Khalistan

Khalistan

 Introduction

The Khalistan movement is a Sikh   movement seeking independence from India , which seeks to create a separate country called Khalistān in the Punjab region of South Asia to serve as a homeland for Sikhs.The territorial definition of the proposed country Khalistan consists of both the Punjab, India along with Punjab, Pakistan and includes parts of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan.

In 1971, the first explicit call for Khalistan was made in an advertisement published in the New York Times by an expat Jagjit Singh Chohan. With financial and political support of the Sikh diaspora the movement flourished in the Indian state of Punjab, which has a Sikh-majority population and reached its zenith in the late 1970s and 1980s when the secessionist movement caused large scale violence among the local population including assassination of PM Indira Gandhi and bombing of Air India plane killing 328 passengers  Various pro-Khalistan outfits have been involved in a separatist movement against the Government of India ever since. In the 1990s the insurgency petered out, and the movement failed to reach its objective due to multiple reasons including a heavy police crackdown on separatists, divisions among the Sikhs and loss of support from the Sikh population.

Causes

With the rise of Sikh Nationalism in British India, the idea of a separate Sikh state first came up in early 20th Century. As a result of the British policy of Divide and rule many religious nationalist movement emerged among the Hindus, Muslims and the Sikhs. The process involved differentiating the religions and creating communal boundaries.

According to evidence by Harjot Oberoi, the belief that Punjab is the "homeland" of the Sikh community is a recent formulation. Despite the Sikh historical linkages with Punjab, territory was never a major element of sikh self definition. The attachment of Punjab with Sikhism was recent and made in 1940s. Historically Sikhism was pan-Indian, with the main Sikh scriptures Guru Granth Sahib drawing from works of saints in North as well as South India, and the several of its major seats (such as Nankana Sahib in Pakistan, Panj Takhts Takht Sri Patna Sahib in Bihar, Hazur Sahib Nanded in Maharashtra) outside of Punjab. Before its conquest by the British, the region around Punjab had been ruled by the confederacy of Sikh Misls founded by Banda Bahadur ruled over the entire Punjab from 1767 to 1799,until their confederacy was unified into the Sikh Empire by Maharajah Ranjit Singh from 1799 to 1849 CE. The Sikhs have traditionally been concentrated in Punjab region of undivided India although not in a majority.

Before the partition of India in 1947, Sikhs were not in majority in any of the districts of pre-partition British Punjab Province other than Ludhiana.The districts in the region had a majority of either the Hindus or Muslims depending on its location in the British province. Among the three major religions (Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism), Sikhs formed the largest group (41.6%) only in the Ludhiana district.When the Muslims proposed the creation of an Islamic-majority Pakistan, many Sikhs staunchly opposed the concept.

In late 1930s and 1940s the Sikh leaders realized that Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India are imminent. To make a case for a separate Sikh state within the Punjab, Sikh leaders started mobilizing meta-commentaries and signs to argue that Punjab belonged to Sikhs and Sikhs belong to Punjab.   The Muslim League's Lahore Resolution demanded a separate country for Muslims. A section of Sikh leaders grew concerned that their community would be left without any homeland following the partition of India between the Hindus and the Muslims. They put forward the idea of Sikhistan, envisaging it as a theocratic state covering a small part of the greater Punjab region. The country which he proposed would include parts of present-day Indian Punjab, Pakistani Punjab (including Lahore), and the Simla Hill States. It was imagined as a theocratic state led by the Maharaja of Patiala with the aid of a cabinet consisting of the representatives of other units.The idea was unviable due to lack of sufficient sikh population as compared to other religions in Punjab.

According to Oberoi, the territorialization of the Sikh community was formalized when Sikh political party Akali Dal in March 1946, passed a resolution proclaiming the natural association of Punjab and Sikh religious community.

The British India was partitioned on a religious basis in 1947 and Punjab province was divided between India and newly created Pakistan. A majority of the Sikhs along with the Hindus migrated from the Pakistani province of Punjab to the Indian province of Punjab, which then included present-day Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. The Sikh population that, in 1941, was as high as 19.8% in some districts of Pakistan, dropped to 0.1% in all of them, and it rose sharply in the districts assigned to India. They were still a minority in the Punjab province of India, which remained a Hindu-majority province. Despite the first mentions of the movement in early 20th century, Khalistan separatist movement was never a major issue until the late 1970s and 1980s when it began to militarize.

Betrayal of the Sikhs

 In 1929, the All India National Congress met at the banks of the River Ravi Amravati  and Sihk representatives  and fixed Complete Independence as its political goal.  On the previous day, the Sikhs had taken out a five hundred thousand strong procession with veteran Baba Kharak Singh leading it on elephant back, from under the walls of the ancient fort of Lahore, which was described in THE TIMES, of London, as "a most impressive spectacle of human congregation that put the Congress show into shame and shade." It was on this occasion that Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, went to meet Baba Kharak Singh, at his place on Chauburji Road, and gave the Sikhs a solemn assurance that after India achieves political freedom no Constitution shall be framed by the majority community unless it is freely acceptable to the Sikhs. This promise was then reduced into a formal Policy Resolution of the All India Congress Committee.

Afterwards, this Policy Resolution was repeatedly reiterated, officially and semi-officially, throughout the period up to August 1947, and it was not officially repudiated till 1950 when the present Constitution was framed. The trusting Sikhs, who in their Daily Prayer, extol keeping faith as the noblest of human virtues, placing complete reliance in this solemn undertaking given to them by the majority community, resisted and refused all offers and proposals made to them by the British and the other people whom we now prefer to call, the Muslim League proposing to accord the Sikhs a sovereign or autonomous status in the areas constituting their ancestral homeland between the River Ghaggar and the River Chenab.  .

The second link is that in the year 1932, at the time of the Second Round Table Conference, the British Government, through Sardar-Bahadur Shivdev Singh, then a member of the Indian Secretary of State's Council, made an informal proposal to the Sikhs that if they dissociate finally with the Congress movement, they would be given such a decisive political weight-age in the Punjab, as would lead to their emerging as a third independent element in India after the British transfer Power to the inhabitants of this subcontinent.

  Master Tara Singh promptly rejected this tempting offer. The third link is this: In the month of July, 1946, the All India Congress Working Committee met at Calcutta, which reaffirmed the assurances already given to the Sikhs, and in his Press Conference held on the 6th July, there, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru spelt out the concrete content of this solemn undertaking in the following flowery words:

"The brave Sikhs of the Punjab are entitled to special consideration. I see nothing wrong in an area and a set-up in the North wherein the Sikhs can also experience the glow of freedom"

In these words, an autonomous State to the Sikhs, within India, was promised. Fourthly, in the early Winter of 1946, the Cabinet Mission, while at Delhi, communicated to the Sikhs through the late Sardar Baldev Singh that if the Sikhs are determined not to part company with Hindu India, the British Parliament, in their solicitude for the Sikh people, was prepared to so frame the Independence Act of India, so that in respect of the Sikh home-land, wherever these areas might eventually go, in Pakistan or India, no Constitution shall be framed such as does not have the concurrence of the Sikhs. But Sardar Baldev Singh, in consultation with the Congress leaders, summarily rejected this offer which went even beyond the assurances given by the majority community, in 1929 and in 1946 by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in Calcutta. Fifthly, in April 1947, Mr. Jinnah, in consultation with certain most powerful leaders of the British Cabinet in London, offered to the Sikhs, first through Master Tara Singh and then through the Maharaja of Patiala, a sovereign Sikh State comprising areas lying in the west of Panipat and east of the left bank of the Ravi river on the understanding that this State then confederates with Pakistan on very advantageous terms to the Sikhs and Master Tara Singh summarily rejected this attractive offer. The Maharaja of Patiala declined to accept it in consultation with Sardar Patel and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Sixthly, on the 9th December, 1946, when the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly was held under the Chairmanship of Babu Rajendra Prasad, Pandit

Jawaharlal Nehru moved the first and the fundamental Resolution in which it was said: "Adequate safeguards would be provided for minorities... It was a declaration, a pledge and an undertaking before the world, a contract with millions of Indians, and, therefore, in the nature of an oath*, which we must keep." To take recourse to a solemn oath, to inspire confidence that might be betrayed when convenient, is quite in the political tradition of the Indian National Congress. On 16th March, 1931, Mahatma Gandhi came to a special Sikh congregation held in Gurdwara Sisganj, Delhi, where he was asked as to what guarantee there was that his Indian National Congress would implement the assurances, given to the Sikh people in 1929, at Lahore. His reply is published in his Young India, of the 19th March, 1931, and it contains the following: "Sardar Madhusudan Singh has asked for an assurance that the Congress would do nothing that might alienate sympathies of the Sikhs from the Congress. Well, the Congress, in its Lahore Session, passed a Resolution that it would not enter into or be a party to any settlement with regard to the minority question that failed to satisfy any of the minorities concerned. What further assurances the Congress can give to the Sikhs, I fail to understand. I ask you to accept my word and the Resolution of the Congress that it will not betray a single individual much less a community. If it ever thinks of doing so, it will only hasten its own doomŠ. I pray you, therefore, to unbosom yourselves of all your doubts... What more shall I say? What more can I say than this. Let God be the witness of the bond that binds me and the Congress with you".When further asked as to what may the Sikhs do in case of betrayal he said, the Sikhs could, in that case, take their kirpans in hand with perfect justification before God and man.

Seventhly, in the month of May, 1947, precisely on the 17th May, Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Nawab Liaqat Ali Khan and Sardar Beldev Singh, flew to London on the invitation of the British Cabinet, in search of final solution of the Indian communal problem. When the Congress and the Muslim League failed to strike any mutual understanding and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru decided to return to India, the British Cabinet leaders conveyed to Sardar Baldev Singh that, if he stays behind, arrangements might be made: "So as to enable the Sikhs to have political feet of their own on which they may walk into the current of World History."

Sardar Baldev Singh promptly divulged the contents of this confidential offer to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and in compliance with the latter¹s wishes, declined to stay back and flew back to India after giving the following brave message to the Press: "The Sikhs have no demands to make on the British except the demand that they should quit India. Whatever political rights and aspirations the Sikhs have, they shall have them satisfied through the goodwill of the Congress and the majority community." Eighthly, and lastly, in the month of July, 1947 the Hindu and Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly met at Delhi to pass a unanimous Resolution favoring partition of the country, in which Resolution occur the following words: "In the divided Indian Punjab, special constitutional measures are imperative to meet just aspirations and rights of the Sikhs." It is these very Hindus of the Punjab, who, with the ready aid of the Government of India leaders, even when their understanding was not qualified to keep pace with the wishes of the heart, adopted every conceivable posture and shrank from no stratagem to keep Sikhs permanently under their political heel, first, by refusing to form a Punjabi-speaking State in which the Sikhs might acquire political effectiveness, and second, by falsely declaring that Panjabi was not their mother tongue. The Bill before the House is a calculatedly forged link in the chain, the story of which I have just narrated. When in 1950, the present Constitution Act of India was enacted, the accredited representatives of the Sikhs the Shiromani Akali Dal declared vehemently and unambiguously in the Constituent Assembly that: "The Sikhs do not accept this Constitution: the Sikhs reject this Constitution Act"

AIkh spokesmen declined to append their signatures to the Constitution Act as a token of this clear and irrevocable rejection.     Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru replied to Master Tara Singh in 1954, when the latter reminded him of the solemn undertaking previously given to the Sikhs on behalf of the majority community. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru coolly replied, the circumstances have now changed. If there is one thing that the Sikhs know too well, it is that now the circumstances have changed!

 The ruling party  committed injustice during the post-Independence era; it  frequent employment of Judiciary for quasi-political purposes, and the result is that the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal had passed a Resolution on the 20th July, 1966, which reads: "AFTER HAVING CAREFULLY VIEWED the findings, the reports and judgements of judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals and Forums that have dealt with matters and cases involving important Sikh interests, COMES TO THE CONCLUSION, that the entire judicial machinery and the judicial process of the Independent India, under influences of a certain section of political Hindus, is prejudiced and has been perverted against the Sikh people in India in relation to their just and legal rights" 

Archives of letters from Nehru to Mountbatten also show that when the Boundary Commission had planned to declare the partition of Punjab on August 12, Nehru tried to sell out hi "brave Sikhs" (who were used to bring most of the  territory north of Delhi into the Indian Union). While influential Sikhs were lobbying Mountbatten for more territory to come into East Punjab (to insiders the demarcation line was known after Aug 6),  archival records show Nehru writing a letter to Mountbatten that he wanted Sutlej as the dividing line between Pakistan/India.

History after Partition

After India's independence, the Punjabi Suba movement, led by the Sikh political party Akali Dal, sought the creation of a province (suba) for Punjabi people. The Akali Dal's maximal position of demands was a Khalistan and minimal position was to have an autonomous state within India. The issues raised during the Punjabi Suba movement were later used as a premise for the creation of a separate Sikh country by the proponents of Khalistan. The partition of India based on the religious grounds had led to a lot of bloodshed. Concerned that creating a Punjabi-majority state would effectively mean creating a state based on religious grounds, the Indian government initially rejected the demand.

In September 1966, the Indira Gandhi-led Union Government accepted the demand. On September 7, 1966 Punjab Reorganisation Act was passed in Parliament. The Act was implemented with effect from November 1, 1966. Punjab was trifurcated creating Punjab, Haryana and transferring certain areas to Himachal Pradesh. Chandigarh was made a centrally administered Union territory. Which effectively mean creating a state based on religious grounds; the Indian government initially rejected the demand. 

Akali Dal's demands

Akali Dal, the Sikh political party, was defeated in the 1972 Punjab elections.^[To regain the public appeal the Akali Dal then put forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 to demand radical devolution of power and further autonomy to Punjab. The resolution document included both religious and political issues. It asked for recognising Sikhism as a religion separate from Hinduism and transfer of Chandigarha and certain areas to Punjab. It also demanded that power be radically devoluted from the Central to state governments.

The document was largely forgotten, for some time after its adoption, but came into the limelight in the 1980s. The Akali Dal an Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale joined hands to launch the Dharam Yudh Morcha in 1982 in order to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Thousands of people joined the movement, feeling that it represented a real solution to demands such as a larger share of water for irrigation and the return of Chandigarh to Punjab

In 1970 Parmar came in contact with Jagjit Singh Chohan in London which led to the launch of the movement. The Khalistan movement was announced formally at a London press conference. Chohan raised the Khalistani flag in Birmingham in the 1970s.   

Chohan visited the United States at the invitation of his supporters in the Sikh diaspora. On 13 October 1971, he placed an advertisement in the New York Times proclaiming an Independent Sikh state. Advertisement of Khalistan enabled him to collect millions of dollars from the Sikh diaspora. He was charged in India with sedition and other crimes in connection with his separatist activities.

After returning to India in 1977, Chohan travelled to Britain in 1979, and established the Khalistan National Council. On 12 April 1980, he declared the formation of a "National Council of Khalistan", at Anandpur Sahib. He declared himself the President of the Council and Balbir Singh Sandhu as its Secretary General.

In May 1980, Jagjit Singh Chohan travelled to London and announced the formation of Khalistan. A similar announcement was made by Balbir Singh Sandhu, in Amritsar, who released stamps and currency of Khalistan. Operating from a building termed "Khalistan House", he remained in contact with the Sikh extremist leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwalewho was violently campaigning for a Sikh theocratic homeland. Chohan also maintained contacts among various groups in Canada, the USA, and Germany. Chohan declared himself president of the "Republic of Khalistan", named a Cabinet, and issued symbolic Khalistan "passports", "postage stamps", and "Khalistan dollars". Embassies in Britain and other European countries were opened by Chohan. It is reported that with the assistance of a wealthy Californian supporter, a peach magnate, he opened an Ecuadorian bank account to support his operation. Apart from Punjab, Himachal, and Haryana, Chohan's proposal of Khalistan also included parts of Rajasthan state. The globalized Sikh diaspora invested efforts and resources for Khalistan, but the Khalistan movement remained nearly invisible on the global political scene until the Operation Bluestar of June 1984.

The late 1970s and the early 1980s the separatist movement began to militarize and saw the increasing involvement of the Sikh religious preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in Punjab politics. Over the period Bhindranwale grew up as a leader of Sikh militancy. There was a dissatisfaction in some sections of the sikh with prevailing economic, social, and political conditions. Bhindranwale articulated these grievances as discrimination against Sikhs and the undermining of Sikh identity.

The growth of Bhindranwale was not solely by his own efforts. In the late 1970s Indira Gandhi's Congress party supported Bhindranwale in a bid to split the Sikh votes and weaken the Akali Dal, its chief rival in Punjab. Congress supported the candidates backed by Bhindranwale in the 1978 SGPC elections. The Congress leader Giani Zail Singh allegedly financed the initial meetings of the separatist organization Dal Khalsa, which disrupted the December 1978 Ludhiana session of the Akali Dal with provocative anti-Hindu wall-writing. In the 1980 election, Bhindranwale supported Congress candidates Gurdial Singh Dhillon and Raghunandan Lal Bhatia. Bhindranwale was originally not very influential, but the activities of Congress elevated him to the status of a major leader by the early 1980s. This later turned out to be a miscalculation as Bhindranwale's separatist political objectives became popular among the agricultural Jat Sikhs in the region.

In a politically charged environment, Lala Jagat Narain, the Hindu owner of the Hind Samachar group of newspapers, was assassinated by Sikh militants on 9 September 1981. Jagat Narain was a prominent critic of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and a Congress leader. In 1981 Census of India was being conducted where the mother toungue of the citizens was being recorded. Lala had been writing about reporting Hindi instead of Punjabi as their mother tongue by Hindus living in Punjab. This infuriated Bhindranwale and his followers. The White Paper issued by the government of India, mentioned that Narain was assassinated because of his criticism of Bhindrawale. On 15 September 1981, Bhindranwale was arrested for his alleged role in the assassination. Bhindranwale had earlier been a suspect in the murder of the Nirankari leader Gurbachan Singh, who had been killed on 24 April 1980 in retaliation for killings of conservative Sikhs belonging to theAkhand Kirtani Jatha. Bhindranwale was released in October by the Punjab State Government, as no evidence was found against him.^[47]

The Akali Dal was initially opposed to Bhindranwale, and even accused him of being a Congress agent. However, as Bhindranwale became increasingly influential, the party decided to join forces with him. In August 1982, under the leadership of Harcharan Singh Longowal, the Akali Dal launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha ("Group for the Battle for Righteousness") in collaboration with Bhindranwale. The goal of the organisation was the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Thousands of people joined the movement as they felt that it represented a real solution to their demands, such as a larger share of water for irrigation, and return of Chandigarh to Punjab.

After the launch of the Morcha, Sikh extremists began committing acts of political violence. Assassination of Chief Minister of Punjab Darabara Singh was attempted and two Indian Airlines flights were hijacked by the terrorists. Indira Gandhi considered the Anandpur Resolution as a secessionist document and evidence of an attempt to secede from the Union of India. The Akali Dal officially stated that Sikhs were Indians, and the Anandpur Sahib resolution did not envisage an autonomous Sikh State of Khalistan. By early October, more than 25,000 Akali workers courted arrest in Punjab in support of the agitation.

To restart the talks with the Akali leadership, Gandhi ordered the release of all Akali workers in mid October and sent Swaran Singh as her emissary. Bhindranwale who was then regarded as "single most important Akali leader" announced that nothing less than full implementation of the Anandpur resolution was acceptable to them. Other Akali leaders agreed to join the negotiations which ended with a compromised settlement with the governments team. The settlement was then presented in the parliament but certain parts of the agreement were changed unilaterally due to advice from Haryana and Rajasthan CMs.  

Operation Blue Star

The pro-Khalistan Sikh separatists within the Harmandir Sahib were led by former Major General Shabeg Singh  Operation Bluestar was an Indian military operation carried out between 1 and 8 June 1984, ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to remove militant religious leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his armed followers from the buildings of the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amritsar,Punjab. In July 1983, the Sikh political party Akali Dal's President Harcharan Singh Longowal had invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in Golden Temple Complex. Bhindranwale later on made the sacred temple complex an armoury and headquarter, for his armed uprising for Khalistan. In the violent events leading up to the Operation Blue Star since the inception of Akali Dharm Yudh Morcha, the militants had killed 165 Hindus and Nirankaris, even 39 Sikhs opposed to Bhindranwale were killed. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent incidents and riots while 1,180 people were injured. Unsuccessful negotiations were held with Bhindranwale and his supporters.

Indira Gandhi ordered the army to launch the Operation Blue Star. Army units led by Indian Army Lt. Gen Kuldip Singh Brar (a Sikh), surrounded the temple complex on 3 June 1984. The Indian Army, Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, and Punjab Police were involved. The army kept asking the militants to surrender, using the public address system. The militants were asked to allow the pilgrims out of the temple premises, before they start fighting the army. However, nothing happened till 7 PM. The army had grossly underestimated the firepower possessed by the militants. Militants had Chinese made Rocket-propelled grenade launchers with armor piercing capabilities. Tanks and heavy artillery were used to attack the militants using anti-tank and machine-gun fire from the heavily fortified Akal Takht. After a 24-hour firefight, the army finally wrested control of the temple complex. Bhindranwale was killed in the operation, while many of his followers managed to escape. Casualty figures for the Army were 83 dead and 249 injured. According to the official estimate presented by the Indian government, 1592 were apprehended and there were 493 combined militant and civilian casualties. High civilian casualties were attributed to militants using pilgrims trapped inside the temple as human shields.

The opponents of Indira Gandhi also criticized the operation for excessive use of force. General Brar later stated that the Government had "no other recourse" as there was a "complete breakdown" of the situation, State machinery was under the control of the militants, declaration of Khalistan was imminent and Pakistan would have come into the picture declaring its support for Khalistan. The Sikh militancy was not crushed with the Operation and it continued.

Assassination of Indria Gandhi

On the morning of 31 October 1984, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh personal security guards Satwant Singh and Beant Singh in New Delhi in retaliation for Operation Blue Star. The assassination triggered fulminant violence against Sikhs across north India. While the ruling party, Congress, maintained that the violence was due to spontaneous riots, its critics have alleged that Congress members had planned apogrom against the Sikhs. Senior Congress leaders such as Jagdish Tytler, H. K. L. Bhagat, and Sajjan Kumar have been accused by Sikhs of inciting the mobs against them.

Other political parties strongly condemned the riots. Two major civil-liberties organizations issued a joint report on the anti-Sikh riots, naming sixteen important politicians, thirteen police officers, and one hundred and ninety-eight others, accused by survivors and eyewitnesses.

The military Operation Blue Star in the Golden Temple in Amritsar offended many Sikhs. The separatists used Operation Bluestar and the riots following the assassination to claim that the interest of the Sikhs were not safe in India and fostered the spread of militancy among the Sikhs in Punjab. Some sections of the Sikh diaspora started to support the separatists with financial and diplomatic support.

A section of Sikhs turned to militancy in Punjab and several Sikh militant outfits proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s. some Sikh militant groups aimed to create an independent state Khalistan through acts of violence directed at members of the Indian government, army or forces.  

In January 1986, the Golden Temple was again occupied by militants belonging to the All India Sikh Students Federation and Damdami Taksal. On 26 January 1986, the gathering passed a resolution (gurmattā) favoring the creation of Khalistan. Subsequently, a number of rebel militant groups in favour of Khalistan waged a major insurgency against the government of India. Indian security forces suppressed the insurgency in the early 1990s, but Sikh political groups such as the Khalsa Raj Party and SAD (A) continued to pursue an independent Khalistan through non-violent means. Pro-Khalistan organizations such as Dal Khalsa (International) are also active outside India, supported by a section of the Sikh diaspora.

On 29 April 1986, an assembly of separatist Sikhs at the Akal Takht made a declaration of an independent state of Khalistan. These events were followed by a decade of violence and conflict in Punjab before a return to normality in the region. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, there was a dramatic rise in radical State militancy in Punjab. This period of insurgency saw clashes of Sikh militants with the police, as well as with the Nirankaris, a mystical Sikh sect that are less conservative and aim to reform Sikhism. The Khalistani militant activities manifested in the form of several attacks, such as the 1987 killing of 32 Hindu bus passengers near Lalru, and the 1991 killing of 80 train passengers in Ludhiana. Khalistan-related militant activities continued in the 1990s, as the perpetrators of the 1984 riots remained unpunished, and many Sikhs felt that they were being discriminated against and that their religious rights were being suppressed. 

In August 1991, Julio Ribeiro, then Indian Ambassador to Romania, was attacked and wounded in a Bucharest assassination attempt by gunmen identified as Punjabi Sikhs.^[ Sikh groups claimed responsibility for the 1991 kidnapping of the Romanian chargé d'affaires in New Delhi, Liviu Radu. This appeared to be in retaliation for Romanian arrests of KLF members suspected of the attempted assassination of Julio Ribeiro  Radu was released unharmed after Sikh politicians criticised the action.

In October 1991, The New York Times reported that violence had increased sharply in the months leading up to the kidnapping, with Indian security forces or Sikh militants killing 20 or more people per day, and that the militants had been "gunning down" family members of police officers.

On 31 August 1995, Chief Minister Beant Singh was killed by a suicide bomber. The pro-Khalistan group Babbar Khalsa claimed responsibility for the assassination, but security authorities were reported to be doubtful of the truth of that claim. A 2006 press release by the Embassy of the United States in New Delhi indicated that the responsible organisation was the \ Khalistan Commando Force 

There were serious charges leveled by human rights activists against Indian Security forces (Headed by KPS Gill - himself a Sikh), claiming that thousands of suspects were killed in staged shootouts and thousands of bodies were cremated/disposed of without proper identification or post-mortems. Human Rights Watch reported that since 1984, government forces had resorted to widespread human rights violations to fight the militants, including arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial, torture, and summary killings of civilians and suspected militants. Family members were frequently detained and tortured to reveal the whereabouts of relatives sought by the police.  Punjab Rights Forum claims that several Sikh women were reportedly gang-raped and molested by the Punjab police and the Indian security forces during house-to-house searches. It also claims that looting of the villagers' properties and the ransacking of entire villages occurred during this period. Amnesty International has also alleged several cases of disappearances, torture, rape, and unlawful detentions by the police during the Punjab insurgency, for which 75-100 police officers had been convicted by December 2002. Ram Narayan Kumar, the author of Reduced to Ashes, claims that the issue of Khalistan was used by the State to divert attention from real issues of democracy, constitutional safeguards, and citizens' rights.

Khalistan Groups

In November 2015, a Sarbat Khalsa, or congregation of the Sikh community, was called in response to recent unrest in the Punjab region. The Sarbat Khalsa adopted 13 resolutions to strengthen Sikh institutions and traditions. The 12th resolution reaffirmed the resolutions adopted by the Sarbat Khalsa in 1986, including the declaration of the sovereign state of Khalistan.

There are several Sikh groups such as the Khalistan Council that are currently functional and provide organization and guidance to the Sikh community. Multiple Sikh militant groups are organized across the countries and coordinate their military efforts for Khalistan. Such groups were most active in 1980s and early 1990s and have since receded in activity. These groups are largely defunct in India but they still have a political presence among the sikh diaspora, especially in countries such as Pakistan where they are not proscribed by law.

The major pro-Khalistan militant outfits include:

·         Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)

·         International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), based in the United Kingdom

·         Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)  .

·         All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)

·         Bhindranwala Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTFK)

·         Also known variously as Bhindranwala Tigers Force of Khalistan, and Bhindranwale Tiger Force, this group appears to have been formed in 1984 by Gurbachan Singh Manochahal. After the founder's death, the BTF (or BTFK) seems to have disbanded or integrated into other organisations.

·         Listed in 1995 as one of the 4 "major militant groups" in the Khalistan movement.

·         Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) Khalistan Liberation Force

·          

·         Khalistan Liberation Army (KLA)

·         Dashmesh Regiment

·         Shaheed Khalsa Force

Most of these outfits were crushed during the anti-insurgency operations by 1993. In recent years, active groups have included Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa, and Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. An unknown group before then, the Shaheed Khalsa Force claimed credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997. The group has never been heard of since.

Since Indra Gandhi assassination

Khalistan movement, Operation Bluestar, Indira Gandhi’s assassination, Anti-Sikh massacres —1984 is etched in public memory as a disastrous, tragic year for India. Operation Bluestar, ordered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to wipe out the Khalistani militants holed up inside the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar, saw the death of hundreds of civilians, militants and military personnel alike. The Akal Takht, one of the sacred religious sites of the Sikhs within the complex, was badly damaged too, enraging a section of the Sikh population. Bluestar ultimately led to a cycle of violence: the prime minister was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and anti-Sikh killings on a massive, mind-numbing scale were orchestrated by leaders and supporters of the ruling Congress party in Delhi and elsewhere, claiming the lives of more than 3,000 persons from the Sikh community. Unofficial estimates place the death toll at more than 5,000.

Here’s a timeline of the events leading up to the 1984 tragedy and afterwards:

Despite many commissions of inquiry instituted over the decades, the victims of the 1984 massacres continue to battle for and await justice. Dozens of eyewitnesses have testified to police inaction before these commissions. They have deposed that the police did not do anything to stop the killings in which large numbers of people participated. Survivors, witnesses and observers spoke of how the violence was orchestrated by Congress leaders — including, they said, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler. But no senior politician has been convicted till now. At least 10 committees have examined different aspects of the anti-Sikh violence, seven of which have investigated the specific aspect of the death count. But most of these committees have had no impact, with successive governments not implementing their recommendations or disregarding their findings.

The Mishra Commission, constituted in 1985, accepted “the submission advanced before it that the violence against Sikhs an October 31, 1984, started as a natural reaction to the situation. And that at that stage there was no organized attempt to cause or spread violence by rioting directed against the Sikhs.”

Similarly, the The Nanavati Commission, submitting its report in 2005, said  that “there was simply no evidence that “Shri Rajiv Gandhi or any other high ranking Congress (I) Leader had suggested or organised attacks on Sikhs. Whatever acts were done, they were done by the local Congress (I) leaders and workers, and they appear to have done so for their personal political reasons.”

However, a fact-finding team jointly organised by the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) reported both Hindus and Sikhs telling the organisations that far from being a spontaneous expression of ‘grief and anger’ at Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the riots were in fact organised by certain Congress(I) leaders.

Congress(I) councillors considered to be loyal followers of the MP Dharamdas Shastri were named as the main culprits who were reportedly carrying voters’ lists to identify Sikh households in the Anand Parbat area.

The Delhi police filed 587 FIRs against those involved in the violence. Out of these, 241 cases were closed by the police, citing lack of evidence.

Several prominent Congress leaders figure on the lists of several complainants  accusing them of instigating crowds to attack Sikhs in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Jagdish Tytler was widely accused of playing a prominent role in mobilising the mobs. He has specifically been accused of instigating the mob that led to the murder of three Sikhs at Gurdwara Pul Bangash, Delhi, on November 1, 1984.

In 2000, the BJP-led government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee set up the Nanavati commission headed by a former Supreme Court judge to investigate the crimes committed during the 1984 massacres. The commission’s report released in 2005 during the UPA-I tenure, put out detailed evidence against Tytler and other Congress leaders of the Delhi wing of the INC. The report led to Tytler’s resignation from the Union cabinet. Despite the CBI clearing him of any wrongdoing in March 2009, the party dropped him  as an INC candidate for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.  In 2013, a New Delhi Court ordered the reopening of the case against Tytler and directed the CBI to record the testimonies of key witnesses who had said they saw the Congress leader instigating mobs. He filed a plea for a stay order on CBI probe, which the high court rejected in January 2014.

One of the most frequently mentioned names in connection with the 1984 violence is that of Congress politician Sajjan Kumar. On the recommendations of Justice G.T. Nanavati Commission, the CBI registered a case against Kumar, alleging that he incited mobs to attack Sikhs in the Delhi Cantonment. The CBI told a Delhi court that Kumar incited the crowd to kill Sikhs. “There was a conspiracy of terrifying proportion with the complicity of police and patronage of local MP Sajjan Kumar,” CBI prosecutor R.S. Cheema told the court. Cheema further told the court that witnesses at the scene heard Sajjan Kumar tell a crowd that “not a single Sikh should survive”. While Kumar was acquitted by a district court, there are several ongoing cases against him, including an appeal against his acquittal, in the Delhi high court.

In the Gandhinagar area, a local Congress(I) councillor Sukhanlal was identified by the victims as the main leader of the assailants. Escapees from the area whom the the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) fact-finding team met at the Shakarpur relief camp on November 6, blamed the Congress(I) MP from the area, H K L Bhagat, for having masterminded the violence in their locality. During the 1990s, a sessions judge in the Karkardooma Court in Delhi, Justice S.N. Dhingra sent senior Congress minister Bhagat to jail briefly. The Nanavati Commission’s recommendations nailed Bhagat in 2005. The Congress leader passed away later that same year due to advanced age and prolonged illness.

The commission found that along with H.K.L. Bhagat, Dr. Ashok Kumar, a local congress leader and member of Municipal Corporation, Kalyanpuri, had taken “active part in this anti-Sikh riots.” He had reportedly held a meeting in Kalyanpuri, in which he incited violence, and in the ensuing violence, there were cases of loot, murder, arson and rape. The commission, though, failed to recommend any further action against Bhagat and Kumar, citing their acquittals in criminal cases even though they had been acquitted due to poor investigations by the police.

Diaspora Support

Operation Bluestar and its violent aftermaths popularized the demand for Khalistan among many Sikhs dispersed globally. Involvement of sections of Sikh diasporas turned out to be important for the movement as it provided the diplomatic and financial support. Some Sikh groups abroad even declared themselves as the Khalistani government in exile.

The Sikh place of worship, gurdwaras provided the geographic and institutional coordination for the Sikh community. Sikh political factions have used the gurdwaras as a forum for political organization. The gurdwaras often served as the site for mobilization of diaspora for Khalistan movement directly by raising funds. Indirect mobilization was provided by promoting a stylized version of conflict and Sikh history. The rooms in gurdwara exhibit pictures of Khalistani leaders along with paintings of martyrs from Sikh history. This visually establishes a line of oppression starting from 17th Century to modern day. Gurdwaras also host speakers and musical groups that promote and encourage the movement. Among the diasporas,  

Different groups of Sikhs in the diaspora organize the convention of international meetings to facilitate communication and establish organizational order. In April 1981 the first “International Convention of Sikhs,” was held in New York and was attended by some 200 delegates. In April 1987 the third convention was held in Slough, Berkshire where the Khalistan issue was addressed. This meeting's objective was to “build unity in the Khalistan movement"

All these factors further strengthened the emerging nationalism among Sikhs. Sikh organizations launched many fund-raising efforts that were used for several purposes. After 1984 one of the objectives was the promotion of the Sikh version of "ethnonational history" and the relationship with the Indian state. The Sikh diaspora also increased their efforts to build institutions to maintain and propagate their ethnonational heritage. A major objective of these educational efforts was to publicize a different face to the non Sikh international community who regarded the Sikhs as “terrorists

Immediately after Operation Blue Star, authorities were unprepared for how quickly extremism spread and gained support in Canada, with extremists "...threatening to kill thousands of Hindus by a number of means, including blowing up Air India flights. Canadian Member of Parliament Ujjal Dosanjh, a moderate Sikh, stated that he and others who spoke out against Sikh extremism in the 1980s faced a "reign of terror"

On 18 November 1998, the Canada-based Sikh journalist Tara Singh Hayer was gunned down by suspected Khalistani militants. The publisher of the "Indo-Canadian Times," a Canadian Sikh and once-vocal advocate of the armed struggle for Khalistan, he had criticised the bombing of Air India flight 182, and was to testify about a conversation he overheard concerning the bombing. On 24 January 1995, Tarsem Singh Purewal, editor of Britain's Punjabi-language weekly "Des Pardes", was killed as he was closing his office in Southall. There is speculation that the murder was related to Sikh extremism, which Purewal may have been investigating. Another theory is that he was killed in retaliation for revealing the identity of a young rape victim.

Terry Milewski reported in a 2006 documentary for the CBC that a minority within Canada's Sikh community was gaining political influence even while publicly supporting terrorist acts in the struggle for an independent Sikh state. In response, the World Sikh Organization of Canada (WSO), a Canadian Sikh human rights group that opposes violence and extremism, sued the CBC for "defamation, slander, and libel", alleging that Milewski linked it to terrorism and damaged the reputation of the WSO within the Sikh community. Canadian journalist Kim Bolan has written extensively on Sikh extremism

There has been some controversy over Canada's response to the Khalistan movement. After Amarinder Singh's refusal to meet Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2017, calling him a "Khalistani sympathizer", Singh ultimately met with Trudeau Feb 22, 2018 over the issue. Trudeau assured Singh that his country would not support the revival of the separatist movement. Shiromani Akali Dal president Sukhbir Badal was quoted saying Khalistan is "no issue, either in Canada or in Punjab" 

Anand Karaj 

Anand Karaj is the Sikh marriage ceremony, meaning "Blissful Union" or "Joyful Union", that was introduced by Guru Amar Das. The four laavaan (hymns which take place during the ceremony) were composed by his successor, Guru Ram Das. It was originally legalised in India through the passage of the Anand Marriage Act of 1909, but is now governed by the Sikh Reht Maryada (Sikh code of conduct and conventions) that was issued by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC).In a recent verdict of the Sri Akal Takht Sahib, i.e. a, Anand Karaj can only take place in a Gurudwara (temple). Any Amritdhari (baptized) Sikh may perform the marriage ceremony. In 2012, India passed The Anand Marriage (Amendment) Bill, after which Sikhs are able to register their marriages under the Anand Marriage Act instead of the Hindu Marriage Act, with President Pratibha Patil giving her assent to a bill passed by Parliament on 7 June 2012 in the budget session. Pakistan declared that it would pass the Sikh Anand Marriage Act in 2007 and a Draft was prepared, but this Draft Act was never passed. In 2018, Pakistani's Punjab Provincial Assembly passed the Punjab Sikh Anand Karaj Marriage Act 2018

Current Status

 Khalistan movement may have diminished in India, but a separate State of Khalistan still remains a big idea among a large section of the Sikh diaspora, especially in North America and the UK. And the aggressive Hindutva politics of the BJP government   appears to have given a new lease of life to the pro-Khalistan elements — especially in the US, the UK and Canada — in the past few years.
The recent attempt by Khalistan supporters to disrupt an event of Congress president Rahul Gandhi in London and the attack on Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee chief Manjit Singh GK in the US is a testimony to the rekindling of the Khalistan movement abroad.

“We support the attack on Manjit Singh GK as our coordination committee has decided that he should not be allowed to speak in any of the gurdwaras in the US. We have already banned Indian diplomats and politicians visiting the country from speaking in gurdwaras; they can just pay their obeisance, eat langar (community food) and go,” Himmat Singh, coordinator of the Sikh Coordination Committee (East) Coast, USA, tells The Sunday Standard.

The Sikhs living in Western countries are deeply attached to their religious identity and feel more strongly about what’s been happening in the country. The sacrilege of Guru Granth Sahib and the subsequent incidents in Punjab have riled the Sikh diaspora which feels the Congress and the Akali Dal are playing a friendly match on the issue.

Political observers feel the hard line Hindutva politics and incidents like lynching have given the radical Sikh groups abroad a fertile ground to re-emerge. “With Hindutva coming to centre stage, the contradictions between Sikhs and Hindu radicals have sharpened this extenuation,” says political analyst Prof Kuldeep Singh.

Then, there is the 1984 anti-Sikh riot, which is still fresh in the memory of Sikh diaspora. “For the Sikhs abroad, this has been an emotive issue and the basis of the Khalistan demand… as they have not seen the downside of it as the Sikhs back in India have witnessed. The appeal of this issue has always more pronounced among NRI Sikhs as compared to Sikhs living in India,” Prof Singh says.

Himmat Singh tells The Sunday Standard: “Everyone knows Congress’s hand in the 1984 genocide, but Rahul Gandhi says the party had no hand in it and Amarinder supports him. Why is he lying?” Singh also support ‘Referendum 2020’ to press for a separate Sikh state. US-based advocacy group Sikhs for Justice (SJF) had organized a rally at Trafalgar Square under ‘London Declaration on Referendum 2020’, seeking the creation of Khalistan. Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, legal adviser of SFJ, says “The response to the rally was very encouraging and we will continue to engage foreign governments on the issue of Sikhs’ right of self-determination and the demand to hold a referendum in Punjab on this issue.”

The over eight-million-strong Sikh diaspora has a significant influence over the community’s politics back home. So, it’s no surprise that the referendum demand is finding traction among certain sections in Punjab. Kanwar Pal Singh of radical group Dal Khalsa says, “We will launch a new phase of consistent democratic engagement with the central government and the United Nations, urging them to set up a mechanism to allow the people of Punjab to exercise the right to self-determination.”

On the re-assertion by Sikh hardliners abroad, he says, “Majority fundamentalism breeds minority fundamentalism. To counter the Hindutva agenda of transforming India into a Hindu state, Sikhs have got pro-active with their Khalistan agenda.”

Indian politicians targeted in US, UK. Three Khalistan supporters tried to disrupt a public event of Rahul Gandhi in London on August 25, a day after the Congress leader denied his party’s role in the 1984 Sikh riots. The same day, DSGMC member and Akali Dal leader Manjeet Singh GS was thrashed outside a gurudwara in California, US.

Kutch

Ethnic cleansing of Sikhs from Kutch .
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYAw1gcMJ8k&feature=youtu.be

Sikhs support Khalistan because of the Anand marriage act that is still not applied on them and they are still forced to marry under the Hindu marriage act, the Indian police killing hundreds of innocent Sikhs extra judicially whose mass graves were also found, the Sikh Diaspora in Western countries and Sikh population in East Punjab not forgetting the atrocities of Indian Army at Akali Takht in Amritsar in 1984 and the massacre of Sikhs in New Delhi following the killing of Indira Gandhi

Update Feb., 10 , 2019 :

Realpolitik in the Khalistan Movement Shyamal Kataria  

Several explanations have been put forward to explain the rise of the Khalistan movement, from economic grievances, the Sikh fear of being absorbed into the Hindu fold, to dubious policy decisions made by the central and Punjab state governments. The discourses of political machinations and tussles for power—the realpolitik—behind the movement are analysed. The realpolitik factors of “over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi, the policies and behaviour of the Congress (I), the policies and behaviour of the Shiromani Akali Dal, and the role of Pakistan are interrogated.

It is often difficult to ascribe a precise date of origin to the rise of a particular secessionist movement. This is especially so when many of its protagonists contend that their demands for separate nationhood are rooted in and legitimised by entrenched “historical realities.” Nevertheless many scholars in attempting to place a fixed time frame around the Sikh separatist movement for Khalistan in North India tend to commence their chronology of events from 1981 and end in 1993. This is because it was during this time period that Punjab endured a “heightened” level of religious militancy with an estimated death toll of over 25,000 resulting from the associated violence (Puri et al 1999: 10). It was only the second insurgency movement—the first being the Naga movement in North East India —that the postcolonial, post-partition, Indian state had to deal with insurgency. The latter was also the more testing of the two.

The roots of Sikh separatism are long and contested, although it is clear that plans for an independent Sikh state did exist in the final years of British rule over the subcontinent. However, these plans emerged as a reaction to the Pakistan resolution of 1940, and were not, for the majority of the Sikh leadership at least, their first preference for a postcolonial settlement. Sikh separatism continued almost immediately after partition through the demand for a Punjabi suba or linguistic state, which Master Tara Singh, a veteran leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), had allegedly conceded was merely an acceptable cover for what his community and he were truly seeking, namely a Sikh majority political entity (Singh 1992: 40). After the Punjabi suba was eventually conceded in 1966, further grievances vis-à-vis New Delhi began to emerge, including the status of Chandigarh, the distribution of river water flowing through Punjab, the alleged religious discrimination of Sikhs, and undue encroachment by the state into their religious affairs. Such grievances found their way into the SAD’s Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, which went to form the bedrock of demands for the early portion of the militant movement that emerged at the beginning of the following decade (1980s), and was supported by the likes of Amritdhari Damdami Taksal preacher Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.

One of the most evocative episodes of the militancy of that period was the Indian army’s raid on the sanctum sanctorum of the Sikhs, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, code-named Operation Blue Star. The operation’s aim was to rid the Golden Temple of its “secessionist elements,” who were accused of inspiring acts of anti-Hindu terror across Punjab. The raid, carried out in early June 1984, sent reverberations throughout India and the rest of the world, particularly in countries with substantial Sikh populations such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. It prompted questions from national and international commentators with a lukewarm understanding of the subcontinent as well as specialist observers with a strong contextual knowledge of the unfolding events. The questions ranged from how the supposedly staunch nationalistic Sikhs of India could suddenly “turn their backs” on the rest of India, towards more nuanced ones that critiqued the role of the Indian government in raiding the most sacred site of one of its most treasured communities.

A great deal of attention has gone towards explaining the rise of the Khalistan movement. The explanations that have been put forward to date span a vast array, ranging from underlying economic grievances, the Sikh fear of being absorbed into the Hindu fold, to the dubious policy decisions made by those in New Delhi, and, to a lesser extent, at the state level in Punjab. What this article aims to do is hone in on those explanatory factors in the discourse which relate to political machinations and tussles for power, the so-called realpolitik, and subject these to thorough scrutiny in order to test their strength. Realpolitik, as employed by this article, is a mode of politics practised by individuals, cliques or institutions, for the cynical pursuit of power to the defiance or superseding of moral and/or ideological considerations. Realpolitik departs from conventional types of politics, which, while also being motivated by power, is typically more transparent, and is guided and legitimised by ideological considerations, pursuit of collective good, and constitutional and procedural norms.

The realpolitik explanations advanced in the discourse, and hence interrogated in this article, span across four broad areas. First, it relates to the “over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi; second, it examines the policies and behaviour of the Congress (I); third, it examines the policies and behaviour of the Shiromani Akali Dal (hereafter Akali Dal or Akalis); and finally, it analyses the role of Pakistan.

Concentrating Power in Delhi

The first category of realpolitik explanations relate to the over-centralisation of power by the central government. To be specific, there was an unhealthy distribution of power between New Delhi and Chandigarh in favour of the former in the lead up to, and during, the period of the Khalistan movement. Even Parkash Singh Badal, the Chief Minister of Punjab on multiple occasions, said that what he and his party wanted was a “re-casting of centre–state financial relations” (Kamath 1984: 138). According to Joyce Pettigrew (1987: 20), “Punjab’s problems [of militancy] … occurred, not because of its richness, but because control over irrigation and power, and all aspects of development, was in New Delhi rather than in Chandigarh.” Such opinion is of course not without foundation since, despite being officially federal in character, the jurisdiction of the centre within the Indian state was vast and spanned over realms typically reserved for provincial units in most other federations. For example, the centre had the ability to influence the amount that Punjabi farmers could charge for their produce through the imposition of “food zones.” Articulating his grievance in this regard, the founding member of Dal Khalsa, Manmohan Singh Khalsa, remarked, “If we [Punjabis] make our own wheat, surely we should fix our own price? Why does the centre, the bania, fix our price? Who are they to tell us?”¹

However, there does appear to be a counterpoise to the view that over-centralisation contributed towards or even created the militant struggle. This view is that the Indian state had been heavily centralised almost since its inception and remains so. This prompts the question of why the secessionist movement, if its rise was indeed a reaction to over-centralisation, did not erupt earlier than it did. This is not a question that appears to have been posed, let alone dealt with, in the wider discourse. Nevertheless, with respect to the proponents of the over-centralisation thesis, there could be a number of reasons as to why their argument remains valid.

The first reason is that, up until 1964, India had been led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who acted as both a unifying and domineering figure. Hence, during his tenure, many ideological and political opponents were marginalised or at least temporarily offset. In other words, his existence merely delayed what was an otherwise inevitable reaction to the over-centralisation of power. The second reason is that, prior to 1966 (that is, before the creation of the Punjabi suba), the Bhakra Dam and the city of Chandigarh were a part of Punjab territory. However, after the reorganisation, the dam was brought under central rule and Chandigarh was made into a union territory (Leaf 1985: 488). Therefore, it could be argued that the centre’s jurisdiction actually increased vis-à-vis Punjab (Kohli 1998).

The third reason is that Punjab’s impressive economic growth in light of the green revolution made common Punjabis, especially those engaged in agriculture (who were incidentally mainly Sikh), increasingly conscious of the need to protect their state’s economic and natural resources (Kapur 1986: 223). This sparked grievances that Punjab was essentially a net contributor to a redistributionist economy or that its vital river waters were being unfairly diverted to neighbouring “non-riparian” states (Dhillon 1996: 124). Therefore, the “appropriacy” of the centre–state balance depends on the context at any given time rather than any hard and fast rules concerning the constitutional separation of powers between the different tiers of governance. The fourth reason in support of the over-centralisation thesis was the increasingly prevalent view among economic elites, aided through interaction with the Sikh diaspora in prosperous Western countries, that socialist-leaning/Keynesian-styled economic models (such as that practised in India) were an impediment to achieving sufficient economic growth. They maintained that the insistence on a large centre actually promoted inefficiency, red tape, and corruption. This led to increased Sikh dissatisfaction with the seemingly flawed Indian economic model.

While there is a strong case to say that increasing centralisation from New Delhi coincided with regionalist tendencies of the linguistic states such as Punjab and that resentment to this was a logical consequence, it does not necessarily follow that centralisation, or over-centralisation, was an inherently detrimental policy from the point of view of maintaining national unity. Acknowledgement of this opposing viewpoint has been virtually absent from the associated discourse. The failure to do so seems particularly odd when we consider that there are ample examples around the world from the latter years of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, to the modern-day examples of post-devolution Britain or post-invasion Iraq. In these cases, increasing regional autonomy for political entities below the level of the nation state does not necessarily abate secessionist demands nor is it conducive to the fostering of ­inter-ethnic peace. So, it is quite conceivable that over-centralisation was quite a sensible policy option for the Indian state to follow given its perceived vulnerabilities as an ethnically fragmented nation state, born out of a “partitioned-mentality” and intrinsically distrustful of political demands put forward by religious minorities.

Therefore, in sum, while it can be said that the over-centralisation thesis holds considerable explanatory power with respect to the rise of the Khalistan movement, this does not necessarily connote that it would have been in India’s national interest, either in the short or long term, to grant more regional autonomy to respective linguistic states.

Policies of Congress (I)

The second category of realpolitik explanations relate to what has been interpreted as the self-defeating policies and behaviour of Indira Gandhi and her confidantes within the Congress (I).² The basic cusp of such arguments is that soon after Indira Gandhi assumed control of the Indian National Congress in 1966, her tenures as Prime Minister (1966–77 and 1980–84) and as leader of the opposition (1977–80) were characterised by her near dictatorial traits. During her multiple tenures she displayed a marked intolerance towards the opposition within and even outside her own party.³ In this regard, Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) embarked upon a range of overt and covert methods for dealing with such dissent both of which, as claimed within the wider discourse, ultimately proved conducive to the growth of the Sikh secessionist struggle.

The first of the overt methods included initiating a growing “interlinked and interdependent” relationship between centre–state politics, whereby the autonomy of the latter virtually disappeared (Brass 1991: 172). Paul Brass (1991: 171) provides a fine example of this method.

In September 1970 … the [Bahujan Kisan Dal (BKD)] of Chaudhuri Charan Singh failed to deliver the three votes that Mrs Gandhi needed, and expected, to pass the Twentyfourth Constitutional Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha, abolishing the privy purses of the princes. In retaliation, the Congress, which had been in a coalition government with the BKD under Charan Singh in UP, withdrew from the UP government and brought it down.

While it is difficult to argue with Brass’s broader suggestion here, it would be naïve to assume that the interlinkage of centre–state politics was something exclusive to Indira Gandhi’s tenure. Indeed, practising a policy of non-interference could have actually been interpreted as an act of weakness, undermining her and her party’s position nationally.

The second overt method used to tackle dissent was the labelling of oppositionists as anti-national or foreign-inspired, a task aided by the Congress (I)’s superior access to the media (Leaf 1985: 493). While there is no doubt that many people appropriated the government’s line with little to no question, it must be borne in mind that the Congress (I) did not have
exclusive access to all information sources, nor the way in which people chose to interpret the official news that they were encountering. For example, many Sikhs, especially after Operation Blue Star, became increasingly suspicious of the government’s version of events. According to Nayar and Singh (1984: 17),

[c]ontrary to the government’s contention that due to the Army’s self-imposed restraint the Harimandir has escaped damage, I counted over two dozen fresh bullet marks in the marble walls and saw holes made by shrapnel that had pierced through metal covered windows and shattered glass panes protecting fresco paintings.

That certain Sikhs simply did not accept the official version of events during the period of militancy was apparent, with one local man recounting that, “we kept listening to Indian broadcasts but we knew everything we heard was false” (qtd in Mahmood 1996: 129).

Third, and closely linked to the previous point, was the tendency to resort to arresting and imprisoning political opponents. Indeed, Indira’s son Sanjay Gandhi became renowned for engaging in “threats, smears and organized violence” against those who dared to openly challenge Indira Gandhi (Chatterjee 1998: 102). It is difficult to view such behaviour in this regard as having anything but a net negative impact upon the Indian state’s ability to contain regional dissension.

The fourth overt method consisted of the liberal use of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution—namely President’s Rule—to bring down state governments. Indira Gandhi used President’s Rule over Punjab on six separate occasions between 1966 and 1984.⁴ Naturally, direct rule was interpreted by many as a denial of the Punjabis’, or in a post-suba context the Sikhs’, ability to administer their own affairs. A fair deal of resentment ensued, especially among those that were ousted from office as a result of this. However, by announcing President’s Rule, the centre arguably demonstrated its capacity to step in once the Punjab government had seemingly failed to maintain law and order in the state and, on that note, perhaps dissuade many Sikhs from thinking that Khalistan was a viable option for their community’s ills.

The fifth overt method deployed by the Congress (I) to deal with opposition was through the suspension of democracy in India during the infamous period of Emergency Rule between 1975 and 1977.⁵ Very much in line with the previous point, arguably the declaration of Emergency was a demonstration of Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I)’s power. Yet, as judged by her party’s consequent performance in the general elections that followed, many Indians are likely to have interpreted the Emergency as a desperate attempt by Indira Gandhi to cling on to power at all costs rather than an act performed for the higher purpose of upholding India’s national interest.

As far as the covert methods used to deal with opposition are concerned, the first was to encourage factionalism within the Akali Dal with a view to weakening them politically (Gill and Singhal 1984: 607; Malik 1985: 36). According to the then President of the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (DSGMC), Paramjit Singh Sarna,

[t]he Congress has long practised divide and rule, which is something they learnt from the Britishers and then carried it on when they came to power … It is their plan to divide the minority communities … to divide the Akalis … so they can come to power.⁶

Indeed, the Akali Dal, which had been factionalised since the early 1960s, has been rife with finger-pointing and paranoid suspicion between individuals and factions, each accusing the other of “being an agent of the centre” (Singh 1994: 93). Though there is a large degree of truth to this, factionalism within the Akali Dal—whether or not sponsored by national parties/organisations such as the Congress or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)—existed long before and has continued long after the period of the Khalistan movement. Therefore, the explanatory weight attached to this argument should be judged accordingly.

The second covert method used by the Congress (I) was to “prop up” Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale⁷ for the purpose of either further fragmenting the Akalis or denying the “rightful” political demands of the Sikhs on the grounds that they were tainted by association with extremists or secessionists (Fair 2005: 128; Rudra 2005: 3; Kapur 1986: 235). Indeed, Bhindranwale was quoted as saying, “It suits the government to publicize me as an extremist, thus making an excuse to frustrate the just cause and the legitimate demands of the entire Sikh community and the Punjab state” (qtd in Lalvani and Iyengar 1983: 4). Those who hold the view that Bhindranwale was essentially a “Congress creation” point to the fact that he campaigned for the party in the 1980 Lok Sabha elections and was allowed to roam free in spite of his provocative sermons (Grewal 2005: 317).

Even Bhindranwale himself, in the wake of being protected by Congress (I) over the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, is supposed to have said that “the government has done more for me in one week … than I could have achieved in years” (qtd in Grewal 2005: 317). Allegedly, Congress (I)’s, or more specifically Zail Singh’s, motive behind the protection of Bhindranwale in this instance was driven by the then home minister’s attempts to undermine the authority of his foe, Chief Minister Darbara Singh (Brass 1991: 179). On this point, there are grounds to suggest that Bhindranwale was built up by the Congress although how long he stayed a Congress affiliate is debatable. Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that Bhindranwale was a key figure during the Khalistan militancy both in life and in death.

In sum, there is enough evidence in the wider discourse to demonstrate that the realpolitiking of the Congress (I), in terms of their policies and behaviour, contributed towards the rise of the Khalistan movement. At the same time, it is also clear that the discourse has largely failed to appreciate or acknowledge the multifaceted nature of some of these approaches. That is, the opposite or softer approaches compared to the ones that were taken by the Congress (I) do not always appear to have offered a more taming effect on secessionist sentiments in Punjab.

Policies of the Shiromani Akali Dal

The third category of realpolitik explanations relate to the policies and behaviour of the factionalised Akali Dal, both when in and out of power in the Punjab legislative assembly. The first argument advanced in this regard is that since the Akali Dal failed to achieve political dominance in Punjab even after 1966,⁸ owing to many Sikhs not voting along communal lines, they felt compelled to communalise politics and “whip up religious and nationalist issues” in order to fracture the vote along Hindu–Sikh lines (Kohli 1998: 22). While there is considerable credence in Kohli’s (1998) argument, it must be borne in mind that even if, on occasion, certain Akali leaders have attempted to communalise politics for electoral gain, they did not have a free rein to do so since involvement in mainstream politics brings with it a range of constraints which serve to dilute the “ideological purity” of such religion-based parties (Basu 2001). For example, the Akalis have had to keep amicable relations with the “Hindu nationalist” Jan Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) when the latter happened to be coalition partners at the state and/or national level, and so have had to ensure their politics does not acquire an overtly anti-Hindu edge. Also, there is the distinct possibility that engaging in rhetoric deemed to be too provocative could trigger legal or criminal proceedings from the government or offended parties, a predicament which obviously most reputable politicians would want to steer clear of.

A second argument in support of the claim that the policies and behaviour of the Akali Dal were responsible for the rise of Sikh secessionism is that since the Akalis believe “in the inseparability of religion and politics” as per the miri-piri doctrine,⁹ there was an inevitable clash with the ideologically secular Indian nation state (Singh 1994: 88; Pettigrew 1987: 4). With regard to the miri-piri doctrine clashing with the “secular” ­Indian nation state, it is imperative that one acknowledges the difference between ideological veneer and empirical reality. This is not something that the discourse has managed to do successfully. For, it should not be forgotten that since independence the Akalis have merged with the Congress on two separate occasions, thereby effectively relinquishing their temporal aspect.

At the same time, the extent to which the Indian nation state can be described as secular is debatable given the inclusion of religion within its constitutional and legal systems (Smith 1963). In addition, it must be stressed that the “official” ideological position of a party does not necessarily determine the ideological position of its members. It is perfectly conceivable to have secular and broad-minded members of supposedly communal parties such as the Akalis or the BJP, just as it is conceivable to have religiously bigoted Congressmen. According to Sucha Singh Gill and K C Singhal, many past Congress leaders have held an RSS background, just as many prominent Sikh leaders of the Congress were previously a part of the Akali Dal and “some of them have been and some remain blatant communal Sikhs” (Gill and Singhal 1984: 607). Therefore, in reality, this apparent irreconcilable ideological clash between miri-piri on the one hand and secularism on the other is too simplistic, and it is most likely that such a difference matters little in day-to-day politics.

The third argument, in sync with the official New Delhi line, is that senior Akali representatives maintained an ambiguous position on the issue of Sikh separatism, thereby providing “a respectable cover for subversive and anti-national forces to operate in the secure knowledge that they could not be politically disowned” (White Paper 1984: 7). This has been explained as a direct consequence of Akali factionalism, whereby non-ruling factions would, rather opportunistically, engage in a more extremist or populist rhetoric so as to maintain visibility (Major 1987: 47).

Going slightly further, certain commentators have suggested, or at least implied, that certain Akalis provided material support to terrorist groups. For instance, many commentators claim that senior Akalis such as Jagdev Singh Talwandi and Sukhjinder Singh had palpable links to the militants and openly expressed slogans in favour of Khalistan (Major 1987: 47; Sahota and Sahota 1993: 149). Indicating direct Akali involvement in the militancy, one disgruntled former Ropar-based militant of the Babbar Khalsa, Amar Singh, accused the Akalis of

[giving] a ladder to a person and [asking] him to scale a wall. But once he is on top, they remove it. They were and are opportunists who are always in need of people like me who they can use for their personal gain. Once their purpose is solved, they turn their backs. (qtd in Singh 1996: 42)

Albeit not exactly an independent voice in the Punjab insurgency, the late director general of police in Punjab, K P S Gill (2001: 31), mentioning his objection to the centre’s decision to lift President’s Rule in Punjab in 1985, said:

I was convinced that there was no real difference between the fundamental thinking of the Akalis and the terrorists—and that the Akalis completely lacked the desire and the will to contain terrorism.

As far as senior Akalis holding an ambiguous position on Khalistan or even supporting militant groups is concerned, it is hard to disagree. Though how prevalent such Akali–militant relations happened to be, remains a matter of opinion. Still, it is fair to say that the behaviour of certain Akalis with respect to militants certainly aided in fuelling the militancy rather than abating it.

Overall, the policies and behaviour of the Akali Dal did indeed contribute towards the rise of the Khalistan movement. However, the associated discourse can be accused of being slightly crude in its reading of the Akali contribution towards the rise of militancy, especially with respect to the clash between miri-piri and secularism. Arguably, the strongest contribution in this category has to do with the ambiguous relationship between the Akalis and militant cells, which can be attributed to the factionalised nature of the party, with each aiming to outmanoeuvre the other in terms of their ideological purity and commitment to the “Sikh cause.”

Role of Pakistan

The fourth category of realpolitik explanations relates to those that implicate India’s antagonistic rival, Pakistan, in the rise of the Khalistan movement. In this argument, the rationale is that Pakistan wanted to weaken India either through overseeing its balkanisation and/or creating a “headache” for them to use as leverage against India’s alleged proxy support of secessionist elements within Pakistan (Prakash 2008: 579).

One of the main accusations levelled against Pakistan is that, under the auspices of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan allowed its territory along the Indian border to be used as a safe haven for Sikhs crossing over from India. The second accusation was that Sikhs crossing the border into Pakistan were actually indoctrinated (if they were not committed to the Khalistan cause already), trained and armed by the ISI for the purpose of re-entering Indian territory to conduct combat operations against the latter’s state forces (La Brack 1999: 381; Singh 1994: 92; Rudra 2005: 55). The second accusation is suggestive of a higher level of complicity from Pakistan’s end. The evidence of the above points appears to be fairly conclusive.

[a]lmost all the major terrorist leaders from Dr Sohan Singh, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal (heads of two separate Panthic Committees) to Sukhdev Singh Dossuwal and Wadhawa Singh of Babbar Khalsa, Atinder Pal Singh of AISSF (later to become MP from Patiala) and Gurjit Singh of Bhindranwale Jatha were in Pakistan … Thanks to a benevolent Pakistan government, very soon every major terrorist outfit—Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa International, AISSF, Akal Federation, Bhindranwale Tiger Force, etc—had its own training centre. (Narayanan 1996: 42)

Many pro-Khalistanis based in India publicly asked for material support from Pakistan in their quest for independence. This was taken by many to be further proof of Pakistan’s involvement in the movement, although these connections could have been circumstantial. For example, prominent Punjab-based Khalistani Sukhjinder Singh was quoted as saying, “any help offered by other countries, including Pakistan, in the struggle for “Khalistan” would be welcome” (qtd in Grewal 2006: 103).

Moreover, the proposed maps or territorial claims of Khalistan extending beyond the territory of Indian Punjab (Singh 1994: 110–11) habitually excluded areas under Pakistani jurisdiction, even though the latter is home to many culturally important sites to the Sikh community that would seem appropriate to be included within any future Khalistan state. According to Kanwarpal Singh, spokesperson of the Amritsar-based Dal Khalsa, when asked whether Khalistan should include the historically important Nankana Sahib (birthplace of Guru Nanak Dev) and Lahore (the seat of Maharajah Ranjit Singh’s empire), both currently in Pakistani Punjab territory, he remarked, “We can’t change what has happened in the past, it’s not practical to demand the inclusion of those areas outside the current state boundaries.”¹⁰

The final piece of circumstantial evidence in support of Pakistani involvement was that notable Khalistani figures in the diaspora regularly travelled to Pakistan and were treated with respect by the Pakistani rulers. For example, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, founder of the National Council of Khalistan, was referred to as the “Father of the Sikh Nation” by Yahya Khan during a trip to Pakistan in 1971. It is well known that US-based Khalistani Ganga Singh Dhillon visited Pakistan on many occasions and was a close friend of Gen Zia-ul Haq (Grewal 2006: 103–04; Sahota and Sahota 1993: 123).

As such, it is very difficult to argue against the view that Pakistan played a role in fuelling the Khalistan militancy. However, the extent and time span of Pakistan’s contribution is ambiguous. Other than certain Indian hawks or Congress officials who may dispute otherwise, it cannot be seriously considered that Pakistan or their contribution alone can explain the rise of the Khalistan militancy. Despite claims that “Chinese marked”¹¹ bullets were found in the Golden Temple after Operation Blue Star (White Paper 1984: 170), it is clear that it was predominantly internal factors that played the largest role in creating the disturbances during the early years of the movement at least. Pakistani involvement was more of an issue from 1985 onwards once President’s Rule had been lifted and the counter-insurgency operation was in full swing.

^{In Conclusion}

This article has identified and interrogated the strength of the realpolitik explanations that exist within the wider discourse surrounding the Khalistan movement. These explanations have spanned across four broad areas: the “over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi, the policies and behaviour of Congress (I), the policies and behaviour of the Akali Dal, and the role of Pakistan.

With respect to the “over-centralisation” thesis, it is evident that centralisation contributed towards, or at least was cited as a justification for, Sikh secessionism. However, the analysis in this section revealed that alternative points or approaches that the Indian state could have followed were not necessarily guaranteed to avert the risk of Khalistan. In terms of the policies and behaviour of the Congress (I), this is probably the most prominent of all the realpolitik explanations advanced in the wider discourse. This is hardly surprising given that it is the normative function of the centre to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation state. Given the context, many of the overt and covert methods used by the Congress (I) to quell dissent, although criticised by many in the wider discourse, appeared to be quite sensible or non-radical steps.

As far as the policies and behaviour of the Akalis are concerned, as with the section on the Congress (I), it is evident that they contributed to the rise of the militancy. This was owed more so to the factionalised nature of the party, which made competition for the Sikh vote particularly ferocious, with a general movement of non-ruling factions in particular towards more extreme positions, and which translated into direct or indirect support for secessionism. Yet, to solely blame the Akalis for the rise of the militancy would be unfair because it is clear that they were just one of the many elements involved, albeit they were quite an important element.

Finally, although Pakistan’s role is part of the wider discourse, it was probably the least prevalent issue. While it is clear that Pakistan had a role to play in the militancy, it ­became apparent only after the cataclysmic events of the ­mid-1980s, such as Operation Blue Star, the anti-Sikh ­pogroms, and the commencement of counter-insurgency operations across Punjab. Therefore, the rise of militancy prior to that period, albeit comparatively limited, had to be owed to other factors.

Update Youth sentenced to life: Feb., 13, 2019:

The Dal Khalsa Monday announced a dharna at the doorsteps of Nawanshahr district and sessions court on February 13, days after three Sikh youths were sentenced to life imprisonment for waging war against the state. Surjit Singh (27), Arvinder Singh (29) and Ranjit Singh (29) were held guilty based on books, literature, pamphlets that were recovered from them following their arrest in 2016. It was alleged that the youth had kept the literature to incite people to establish a separate state of Khalistan. The order of the court indicting the trio merely for possession of books related to Sikh struggle and other Khalistani literature is highly unjust, illegal and disturbing,” the party said in a statement. The decision has clearly violated principles of natural justice and fair play. “We will not remain silent spectators and we will take all legal and civil steps against this unjust judicial overreach,” he said.  “The three youth never indulged in any violent activity, neither did anyone else allegedly influenced by them. The court held the trio guilty on mere possession of pamphlets,” said Kanwarpal Singh, spokesperson, Dal Khalsa.  a case against Arvinder and the two others under IPC sections 121, 121-A (waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India) and section 10/13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. As per Arvinder’s family, he had been working in Doha since 2011 and had returned to Punjab in late 2015 to get married. After around five months of his marriage, he was arrested and charged with waging war against state. The family claimed he had in his possession some books written by former Lt General KS Brar, who led the Operation Blue Star in 1984, some posters carrying the word Khalistan and literature related to Sikh religion. Police had said that he was trying to enroll Sikh youths from Punjab to join him to wage war against the state.  Another youth, Surjit was a ‘Pathi’ (a clergy) before he was arrested by police. “Oh Path karda see te kadi kise jhagre vich ni pia, pata ni eh case kiddan aa giya ude te (He used to perform religious things and has never been involved in any anti-social activities. I don’t know his name got involved in this case),” said his father Tek Singh. Ranjit Singh was also a Pathi. “We have joint family and anyone can ask about our family’s reputation in the village. We don’t know how our son’s name cropped up in this case,” Ranjit’s father Kashmir Singh said.

Update : Mar.,12,2019:

 ...the narcotics control bureau mentioned a visiting official from a large European nation, who warned that the Khalistan movement was rearing its head again. He speculated that a "lost generation" in Punjab – lost partly to drugs, partly to shrinking job opportunities and reluctance to work on the family land – was susceptible to separatism because there was nothing to do and it provided them with purpose. The drug menace and allegations that state ministers were profiting off of Punjab's drug addiction epidemic peaked during the 2017 assembly election, and then seemed to die down again.

 Khalistan: Apr., 15, 2019: SFJ legal adviser Gurpatwant Singh Pannun claimed that authorities in Pakistan had stopped the group's activists from putting up posters and banners of the Khalistan referendum campaign at Gurdwara Panja Sahib in Hassan Abdal at the behest of the Narendra Modi government

Pakistan Foreign Policy: June, 7, 2019:There was news that Pakistan had banned peaceful rallies for Sikh democracy – aka the Khalistan movement. The same international Sikh grass roots activists that had rallied to Pakistan’s defence after Pulwama were prohibited from engaging in a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration whose essence was fraternal in spirit to Pakistan.

Khalistan update: July, 22, 2019:

India is politicizing the Kartarpur Corridor by its demand that Pakistan prevent nationalist Sikhs from sharing their pro-Khalistan sentiment with pilgrims along the route, which reveals just how scared it is of this national liberation movement and the potentially far-reaching domestic political consequences of its revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution if that 1973 manifesto ever enjoys a resurgence of popularity.

The Kartarpur Corridor

India media reported that their country’s officials recently complained to Pakistan about the pro-Khalistan activities that are supposedly taking place on its side of the border, demanding that their neighbor prevent them from occurring along the Kartarpur Corridor that the two are presently negotiating to open before the 550th birth anniversary of Baba Guru Nanak in November. The Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur sits just across the border in Pakistan from India’s majority-Sikh state of Punjab and is revered by this religion’s adherents as the site of their founder’s final resting place, hence why PM Khan prioritized the creation of this visa-free corridor immediately after he took office last August in advance of this hugely symbolic upcoming anniversary. India is very concerned, however, that its Sikh minority will be exposed to the separatist sentiments expressed by the Khalistani national liberation movement during their pilgrimages on Pakistani territory, and it’s deathly afraid that millions of this demographic could therefore feel emboldened to give this cause a fresh impetus once they return home and consequently pose a serious challenge to the state.

The Khalistan Movement

Relations between the Sikhs and the central government haven’t been good after former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the 1984 “Operation Blue Star” massive military assault on the Harmandir Sahib in response to leaders of the Khalistan movement seeking refuge there two years prior. Two of the Indian leader’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her by the end of the year as revenge for the bloodshed that she brought upon their people in one of their holiest sites, which briefly triggered anti-Sikh pogroms all across the country. Those events, more so than any others, inspired many Sikhs to support outright Khalistani separatism instead of the autonomous goals originally laid out in the revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. The far-reaching domestic political significance of that document will be returned to shortly in this analysis, but at this moment it’s enough to recognize that the Khalistani cause itself initially started out as a states-rights movement advocating constitutional reform and didn’t begin to popularly take on its contemporary separatist character until after “Operation Blue Star” forever ruined what little trust remained up until that point between the Sikhs and the central government.

Two Sets of Concerns

India officially downplays the support that the Khalistani cause has among the millions of Sikhs in its territory, but its politicized concerns that Pakistan won’t prevent pro-Khalistani activities from taking place along this route reveal just how scared it really is of this national liberation movement and strongly suggest that the members of its religious minority are much more sympathetic to that cause that New Delhi cares to publicly admit. From a military perspective, the “nightmare scenario” of a second rebellion along India’s sensitive western borderlands would complement the ongoing one in Kashmir and make it much more difficult for the country’s armed forces to confidently maintain a credible forward-operating posture against Pakistan if they’re forced to also confront the possibility of behind-the-lines attacks by Khalistani separatists in the event of another conventional conflict with their neighbor. While this factor certainly shouldn’t be underestimated, it’s more so the nationwide political strategic impact of the Khalistani cause as enshrined in the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution that India fears the most.

A Revolutionary Manifesto

That revolutionary manifesto is significant in this context because it advocates sweeping administrative-territorial reform on the basis of a fully federalized state whose newly created units would more accurately represent the country’s linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity than the imperfect framework implemented by the 1956 States Reorganization Act that relied mostly on the creation of large states around the linguistic majority of a given region. In pursuit of their State of Khalistan, activists sought to incorporate the Sikh areas of neighboring states into their proposed political entity, “thus bringing main contiguous Sikh population and Sikh habitats with this autonomous Sikh region as an integral part of the Union of India.” This “irredentist” vision mirrors that of the Nagas on the complete opposite side of the country who want all Naga-inhabited areas under the jurisdiction of what they call Nagalim, which recent reports from Northeastern India indicate might have been secretly agreed to by New Delhi as part of the mysterious 2015 framework agreement that it clinched with a rebel faction and whose details have yet to be revealed.

Eastern Concessions Might Trigger A Western Reaction

In the event that New Delhi concedes to the Nagas’ demand for Nagalim, even if only in the sense of establishing a pan-Naga cultural body in the Naga-inhabited areas of the neighboring states instead of formally revising regional borders and risking a geopolitical explosion in the “Indian Balkans“, then it would automatically trigger a reaction in Khalistan. The authorities are evidently trying to prevent that scenario from transpiring by doing their utmost to pressure Pakistan to ensure that India’s Sikh pilgrims aren’t exposed to pro-Khalistan sentiment while traveling along the Kartarpur Corridor, but the proverbially cat has been out of the bag for three and a half decades already since “Operation Blue Star” heralded the point of no return in the Sikhs’ relations with the central government. That doesn’t necessarily mean that all supporters of the Khalistani national liberation movement are in favor of separatism, but just that the basis of their cause as elaborated in the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution could predictably enjoy a resurgence of popular support if New Delhi gives the Nagas some form of Nagalim, which could also inspire other minorities in the country to rise up as well.

Another Issue of Global Renown?

This strategic risk assessment isn’t just speculation but is backed up by none other than the Indian Defence Ministry’s latest report about the global success that Pakistan has had over the past year under PM Khan’s leadership in raising awareness about the Kashmiri cause. It’s therefore not inconceivable that the Khalistani one could soon enjoy similar success as a result of the emerging relationship between Nagalim and the Kartarpur Corridor, which would naturally also bring worldwide attention to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s federalist vision of administrative-territorial reform. The Indian government has been doing everything in its power to keep its many minorities in the dark about that political proposal because it’s afraid that this suggested power-sharing arrangement would eventually encourage outright separatism if it ever came to pass, to say nothing of weakening the current Hindutva authorities’ influence over states outside of the their traditional bastion of support in the “Hindi/Cow Belt”, but New Delhi wouldn’t be able to maintain its policy of censorship if that manifesto achieved as much global renown as the Kashmiri cause.

An Alternative Model for Shaping India’s Future

There’s no way that India could stop its many minorities from becoming aware of this decentralized and more democratic alternative to the country’s current centralized fascism if the Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s political vision went viral on social media as a result of a new worldwide awareness campaign modeled off of the successful Kashmiri one. This could be especially impactful in the domestic political sense if it occurs ahead of what seems poised to be the country’s large-scale social disruption in the next decade caused by its looming agricultural crisis, during which time identity conflicts might predictably explode given the socio-political and economic dynamics typically associated with transformational scenarios of that sort. The current authorities are already doing all they can to snuff out secular and minority-led political forces in the country as part of their quest to create the Hindu Rashtra of Akhand Bharatby that time, but these two main obstacles to their goal could present a much more serious challenge if they merged and presented a forward-looking alternative vision inspired by the decentralized and democratic principles enshrined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

Concluding Thoughts

In view of everything that’s been touched upon in this analysis, India’s fear of Khalistan stems more from the domestic political consequences that the widespread popularization of this national liberation movement’s revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution could have than the military implications pertaining to the possible creation of an independent state. There are many more sympathizers of the Khalistani cause in the Indian state of Punjab than New Delhi will admit, which is why it’s so concerned that the possible pilgrimage of millions of this region’s majority-Sikh inhabitants to Pakistan via the Kartarpur Corridor will expose this strategically located minority to separatist sentiment that will in turn embolden them to give a fresh impetus to the cause upon their return home. New Delhi’s reported concessions regarding Nagalim could trigger a Khalistani reaction if/when they’re made public, which might realistically help that latter cause receive as much global renown as the neighboring Kashmiri one. In that scenario, the resurgence in popularity that its 1973 manifesto might have could finally give secular and minority-led forces an alternative vision for challenging the state’s Hindutva one.

Agenda for Khalistan supporters: July, 22,, 2019: The Khalistan national liberation movement should emphasize the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s decentralizing and democratic principles in order to become the core of a new nationwide opposition movement that inspires India’s diverse population to unite in challenging the centralizing and fascist tendencies of the country’s current Hindutva rulers.

The Roots Of India’s Fear

India’s Hindutva rulers are deathly afraid of the Khalistan national liberation movement, though not so much for the separatism that it supports but because of the decentralizing and democratic principles enshrined in its 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution. That revolutionary document could enable the movement to become the core of a nationwide opposition movement to the BJP’s vision of creating a Hindu Rashtra, but only if the country’s diverse population becomes aware of it in the first place. New Delhi has been doing all that it can over the decades to suppress any serious discussion about the constitutional reforms contained in that manifesto, which is why the Khalistan movement should prioritize spreading its details far and wide in order to counter the state’s de-facto censorship of their proposals.

Making The Best Of Bad Developments

India is already extremely worried about the political consequences of the Kashmiri national liberation movement‘s recent successes in raising awareness about their cause, so the Khalistani one would do well to emulate its informational tactics in order to achieve a similar level of global renown. The Sikhs For Justice’s Referendum 2020 plans to hold a vote on Punjab’s independence are a step in the right direction, and the India’s recent banning of this peaceful group could be taken advantage of to bring even more attention to their goals, as could Twitter’s scandalous suspension of the account held by the organization’s lawyer at New Delhi’s demand. The contemporary zeitgeist is such that people all across the world are suspicious of states banning peaceful groups and Big Tech companies shutting down activist accounts, so that all works in Khalistan’s favor.

The movement should capitalize on both of these developments by reaching out to other peaceful organizations within India and abroad that have been banned by their countries and/or Big Tech companies for political reasons. This strategy could allow the Sikhs For Justice to expand their network of supporters and possibly even gain access to other media platforms, which would further the goal of popularizing the decentralizing and democratic principles articulated in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The international community would become more sympathetic to the Khalistan cause if they were made aware of its political foundations, while a new Indian opposition movement could coalesce around its revolutionary vision and ultimately pose the greatest challenge to the country’s Hindutva rulers.

Dismantling The Bollywood Myth About India

It’s that latter development that could change India forever if it succeeds, but there would have to be additional informational components to this strategy in order to make it more viable, especially in the realm of international public opinion. It’s not enough for the average person to know what the Khalistan national liberation movement is, but for influential ones (especially in social media and NGOs) and foreign government officials to be aware of it too. Once people hear about it, they should also be informed of India’s 1984 “Operation Blue Star” against the Harmandir Sahib, one of Sikhism holiest places. Speaking of which, many people don’t even know that Sikhism is its own separate religion and wrongly think that it’s a sect of Hinduism, so that misperception should be corrected whenever possible.

That’s very important since Khalistan’s case would engender more international sympathy — and consequently, pressure on the Indian government — if people learned that New Delhi doesn’t even recognize the religion’s separate standing which is one of its adherents’ many grievances against the Indian government. The other more obvious one is “Operation Blue Star”, the legacy of which continues to poison the Sikhs’ relations with the state and explains why the decision was made to pursue separatism as opposed to the federal principles originally proposed in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. It also powerfully contradicts the notion that India is a peace-loving country that wouldn’t dare kill its own people like other ones with much worse international reputations have done before on a similar scale to near-unanimous global condemnation each time.

Closing Down The “Prison Of Nations”

Dismantling the Bollywood myth about India reveals that the contemporary civilization-state is actually a “prison of nations” like the USSR was once described, though one in which its many linguistic, ethnic, religious, and regional minorities are regularly oppressed without barely anyone abroad uttering a word of support on their behalf. While the Kashmiri struggle is the most well-known one in India today, the state has succeeded in discrediting it to a certain extent because of the militant tactics that some of its members have resorted to out of desperation, but the Sikhs For Justice’s purely peaceful approach to Referendum 2020 means that it’s not at risk of having its international reputation tarnished on that basis. That said, the organization would do well to raise the concern that India might be planning a brutal crackdown against it in the coming future.

Referendum 2020 will still happen in spite of India banning the group, but the state could exploit its “unlawful” designation as a pretext for using force against it in order to stop the vote. Depending on how much the Sikh majority of Punjab publicly expresses its support for this plebiscite in the run-up to the event, the authorities might declare part or all of the region a “disturbed area” in line with the controversial 1958 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) that’s been abused for over half a century to carry out crimes against targeted populations all across the country that include arbitrary arrests and even extrajudicial executions. The Sikhs For Justice should warn the world about this dangerous scenario ahead of time in the hopes that foreign pressure could be put upon India to eschew this course of action.

Fleshing Out The Future Vision Of Federalism

Unlike the Kashmiris, many Sikhs live in the influential Western countries of the US, UK, and Canada, where they’re sometimes prominent members of their communities who command a lot of respect. This preconditions the citizens of those countries to having sympathy for the Khalistani cause, which could be furthered by those individuals using local, regional, and national media to advance the aforementioned informational strategy. What’s most important is to bring this issue to a high level of discourse that succeeds in breaking through the Indian state’s censorship about it within the country, thereby inspiring all Hindutva opponents — and especially minority groups with similar ambitions as Khalistan’s and/or who would benefit the most from decentralization — to unite in presenting an alternative national vision based on the 1973 manifesto.

The proposals for decentralization and democracy shouldn’t just be kept at the level of slogans, however, but should be elaborated upon in a detailed fashion for their intended domestic audience and interested members of the international one who want to know more about what exactly it entails. It might be helpful to learn from the Kurds’ system of  “democratic confederalism” that they adapted from the late anarchist thinker Murray Bookchin’s theories about “Communalism” since their vision broadly aligns with the one expressed in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. That could add some substance to how they envision the New India functioning if the opposition movement that they might inspire ever ends up coming to power, as well as importantly give voters a sense of exactly how different it would be than the current centralized and fascist status quo.

Concluding Thoughts

All in all, the Khalistan movement must appreciate the importance of perception management and media messaging in spreading awareness of its goals across India and the rest of the world. Conceiving of itself as the core of a new nationwide opposition to Hindutva based on the decentralizing and democratic principles of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution would imbue the government’s many opponents with a much-needed sense of vision to fill the void left by Congress’ lack thereof, which could therefore transform the rest of rump India for the better in the event of Khalistan’s eventual secession. Even prior to the scenario of its national liberation campaign succeeding, the Sikhs can still play a leading role in national affairs by following this strategy. 

August 15 as Black day: Aug., 13, 2109: Extending their solidarity with Kashmiri people and their cause, radical Sikh organization Dal Khalsa besides SAD (Amritsar), United Akali Dal and Sikh Youth of Punjab have decided to observe August 15 as Black Day. Kanwar Pal Singh of Dal Khalsa said that they will stage protests on Independence Day against the atrocities, political subjugation and denial of rights to Sikhs in the last seven decades. Their activists will hold a two-hour demonstration at 15 district headquarters. He fired a salvo against Shiromani Akali Dal for supporting NDA Government to strip J&K of its special status. Referring to PM Modi’s address in which he said article 370 and 35-A paved way to secessionism in Kashmir, Singh reminded that Modi’s one-time mentor and BJP stalwart L K Advani has dubbed the Anandpur Sahib resolution as secessionist document in his book “My country, My life”. He slammed BJP leaders including Haryana chief minister for using derogatory words against Kashmiri women.

Blue Star: Jun., 10, 2020: Eight-day long Operation Blue Star (OBS) still haunts the Sikh community although 36 years have passed. For those who lived through Operation Blue Star (OBS), the situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir today brings back vivid memories of what they went through in 1984. OBS was an official beginning of a systematic purge of the Sikhs community in India. Over 100,000 Sikhs (mostly youth) were killed in the next four years (till 1988) while over 25,000 victims were left crippled for the whole of their lives. Over 20,000 Sikh families migrated out of India (mostly in Canada, United States, United Kingdom) after this event as they felt India does not own them and they were alien in their land people in Amritsar could not have imagined in their wildest dreams in mid-May .1984 that their beloved Golden Temple would be fired upon by their own Army.The OBS assault started on June 1, 1984, and continued till the night of June 8. Indian government came out a cooked, fictional, concocted and fabricated ‘White Paper’ on Operation Blue Star, but no one believed it. Then as now, the official version projected the government’s decision as absolutely justified, given the fact that militant leader JS Bhindranwale had dug in his heels inside the Golden Temple with his heavily armed followers. Then as now, came the whitewash of the terrible fallout. Desperate to restore the Akal Takht, reduced to rubble by tank fire, the Centre ultimately found a little-known Nihang to undertake ‘kar seva’, the voluntary labour with which Sikhs build their gurdwaras. “Stories coming out from Punjab (Indian Punjab) of Army excesses resulted in anarchy within the Indian Army and Punjab Police. As many as 2,800 Sikh soldiers deserting their regiments. Three officers were shot by deserters; one, Brig SC Puri, died. Many deserters were jailed, court-martialed, and dismissed. The 9th battalion of the Sikh Regiment, the first to react, was never raised again,” said Jyoti Punwani in her article published on August 2, 2019, in New Indian Express under the .One of the most important events related to OBS is the “Mutiny of 9th battalion of the Sikh Regiment” that started from Bihar and spread as far as Rajasthan and over 2600 Sikh soldiers were killed by Indian Police and Army after this mutiny and their bodies were not handed over to their relatives. One serving Brigadier Brig Puri was shot dead at brigade headquarters in Ramgarh in Bihar by Sikh soldiers. Sikh Soldiers were under constant surveillance in the Indian Air Force, Army, and Indian Navy for years to come after this incident. Operation Blue Star was planned by RAW to purge the rising demand of the Khalistan movement. It was planned well before it started to purge the rising demand of the Khalistan movement. The Khalistan movement was a politico-religious Sikh nationalist movement which aimed at creating an independent state for Sikhs inside the current North-Western Republic of India. Even though the Khalistan movement started in the early 1940s and 1950s, it gained popularity in 1970s when former East Pakistan became “Bangladesh”. Sikhs understood that India helped Bangalis to form their separate country on the bases of language, culture, ethnicity then why Sikh should not get their own separate country on the same basis  Her murder was instantly followed by Anti-Sikh riots spread all over India, killing more than 8,000 Sikhs in New Delhi alone in four days, and an estimated 20,000 or more Sikhs were killed in 40 cities across India. At least 50,000 Sikh families were displaced and their belongings, homes, shops, transport, offices, and businesses were looted and burnt down. Like recent Anti-Muslim Delhi Riots which took place in February 2020, Hindus attacked Sikhs with iron rods, knives, clubs, and combustible material (including kerosene and petrol). They entered Sikh neighbourhoods, killing Sikhs indiscriminately and destroying shops and houses.Armed mobs stopped buses and trains in and near Delhi, pulling off Sikh passengers for lynching; some were burnt alive. Others were dragged from their homes and hacked to death, and Sikh women were reportedly gang-raped and acid was thrown on them. Anti-Sikhs Riots continued for four days (like recent Anti-Muslims riots in Delhi) with the complete support of Police and paramilitary forces all over India. The next two years for Sikh community were very punitive and their economic survival was at stake. Hindu community did not forgive them and caused all kinds of social and economic boycotts of the Sikh community. The first Operation Black Thunder took place on April 30, 1986, and was carried out by Black Cat commandos of National Security Guards (NSG) to remove Sikh militants from the Golden Temple. Second Operation Black Thunder began on May 9, 1988, and both operations cost disappearance of over 7,000 young Sikhs and killing of over 3,500 undocumented youth from Indian Punjab. Indian Army used tanks, artillery, helicopters, and armored vehicles in this Operation. Retired Sikh bureaucrats claimed that Intelligence Units working in universities all over India were keeping eyes on Sikh students almost two years before Operation Blue Star and their (students) data had been compiled with details. Indian Army simultaneously attacked over 45 gurdwaras in Punjab and did massacre all over Punjab which was not confined only to Amritsar. Over 50,000 Sikhs were killed within the first three weeks of Operation and businesses and shops belonging to Sikhs were looted by Indian Army and Hindu mobs. Thousands of Sikh girls and women were raped by soldiers of the Indian Army and Hindu Policemen who were sent from Delhi. It is pertinent to mention that pro-Hindu leaders including LK Advani, Vajpayee demanded Army action against Sikhs in 1984 and led the anti-Sikh Movement. Economic cost and social deprivation faced by Sikh Community after OBS, Anti Sikh Riots, and Operation Black Thunder (Part I and II) are still undocumented and need detailed research work. https://dnd.com.pk/from-operation-blue-star-to-operation-black-thunder/190989

India began its nation-building project, bringing the immense challenge of forging a common identity among large and religiously, linguistically, and culturally diverse populations. What a majority of the total population shared, though, was a Hindu identity, and this religion became the center around which political leaders decided to coalesce Indian national identity, much to the dismay of India’s minority populations.

Indian leadership came to see religious minorities as a threat to their nation-building project, viewing Sikhs with particular suspicion and disdain, recognizing they catalyzed anti-colonial efforts and played a leading role in them. They were also aware that Sikhs still had recent memories of political autonomy in Punjab. Indian elites worried about Punjab becoming a majority Sikh state that would gain in political power and threaten the stability of young India. This led Indian leadership to deny Punjab and its Sikhs consequential rights that were afforded to other states, including official language status for Punjabi and its own state capital. India also weakened Punjab’s political power by carving out territory from it for other states, such as Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, contravening riparian law, an international norm, India diverted Punjab’s river waters to other states and regions, a massive economic blow to the state long-known as the breadbasket of India, and a threat to the livelihood of Punjab’s agrarian society.  

Punjabi Sikhs soon began agitating against the Indian government, protesting the erosion of its cultural, economic, and political rights. In 1978, Sikh leadership drafted the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which laid out a list of demands to safeguard the rights of Sikhs in Punjab and other minorities around India.

A charismatic Sikh leader from a religious seminary emerged during this period, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, whose ascent caught the eye of the Indian government. Bhindranwale spoke adamantly against the infringements of the Indian state, which by this stage had escalated to include gross human rights violations. He called on Sikhs and minorities everywhere to stand up against oppression. Citing him as an anti-national who threatened India’s stability, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi launched a military assault  against him and his followers at the Golden Temple of Amritsar—the most significant site for Sikhs—on a major religious holiday. Bhindranwale was killed in the assault, along with thousands of other Sikh pilgrims who were worshipping there.

The global Sikh community was furious about the government’s attack and demanded justice. In this moment, the movement for a separate Sikh homeland was reborn. Bhindranwale had stated openly that he neither supported nor rejected the idea of Khalistan – but that if the Indian government ever invaded the Golden Temple complex, the foundation for an independent Sikh homeland would be laid.

Later that year, Ms. Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, presumably to avenge her assault on the Golden Temple. In the days that followed, the ruling Congress Party, utilizing state agencies and infrastructure, organized violent anti-Sikh pogroms across North India, focused primarily on the Indian capital of New Delhi. The pogroms left thousands of Sikhs dead, thousands more displaced, and all Sikhs wondering if they could ever have a home in India.

Bhindranwale’s prediction came true. The anti-Sikh violence of 1984 made many Sikhs feel like the pattern of abuses under Indian leadership would not end, and it fueled a new movement for Sikh self-determination. In July of 1984, Sikhs gathered in Madison Garden in New York City and announced their commitment “to support the struggle of Sikhs in the Punjab for self-determination and the preservation of their distinct and religious identity.” Less than two years later, thousands of Sikhs gathered at the Golden Temple in their political tradition of Sarbat Khalsa and announced a resolution to recognize Khalistan.

From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Punjab was enmeshed in a violent struggle. A segment of the Sikh population took up armed resistance, with the aim of winning an independent Sikh state, free from the tyranny of India. This period of insurgency is often what westerners mean when they are referring to the Khalistan Movement.

While India accused militants of targeting politicians and civilians, Indian security forces employed widespread and systematic abuses for over a decade, including torture, murder, and enforced disappearances, targeting anyone it suspected of being involved in the insurgency or political movement for self-determination. In the years since, human rights defenders and researchers have uncovered the extent of India’s atrocity crimes. In 1995, human rights defender Jaswant Singh Khalra released official records demonstrating Punjab Police had abducted, killed and secretly cremated thousands of Punjabi Sikhs. Punjab Police subsequently abducted, tortured, and killed Khalra for refusing to retract his findings. In 2017, new evidence demonstrated more than 8,000 additional extra-judicial killings, bringing total estimates to 25,000. 

Although the violent conflict subsided by the mid-1990s, the culture of impunity for gross human rights violations and extra-judicial violence continues to grip Punjab. None of the chief architects of the crimes against humanity have been brought to account, nor have survivors and their communities been given reparations. Moreover, the government continues to use the specter of terrorism to target its critics, and the central issue of the denuding of Punjab’s river waters serves as a continuing flashpoint.  

This tension was evident over the last couple of years, when India attacked Sikhs during the 2022 Farmers Protests by calling the protestors “Khalistanis and “Anti-nationals.” The accusations fell on deaf ears, with global recognition that Sikhs and others were organizing to protect their agrarian livelihoods. The government used these same tactics this past spring during their manhunt for Sikh leader Amritpal Singh—again, using the threat of national security to violate human rights, targeting journalists and community organizers in dragnet operations. Sikhs have become desensitized to these spurious accusations, well accustomed to the cynical nationalist playbook: demonize minorities to galvanize the Hindu majority. That this strategy is being deployed in the midst of an election year is no coincidence. Modi and his BJP regime have used this program diligently for two decades.

And yet, the Indian government’s alleged attempts to kill foreign nationals on foreign soil indicate a shifting approach. Modi’s India is now willing to engage transnational repression and murder of his critics, joining the ranks of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia with these practices.

As India continues its slide from democracy to authoritarianism, Sikhs in India and around the world have been reminded that this devolution is not just Modi’s India. It is India as they have always experienced it. The latest assassination attempt in New York City and the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar on Canadian soil fall into a long history of abuses, underscoring why Sikhs do not feel secure and vindicating their long-held belief that India poses the greatest threat to its own national security.