalinist variety” that had been readily accepted by the
previous generation of Iranian intellectuals. The second was conservative
Islam, notably the clerical variety, which had been propagated by the ruling
class for over twelve centuries in order to stupefy the exploited masses. Thus
many of Shari’ati’s more interesting and controversial works deal precisely
with Marxism, particularly the different brands of Marxism, and with
clericalism, especially its conservative misinterpretations of Shi‘ism.
Post Nuclear Deal scenario
Unshackled from the United Nations Security Council sanctions,
Iran is only warming up to fully exert its influence in the region, change the
political chessboard of the Middle East further, and tip the regional balance
of power in its favor. For over three decades, the Islamic Republic preferred
to employ soft power rather than hard power, in order to insert its influence
in other Sunni Arab nations. Over the three decades, Iran infiltrated almost
every Middle Eastern country by building alliances with the Shiitte
communities, or by arming, training, financing and giving birth to Shiite
militias or oppositional groups.
Iran’s foreign policy has been unique in that regard; Iranian
leaders’ geopolitical, ideological and regional hegemonic ambitions have been
consistent since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless,
having been previously alienated regionally and globally as well as chained
with the shackles of international sanctions, Iran’s ruling clerics did not
have any option other than to hide their imperialistic intentions, employ soft
power and deny any intervention in other nations.
Liberation, Imperialism, and the West’s Confinement
Through the nuclear deal, once Iran is liberated from the
confining bars of international sanctions, there is no need for Iranian leaders
to hide their intentions anymore. This is due to the notion that the nuclear
deal not only meant the liberation of Iran’s ruling clerics, but also the
confinement of the US and Western powers to re-punish Iran. As the Persian saying
goes: We tied their hands and feet
together. As a result, it is not Iran that is chained anymore by its nuclear
program, but it is the US that is being handcuffed with the nuclear deal.
From the perspectives of the Iranian leaders, it does not make
sense anymore to geopolitically and ideologically employ soft power rather than
hard power. The Islamic Republic is cognizant of the fact that, first of all;
Tehran has the West off its back- because the West want to do business with
Iran (mainly oil and gas), fight the Islamic State through Iran, and the West
knows that it cannot anymore reverse the nuclear deal due to Russia and China’s
veto power in the United Nations Security Council.
Secondly, the cash is flowing in Tehran and Iran is aware that it
enjoys the support of two major global powers, Russia and China. Third, Tehran
knows that its children, the Shiite militia across the region, are being
empowered day by day, and they are absolutely loyal to the ideological
principles of the Islamic Republic, and that they will fight for Iran to the
end, in any country including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, etc.
The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, and the senior
cadre of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) analysis indicates that it is
totally in their interest to show the region Iran’s military capabilities, such
as Iran’s Quds force, on the ground in other Arab countries. For the ruling
Iranian politicians, it is currently in their interests to shift tactics and
publicly launch ballistic missiles, in violation of the UN resolution, to
publicly support Bashar Al Assad who has killed tens of thousands of his own
citizens, and to publicly acknowledge the IRGC role in Iraq, Yemen, and other
countries.
Being cognizant of all the aforementioned assets, Iranian
politicians view it in their parochial interests to publicly pursue their
Islamic-Persian imperialistic ambitions, regional hegemonic and ideological
objectives by ostentatiously and overtly attempting to tip the regional balance
of power in its favor, by publicly provoking other countries in the region, and
by challenging other nations.
Oil Revenues
The Islamic Republic
also blatantly rejected the regional proposal by OPEC members and other major
oil-producing nations to join and freeze oil output in order to address a
global surplus. Iran will not accept such proposals to cut oil output in order
to rebound oil prices anytime soon. In fact, according to Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh, Iran has the total potential to ramp
up oil export to 4 million barrels a day. This will have a significant negative
impact on oil prices, not only impacting the regional countries’ revenues, but
also the global market.
For Iran, the cash is flowing. Iran’s oil revenue has currently increased approximately 90%, in
only a few months after sanctions were lifted, from $12 billion per year to $21
billion per year. This revenue is based on the current low prices of oil, and
selling roughly 1.7 million barrels a day. Approximately 29% of Iran’s crude
oil is being exported to European countries including Spain, Greece, and
France. The export to European nations will definitely increase as Iran expands
its output. This means that, even at the current low oil prices, Iran’s oil
revenues will be around $50 billion a year, almost 500% of Iran’s oil revenue
of pre-sanctions.
Current
situation
Iranian
influence in Syria is in no danger of dissipating as its civil war rages on and
millions more of its citizens may soon be fleeing their homes in a new round of
fighting, a panel of Middle East experts said this week.
“The
Iranians are playing the long-game here” through its power base of Hezbollah in
Lebanon and strong influence in Shia-controlled Iraq, Charles Lister, director
of the Extremism and Counterterrorism Program at the Middle East Institute,
said at the Hudson Institute on Wednesday. Tehran has 70,000 to 100,000
fighters in Syria through its own forces and proxies backing the Bashar al
Assad regime. Russia is acknowledging internationally “we cannot do what you
want us to do in Syria” when it comes to controlling Iran.
“The
U.S. is coming to realize no one will be pushing [Iran] out,” said Randa Slim,
the director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute.“[Bashar al
Assad] is a hostage of Iran,” Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian civil servant,
said. Add Russian air and naval power to keeping Assad in power, R.J. Brodsky,
a senior fellow at the Security Studies Group said, “Assad will be a puppet of
Iran and Russia” for years to come.
Emphasizing
that point in recent days is the build-up of Russian naval forces off the Syria
coast, regime soldiers and Iranian-backed militias now in place on the ground
poised to attack the city of Idlib, close to the Turkish border. It is one of
the last strongholds of opposition groups backed by the United States and those
supporting what had been the Islamic State.
Idlib
could push another 3 million Syrians out of their residences toward Turkey,
putting more pressure on Ankara and also on countries like Greece on the
periphery of Europe with a new refugee crisis.
Turkey,
with millions of displaced Syrians already inside its borders, has made clear
that it does not want more refugees and is taking steps to close off entry
points. Lister said that Turkish forces inside Syria have transformed their
initially small presence into larger fortified forward operating bases with
anti-air missile emplacements and armor support. It also provides staging
points, if needed, to contain anti-Assad Kurdish forces that Ankara considers
terrorists.
Iran,
Russia and Turkey “look at the regime not as an equal partner” and discuss
among themselves ways to de-conflict military operations and the next steps
forward for Syria without consulting Assad, Barabandi said.
For
Russia, this demonstration of military force far from its borders shows “the
U.S. we are the super power in the area,” he added. But Moscow’s attempted
reach to achieve super power status goes further. It includes visits by
President Vladimir Putin to Berlin and regular diplomatic talk from Moscow in
the U.N. and elsewhere of the need to rebuild Syria so that refugees are
willing to return. In short, Moscow is trying to project an image of Syria as a
secure nation with political stability because it has allied itself with Russia
and is now open to investors. But neither Moscow nor Tehran has the cash to
rebuild Syria, the panelists agreed. “We need money” that neither has because
of U.S. and European Union economic sanctions on both countries to rebuild, the
panelists said.
So
Russia, especially, is turning to the West and to the Gulf States for
reconstruction money, Lister said. But Assad “will make the decision where the
money will go,” likely into large infrastructure projects ripe for cronyism in
regions of the country that backed the regime. Areas like Homs where the revolt
was strongest and then destroyed are not targeted for new projects. Although
Russia is saying publicly and calling for conferences at Geneva into how to
take care of millions of returning Syria, “I don’t think Assad can absorb all
the refugees coming back” nor does he want to, Barabandi said.
“Syria
is playing a different game” on refugees, Lister said, noting that Assad’s
intelligence chief has said half of them are suspected terrorists and would be
arrested if they returned. Many of the refugees and opposition fighters still
in Syria are Sunni. Assad and many in his regime are Alawite or Shiia, on the
other side of an Islamic sectarian divide.
Assad
says, “he wants businessmen,” Brodsky added but he wants them under conditions
of acceptability. The reason he says he wants this return of persons with
capital comes down to: “his oligarchs and businessmen are already under
sanctions” and cannot attract international investments or World Bank loans. By
bringing in new players they can attract investment and also become “part of
his game” to stay in power.
“There
are not many points of convergence” between Russia and the United States when
it comes to Syria beyond military deconfliction, Lister said. While Israel has
made clear to Moscow what it considers to be “red lines” in Syria, especially
when it comes to Iranian-backed ground operations, Washington has not, the
panelists said.
“The
United States and other actors [the European Union primarily] don’t have a
comprehensive approach” to dealing with the Syrian civil war on the diplomatic,
political and economic fronts. Slim cited chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Joseph Dunford’s comments Tuesday that the American objective is, ending the
Assad regime’s hold on power. That was the goal of the Obama administration
when it began funneling military aid to groups fighting the Islamic State that
then controlled large sections of Syria and Iraq.“Is this the old-slash-new
objective?” she asked rhetorically.
Two
events in the last month have underscored the growing reach of Iranian
influence in the Middle East. The first was the abrupt and unexpected
resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister, later rescinded, Saad Rafik al-Hariri. The
second was the announcement that Fatah, which controls the Palestinian
Authority and the territory on the West Bank, would share administrative
jurisdiction with the Hamas controlled government in Gaza. Both events,
seemingly unrelated, underscore a new phase in Tehran's growing Middle Eastern
clout.
HARIRI'S RESIGNATION DESTABILIZES LEBANON
On
November 4, 2017, Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri announced, via Saudi TV, that
he intended to step down. At the time, he was on an official state visit to
Riyadh. Hariri cited the growing power of Iran in the Middle East, in general,
and the increasing influence of Hezbollah, an Iranian funded proxy, in Lebanese
affairs as reasons for his resignation. He also cited fears for his personal
safety. Hariri's father, Rafic Hariri, was assassinated in 2005, in what is
widely believed to have been a Hezbollah orchestrated attack.
His
resignation announcement precipitated a political crisis in Lebanon, which many
saw as a deliberate Saudi attempt to isolate Tehran and underscore Hezbollah's,
and by extension Iran's, growing influence in the country. Hezbollah, a
militant Shia Islamist political organization based in Lebanon that was
organized by Iran in 1985, has been funded by Tehran since its inception.
The
group's political arm, Loyalty to the Resistance, is the third largest
political party in the Lebanese parliament. The group, along with Amal (Hope
Movement), another Lebanese political party associated with the Shiite
community, dominates the March 8 Alliance, which currently holds power in
Lebanon.
The
alliance has 24 of the alliance's 63 parliamentary seats. The balance of 65
seats is held by a smattering of other parties, including 59 seats by the March
14 alliance -- the official opposition. Hezbollah holds two of the thirty cabinet
seats in the Lebanese government.
Hezbollah's
paramilitary wing is the Jihad Council. Originally set up by a contingent of
1,500 troops from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the group has long clashed
with Israeli forces along the Lebanon border. In 2006, Israel and Hezbollah
fought a full-scale war that saw Hezbollah fire thousands of short-range
missiles into Israeli territory and led to the capture of several Israeli
soldiers. Additionally, Hezbollah fighters continue to be deployed in Syria in
support of the Assad government in Damascus.
It's
unclear what specific events triggered Hariri's resignation, although it was
widely believed to have been in response to Hezbollah's possible attempts to
increase the number of cabinet seats it controls in the Lebanese government.
Currently,
Hezbollah represents around 20 percent of the parliamentary seats in the
government coalition, but has only about six percent of the cabinet positions.
It may also have simply been a useful pretext by Riyadh to highlight
Hezbollah's growing influence in the country.
After
announcing a series of trips to the Gulf Emirates and Bahrain, later cancelled,
Hariri traveled to France, accompanied by his wife and children, for a meeting
with French President Emmanuel Macron. Hariri is also a French citizen and
holds both Lebanese and French nationality.
It
is believed that his wife and children remained in France for their protection.
On November 21, Hariri announced that at the request of Lebanese president
Michel Aoun, he had agreed to put his resignation "on hold ahead of
further consultations."
HAMAS AND FATAH MOVE TO RECONCILE
In
the meantime, on October 13, 2017, Hamas and Fatah announced that they had
agreed to an Egyptian government brokered agreement to reconcile, after more
than a decade of bitter infighting, and establish a national unity government.
The agreement, which is still far from complete, calls for the two sides to
integrate the Hamas administration of Gaza into the broader Palestinian
Authority (PA) government of Fatah.
Several
hundred Fatah administrators will be transferred to Gaza to work with the Hamas
government there and pave the way for the eventual integration of the two
government's administrations.
In
addition, Hamas agreed that the Gaza police force would be rebuilt and that it
would include 3,000 officers drawn from the Palestinian Authority police force.
Hamas also agreed to turn over control of the Rafah border crossing between
Gaza and Egypt to the Palestinian Authority.
That
border crossing had been closed by the Egyptian government, preventing the
transit of goods and people between Gaza and Sinai, and further isolating the
Hamas government in Gaza.
As
part of the reconciliation announcement, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas
announced that he would make a visit to Gaza for the first time since Hamas had
ousted the Palestinian Authority from there in 2007.
Significantly,
the most contentious issues were set aside for the moment. These included the
ultimate disposition of the 25,000-strong armed wing of Hamas, control of the
tunnel networks that Hamas has built under the Israeli-Gaza border and the
reform of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
The
latter is widely seen by Palestinians as corrupt and riddled with cronyism,
especially as it relates to the allocation and spending of financial aid given
to the Palestinian Authority by various governments.
The
most significant issue is the question of national elections. It was Hamas's
upset victory in 2007 that led to the split with the PA. Most intelligence
agencies believe that if national elections were held today PA President
Mahmoud Abbas, or any of his likely successors, would lose to Hamas leader
Ismail Haniya.
It's
not clear that Hamas wants to take responsibility for the governance of the Palestinian
territory. On the other hand, Hamas has received significant aid from Iran and
a Hamas takeover of the PA would be widely seen as a victory for Iran and
further proof of Tehran's growing clout in the region.
PERSIAN IMPERIALISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
The
reconciliation agreement underscores some important changes taking place in the
Middle East and marks the confluence of several different issues, some purely
local, while others are more regional in scope. The core issue is the growing reach
of Iranian influence, a topic that the Arab press sometimes refers to as a
reassertion of historic Persian imperialism in the region.
Persian
imperialism is in fact, nothing new to the Middle East. It has waxed and waned
over the millennia, from the empire of Cyrus the Great to the present
"Shite arc of influence," which stretches from Iran across Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon and Gaza.
When
strong regional powers or super states existed, Egypt, Greece, Rome, Byzantium,
the various Sunni Muslim and later Ottoman empires, to most recently Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, the reach of Persia or its Iranian namesake has been
constrained and contained. In the absence of such countervailing powers,
historic Persian imperialism cut a wide swath across the Middle East, including
Arabia. Many Sunni Arab governments, especially those in the Gulf, fear that
Tehran is in the process of another such flexing of historic Persian power.
THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: DOES IT STILL MATTER?
There
is also a large issue in play here. The messy Israeli-Palestinian issue is no
longer one of the defining pillars of Arab foreign policy in the region. It has
been subsumed by the larger issues of Iran's growing regional clout.
From
the standpoint of the Saudis and their Gulf allies, long-time primary
financiers of the "frontline states" in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
not to mention the actual front-line states like Egypt and Jordan, the
Palestinian issue is one they would like to see go away as it distracts from
the problem of dealing with Iranian imperialism.
A
continuation of the Palestinian issue serves to give Tehran additional
opportunities to aggravate tensions in the region and to destabilize moderate
Arab regimes there. Moreover, it makes security cooperation with Israel harder
to implement.
That's
one reason why the PA's Arab state supporters and bankers are pressuring them
to cooperate with the Trump Administration's Mideast peace initiative; even
threatening to withdraw or withhold financial aid if they prove recalcitrant.
That's
a dangerous strategy, especially given Abbas's and the Palestinian Authority's
lack of political support. That strategy may well push the PA toward a de facto
alliance with Hamas and its Iranian backers; a strategy that would
significantly diminish the chances of a comprehensive peace accord and embolden
Tehran supported proxies on Israel's borders.
Abbas
has not been afraid to push back against Arab and American pressure to get
onboard the latest peace process, dropping subtle hints that a potential
Iranian sugar daddy is waiting in the wings should his Arab benefactors
withhold financial support or an unpopular peace accord be forced on the
Palestinian Authority.
Tehran
has long maneuvered to position itself as a frontline state in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Should Hamas end up by default supplanting the
PA, Iranian proxies will find themselves on four of Israel's frontiers: Gaza,
Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Moreover, with de facto Iranian
military bases in Iraq and Syria, and the defeat of Islamic State, Tehran's
ability to directly supply its proxies with arms has improved substantially.
It
used to be that all issues in the Middle East, however benign, were invariably
subsumed to the larger issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an issue that
even defined the boundaries of U.S.-Soviet relations in the region during the
Cold War. Today, it is the rise of Iran and the reach of Persian imperialism
that have subsumed all other issues in the Middle East, including the one of
Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Update: Mar., 20,
2019:
Musa Ghazanfarabadi, head
of the Tehran Islamic Revolution Courts, told religious students in Qom this
month that his government could use foreign fighters to crack down on potential
popular uprisings in Iran. "If we don't support [our] revolution, the
Iraqi Hashd al-Shaabi, the Afghan Fatemiyoun [Brigade], the Pakistani
Zainebiyoun and Yemeni Houthis will come and support the revolution," he
said. Ghazanfarabadi was referring to Shiite militias from Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Yemen that have been formed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC). These armed groups have played a major role in conflicts in Iraq
and Syria, supporting the governments of both countries. In Yemen, the
Iran-backed Houthis have been fighting Saudi-backed government forces for years.
Some analysts say the Iranian regime is considering the foreign fighters backed
by Tehran as a potential reserve force for emergency use. Saeed Bashirtash, a
Belgium-based Iranian affairs analyst, believes that the presence of
IRGC-controlled foreign militia could threaten any national movement seeking
democratic change in Iran. Seeking help from non-Iranian groups is not
unprecedented in Iran. In the protests during the 2009 presidential election,
also known as the Green Revolution, Tehran reportedly brought foreign agents to
persecute Iranian protesters in Tehran and elsewhere in the country. Iran
has sent thousands of Shiite Afghan refugees to Syria to fight alongside other
Iranian-backed forces in support of the government of Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad. Iran's army recruits them with promises of citizenship and improved
living standards for their families. Analysts say Ghazanfarabadi's comments
could be a hint at the possibility of returning those fighters to Iran once the
conflict in Syria is over. "That might apply to Afghans who fought in
Syria in return for promises of legal residence in Iran," Slavin said.
"I doubt it applies to the others."
Update Mar.,21,2019:
Afghan’s government officials condemned the Islamic Republic for recruiting Afgan citizens to fight in Syria with the Fatemiyoun Brigade last year.
A study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy declared, “The Afghan government outlawed the group and worked to suppress it, largely in order to avoid further sectarian strife and proxy warfare in the war-ravaged country.” It added that recruitment by the Revolutionary Guards has continued, but it had gone “underground.”
The Fatemiyoun Brigade was set up by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 2014 to send Shia Afghan immigrants and refugees in Iran to fight in the Syrian civil war on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Guards’ officials have confirmed this fact. Zahir Mojahed, spokesperson for the Fatemiyoun Brigade, claimed in January 2018, that more than 2,000 members of the Afghan militia had been killed in Syria and more than 8,000 had been injured.
According to Afghan officials, the IRGC lures Afghan immigrants with promises such as fixed salaries and residency permits for their families. Interviews with the family members of those killed in action and the survivors confirm this. Religious loyalties of the potential recruits are also used, as they are made to believe that they will be defending Shia holy shrines in Syria.
The US Department of Treasury accused Iran of recruiting, training, and deploying child soldiers, which is a war crime, in October 2018. Recruitment of Afghan nationals to fight in Syria may amount to a violation of their human rights under both international law and the laws of both countries. In fact, recruiting Afghan nationals violates Article 145 of the Iranian constitution, which says, “No foreigner will be accepted into the army or security forces of the country.”
There are also documented cases of the Guards recruiting Afghan children to fight in Syria. In October 2017 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, “Afghan children as young as 14 have fought in the Fatemiyoun division.” Allegedly, when Human Rights Watch researchers reviewed photographs of tombstones in Iranian cemeteries where the authorities buried combatants killed in Syria, they identified eight Afghan children.
As well, a 15-year-old Afghan boy said in an interview in January 2019 that he was tricked into fighting in Syria by the false promise that he would be given a job in a holy shrine.
According to Article 2 of the National Conscription Law, only individuals over 18 can be conscripted to serve in the military. Recruitment of children under 18 is also banned under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Iran is a signatory to both.
Abdulvahid Farzei, vice president of the Afghan Bar Association, says that the Islamic Republic’s actions violate international conventions and laws because Article 7 of the Afghan constitution states that the government “shall observe the United Nations Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The state shall prevent all kinds of terrorist activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotics, and production and use of intoxicants.” Farzei says that since both Iran and Afghanistan have signed up to this declaration and other human rights conventions, they must follow and observe them.
Iran has violated the rights of young Afgans, and sacrificed them for its own interests, according to Farzei. One must turn to international law, he emphasizes, to stop Tehran because Afghanistan is mired in a deep crisis and dealing with a range of serious problems including challenges to national security. “the government is weak and, as a result, nothing in this regard has been done,” he said.
Iran’s conduct is wrong on multiple levels, Najla Rahal, a lawyer based in the Afghan capital of Kabul, insists. “Sending Afghan immigrants to the war not only violates Iranian laws, but it also exploits the destitute by deceiving them,” she says.
“This is not only unacceptable from a legal point of view, it is also morally wrong.” She adds that Afghan nationals have gone to live in Iran seeking refuge from the Taliban, the war in Afghanistan, insecurities, and unemployment. Legally, the Islamic Republic has no right to exploit these refugees’ situation, and Kabul is by law allowed to take action to put an end to this.
Rahal also believes that because Afghans were used to fight ISIS in Syria, ISIS has launched terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in revenge.
Afghan Refuges: Mr., 31, 2019: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has praised the
Afghan fighters, called the Fatemiyoun Brigade, who fought Daesh in
Syria, and said the Afghan fighters showed more resistance on the
battlefields than other fighters. Khamenei met some
families of fallen Fatemiyoun fighters on Thursday, March 28, where he said the
Afghan fighters were very motivated. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MoFA), meanwhile, said that using Afghan refugees as soldiers and sending them
to battlefields in Syria is in contravention of the international laws. Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) said Iran’s move to send Afghan
refugees to Syrian war is a serious human rights violation.“Misusing from the people’s
poverty is obviously a human rights violation,” the AIHRC chairperson Sima
Samar said. Reports indicate that dozens of Afghans have been killed in battle
in Syria and their bodies were buried in Iran.
Iranian Proxies: Apr.,2,2109: US imposes fresh Iran-related sanctions
against Shia militias in Syria, airline companies The US Treasury Department
has issued a new batch of sanctions against four entities that it says have
ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and airlines that are already on
Washington’s black list. The new ‘Iran-related’ sanctions list published by the
Treasury on Thursday contains only one Iranian entity – a cargo airline based
in the southern town of Qeshm – Qeshm Fars Air. The company was subjected to US
punitive measures over its ties to another Iranian airline, Mahan Air, which
was already sanctioned by the US. Armenia-based Flight Travel LLC also landed
on Washington’s list for the same reason. Two more entities added to the
blacklist are both Shia militias, which are fighting in Syria on the
government‘s side. Known as the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Zainebiyoun Brigade, the
groups were formed by Afghan and Pakistani Shiites, and are trained and
equipped by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – a fact that landed them
both on the sanctions list.
Iranian imperialism: Apr., 2, 2109: Tens of
thousands of Afghans recruited, paid and trained under the Fatemiyoun Liwa
(Fatemiyoun Brigade) by Iran to fight in support of Tehran’s ally President
Bashar Assad are returning to their homeland, as the 8-year war in Syria winds
down. Afghan veterans returning from Syria are threatened from
multiple sides. They face arrest by security agencies that view them as
traitors. According to some statistics, Iran has sent over 50,000 Afghan
fighters under the Fatemiyoun Brigade to fight in Syria.
IRGC: Apr., 7, 2019: The US is expected to designate Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards Corps
a foreign terrorist organization the announcement would come ahead of the first
anniversary of President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of a 2015 nuclear
deal with Tehran and to reimpose sanctions that had crippled Iran’s economy. The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran’s elite military force whose
primary function is not to defend Iran against foreign aggression but to
protect the regime from internal and external threats. A 125,000-man force, the
IRGC was established at the end of Iran’s 1979 revolution as an elite armed
militia whose role was sustain and protect the shaky clerical government that
took over after the fall of the Shah’s regime. The new rulers saw many of the
generals of the traditional Iranian military – known as the Atresh – as still being
loyal to the exiled Shah. The Quds Force is the foreign operations
unit of the IRGC, and is led by Brigadier General Qassem Sulaimani, who has
emerged as one of the most powerful figures inside Iran. It was established
during the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988). To this day, its biggest undertaking is
helping establish Hezbollah as a formidable fighting force in Lebanon,
following the 1982 invasion by the Israeli regime. The force has been Iran’s
primary military actor in neighbouring states, particularly Syria, where it
helped prop up the regime of Bashar Al Assad, and Iraq, where it supports a
coalition of powerful Shiite militias collectively known as Hashd Al Shaabi. It
also backs Al Houthis in Yemen. In 2007, the US Treasury designated the Quds
Force as a terror organisation. The ‘Basij Resistance Force’ is a volunteer
paramilitary organisation operating under the aegis of the IRGC. It is an
auxiliary force that is entrusted with helping sustain internal security, law
enforcement, and special religious or political events and morals policing. The
Basij, numbering 90,000, have branches in virtually every city and town in
Iran. The Khatam Al Anbiya is an
extraordinarily powerful conglomerate that has often been seen as the economic
arm of the IRGC. Some have even referred to it as an armed business enterprise.
It is a giant holding company with control of at least 800 firms both in Iran
and abroad, and it is the recipient of billions of dollars worth of government
contracts, often without a tender system.
Iraq: Apr.,10,2019: The Hashd al-Shaabi, a Shia fighting force affiliated with the
Iraqi army, is hindering efforts to expel PKK terrorist elements from Iraq’s
northern Nineveh province, according to a local official.“Efforts by the Iraqi
army to expel the PKK and affiliated factions from Sinjar are being impeded by
the Hashd al-Shaabi,” Veyis Nevaf, chairman of Mosul’s municipal council, said
in a Monday statement. A predominantly Shia fighting force, the Hashd al-Shaabi
was drawn up in 2014 with the express purpose of fighting the Daesh terrorist
group. In 2017, the Hashd al-Shaabi was incorporated into the Iraqi army. What’s
more, according to Nevaf, some 3,000 Ezidi youth from the region have been
forcibly recruited by the terrorist group.In the early 1980s, the PKK had
maintained camps in Syria and Lebanon before relocating to Iraq’s northern
Qandil Mountain region, where the group continues to maintain a presence today.
In late 2017, Baghdad sent federal troops into parts of northern Iraq
“disputed” between it and the KRG — including Sinjar. After federal forces
moved into Sinjar, the PKK falsely claimed to have withdrawn from the area. The
people of the region, and the KRG itself, have repeatedly complained of the
continued PKK presence. Nevertheless, the terrorist group still maintains an
active presence in both Sinjar and Qandil. In its more than 30-year terror
campaign against Turkey, the PKK — listed as a terrorist organization by both
the U.S. and the EU — has been responsible for the death of nearly 40,000
people.
IRGC: Apr., 12, 2019: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps
(RGC), which the U.S. this week dubbed a “foreign terrorist organization”, is
not a purely military institution, but also boasts considerable political and
economic clout.Through its many corporate holdings, the RGC maintains
considerable influence over Iranian foreign policy, income sources and
strategic expenditures. Established on May 5, 1979, the RGC was established on
the orders of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the late leader of the Iranian
revolution. Functioning independently from the Iranian military, the RGC was
drawn up with the express purpose of ensuring the security of Iran’s
post-revolution regime. Roughly 150,000 personnel currently operate under the
RGC’s auspices. The RGC also has an affiliated militia (Basij) consisting of
millions of volunteers.The RGC’s Quds Force, led by Major-General Qasem
Soleimani, runs military-intelligence operations abroad, while also being
responsible for Iran’s formidable ballistic missile program. The Quds Force is
answerably directly to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and operates
independently from Iran’s Foreign Ministry. The RGC accounts for the lion’s
share of Iran's defense budget. It also generates revenue through its various
corporate holdings, especially those in the energy, infrastructure and
telecommunications sectors.These holdings include Khatam-al Anbiya Construction
Headquarters, Iran’s largest engineering firm; Mahan Air, a Tehran-based
airline company; the Ansar Banking Corporation; and Oriental Oil Kish, an
energy concern. Khatam-al Anbiya was established by Khamenei in 1989 to rebuild
infrastructure damaged during Iran’s devastating war with Iraq in the 1980s. It
is currently involved in numerous projects across the country. It is believed to have more influence on
Iranian foreign policy -- especially as it pertains to the Middle East -- than
the Foreign Ministry itself.This influence frequently comes in for criticism,
especially given the fact that the RGC is answerable only to the supreme
leader, putting it outside the control of state institutions. The RGC’s
ascendancy over the Foreign Ministry was made evident in February when Syrian
leader Bashar al-Assad visited Tehran -- a visit the Foreign Ministry was not
informed of in advance. Along with maintaining a presence in Iraq and Syria,
the RGC also enjoys considerable influence in Lebanon through the Shia
Hezbollah group.
Baluch
terrorists: Apr., 21, 2019: The Baloch insurgents who killed 14 people
along Pakistan’s coast this week are based in neighboring Iran, Pakistan’s
foreign minister said on Saturday, heightening tensions ahead of Prime Minister
Imran Khan’s trip to Tehran on Sunday. The
militants checked the identity cards of passengers, singled out some of them,
and then kidnapped and killed them. The Baloch Raji Aajoi Saangar (BRAS)
umbrella group said it targeted Pakistani navy and Coast Guard officials
travelling on buses. “The training camps and logistical camps of this new
alliance…are inside the Iranian border region,” Qureshi told reporters in
Islamabad. Pakistan has decided to fence the border, just as it has started
fencing its frontier with Afghanistan.“The work has already started from the
points that are frequently misused,” Qureshi said. “We intend to seal this
whole border which spreads to 950 kilometers, gradually.”
Apr., 22,2019:
#IRGC Commanders replaced: Apr., 22,, 2019: Supreme
Leader Ayatollah #Khamenei
removes Commander #IRGC
Gen. Mohammed Ali Jaafari from position as Commander-in-chief of the religious
militia without giving reasons.
(News agencies report that the supreme leader appointed Mohammad
Ali Jafari (also known as Aziz or Ali Jafari) to succeed Yahya Rahim-Safavi as
IRGC commander. Observers appear to regard Jafari as principally a tactician,
organizer, and "technical" military man. His appointment appears to
be more a response to perceived external threats than a reflection of domestic
politics. Jafari spoke to
the press on September 3 and said the IRGC's role is to "expand" the
deterrence capability against "the enemies of Iran and the
revolution" without an exclusively military role. He said the IRGC will
"hasten" to help other institutions in Iran "where
necessary," ISNA reported. Jafari added
that Iran's "environmental conditions" have changed, and the IRGC
needs to be flexible in facing new threats to Iran. The new commander assured
reporters that the IRGC is better prepared than in the past to face these
threats, and with the necessary intelligence on "enemies" and a
considerable ballistic capability. He urged "the enemies" to leave
the Middle East region and choose instead an "interaction" with
Islamic states, ISNA reported. Observers
have speculated on the domestic and foreign-policy significance of the
reshuffle. Radio Farda said on September 2 that Jafari is or was thought to be
close to the Expediency Council's Rezai, who used to head the IRGC, and to
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, another former IRGC guardsman and currently the mayor
of Tehran. The move might be interpreted as
a stimulus from Khamenei to the Rezai-Qalibaf clique -- a conservative
subfaction thought to be a counterweight to the radicalizers around President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Radio Farda observed that Rahim-Safavi is perceived to have
become too openly sympathetic to the Ahmadinejad government, when officers are
obliged to shun )
This happens a day before meeting visiting #Pakistani
PM #ImranKhan.
In Pakistan, the IRGC is suspected of involvement in #Ormara
terror attack where 14 #Pakistan
soldiers were killed execution style after being offloaded from buses.
The removal of IRGC chief could
be a goodwill signal to Pakistan.
#Khamenei's calculations are
definitely bigger than just #Pakistan. But the replacement of #IRGC leadership
gives him room to maneuver when Pakistani PM will raise #OrmaraMassacre,
as he is expected to do, privately. Khamenei will tell #Pakistan PM #ImranKhan
that #Tehran is
acting on the conclusive evidence of IRGC involvement in executing Pak Navy
& Air Force soldiers, and that IRGC removal is a sign of introspection.
Another interesting point is that
Foreign Minister SMQ, who condemned #IRGC involvement in executing #Pakistani
soldiers, and ordered that #Iranian Ambassador
to Pakistan be summoned to MFA for a formal protest, did not accompany the PM
in his Iran stopover. SMQ left for #Japan,
then to #China where
he'll rejoin PM #ImranKhan. PM Khan has stopped in Iran en route to China. Observers
in Pakistan are closely watching the changes at IRGC, which is considered
India's ally in Iran. It is involved Indian RAW's #KulbhashanJhadav network
at #Chabahar.
The IRGC is wrongly considered
Iran's army. Iran Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Airforce) are separate from IRGC,
which is a religious militia not answerable to the government or the armed
forces, and only answerable to Khamenei. As such, the IRGC is the main force
responsible for protecting the Khomeinist order in Iran. It is also Iran's only
force that is involved in wars and conflicts inside other countries in the
region.
Iran role
in Baluchistan: May ,20,209: The recent wave of high-impact attacks
by Baloch insurgent groups suggests the latter have not only changed their
tactics, but have also considerably strengthened their operational
capabilities. Apparently, they are consolidating their strength in and around
the Makran region, where the Gwadar port lies as the starting point of the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This renewed wave of violence comes at a time
when the geopolitical landscape of the Persian Gulf is dramatically changing
and CPEC is about to enter its second phase.
It is tricky business to try and establish an empirical link
between the Baloch insurgency and regional geopolitics, but the evolving
dynamics provide some clues about their probable correlation. One such clue can
be discerned from the states’ complicit or inattentive attitude towards those
non-state actors that, though not creating trouble on their own soil, are
hurting others, mainly in the neighbourhood. Some even argue that the states in
our region have lost the ability to resolve issues through diplomacy and have
let them go adrift propelled by regional geoeconomics and geopolitical
impulses.
Most regional actors with strategic or economic interests in
Balochistan have a long history of using militant proxies. Afghanistan, India
and Pakistan have had their own regional geostrategic contexts to nurture such
proxies, but Iran and Saudi Arabia have added sectarian dimensions to it. Iran
claims that the Sistan-based Jaishul Adl is using Pakistani soil. Many in
Pakistan believe Tehran is supporting the Pakistani Baloch insurgents.
Baloch insurgents from Pakistani Balochistan hold Iran responsible
for the oppression of the Baloch on its territory. Iran has remained tough on
secular insurgent groups on its side, which had links with Pakistan-based
groups. Many nationalist leaders in Balochistan believe that during the 1980s
and 1990s, Iranian agents killed several nationalist Baloch leaders from
Iranian Sistan-Baluchestan in Karachi.
While it may not have been an easy option for Pakistani Baloch
insurgent groups to get support from Iran, places for refuge were few, apart
from Iran and Afghanistan. According to locals, the families of many Baloch
insurgent leaders have relocated to Iran, which have in a way made them
dependent on Iran. This has given Iran clout over these insurgent groups.
The Baloch insurgency has gradually been slipping out of the
control of exiled Baloch leaders, including Harbiyar Marri, Brahmdagh Bugti and
Bakhtiar Domki. While living mostly in Europe, these leaders have lobbied for
the Baloch nationalist cause in the West where an Iranian label could damage
their case.
Drones
as weapon of war: July, 20, 2019:
Iran is quietly building up an arsenal of locally-produced
drones that it is exporting to its allies in the region and testing against
enemies in Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia. On July 10, Iranian drones reportedly
were used to attack a Kurdish dissident group in northern Iraq, after
Iran accused the group of killing members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps. Iranian media said that a new IRGC drone unit was used during the attack,
which comes three weeks after Iran downed a sophisticated American drone over the Gulf of Oman.
The Iranian drone threat is not confined to waters off Iran’s
coast, or to neighboring states. It is becoming a regional threat against U.S.
allies. Iran’s allies, from the Houthi rebels in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon,
are benefiting from Iran’s technical drone know-how. For example, the U.S.
believes that a drone attack on Saudi oil facilities was launched by pro-Iranian groups in Iraq in May.
In Yemen, the Houthi rebels have been launching drone attacks on Saudi Arabian airports near the Yemen border. Nine
were injured in early July in Abha. The Houthis use
a drone called a Qasef-2K, which is based on Iran’s Ababil T drone. Taken as a whole, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, using drone
technology from Tehran, represent a major stepping stone for Iran in its
ability to threaten the U.S. and its allies. Iran’s drone technology also
appears to be growing more sophisticated. Since the 1980s, Iran sought to build
up a force of locally produced drones.
In January, Iran put on display a plethora of new UAVs. These
included its Shahed-171 “stealth drone” with precision-guided missiles and its
Kaman 12 drone, which supposedly can fly to a range of 200 kilometers for up to
10 hours, according to Iranian media. Some Iranian drones are basically reverse-engineered copies of
American drones. The Iranian Saegheh and Shahed 171 are copies of the Sentinel
RQ-170 Iran captured in 2011. The Shahed 129 is similar to the U.S. MQ-1
Predator Iran is quietly building up an
arsenal of locally-produced drones that it is exporting to its allies in the
region and testing against enemies in Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia. On July
10, Iranian drones reportedly were used to attack a Kurdish
dissident group in northern Iraq, after Iran accused the group of killing
members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iranian media said that a new IRGC
drone unit was used during the attack, which comes three weeks after Iran
downed a sophisticated American drone over the Gulf of
Oman.
The establishment of a special UAV unit
and its use against Kurdish groups on July 10 shows that the IRGC’s drone
expertise can be easily linked to Iran’s role across the Middle East. The
IRGC’s Quds Force has been behind Iranian UAVs sent to Syria during the civil
war and to Iraq