Khalistan
Introduction
In 1971, the first explicit call for Khalistan was
made in an advertisement published in the New York Times by an expat
Jagjit Singh Chohan. With financial and political support of the
Sikh diaspora the movement flourished in the Indian state of
Punjab, which has a Sikh-majority population and
reached its zenith in the late 1970s and 1980s when the secessionist movement
caused large scale violence among the local population including assassination
of PM Indira
Gandhi and bombing of Air India plane killing
328 passengers Various pro-Khalistan
outfits have been involved in a separatist movement against the Government of India ever
since. In the 1990s the insurgency petered out, and the movement
failed to reach its objective due to multiple reasons including a heavy police
crackdown on separatists, divisions among the Sikhs and loss of support from
the Sikh population.
Causes
With the rise of Sikh Nationalism in British
India, the idea of a separate Sikh state first came up in early 20th Century.
As a result of the British policy of Divide
and rule many religious nationalist movement emerged among the Hindus, Muslims
and the Sikhs. The process involved differentiating the religions and creating
communal boundaries.
According to evidence by Harjot
Oberoi, the belief that Punjab is the "homeland" of the Sikh
community is a recent formulation. Despite the Sikh historical linkages with
Punjab, territory was never a major element of sikh self definition. The
attachment of Punjab with Sikhism was recent and made in 1940s. Historically
Sikhism was
pan-Indian, with the main Sikh scriptures Guru
Granth Sahib drawing from works of saints in North as well as
South India, and the several of its major seats (such as Nankana
Sahib in Pakistan, Panj Takhts Takht Sri Patna Sahib in
Bihar, Hazur Sahib Nanded in
Maharashtra) outside of Punjab. Before its conquest by the British, the region
around Punjab had been ruled by the confederacy of Sikh Misls founded
by Banda Bahadur ruled over the entire
Punjab from 1767 to 1799,until their confederacy was unified into the Sikh
Empire by Maharajah Ranjit Singh from
1799 to 1849 CE. The Sikhs have traditionally been concentrated in Punjab
region of undivided India although not in a majority.
Before the partition of India in 1947,
Sikhs were not in majority in any of the districts of pre-partition British Punjab Province other
than Ludhiana.The
districts in the region had a majority of either the Hindus or Muslims
depending on its location in the British province. Among the three major
religions (Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism), Sikhs formed the largest group
(41.6%) only in the Ludhiana district.When the Muslims proposed the creation of
an Islamic-majority Pakistan, many Sikhs staunchly opposed the concept.
In late 1930s and 1940s the Sikh leaders realized
that Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India are imminent. To make a case for a
separate Sikh state within the Punjab, Sikh leaders started mobilizing
meta-commentaries and signs to argue that Punjab belonged to Sikhs and Sikhs
belong to Punjab. The Muslim League's Lahore
Resolution demanded a separate country for Muslims. A section
of Sikh leaders grew concerned that their community would be left without any
homeland following the partition of India between
the Hindus and the Muslims. They put forward the idea of Sikhistan, envisaging
it as a theocratic state covering a small part of the greater Punjab
region. The country which he proposed would include parts of present-day Indian
Punjab, Pakistani Punjab (including Lahore), and
the Simla Hill States. It was imagined
as a theocratic state
led by the Maharaja of Patiala with the
aid of a cabinet consisting of the representatives of other units.The idea was
unviable due to lack of sufficient sikh population as compared to other
religions in Punjab.
According to Oberoi, the territorialization of the
Sikh community was formalized when Sikh political party Akali Dal in March
1946, passed a resolution proclaiming the natural association of Punjab and
Sikh religious community.
The British India was partitioned on a religious
basis in 1947 and Punjab province was divided between India and newly created
Pakistan. A majority of the Sikhs along with the Hindus migrated from the
Pakistani province of Punjab to the
Indian province of Punjab, which then included present-day Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh. The Sikh population that, in 1941, was as high as 19.8% in some
districts of Pakistan, dropped to 0.1% in all of them, and it rose sharply in
the districts assigned to India. They were still a minority in the Punjab province
of India, which remained a Hindu-majority province. Despite the first mentions
of the movement in early 20th century, Khalistan separatist movement was never
a major issue until the late 1970s and 1980s when it began to militarize.
Betrayal of the Sikhs
In 1929, the All India National Congress met
at the banks of the River Ravi Amravati and Sihk representatives and fixed Complete Independence as its
political goal. On the previous day, the
Sikhs had taken out a five hundred thousand strong procession with veteran Baba
Kharak Singh leading it on elephant back, from under the walls of the ancient
fort of Lahore, which was described in THE TIMES, of London, as "a most impressive
spectacle of human congregation that put the Congress show into shame and
shade." It was on this occasion that Mahatma
Gandhi, Pandit Moti Lal Nehru, and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, went to meet Baba
Kharak Singh, at his place on Chauburji Road, and gave the Sikhs a solemn
assurance that after India achieves political freedom no Constitution shall be
framed by the majority community unless it is freely acceptable to the Sikhs.
This promise was then reduced into a formal Policy Resolution of the All India
Congress Committee.
Afterwards, this Policy Resolution was repeatedly
reiterated, officially and semi-officially, throughout the period up to August
1947, and it was not officially repudiated till 1950 when the present
Constitution was framed. The trusting Sikhs, who in their Daily Prayer, extol
keeping faith as the noblest of human virtues, placing complete reliance in
this solemn undertaking given to them by the majority community, resisted and
refused all offers and proposals made to them by the British and the other
people whom we now prefer to call, the Muslim League proposing to accord the
Sikhs a sovereign or autonomous status in the areas constituting their
ancestral homeland between the River Ghaggar and the River Chenab. .
The second link is that in the year
1932, at the time of the Second Round Table Conference, the British Government,
through Sardar-Bahadur Shivdev Singh, then a member of the Indian Secretary of
State's Council, made an informal proposal to the Sikhs that if they dissociate
finally with the Congress movement, they would be given such a decisive
political weight-age in the Punjab, as would lead to their emerging as a third
independent element in India after the British transfer Power to the
inhabitants of this subcontinent.
Master Tara Singh promptly rejected this
tempting offer. The third link is this: In the month of July, 1946, the All
India Congress Working Committee met at Calcutta, which reaffirmed the
assurances already given to the Sikhs, and in his Press Conference held on the
6th July, there, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru spelt out the concrete content of this
solemn undertaking in the following flowery words:
"The brave Sikhs of the Punjab are
entitled to special consideration. I see nothing wrong in an area and a set-up in
the North wherein the Sikhs can also experience the glow of freedom"
In these words, an autonomous State to
the Sikhs, within India, was promised. Fourthly, in the early Winter of 1946,
the Cabinet Mission, while at Delhi, communicated to the Sikhs through the late
Sardar Baldev Singh that if the Sikhs are determined not to part company with
Hindu India, the British Parliament, in their solicitude for the Sikh people,
was prepared to so frame the Independence Act of India, so that in respect of
the Sikh home-land, wherever these areas might eventually go, in Pakistan or
India, no Constitution shall be framed such as does not have the concurrence of
the Sikhs. But Sardar Baldev Singh, in consultation with the Congress leaders,
summarily rejected this offer which went even beyond the assurances given by
the majority community, in 1929 and in 1946 by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in
Calcutta. Fifthly, in April 1947, Mr. Jinnah, in consultation with certain most
powerful leaders of the British Cabinet in London, offered to the Sikhs, first
through Master Tara Singh and then through the Maharaja of Patiala, a sovereign
Sikh State comprising areas lying in the west of Panipat and east of the left
bank of the Ravi river on the understanding that this State then confederates
with Pakistan on very advantageous terms to the Sikhs and Master Tara Singh
summarily rejected this attractive offer. The Maharaja of Patiala declined to
accept it in consultation with Sardar Patel and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.
Sixthly, on the 9th December, 1946, when the first meeting of the Constituent
Assembly was held under the Chairmanship of Babu Rajendra Prasad, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru moved the first and
the fundamental Resolution in which it was said: "Adequate safeguards
would be provided for minorities... It was a declaration, a pledge and an
undertaking before the world, a contract with millions of Indians, and,
therefore, in the nature of an oath*, which we must keep." To take
recourse to a solemn oath, to inspire confidence that might be betrayed when
convenient, is quite in the political tradition of the Indian National
Congress. On 16th March, 1931, Mahatma Gandhi came to a special Sikh
congregation held in Gurdwara Sisganj, Delhi, where he was asked as to what
guarantee there was that his Indian National Congress would implement the
assurances, given to the Sikh people in 1929, at Lahore. His reply is published
in his Young India, of the 19th March, 1931, and it contains the following:
"Sardar Madhusudan Singh has asked for an assurance that the Congress
would do nothing that might alienate sympathies of the Sikhs from the Congress.
Well, the Congress, in its Lahore Session, passed a Resolution that it would
not enter into or be a party to any settlement with regard to the minority
question that failed to satisfy any of the minorities concerned. What further
assurances the Congress can give to the Sikhs, I fail to understand. I ask you
to accept my word and the Resolution of the Congress that it will not betray a
single individual much less a community. If it ever thinks of doing so, it will
only hasten its own doomŠ. I pray you, therefore, to unbosom yourselves of all
your doubts... What more shall I say? What more can I say than this. Let God be
the witness of the bond that binds me and the Congress with you".When
further asked as to what may the Sikhs do in case of betrayal he said, the Sikhs could, in that case, take their
kirpans in hand with perfect justification before God and man.
Seventhly, in the month of May, 1947,
precisely on the 17th May, Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Nawab
Liaqat Ali Khan and Sardar Beldev Singh, flew to London on the invitation of
the British Cabinet, in search of final solution of the Indian communal
problem. When the Congress and the Muslim League failed to strike any mutual
understanding and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru decided to return to India, the
British Cabinet leaders conveyed to Sardar Baldev Singh that, if he stays
behind, arrangements might be made: "So as to enable the Sikhs to have political
feet of their own on which they may walk into the current of World
History."
Sardar Baldev Singh promptly divulged
the contents of this confidential offer to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and in
compliance with the latter¹s wishes, declined to stay back and flew back to
India after giving the following brave message to the Press: "The Sikhs
have no demands to make on the British except the demand that they should quit
India. Whatever political rights and aspirations the Sikhs have, they shall
have them satisfied through the goodwill of the Congress and the majority
community." Eighthly, and lastly, in the month of July, 1947 the Hindu and
Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly met at Delhi to pass a
unanimous Resolution favoring partition of the country, in which Resolution
occur the following words: "In
the divided Indian Punjab, special constitutional measures are imperative to
meet just aspirations and rights of the Sikhs." It is these very
Hindus of the Punjab, who, with the ready aid of the Government of India
leaders, even when their understanding was not qualified to keep pace with the
wishes of the heart, adopted every conceivable posture and shrank from no
stratagem to keep Sikhs permanently under their political heel, first, by
refusing to form a Punjabi-speaking State in which the Sikhs might acquire
political effectiveness, and second, by falsely declaring that Panjabi was not
their mother tongue. The Bill before the House is a calculatedly forged link in
the chain, the story of which I have just narrated. When in 1950, the present
Constitution Act of India was enacted, the accredited representatives of the
Sikhs the Shiromani Akali Dal declared vehemently and unambiguously in the
Constituent Assembly that: "The Sikhs do not accept this Constitution: the
Sikhs reject this Constitution Act"
AIkh spokesmen declined to append their
signatures to the Constitution Act as a token of this clear and irrevocable
rejection. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru replied to Master Tara
Singh in 1954, when the latter reminded him of the solemn undertaking
previously given to the Sikhs on behalf of the majority community. Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru coolly replied, the
circumstances have now changed. If there is one thing that the Sikhs know too
well, it is that now the circumstances have changed!
The ruling party committed injustice during the
post-Independence era; it frequent
employment of Judiciary for quasi-political purposes, and the result is that
the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal had passed a Resolution on the
20th July, 1966, which reads: "AFTER HAVING CAREFULLY VIEWED the findings,
the reports and judgements of judicial and quasi-judicial Tribunals and Forums
that have dealt with matters and cases involving important Sikh interests,
COMES TO THE CONCLUSION, that the entire judicial machinery and the judicial
process of the Independent India, under influences of a certain section of
political Hindus, is prejudiced and has been perverted against the Sikh people
in India in relation to their just and legal rights"
Archives of letters
from Nehru to Mountbatten also show that when
the Boundary Commission had planned to declare the partition of Punjab on August 12, Nehru tried to sell
out hi "brave Sikhs" (who were used to bring most of the
territory north of Delhi into the Indian Union).
While influential Sikhs were lobbying
Mountbatten for more territory to come into East Punjab (to insiders the
demarcation line was known after Aug 6),
archival records show Nehru writing a letter to Mountbatten that he
wanted Sutlej as the dividing line between Pakistan/India.
History after Partition
After India's independence, the Punjabi
Suba movement, led by the Sikh political party Akali Dal, sought
the creation of a province (suba)
for Punjabi people. The Akali Dal's maximal position of demands was a Khalistan
and minimal position was to have an autonomous state within India. The issues
raised during the Punjabi Suba movement were later used as a premise for the
creation of a separate Sikh country by the proponents of Khalistan. The
partition of India based on the religious grounds had led to a lot of
bloodshed. Concerned that creating a Punjabi-majority state would effectively
mean creating a state based on religious grounds, the Indian government
initially rejected the demand.
In September 1966, the Indira
Gandhi-led Union Government accepted the demand. On September 7, 1966 Punjab Reorganisation Act was
passed in Parliament. The Act was implemented with effect from November 1,
1966. Punjab was trifurcated creating Punjab, Haryana and transferring certain
areas to Himachal Pradesh. Chandigarh was made a centrally administered Union
territory. Which effectively
mean creating a state based on religious grounds; the Indian government
initially rejected the demand.
Akali Dal's demands
Akali Dal, the Sikh political party, was defeated
in the 1972 Punjab elections.[To
regain the public appeal the Akali Dal then put
forward the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973
to demand radical devolution of power and further autonomy to Punjab. The
resolution document included both religious and political issues. It asked for
recognising Sikhism as a religion separate from Hinduism and transfer of
Chandigarha and certain areas to Punjab. It also demanded that power be
radically devoluted from the Central to state governments.
The document was largely forgotten, for some time
after its adoption, but came into the limelight in the 1980s. The Akali Dal an Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale joined
hands to launch the Dharam Yudh Morcha in 1982
in order to implement the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Thousands of people joined
the movement, feeling that it represented a real solution to demands such as a
larger share of water for irrigation and the return of Chandigarh to
Punjab
In 1970 Parmar came in contact with Jagjit Singh Chohan in
London which led to the launch of the movement. The Khalistan movement was
announced formally at a London press conference. Chohan raised the Khalistani
flag in Birmingham in the 1970s.
Chohan visited the United States at the invitation
of his supporters in the Sikh diaspora. On 13 October 1971, he placed an
advertisement in the New York
Times proclaiming an Independent Sikh state. Advertisement of Khalistan
enabled him to collect millions of dollars from the Sikh
diaspora. He was charged in India with sedition and other crimes in connection
with his separatist activities.
After returning to India in 1977, Chohan travelled
to Britain in 1979, and established the Khalistan National Council. On 12
April 1980, he declared the formation of a "National Council of
Khalistan", at Anandpur
Sahib. He declared himself the President of the Council and Balbir Singh
Sandhu as its Secretary General.
In May 1980, Jagjit Singh Chohan travelled to London and
announced the formation of Khalistan. A similar announcement was made by Balbir
Singh Sandhu, in Amritsar, who released stamps and currency of Khalistan.
Operating from a building termed "Khalistan House", he remained in
contact with the Sikh extremist leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwalewho was
violently campaigning for a Sikh theocratic homeland. Chohan also maintained
contacts among various groups in Canada, the USA, and Germany. Chohan declared
himself president of the "Republic of Khalistan", named a Cabinet,
and issued symbolic Khalistan "passports", "postage
stamps", and "Khalistan dollars". Embassies in Britain and other
European countries were opened by Chohan. It is reported that with the
assistance of a wealthy Californian supporter, a peach magnate, he opened an
Ecuadorian bank account to support his operation. Apart from Punjab, Himachal,
and Haryana, Chohan's proposal of Khalistan also included parts of Rajasthan state.
The globalized Sikh diaspora invested efforts and resources for Khalistan, but
the Khalistan movement remained nearly invisible on the global political scene
until the Operation Bluestar of June 1984.
The late 1970s and the early 1980s the separatist
movement began to militarize and saw the increasing involvement of the Sikh
religious preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale in
Punjab politics. Over the period Bhindranwale grew up as a leader of Sikh
militancy. There was a dissatisfaction in some sections of the sikh with
prevailing economic, social, and political conditions. Bhindranwale articulated
these grievances as discrimination against Sikhs and the undermining of Sikh
identity.
The growth of Bhindranwale was not solely by his
own efforts. In the late 1970s Indira Gandhi's Congress party supported Bhindranwale in a bid to split the
Sikh votes and weaken the Akali Dal, its chief rival in Punjab. Congress
supported the candidates backed by Bhindranwale in the 1978 SGPC elections. The Congress leader Giani
Zail Singh allegedly financed the initial meetings of the
separatist organization Dal Khalsa, which disrupted the December 1978 Ludhiana
session of the Akali Dal with provocative anti-Hindu wall-writing. In the 1980
election, Bhindranwale supported Congress candidates Gurdial Singh Dhillon and Raghunandan Lal Bhatia.
Bhindranwale was originally not very influential, but the activities of
Congress elevated him to the status of a major leader by the early 1980s. This
later turned out to be a miscalculation as Bhindranwale's separatist political
objectives became popular among the agricultural Jat Sikhs in the region.
In a politically charged environment, Lala
Jagat Narain, the Hindu owner of the Hind Samachar group of
newspapers, was assassinated by Sikh militants on 9 September 1981. Jagat
Narain was a prominent critic of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and a Congress
leader. In 1981 Census of India was being conducted where
the mother toungue of the citizens was being recorded. Lala had been writing
about reporting Hindi instead of Punjabi as their mother tongue by Hindus
living in Punjab. This infuriated Bhindranwale and his followers. The White
Paper issued by the government of India, mentioned that Narain was assassinated
because of his criticism of Bhindrawale. On 15 September 1981, Bhindranwale was
arrested for his alleged role in the assassination. Bhindranwale had earlier
been a suspect in the murder of the Nirankari leader Gurbachan Singh, who had been killed on 24
April 1980 in retaliation for killings of conservative Sikhs belonging to theAkhand Kirtani Jatha. Bhindranwale
was released in October by the Punjab State Government, as no evidence was
found against him.[47]
The Akali Dal was initially opposed to
Bhindranwale, and even accused him of being a Congress agent. However, as
Bhindranwale became increasingly influential, the party decided to join forces
with him. In August 1982, under the leadership of Harcharan Singh Longowal, the
Akali Dal launched the Dharam Yudh Morcha ("Group for the Battle
for Righteousness") in collaboration with Bhindranwale. The goal of the
organisation was the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Thousands
of people joined the movement as they felt that it represented a real solution
to their demands, such as a larger share of water for irrigation, and return of
Chandigarh to Punjab.
After the launch of the Morcha, Sikh extremists
began committing acts of political violence. Assassination of Chief Minister of
Punjab Darabara Singh was attempted and two Indian Airlines flights were
hijacked by the terrorists. Indira Gandhi considered the Anandpur Resolution as
a secessionist document and evidence of an attempt to secede from the Union of
India. The Akali Dal officially stated that Sikhs were Indians, and the
Anandpur Sahib resolution did not envisage an autonomous Sikh State of
Khalistan. By early October, more than 25,000 Akali workers courted arrest in
Punjab in support of the agitation.
To restart the talks with the Akali leadership,
Gandhi ordered the release of all Akali workers in mid October and sent Swaran
Singh as her emissary. Bhindranwale who was then regarded as "single
most important Akali leader" announced that nothing less than full
implementation of the Anandpur resolution was acceptable to them. Other Akali
leaders agreed to join the negotiations which ended with a compromised
settlement with the governments team. The settlement was then presented in the
parliament but certain parts of the agreement were changed unilaterally due to
advice from Haryana and Rajasthan CMs.
Operation Blue Star
The pro-Khalistan Sikh separatists within the Harmandir
Sahib were led by former Major General Shabeg
Singh Operation Bluestar was an
Indian military operation carried out between 1 and 8 June 1984, ordered by Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi to remove militant religious leader Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his
armed followers from the buildings of the Harmandir
Sahib complex in Amritsar,Punjab. In July
1983, the Sikh political party Akali Dal's
President Harcharan Singh Longowal had
invited Bhindranwale to take up residence in Golden Temple
Complex. Bhindranwale later on made the sacred temple complex an armoury and
headquarter, for his armed uprising for Khalistan. In the violent events
leading up to the Operation Blue Star since the inception of Akali Dharm Yudh Morcha, the
militants had killed 165 Hindus and Nirankaris, even 39 Sikhs opposed to
Bhindranwale were killed. The total number of deaths was 410 in violent
incidents and riots while 1,180 people were injured. Unsuccessful negotiations
were held with Bhindranwale and his supporters.
Indira
Gandhi ordered the army to launch the Operation Blue Star. Army units led by
Indian Army Lt. Gen Kuldip
Singh Brar (a Sikh), surrounded the temple complex on 3 June
1984. The Indian Army, Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, and Punjab Police were involved. The army
kept asking the militants to surrender, using the public address system. The
militants were asked to allow the pilgrims out of the temple premises, before
they start fighting the army. However, nothing happened till 7 PM. The army had
grossly underestimated the firepower possessed by the militants. Militants had
Chinese made Rocket-propelled grenade launchers with armor
piercing capabilities. Tanks and heavy
artillery were used to attack the militants using anti-tank and machine-gun fire
from the heavily fortified Akal Takht. After a 24-hour firefight, the army
finally wrested control of the temple complex. Bhindranwale was killed in the
operation, while many of his followers managed to escape. Casualty figures for
the Army were 83 dead and 249 injured. According to the official estimate
presented by the Indian government, 1592 were apprehended and there were 493
combined militant and civilian casualties. High civilian casualties were
attributed to militants using pilgrims trapped
inside the temple as human shields.
The opponents of Indira Gandhi also criticized the
operation for excessive use of force. General Brar later stated that the
Government had "no other recourse" as there was a "complete
breakdown" of the situation, State machinery was under the control of the
militants, declaration of Khalistan was imminent and Pakistan would have come
into the picture declaring its support for Khalistan. The Sikh militancy was
not crushed with the Operation and it continued.
Assassination of Indria Gandhi
Other political parties strongly condemned the
riots. Two major civil-liberties organizations issued a joint report on the
anti-Sikh riots, naming sixteen important politicians, thirteen police
officers, and one hundred and ninety-eight others, accused by survivors and
eyewitnesses.
The military Operation Blue Star in the Golden
Temple in Amritsar offended many Sikhs. The separatists used Operation Bluestar
and the riots following the assassination to claim that the interest of the
Sikhs were not safe in India and fostered the spread of militancy among the
Sikhs in Punjab. Some sections of the Sikh diaspora started to support the
separatists with financial and diplomatic support.
A section of Sikhs turned to militancy in Punjab
and several Sikh militant outfits proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s. some
Sikh militant groups aimed to create an independent state Khalistan through
acts of violence directed at members of the Indian government, army or forces.
In January 1986, the Golden Temple was again
occupied by militants belonging to the All India Sikh Students Federation and Damdami
Taksal. On 26 January 1986, the gathering passed a resolution (gurmattā)
favoring the creation of Khalistan. Subsequently, a number of rebel militant
groups in favour of Khalistan waged a major
insurgency against the government of India. Indian security forces
suppressed the insurgency in the early 1990s, but Sikh political groups such as
the Khalsa Raj Party and SAD (A) continued to pursue an independent Khalistan
through non-violent means. Pro-Khalistan organizations such as Dal Khalsa (International) are also
active outside India, supported by a section of the Sikh diaspora.
On 29 April 1986, an assembly of separatist Sikhs
at the Akal Takht made a declaration of an independent state of
Khalistan. These events were followed by a decade of violence and conflict in
Punjab before a return to normality in the region. During the late 1980s and
the early 1990s, there was a dramatic rise in radical State militancy in
Punjab. This period of insurgency saw clashes of Sikh militants with the
police, as well as with the Nirankaris, a
mystical Sikh sect that are less conservative and aim to reform Sikhism. The
Khalistani militant activities manifested in the form of several attacks, such as
the 1987 killing of 32 Hindu bus passengers
near Lalru, and the 1991 killing of 80 train passengers in
Ludhiana. Khalistan-related militant activities continued in the 1990s, as the
perpetrators of the 1984 riots remained unpunished, and many Sikhs felt that
they were being discriminated against and that their religious rights were
being suppressed.
In August 1991, Julio Ribeiro, then Indian Ambassador to
Romania, was attacked and wounded in a Bucharest assassination
attempt by gunmen identified
as Punjabi Sikhs.[ Sikh groups claimed
responsibility for the 1991 kidnapping of the Romanian chargé d'affaires in New
Delhi, Liviu Radu. This appeared to be in retaliation for Romanian arrests of
KLF members suspected of the attempted assassination of Julio Ribeiro Radu
was released unharmed after Sikh politicians criticised the action.
In October 1991, The New York Times reported that
violence had increased sharply in the months leading up to the kidnapping, with
Indian security forces or Sikh militants killing 20 or more people per day, and
that the militants had been "gunning down" family members of police
officers.
On 31 August 1995, Chief Minister Beant Singh was killed by a suicide
bomber. The pro-Khalistan group Babbar
Khalsa claimed responsibility for the assassination, but security authorities
were reported to be doubtful of the truth of that claim. A 2006 press release
by the Embassy of the United States in New Delhi indicated that the responsible
organisation was the \ Khalistan Commando Force
There were serious charges leveled by human rights
activists against Indian Security forces (Headed by KPS Gill -
himself a Sikh), claiming that thousands of suspects were killed in staged
shootouts and thousands of bodies were cremated/disposed of without proper
identification or post-mortems. Human Rights Watch reported
that since 1984, government forces had resorted to widespread human rights
violations to fight the militants, including arbitrary arrest, prolonged
detention without trial, torture, and summary killings of civilians and
suspected militants. Family members were frequently detained and tortured to
reveal the whereabouts of relatives sought by the police. Punjab Rights Forum claims that several Sikh
women were reportedly gang-raped and molested by the Punjab police and the
Indian security forces during house-to-house searches. It also claims that
looting of the villagers' properties and the ransacking of entire villages
occurred during this period. Amnesty International has also alleged several cases
of disappearances, torture, rape, and unlawful detentions by the police during
the Punjab insurgency, for which 75-100 police
officers had been convicted by December 2002. Ram Narayan Kumar, the author of Reduced to Ashes, claims
that the issue of Khalistan was used by the State to divert attention from
real issues of democracy, constitutional safeguards, and citizens' rights.
Khalistan Groups
In November 2015, a Sarbat
Khalsa, or congregation of the Sikh community, was called in response to
recent unrest in the Punjab region. The Sarbat Khalsa adopted 13 resolutions to
strengthen Sikh institutions and traditions. The 12th resolution reaffirmed the
resolutions adopted by the Sarbat Khalsa in 1986, including the declaration of
the sovereign state of Khalistan.
There are several Sikh groups such as the Khalistan
Council that are currently functional and provide organization and guidance to
the Sikh community. Multiple Sikh militant groups are organized across the
countries and coordinate their military efforts for Khalistan. Such groups were
most active in 1980s and early 1990s and have since receded in activity. These
groups are largely defunct in India but they still have a political presence
among the sikh diaspora, especially in countries such as Pakistan where they
are not proscribed by law.
The major pro-Khalistan militant outfits include:
·
Also known
variously as Bhindranwala Tigers Force of Khalistan, and Bhindranwale Tiger
Force, this group appears to have been formed in 1984 by Gurbachan Singh
Manochahal. After the founder's death, the BTF (or BTFK) seems to have
disbanded or integrated into other organisations.
·
Listed in
1995 as one of the 4 "major militant groups" in the Khalistan
movement.
·
Most of these outfits were crushed
during the anti-insurgency operations by 1993. In recent years, active groups
have included Babbar Khalsa, International Sikh Youth Federation, Dal Khalsa,
and Bhinderanwala Tiger Force. An unknown group before then, the Shaheed Khalsa
Force claimed credit for the marketplace bombings in New Delhi in 1997. The
group has never been heard of since.
Since Indra Gandhi assassination
Khalistan movement, Operation Bluestar,
Indira Gandhi’s assassination, Anti-Sikh massacres —1984 is etched in public
memory as a disastrous, tragic year for India. Operation Bluestar, ordered by
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to wipe out the Khalistani militants holed up
inside the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar, saw the death of hundreds of
civilians, militants and military personnel alike. The Akal Takht, one of the sacred religious
sites of the Sikhs within the complex, was badly damaged too, enraging a
section of the Sikh population. Bluestar ultimately led to a cycle of violence:
the prime minister was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, and anti-Sikh
killings on a massive, mind-numbing scale were orchestrated by leaders and
supporters of the ruling Congress party in Delhi and elsewhere, claiming the
lives of more than 3,000 persons from the Sikh community. Unofficial estimates
place the death toll at more than 5,000.
Here’s a timeline of the events leading
up to the 1984 tragedy and afterwards:
Despite many commissions of inquiry
instituted over the decades, the victims of the 1984 massacres continue to
battle for and await justice. Dozens of eyewitnesses have testified to police
inaction before these commissions. They have deposed that the police did not do
anything to stop the killings in which large numbers of people participated.
Survivors, witnesses and observers spoke of how the violence was orchestrated
by Congress leaders — including, they said, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler.
But no senior politician has been convicted till now. At least 10
committees have examined different aspects of the anti-Sikh violence, seven of
which have investigated the specific aspect of the death count. But most of
these committees have had no impact, with successive governments not
implementing their recommendations or disregarding their findings.
The Mishra Commission, constituted in
1985, accepted “the submission advanced before it that the violence
against Sikhs an October 31, 1984, started as a natural reaction to the
situation. And that at that stage there was no organized attempt to cause or
spread violence by rioting directed against the Sikhs.”
Similarly, the The Nanavati Commission,
submitting its report in 2005, said that
“there was simply no evidence that “Shri Rajiv Gandhi or any other high ranking
Congress (I) Leader had suggested or organised attacks on Sikhs. Whatever acts
were done, they were done by the local Congress (I) leaders and workers, and
they appear to have done so for their personal political reasons.”
Congress(I) councillors considered to
be loyal followers of the MP Dharamdas Shastri were named as the main culprits
who were reportedly carrying voters’ lists to identify Sikh households in the
Anand Parbat area.
The Delhi police filed 587 FIRs against
those involved in the violence. Out of these, 241 cases were closed by the
police, citing lack of evidence.
Several prominent Congress leaders
figure on the lists of several complainants
accusing them of instigating crowds to attack Sikhs in the aftermath of
Indira Gandhi’s assassination. Jagdish Tytler was widely accused of playing a
prominent role in mobilising the mobs. He has specifically been accused of
instigating the mob that led to the murder of three Sikhs at Gurdwara Pul
Bangash, Delhi, on November 1, 1984.
In 2000, the BJP-led government of Atal
Bihari Vajpayee set up the Nanavati commission headed by a former Supreme Court
judge to investigate the crimes committed during the 1984 massacres. The
commission’s report released in 2005 during the UPA-I tenure, put out detailed
evidence against Tytler and other Congress leaders of the Delhi wing of the
INC. The report led to Tytler’s resignation from the Union cabinet. Despite the
CBI clearing him of any wrongdoing in March 2009, the party dropped him
as an INC candidate for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. In 2013, a New
Delhi Court ordered the reopening of
the case against Tytler and directed the CBI to record the testimonies of key
witnesses who had said they saw the Congress leader instigating mobs. He filed
a plea for a stay order on CBI probe, which the high court rejected in January
2014.
One of the most frequently mentioned names
in connection with the 1984 violence is that of Congress politician Sajjan
Kumar. On the recommendations of Justice G.T. Nanavati Commission, the CBI
registered a case against Kumar, alleging that he incited mobs to attack Sikhs
in the Delhi Cantonment. The CBI told a Delhi court that Kumar incited the
crowd to kill Sikhs. “There was a conspiracy of terrifying proportion with the
complicity of police and patronage of local MP Sajjan Kumar,” CBI prosecutor
R.S. Cheema told the court. Cheema further told the court that witnesses
at the scene heard Sajjan Kumar tell a crowd that “not a single Sikh should
survive”. While Kumar was acquitted by a district court, there are several
ongoing cases against him, including an appeal against his acquittal, in the
Delhi high court.
In the Gandhinagar area, a local
Congress(I) councillor Sukhanlal was identified by the victims as the main
leader of the assailants. Escapees from the area whom the the People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People’s Union for Civil
Liberties (PUCL) fact-finding team met at the Shakarpur relief camp
on November 6, blamed the Congress(I) MP from the area, H K L Bhagat, for
having masterminded the violence in their locality. During the 1990s, a
sessions judge in the Karkardooma Court in Delhi, Justice S.N. Dhingra sent
senior Congress minister Bhagat to jail briefly. The Nanavati Commission’s
recommendations nailed Bhagat in 2005. The Congress leader passed away later
that same year due to advanced age and prolonged illness.
The commission found that along with
H.K.L. Bhagat, Dr. Ashok Kumar, a local congress leader and member of Municipal
Corporation, Kalyanpuri, had taken “active part in this anti-Sikh riots.” He had reportedly held a
meeting in Kalyanpuri, in which he incited violence, and in the ensuing
violence, there were cases of loot, murder, arson and rape. The commission,
though, failed to recommend any further action against Bhagat and
Kumar, citing their acquittals in criminal cases even though they had been
acquitted due to poor investigations by the police.
Diaspora Support
Operation Bluestar and its violent
aftermaths popularized the demand for Khalistan among many Sikhs dispersed
globally. Involvement of sections of Sikh diasporas
turned out to be important for the movement as it provided the diplomatic and
financial support. Some Sikh groups abroad even declared themselves as the
Khalistani government in exile.
The Sikh place of worship, gurdwaras provided the geographic and
institutional coordination for the Sikh community. Sikh political factions have
used the gurdwaras as a forum for political organization. The gurdwaras often
served as the site for mobilization of diaspora for Khalistan movement directly
by raising funds. Indirect mobilization was provided by promoting a stylized
version of conflict and Sikh history. The rooms in gurdwara exhibit pictures of
Khalistani leaders along with paintings of martyrs from Sikh history. This
visually establishes a line of oppression starting from 17th Century to modern
day. Gurdwaras also host speakers and musical groups that promote and encourage
the movement. Among the diasporas,
Different groups of Sikhs in the
diaspora organize the convention of international meetings to facilitate
communication and establish organizational order. In April 1981 the first
“International Convention of Sikhs,” was held in New York and was attended by
some 200 delegates. In April 1987 the third convention was held in Slough,
Berkshire where the Khalistan issue was addressed. This meeting's objective was
to “build unity in the Khalistan movement"
All these factors further
strengthened the emerging nationalism among Sikhs. Sikh organizations launched
many fund-raising efforts that were used for several purposes. After 1984 one
of the objectives was the promotion of the Sikh version of "ethnonational
history" and the relationship with the Indian state. The Sikh diaspora
also increased their efforts to build institutions to maintain and propagate
their ethnonational heritage. A major objective of these educational efforts
was to publicize a different face to the non Sikh international community who
regarded the Sikhs as “terrorists
Immediately after Operation Blue Star,
authorities were unprepared for how quickly extremism spread and gained support
in Canada, with extremists "...threatening to kill thousands of Hindus by
a number of means, including blowing up Air India flights. Canadian Member of Parliament Ujjal
Dosanjh, a moderate Sikh, stated that he and others who spoke out against Sikh
extremism in the 1980s faced a "reign of terror"
On 18 November 1998, the Canada-based Sikh
journalist Tara Singh Hayer was gunned down by
suspected Khalistani militants. The publisher of the "Indo-Canadian
Times," a Canadian Sikh and once-vocal advocate of the armed struggle for
Khalistan, he had criticised the bombing of Air India flight 182, and was
to testify about a conversation he overheard concerning the bombing. On 24
January 1995, Tarsem Singh Purewal, editor of Britain's Punjabi-language weekly
"Des Pardes", was killed as he was closing his office in Southall. There
is speculation that the murder was related to Sikh extremism, which Purewal may
have been investigating. Another theory is that he was killed in retaliation
for revealing the identity of a young rape victim.
Terry
Milewski reported in a 2006 documentary for the CBC that a minority within
Canada's Sikh community was gaining political influence even while publicly
supporting terrorist acts in the struggle for an independent Sikh state. In
response, the World Sikh Organization of Canada (WSO), a
Canadian Sikh human rights group that opposes violence and extremism, sued the
CBC for "defamation, slander, and libel", alleging that Milewski
linked it to terrorism and damaged the reputation of the WSO within the Sikh
community. Canadian journalist Kim Bolan has
written extensively on Sikh extremism
There has been some controversy over Canada's
response to the Khalistan movement. After Amarinder Singh's refusal to meet Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau in 2017, calling him a "Khalistani sympathizer", Singh
ultimately met with Trudeau Feb 22, 2018 over the issue. Trudeau assured Singh
that his country would not support the revival of the separatist movement. Shiromani
Akali Dal president Sukhbir Badal was quoted saying Khalistan is "no
issue, either in Canada or in Punjab"
Anand Karaj
Anand Karaj is the Sikh marriage
ceremony, meaning "Blissful Union" or "Joyful
Union", that was introduced by Guru Amar Das.
The four laavaan
(hymns which take place during the ceremony) were composed by his successor, Guru Ram Das.
It was originally legalised in India through the passage of the Anand Marriage
Act of 1909, but is now governed by the Sikh Reht
Maryada (Sikh code of conduct and conventions) that was issued by
the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak
Committee (SGPC).In a recent verdict of the Sri Akal Takht
Sahib, i.e. a, Anand Karaj can only take place in a Gurudwara (temple).
Any Amritdhari
(baptized) Sikh may perform the marriage ceremony. In 2012, India passed The
Anand Marriage (Amendment) Bill, after which Sikhs are able to register their
marriages under the Anand Marriage Act instead of the Hindu Marriage Act, with President Pratibha
Patil giving her assent to a bill passed by Parliament on 7 June 2012 in the
budget session. Pakistan
declared that it would pass the Sikh Anand Marriage Act in 2007 and a Draft was
prepared, but this Draft Act was never passed. In 2018, Pakistani's Punjab
Provincial Assembly passed the Punjab Sikh Anand Karaj Marriage Act 2018
Khalistan movement may have diminished in
India, but a separate State of Khalistan still remains a big idea among a large
section of the Sikh diaspora, especially in North America and the UK. And the
aggressive Hindutva politics of the BJP government appears to have given a new lease of life to
the pro-Khalistan elements — especially in the US, the UK and Canada — in the
past few years.
The recent attempt by Khalistan supporters to disrupt an event of Congress
president Rahul Gandhi in London and the attack on Delhi Sikh Gurdwara
Management Committee chief Manjit Singh GK in the US is a testimony to the
rekindling of the Khalistan movement abroad.
“We
support the attack on Manjit Singh GK as our coordination committee has decided
that he should not be allowed to speak in any of the gurdwaras in the US. We
have already banned Indian diplomats and politicians visiting the country from
speaking in gurdwaras; they can just pay their obeisance, eat langar (community
food) and go,” Himmat Singh, coordinator of the Sikh Coordination Committee
(East) Coast, USA, tells The Sunday Standard.
The Sikhs
living in Western countries are deeply attached to their religious identity and
feel more strongly about what’s been happening in the country. The sacrilege of
Guru Granth Sahib and the subsequent incidents in Punjab have riled the Sikh
diaspora which feels the Congress and the Akali Dal are playing a friendly
match on the issue.
Political
observers feel the hard line Hindutva politics and incidents like lynching have
given the radical Sikh groups abroad a fertile ground to re-emerge. “With
Hindutva coming to centre stage, the contradictions between Sikhs and Hindu
radicals have sharpened this extenuation,” says political analyst Prof Kuldeep
Singh.
Then,
there is the 1984 anti-Sikh riot, which is still fresh in the memory of Sikh
diaspora. “For the Sikhs abroad, this has been an emotive issue and the basis
of the Khalistan demand… as they have not seen the downside of it as the Sikhs
back in India have witnessed. The appeal of this issue has always more
pronounced among NRI Sikhs as compared to Sikhs living in India,” Prof Singh
says.
Himmat Singh tells The Sunday Standard:
“Everyone knows Congress’s hand in the 1984 genocide, but Rahul Gandhi says the
party had no hand in it and Amarinder supports him. Why is he lying?” Singh
also support ‘Referendum 2020’ to press for a separate Sikh state. US-based
advocacy group Sikhs for Justice (SJF) had organized a rally at Trafalgar
Square under ‘London Declaration on Referendum 2020’, seeking the creation of
Khalistan. Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, legal adviser of SFJ, says “The response to
the rally was very encouraging and we will continue to engage foreign
governments on the issue of Sikhs’ right of self-determination and the demand
to hold a referendum in Punjab on this issue.”
The
over eight-million-strong Sikh diaspora has a significant influence over the
community’s politics back home. So, it’s no surprise that the referendum demand
is finding traction among certain sections in Punjab. Kanwar Pal Singh of
radical group Dal Khalsa says, “We will launch a new phase of consistent
democratic engagement with the central government and the United Nations,
urging them to set up a mechanism to allow the people of Punjab to exercise the
right to self-determination.”
On the
re-assertion by Sikh hardliners abroad, he says, “Majority fundamentalism
breeds minority fundamentalism. To counter the Hindutva agenda of transforming
India into a Hindu state, Sikhs have got pro-active with their Khalistan
agenda.”
Indian politicians targeted in US, UK. Three
Khalistan supporters tried to disrupt a public event of Rahul Gandhi in London
on August 25, a day after the Congress leader denied his party’s role in the
1984 Sikh riots. The same day, DSGMC member and Akali Dal leader Manjeet Singh
GS was thrashed outside a gurudwara in California, US.
Kutch
Ethnic cleansing of Sikhs from Kutch .
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYAw1gcMJ8k&feature=youtu.be
Sikhs support Khalistan because of the Anand marriage act that is still
not applied on them and they are still forced to marry under the Hindu marriage
act, the Indian police killing hundreds of innocent Sikhs extra judicially
whose mass graves were also found, the Sikh Diaspora in Western countries and
Sikh population in East Punjab not forgetting the atrocities of Indian Army at
Akali Takht in Amritsar in 1984 and the massacre of Sikhs in New Delhi
following the killing of Indira Gandhi
Update Feb., 10 , 2019 :
Realpolitik in the Khalistan Movement Shyamal
Kataria
Several
explanations have been put forward to explain the rise of the Khalistan
movement, from economic grievances, the Sikh fear of being absorbed into the
Hindu fold, to dubious policy decisions made by the central and Punjab state
governments. The discourses of political machinations and tussles for power—the
realpolitik—behind the movement are analysed. The realpolitik factors of
“over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi, the policies and behaviour of
the Congress (I), the policies and behaviour of the Shiromani Akali Dal, and
the role of Pakistan are interrogated.
It is often difficult to ascribe a precise date of origin to
the rise of a particular secessionist movement. This is especially so when many
of its protagonists contend that their demands for separate nationhood are
rooted in and legitimised by entrenched “historical realities.” Nevertheless
many scholars in attempting to place a fixed time frame around the Sikh
separatist movement for Khalistan in North India tend to commence
their chronology of events from 1981 and end in 1993. This is because it was
during this time period that Punjab endured a “heightened” level of
religious militancy with an estimated death toll of over 25,000 resulting from
the associated violence (Puri et al 1999: 10). It was only the
second insurgency movement—the first being the Naga movement in North East
India —that the postcolonial, post-partition, Indian state had to deal with
insurgency. The latter was also the more testing of the two.
The roots of Sikh separatism are long and contested,
although it is clear that plans for an independent Sikh state did exist in the
final years of British rule over the subcontinent. However, these plans emerged
as a reaction to the Pakistan resolution of 1940, and were not, for the
majority of the Sikh leadership at least, their first preference for a
postcolonial settlement. Sikh separatism continued almost immediately after
partition through the demand for a Punjabi suba or linguistic state, which
Master Tara Singh, a veteran leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), had
allegedly conceded was merely an acceptable cover for what his community and he
were truly seeking, namely a Sikh majority political entity (Singh 1992: 40).
After the Punjabi suba was eventually conceded in 1966, further grievances
vis-à-vis New Delhi began to emerge, including the status of Chandigarh, the
distribution of river water flowing through Punjab, the alleged religious
discrimination of Sikhs, and undue encroachment by the state into their
religious affairs. Such grievances found their way into the SAD’s
Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973, which went to form the bedrock of
demands for the early portion of the militant movement that emerged at the
beginning of the following decade (1980s), and was supported by the likes of
Amritdhari Damdami Taksal preacher Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
One of the most evocative episodes of the militancy of that
period was the Indian army’s raid on the sanctum sanctorum of the Sikhs, the
Golden Temple in Amritsar, code-named Operation Blue Star. The operation’s aim
was to rid the Golden Temple of its “secessionist elements,” who were accused
of inspiring acts of anti-Hindu terror across Punjab. The raid, carried out in
early June 1984, sent reverberations throughout India and the rest of the
world, particularly in countries with substantial Sikh populations such as the
United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. It prompted questions from national and
international commentators with a lukewarm understanding of the subcontinent as
well as specialist observers with a strong contextual knowledge of the
unfolding events. The questions ranged from how the supposedly staunch
nationalistic Sikhs of India could suddenly “turn their backs” on the rest of
India, towards more nuanced ones that critiqued the role of the Indian
government in raiding the most sacred site of one of its most treasured
communities.
A great deal of attention has gone towards explaining the
rise of the Khalistan movement. The explanations that have been put forward to
date span a vast array, ranging from underlying economic grievances, the Sikh
fear of being absorbed into the Hindu fold, to the dubious policy decisions
made by those in New Delhi, and, to a lesser extent, at the state level in
Punjab. What this article aims to do is hone in on those explanatory factors in
the discourse which relate to political machinations and tussles for power, the
so-called realpolitik, and subject these to thorough scrutiny in order to test
their strength. Realpolitik, as employed by this article, is a mode of politics
practised by individuals, cliques or institutions, for the cynical pursuit of
power to the defiance or superseding of moral and/or ideological
considerations. Realpolitik departs from conventional types of politics, which,
while also being motivated by power, is typically more transparent, and is
guided and legitimised by ideological considerations, pursuit of collective
good, and constitutional and procedural norms.
The realpolitik explanations advanced in the discourse, and
hence interrogated in this article, span across four broad areas. First, it
relates to the “over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi; second, it
examines the policies and behaviour of the Congress (I); third, it examines the
policies and behaviour of the Shiromani Akali Dal (hereafter Akali Dal or
Akalis); and finally, it analyses the role of Pakistan.
Concentrating Power in Delhi
The first category of realpolitik explanations relate to the
over-centralisation of power by the central government. To be specific, there
was an unhealthy distribution of power between New Delhi and Chandigarh in
favour of the former in the lead up to, and during, the period of the Khalistan
movement. Even Parkash Singh Badal, the Chief Minister of Punjab on multiple
occasions, said that what he and his party wanted was a “re-casting of
centre–state financial relations” (Kamath 1984: 138). According to Joyce
Pettigrew (1987: 20), “Punjab’s problems [of militancy] … occurred, not because
of its richness, but because control over irrigation and power, and all aspects
of development, was in New Delhi rather than in Chandigarh.” Such opinion is of
course not without foundation since, despite being officially federal in
character, the jurisdiction of the centre within the Indian state was vast and
spanned over realms typically reserved for provincial units in most other
federations. For example, the centre had the ability to influence the amount
that Punjabi farmers could charge for their produce through the imposition of
“food zones.” Articulating his grievance in this regard, the founding member of
Dal Khalsa, Manmohan Singh Khalsa, remarked, “If we [Punjabis] make our own
wheat, surely we should fix our own price? Why does the centre, the bania,
fix our price? Who are they to tell us?”1
However, there does appear to be a counterpoise to the view
that over-centralisation contributed towards or even created the militant
struggle. This view is that the Indian state had been heavily centralised
almost since its inception and remains so. This prompts the question of why the
secessionist movement, if its rise was indeed a reaction to
over-centralisation, did not erupt earlier than it did. This is not a question
that appears to have been posed, let alone dealt with, in the wider discourse. Nevertheless,
with respect to the proponents of the over-centralisation thesis, there could
be a number of reasons as to why their argument remains valid.
The first reason is that, up until 1964, India had been led
by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who acted as both a unifying and domineering
figure. Hence, during his tenure, many ideological and political opponents were
marginalised or at least temporarily offset. In other words, his existence
merely delayed what was an otherwise inevitable reaction to the
over-centralisation of power. The second reason is that, prior to 1966 (that
is, before the creation of the Punjabi suba), the Bhakra Dam and the city of
Chandigarh were a part of Punjab territory. However, after the reorganisation,
the dam was brought under central rule and Chandigarh was made into a union
territory (Leaf 1985: 488). Therefore, it could be argued that the centre’s
jurisdiction actually increased vis-à-vis Punjab (Kohli 1998).
The third reason is that Punjab’s impressive economic growth
in light of the green revolution made common Punjabis, especially those engaged
in agriculture (who were incidentally mainly Sikh), increasingly conscious of
the need to protect their state’s economic and natural resources (Kapur 1986:
223). This sparked grievances that Punjab was essentially a net contributor to
a redistributionist economy or that its vital river waters were being unfairly
diverted to neighbouring “non-riparian” states (Dhillon 1996: 124). Therefore,
the “appropriacy” of the centre–state balance depends on the context at any
given time rather than any hard and fast rules concerning the constitutional
separation of powers between the different tiers of governance. The fourth
reason in support of the over-centralisation thesis was the increasingly
prevalent view among economic elites, aided through interaction with the Sikh
diaspora in prosperous Western countries, that
socialist-leaning/Keynesian-styled economic models (such as that practised in
India) were an impediment to achieving sufficient economic growth. They
maintained that the insistence on a large centre actually promoted
inefficiency, red tape, and corruption. This led to increased Sikh
dissatisfaction with the seemingly flawed Indian economic model.
While there is a strong case to say that increasing
centralisation from New Delhi coincided with regionalist tendencies of the
linguistic states such as Punjab and that resentment to this was a logical
consequence, it does not necessarily follow that centralisation, or
over-centralisation, was an inherently detrimental policy from the point of
view of maintaining national unity. Acknowledgement of this opposing viewpoint
has been virtually absent from the associated discourse. The failure to do so
seems particularly odd when we consider that there are ample examples around
the world from the latter years of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,
to the modern-day examples of post-devolution Britain or post-invasion Iraq. In
these cases, increasing regional autonomy for political entities below the
level of the nation state does not necessarily abate secessionist demands nor
is it conducive to the fostering of inter-ethnic peace. So, it is quite
conceivable that over-centralisation was quite a sensible policy option for the
Indian state to follow given its perceived vulnerabilities as an ethnically
fragmented nation state, born out of a “partitioned-mentality” and
intrinsically distrustful of political demands put forward by religious
minorities.
Therefore, in sum, while it can be said that the
over-centralisation thesis holds considerable explanatory power with respect to
the rise of the Khalistan movement, this does not necessarily connote that it
would have been in India’s national interest, either in the short or long term,
to grant more regional autonomy to respective linguistic states.
Policies of Congress (I)
The second category of realpolitik explanations relate to
what has been interpreted as the self-defeating policies and behaviour of
Indira Gandhi and her confidantes within the Congress (I).2 The
basic cusp of such arguments is that soon after Indira Gandhi assumed control
of the Indian National Congress in 1966, her tenures as Prime Minister (1966–77
and 1980–84) and as leader of the opposition (1977–80) were characterised by her
near dictatorial traits. During her multiple tenures she displayed a marked
intolerance towards the opposition within and even outside her own party.3 In
this regard, Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I) embarked upon a range of overt
and covert methods for dealing with such dissent both of which, as claimed
within the wider discourse, ultimately proved conducive to the growth of the
Sikh secessionist struggle.
The first of the overt methods included initiating a growing
“interlinked and interdependent” relationship between centre–state politics,
whereby the autonomy of the latter virtually disappeared (Brass 1991: 172).
Paul Brass (1991: 171) provides a fine example of this method.
In
September 1970 … the [Bahujan Kisan Dal (BKD)] of Chaudhuri Charan Singh failed
to deliver the three votes that Mrs Gandhi needed, and expected, to pass the
Twentyfourth Constitutional Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha,
abolishing the privy purses of the princes. In retaliation, the Congress, which
had been in a coalition government with the BKD under Charan Singh in UP,
withdrew from the UP government and brought it down.
While it is difficult to argue with Brass’s broader
suggestion here, it would be naïve to assume that the interlinkage of
centre–state politics was something exclusive to Indira Gandhi’s tenure.
Indeed, practising a policy of non-interference could have actually been
interpreted as an act of weakness, undermining her and her party’s position
nationally.
The second overt method used to tackle dissent was the labelling
of oppositionists as anti-national or foreign-inspired, a task aided by the
Congress (I)’s superior access to the media (Leaf 1985: 493). While there is no
doubt that many people appropriated the government’s line with little to no
question, it must be borne in mind that the Congress (I) did not have
exclusive access to all information sources, nor the way in which people chose
to interpret the official news that they were encountering. For example, many
Sikhs, especially after Operation Blue Star, became increasingly suspicious of
the government’s version of events. According to Nayar and Singh (1984: 17),
[c]ontrary
to the government’s contention that due to the Army’s self-imposed restraint
the Harimandir has escaped damage, I counted over two dozen
fresh bullet marks in the marble walls and saw holes made by shrapnel that had
pierced through metal covered windows and shattered glass panes protecting
fresco paintings.
That certain Sikhs simply did not accept the official
version of events during the period of militancy was apparent, with one local
man recounting that, “we kept listening to Indian broadcasts but we knew
everything we heard was false” (qtd in Mahmood 1996: 129).
Third, and closely linked to the previous point, was the
tendency to resort to arresting and imprisoning political opponents. Indeed,
Indira’s son Sanjay Gandhi became renowned for engaging in “threats, smears and
organized violence” against those who dared to openly challenge Indira Gandhi
(Chatterjee 1998: 102). It is difficult to view such behaviour in this regard
as having anything but a net negative impact upon the Indian state’s ability to
contain regional dissension.
The fourth overt method consisted of the liberal use of
Article 356 of the Indian Constitution—namely President’s Rule—to bring down
state governments. Indira Gandhi used President’s Rule over Punjab on six
separate occasions between 1966 and 1984.4 Naturally,
direct rule was interpreted by many as a denial of the Punjabis’, or in a
post-suba context the Sikhs’, ability to administer their own affairs. A fair
deal of resentment ensued, especially among those that were ousted from office
as a result of this. However, by announcing President’s Rule, the centre
arguably demonstrated its capacity to step in once the Punjab government had
seemingly failed to maintain law and order in the state and, on that note,
perhaps dissuade many Sikhs from thinking that Khalistan was a viable option
for their community’s ills.
The fifth overt method deployed by the Congress (I) to deal
with opposition was through the suspension of democracy in India during the
infamous period of Emergency Rule between 1975 and 1977.5 Very
much in line with the previous point, arguably the declaration of Emergency was
a demonstration of Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I)’s power. Yet, as judged
by her party’s consequent performance in the general elections that followed,
many Indians are likely to have interpreted the Emergency as a desperate
attempt by Indira Gandhi to cling on to power at all costs rather than an act
performed for the higher purpose of upholding India’s national interest.
As far as the covert methods used to deal with opposition
are concerned, the first was to encourage factionalism within the Akali Dal
with a view to weakening them politically (Gill and Singhal 1984: 607; Malik
1985: 36). According to the then President of the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara
Management Committee (DSGMC), Paramjit Singh Sarna,
[t]he
Congress has long practised divide and rule, which is something they learnt
from the Britishers and then carried it on when they came to power … It is
their plan to divide the minority communities … to divide the Akalis … so they
can come to power.6
Indeed, the Akali Dal, which had been factionalised since
the early 1960s, has been rife with finger-pointing and paranoid suspicion
between individuals and factions, each accusing the other of “being an agent of
the centre” (Singh 1994: 93). Though there is a large degree of truth to this,
factionalism within the Akali Dal—whether or not sponsored by national
parties/organisations such as the Congress or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS)—existed long before and has continued long after the period of the Khalistan
movement. Therefore, the explanatory weight attached to this argument should be
judged accordingly.
The second covert method used by the Congress (I) was to
“prop up” Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale7 for
the purpose of either further fragmenting the Akalis or denying the “rightful”
political demands of the Sikhs on the grounds that they were tainted by
association with extremists or secessionists (Fair 2005: 128; Rudra 2005: 3;
Kapur 1986: 235). Indeed, Bhindranwale was quoted as saying, “It suits the
government to publicize me as an extremist, thus making an excuse to frustrate
the just cause and the legitimate demands of the entire Sikh community and the
Punjab state” (qtd in Lalvani and Iyengar 1983: 4). Those who hold the view
that Bhindranwale was essentially a “Congress creation” point to the fact that
he campaigned for the party in the 1980 Lok Sabha elections and was allowed to
roam free in spite of his provocative sermons (Grewal 2005: 317).
Even Bhindranwale himself, in the wake of being protected by
Congress (I) over the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, is supposed to have said
that “the government has done more for me in one week … than I could have
achieved in years” (qtd in Grewal 2005: 317). Allegedly, Congress (I)’s, or
more specifically Zail Singh’s, motive behind the protection of Bhindranwale in
this instance was driven by the then home minister’s attempts to undermine the
authority of his foe, Chief Minister Darbara Singh (Brass 1991: 179). On this
point, there are grounds to suggest that Bhindranwale was built up by the
Congress although how long he stayed a Congress affiliate is debatable.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to deny that Bhindranwale was a key figure during
the Khalistan militancy both in life and in death.
In sum, there is enough evidence in the wider discourse to
demonstrate that the realpolitiking of the Congress (I), in terms
of their policies and behaviour, contributed towards the rise of the Khalistan
movement. At the same time, it is also clear that the discourse has largely
failed to appreciate or acknowledge the multifaceted nature of some of these
approaches. That is, the opposite or softer approaches compared to the ones
that were taken by the Congress (I) do not always appear to have offered a more
taming effect on secessionist sentiments in Punjab.
Policies of the Shiromani Akali Dal
The third category of realpolitik explanations
relate to the policies and behaviour of the factionalised Akali Dal, both when
in and out of power in the Punjab legislative assembly. The first argument
advanced in this regard is that since the Akali Dal failed to achieve political
dominance in Punjab even after 1966,8 owing
to many Sikhs not voting along communal lines, they felt compelled to
communalise politics and “whip up religious and nationalist issues” in order to
fracture the vote along Hindu–Sikh lines (Kohli 1998: 22). While there is
considerable credence in Kohli’s (1998) argument, it must be borne in mind that
even if, on occasion, certain Akali leaders have attempted to communalise
politics for electoral gain, they did not have a free rein to do so since
involvement in mainstream politics brings with it a range of constraints which
serve to dilute the “ideological purity” of such religion-based parties (Basu
2001). For example, the Akalis have had to keep amicable relations with the
“Hindu nationalist” Jan Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) when the
latter happened to be coalition partners at the state and/or national level,
and so have had to ensure their politics does not acquire an overtly anti-Hindu
edge. Also, there is the distinct possibility that engaging in rhetoric deemed
to be too provocative could trigger legal or criminal proceedings from the
government or offended parties, a predicament which obviously most reputable
politicians would want to steer clear of.
A second argument in support of the claim that the policies
and behaviour of the Akali Dal were responsible for the rise of Sikh
secessionism is that since the Akalis believe “in the inseparability of religion
and politics” as per the miri-piri doctrine,9 there
was an inevitable clash with the ideologically secular Indian nation state
(Singh 1994: 88; Pettigrew 1987: 4). With regard to the miri-piri doctrine
clashing with the “secular” Indian nation state, it is imperative that one
acknowledges the difference between ideological veneer and empirical reality.
This is not something that the discourse has managed to do successfully. For,
it should not be forgotten that since independence the Akalis have merged with
the Congress on two separate occasions, thereby effectively relinquishing their
temporal aspect.
At the same time, the extent to which the Indian nation
state can be described as secular is debatable given the inclusion of religion
within its constitutional and legal systems (Smith 1963). In addition, it must
be stressed that the “official” ideological position of a party does not
necessarily determine the ideological position of its members. It is perfectly
conceivable to have secular and broad-minded members of supposedly communal
parties such as the Akalis or the BJP, just as it is conceivable to have
religiously bigoted Congressmen. According to Sucha Singh Gill and K C Singhal,
many past Congress leaders have held an RSS background, just as many prominent
Sikh leaders of the Congress were previously a part of the Akali Dal and “some
of them have been and some remain blatant communal Sikhs” (Gill and Singhal
1984: 607). Therefore, in reality, this apparent irreconcilable ideological
clash between miri-piri on the one hand and secularism on the other is too
simplistic, and it is most likely that such a difference matters little in
day-to-day politics.
The third argument, in sync with the official New Delhi
line, is that senior Akali representatives maintained an ambiguous position on
the issue of Sikh separatism, thereby providing “a respectable cover for
subversive and anti-national forces to operate in the secure knowledge that
they could not be politically disowned” (White Paper 1984: 7). This has been
explained as a direct consequence of Akali factionalism, whereby non-ruling
factions would, rather opportunistically, engage in a more extremist or
populist rhetoric so as to maintain visibility (Major 1987: 47).
Going slightly further, certain commentators have suggested,
or at least implied, that certain Akalis provided material support to terrorist
groups. For instance, many commentators claim that senior Akalis such as Jagdev
Singh Talwandi and Sukhjinder Singh had palpable links to the militants and
openly expressed slogans in favour of Khalistan (Major 1987: 47; Sahota and
Sahota 1993: 149). Indicating direct Akali involvement in the militancy, one
disgruntled former Ropar-based militant of the Babbar Khalsa, Amar Singh,
accused the Akalis of
[giving]
a ladder to a person and [asking] him to scale a wall. But once he is on top,
they remove it. They were and are opportunists who are always in need of people
like me who they can use for their personal gain. Once their purpose is solved,
they turn their backs. (qtd in Singh 1996: 42)
Albeit not exactly an independent voice in the Punjab
insurgency, the late director general of police in Punjab, K P S Gill (2001:
31), mentioning his objection to the centre’s decision to lift President’s Rule
in Punjab in 1985, said:
I
was convinced that there was no real difference between the fundamental
thinking of the Akalis and the terrorists—and that the Akalis completely lacked
the desire and the will to contain terrorism.
As far as senior Akalis holding an ambiguous position on
Khalistan or even supporting militant groups is concerned, it is hard to
disagree. Though how prevalent such Akali–militant relations happened to be,
remains a matter of opinion. Still, it is fair to say that the behaviour of
certain Akalis with respect to militants certainly aided in fuelling the
militancy rather than abating it.
Overall, the policies and behaviour of the Akali Dal did
indeed contribute towards the rise of the Khalistan movement. However, the
associated discourse can be accused of being slightly crude in its reading of
the Akali contribution towards the rise of militancy, especially with respect
to the clash between miri-piri and secularism. Arguably, the strongest
contribution in this category has to do with the ambiguous relationship between
the Akalis and militant cells, which can be attributed to the factionalised
nature of the party, with each aiming to outmanoeuvre the other in terms of
their ideological purity and commitment to the “Sikh cause.”
Role of Pakistan
The fourth category of realpolitik explanations relates to
those that implicate India’s antagonistic rival, Pakistan, in the rise of the
Khalistan movement. In this argument, the rationale is that Pakistan wanted to
weaken India either through overseeing its balkanisation and/or creating a
“headache” for them to use as leverage against India’s alleged proxy support of
secessionist elements within Pakistan (Prakash 2008: 579).
One of the main accusations levelled against Pakistan is
that, under the auspices of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan
allowed its territory along the Indian border to be used as a safe haven for
Sikhs crossing over from India. The second accusation was that Sikhs crossing
the border into Pakistan were actually indoctrinated (if they were not
committed to the Khalistan cause already), trained and armed by the ISI for the
purpose of re-entering Indian territory to conduct combat operations against
the latter’s state forces (La Brack 1999: 381; Singh 1994: 92; Rudra 2005: 55).
The second accusation is suggestive of a higher level of complicity from
Pakistan’s end. The evidence of the above points appears to be fairly
conclusive.
[a]lmost
all the major terrorist leaders from Dr Sohan Singh, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal
(heads of two separate Panthic Committees) to Sukhdev Singh Dossuwal and
Wadhawa Singh of Babbar Khalsa, Atinder Pal Singh of AISSF (later to become MP
from Patiala) and Gurjit Singh of Bhindranwale Jatha were in Pakistan … Thanks
to a benevolent Pakistan government, very soon every major terrorist
outfit—Khalistan Commando Force, Babbar Khalsa International, AISSF, Akal
Federation, Bhindranwale Tiger Force, etc—had its own training centre.
(Narayanan 1996: 42)
Many pro-Khalistanis based in India publicly asked for
material support from Pakistan in their quest for independence. This was taken
by many to be further proof of Pakistan’s involvement in the movement, although
these connections could have been circumstantial. For example, prominent
Punjab-based Khalistani Sukhjinder Singh was quoted as saying, “any help
offered by other countries, including Pakistan, in the struggle for “Khalistan”
would be welcome” (qtd in Grewal 2006: 103).
Moreover, the proposed maps or territorial claims of
Khalistan extending beyond the territory of Indian Punjab (Singh 1994: 110–11)
habitually excluded areas under Pakistani jurisdiction, even though the latter
is home to many culturally important sites to the Sikh community that would
seem appropriate to be included within any future Khalistan state. According to
Kanwarpal Singh, spokesperson of the Amritsar-based Dal Khalsa, when asked
whether Khalistan should include the historically important Nankana Sahib
(birthplace of Guru Nanak Dev) and Lahore (the seat of Maharajah Ranjit Singh’s
empire), both currently in Pakistani Punjab territory, he remarked, “We can’t
change what has happened in the past, it’s not practical to demand the
inclusion of those areas outside the current state boundaries.”10
The final piece of circumstantial evidence in support of
Pakistani involvement was that notable Khalistani figures in the diaspora
regularly travelled to Pakistan and were treated with respect by the Pakistani
rulers. For example, Jagjit Singh Chauhan, founder of the National Council of
Khalistan, was referred to as the “Father of the Sikh Nation” by Yahya Khan
during a trip to Pakistan in 1971. It is well known that US-based Khalistani
Ganga Singh Dhillon visited Pakistan on many occasions and was a close friend
of Gen Zia-ul Haq (Grewal 2006: 103–04; Sahota and Sahota 1993: 123).
As such, it is very difficult to argue against the view that
Pakistan played a role in fuelling the Khalistan militancy. However, the extent
and time span of Pakistan’s contribution is ambiguous. Other than certain
Indian hawks or Congress officials who may dispute otherwise, it cannot be
seriously considered that Pakistan or their contribution alone can explain the
rise of the Khalistan militancy. Despite claims that “Chinese marked”11 bullets
were found in the Golden Temple after Operation Blue Star (White Paper 1984:
170), it is clear that it was predominantly internal factors that played the
largest role in creating the disturbances during the early years of the
movement at least. Pakistani involvement was more of an issue from 1985 onwards
once President’s Rule had been lifted and the counter-insurgency operation was
in full swing.
In Conclusion
This article has identified and interrogated the strength of
the realpolitik explanations that exist within the wider discourse surrounding
the Khalistan movement. These explanations have spanned across four broad
areas: the “over-centralisation” of power from New Delhi, the policies and
behaviour of Congress (I), the policies and behaviour of the Akali Dal, and the
role of Pakistan.
With respect to the “over-centralisation” thesis, it is
evident that centralisation contributed towards, or at least was cited as a
justification for, Sikh secessionism. However, the analysis in this section
revealed that alternative points or approaches that the Indian state could have
followed were not necessarily guaranteed to avert the risk of Khalistan. In
terms of the policies and behaviour of the Congress (I), this is probably the
most prominent of all the realpolitik explanations advanced in the wider
discourse. This is hardly surprising given that it is the normative function of
the centre to maintain the unity and integrity of the nation state. Given the
context, many of the overt and covert methods used by the Congress (I) to quell
dissent, although criticised by many in the wider discourse, appeared to be
quite sensible or non-radical steps.
As far as the policies and behaviour of the Akalis are concerned,
as with the section on the Congress (I), it is evident that they contributed to
the rise of the militancy. This was owed more so to the factionalised nature of
the party, which made competition for the Sikh vote particularly ferocious,
with a general movement of non-ruling factions in particular towards more
extreme positions, and which translated into direct or indirect support for
secessionism. Yet, to solely blame the Akalis for the rise of the militancy
would be unfair because it is clear that they were just one of the many
elements involved, albeit they were quite an important element.
Finally, although Pakistan’s role is part of the wider
discourse, it was probably the least prevalent issue. While it is clear that
Pakistan had a role to play in the militancy, it became apparent only after
the cataclysmic events of the mid-1980s, such as Operation Blue Star, the
anti-Sikh pogroms, and the commencement of counter-insurgency operations
across Punjab. Therefore, the rise of militancy prior to that period, albeit
comparatively limited, had to be owed to other factors.
Update
Youth sentenced to life: Feb., 13, 2019:
The Dal Khalsa Monday announced a dharna at
the doorsteps of Nawanshahr district and sessions court on February 13, days
after three Sikh youths were sentenced to life imprisonment for waging war
against the state. Surjit Singh (27), Arvinder Singh (29) and Ranjit Singh (29)
were held guilty based on books, literature, pamphlets that were recovered from
them following their arrest in 2016. It was alleged that the youth had kept the
literature to incite people to establish a separate state of Khalistan. The
order of the court indicting the trio merely for possession of books related to
Sikh struggle and other Khalistani literature is highly unjust, illegal and
disturbing,” the party said in a statement. The decision has clearly violated
principles of natural justice and fair play. “We will not remain silent
spectators and we will take all legal and civil steps against this unjust
judicial overreach,” he said. “The three
youth never indulged in any violent activity, neither did anyone else allegedly
influenced by them. The court held the trio guilty on mere possession of
pamphlets,” said Kanwarpal Singh, spokesperson, Dal Khalsa. a case against Arvinder and the two others
under IPC sections 121, 121-A (waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting
waging of war, against the Government of India) and section 10/13 of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. As per Arvinder’s family, he had been
working in Doha since 2011 and had returned to Punjab in late 2015 to get
married. After around five months of his marriage, he was arrested and charged
with waging war against state. The family claimed he had in his possession some
books written by former Lt General KS Brar, who led the Operation Blue Star in
1984, some posters carrying the word Khalistan and literature related to Sikh
religion. Police had said that he was trying to enroll Sikh youths from Punjab
to join him to wage war against the state.
Another youth, Surjit was a ‘Pathi’ (a clergy) before he was arrested by
police. “Oh Path karda see te kadi kise jhagre vich ni pia, pata ni eh case
kiddan aa giya ude te (He used to perform religious things and has never been
involved in any anti-social activities. I don’t know his name got involved in
this case),” said his father Tek Singh. Ranjit Singh was also a Pathi. “We have
joint family and anyone can ask about our family’s reputation in the village.
We don’t know how our son’s name cropped up in this case,” Ranjit’s father
Kashmir Singh said.
Update : Mar.,12,2019:
...the narcotics control bureau mentioned a visiting official from a large European nation, who warned that the Khalistan movement was rearing its head again. He speculated that a "lost generation" in Punjab – lost partly to drugs, partly to shrinking job opportunities and reluctance to work on the family land – was susceptible to separatism because there was nothing to do and it provided them with purpose. The drug menace and allegations that state ministers were profiting off of Punjab's drug addiction epidemic peaked during the 2017 assembly election, and then seemed to die down again.
Khalistan: Apr., 15, 2019: SFJ legal
adviser Gurpatwant Singh Pannun claimed that authorities in Pakistan had
stopped the group's activists from putting up posters and banners of the
Khalistan referendum campaign at Gurdwara Panja Sahib in Hassan Abdal at the behest of the Narendra
Modi government
Pakistan Foreign Policy: June, 7,
2019:There was news that Pakistan had banned peaceful
rallies for Sikh democracy – aka the Khalistan movement. The same international
Sikh grass roots activists that had rallied to Pakistan’s defence after Pulwama
were prohibited from engaging
in a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration whose essence was fraternal in spirit
to Pakistan.
Khalistan update: July, 22, 2019:
India is politicizing the Kartarpur Corridor by its demand that Pakistan
prevent nationalist Sikhs from sharing their pro-Khalistan sentiment with
pilgrims along the route, which reveals just how scared it is of this national
liberation movement and the potentially far-reaching domestic political
consequences of its revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution if that 1973
manifesto ever enjoys a resurgence of popularity.
The Kartarpur
Corridor
India media reported that
their country’s officials recently complained to Pakistan about the
pro-Khalistan activities that are supposedly taking place on its side of the
border, demanding that their neighbor prevent them from occurring along the
Kartarpur Corridor that the two are presently negotiating to open before the
550th birth anniversary of Baba Guru Nanak in November. The Gurdwara Darbar
Sahib Kartarpur sits just across the border in Pakistan from India’s
majority-Sikh state of Punjab and is revered by this religion’s adherents as
the site of their founder’s final resting place, hence why PM Khan prioritized
the creation of this visa-free corridor immediately after he took office last
August in advance of this hugely symbolic upcoming anniversary. India is very
concerned, however, that its Sikh minority will be exposed to the separatist
sentiments expressed by the Khalistani national liberation movement during
their pilgrimages on Pakistani territory, and it’s deathly afraid that millions
of this demographic could therefore feel emboldened to give this cause a fresh
impetus once they return home and consequently pose a serious challenge to the
state.
The Khalistan
Movement
Relations between the
Sikhs and the central government haven’t been good after former Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi ordered the 1984 “Operation Blue Star”
massive military assault on the Harmandir Sahib in response to leaders of the
Khalistan movement seeking refuge there two years prior. Two of the Indian
leader’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her by the end of the year as revenge for
the bloodshed that she brought upon their people in one of their holiest sites,
which briefly triggered anti-Sikh pogroms all across the country. Those events,
more so than any others, inspired many Sikhs to support outright Khalistani
separatism instead of the autonomous goals originally laid out in the
revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution of 1973. The
far-reaching domestic political significance of that document will be returned
to shortly in this analysis, but at this moment it’s enough to recognize that
the Khalistani cause itself initially started out as a states-rights movement
advocating constitutional reform and didn’t begin to popularly take on its
contemporary separatist character until after “Operation Blue Star” forever
ruined what little trust remained up until that point between the Sikhs and the
central government.
Two Sets of Concerns
India officially
downplays the support that the Khalistani cause has among the millions of Sikhs
in its territory, but its politicized concerns that Pakistan won’t prevent
pro-Khalistani activities from taking place along this route reveal just how
scared it really is of this national liberation movement and strongly suggest
that the members of its religious minority are much more sympathetic to that
cause that New Delhi cares to publicly admit. From a military perspective, the
“nightmare scenario” of a second rebellion along India’s sensitive western
borderlands would complement the ongoing one in Kashmir and make it much more
difficult for the country’s armed forces to confidently maintain a credible
forward-operating posture against Pakistan if they’re forced to also confront
the possibility of behind-the-lines attacks by Khalistani separatists in the
event of another conventional conflict with their neighbor. While this factor
certainly shouldn’t be underestimated, it’s more so the nationwide political
strategic impact of the Khalistani cause as enshrined in the 1973 Anandpur
Sahib Resolution that India fears the most.
A Revolutionary
Manifesto
That revolutionary
manifesto is significant in this context because it advocates sweeping
administrative-territorial reform on the basis of a fully federalized state
whose newly created units would more accurately represent the country’s
linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity than the imperfect framework
implemented by the 1956 States Reorganization Act that relied mostly on the
creation of large states around the linguistic majority of a given region. In
pursuit of their State of Khalistan, activists sought to incorporate the Sikh
areas of neighboring states into their proposed political entity, “thus
bringing main contiguous Sikh population and Sikh habitats with this autonomous
Sikh region as an integral part of the Union of India.” This “irredentist”
vision mirrors that of the Nagas on the complete opposite side of the country
who want all Naga-inhabited areas under the jurisdiction of what they call
Nagalim, which recent reports from
Northeastern India indicate might have been secretly agreed to by New Delhi as
part of the mysterious 2015 framework agreement that it clinched with a rebel
faction and whose details have yet to be revealed.
Eastern Concessions
Might Trigger A Western Reaction
In the event that New
Delhi concedes to the Nagas’ demand for Nagalim, even if only in the sense of
establishing a pan-Naga cultural body in the Naga-inhabited areas of the
neighboring states instead of formally revising regional borders and risking a
geopolitical explosion in the “Indian Balkans“,
then it would automatically trigger a reaction in Khalistan. The authorities
are evidently trying to prevent that scenario from transpiring by doing their
utmost to pressure Pakistan to ensure that India’s Sikh pilgrims aren’t exposed
to pro-Khalistan sentiment while traveling along the Kartarpur Corridor, but
the proverbially cat has been out of the bag for three and a half decades
already since “Operation Blue Star” heralded the point of no return in the
Sikhs’ relations with the central government. That doesn’t necessarily mean
that all supporters of the Khalistani national liberation movement are in favor
of separatism, but just that the basis of their cause as elaborated in the 1973
Anandpur Sahib Resolution could predictably enjoy a resurgence of popular
support if New Delhi gives the Nagas some form of Nagalim, which could also
inspire other minorities in the country to rise up as well.
Another Issue of
Global Renown?
This strategic risk
assessment isn’t just speculation but is backed up by none other than the
Indian Defence Ministry’s latest report about the global success that
Pakistan has had over the past year under PM Khan’s leadership in raising
awareness about the Kashmiri cause. It’s therefore not inconceivable that the
Khalistani one could soon enjoy similar success as a result of the emerging relationship
between Nagalim and the Kartarpur Corridor, which would naturally also bring
worldwide attention to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s federalist vision of
administrative-territorial reform. The Indian government has been doing
everything in its power to keep its many minorities in the dark about that
political proposal because it’s afraid that this suggested power-sharing
arrangement would eventually encourage outright separatism if it ever came to
pass, to say nothing of weakening the current Hindutva authorities’ influence
over states outside of the their traditional bastion of support in the
“Hindi/Cow Belt”, but New Delhi wouldn’t be able to maintain its policy of
censorship if that manifesto achieved as much global renown as the Kashmiri
cause.
An Alternative Model for
Shaping India’s Future
There’s no way that
India could stop its many minorities from becoming aware of this decentralized
and more democratic alternative to the country’s current centralized fascism if
the Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s political vision went viral on social media as
a result of a new worldwide awareness campaign modeled off of the successful
Kashmiri one. This could be especially impactful in the domestic political
sense if it occurs ahead of what seems poised to be the country’s large-scale social disruption in the next decade
caused by its looming agricultural crisis, during which time identity conflicts
might predictably explode given the socio-political and economic dynamics
typically associated with transformational scenarios of that sort. The current
authorities are already doing all they can to snuff out secular and
minority-led political forces in the country as part of their quest to create
the Hindu Rashtra of Akhand Bharatby
that time, but these two main obstacles to their goal could present a much more
serious challenge if they merged and presented a forward-looking alternative
vision inspired by the decentralized and democratic principles enshrined in the
Anandpur Sahib Resolution.
Concluding Thoughts
In view of everything
that’s been touched upon in this analysis, India’s fear of Khalistan stems more
from the domestic political consequences that the widespread popularization of
this national liberation movement’s revolutionary Anandpur Sahib Resolution
could have than the military implications pertaining to the possible creation
of an independent state. There are many more sympathizers of the Khalistani
cause in the Indian state of Punjab than New Delhi will admit, which is why
it’s so concerned that the possible pilgrimage of millions of this region’s
majority-Sikh inhabitants to Pakistan via the Kartarpur Corridor will expose
this strategically located minority to separatist sentiment that will in turn
embolden them to give a fresh impetus to the cause upon their return home. New
Delhi’s reported concessions regarding Nagalim could trigger a Khalistani
reaction if/when they’re made public, which might realistically help that
latter cause receive as much global renown as the neighboring Kashmiri one. In
that scenario, the resurgence in popularity that its 1973 manifesto might have
could finally give secular and minority-led forces an alternative vision for
challenging the state’s Hindutva one.
Agenda for Khalistan supporters: July, 22,, 2019: The Khalistan national
liberation movement should emphasize the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution’s
decentralizing and democratic principles in order to become the core of a new
nationwide opposition movement that inspires India’s diverse population to unite
in challenging the centralizing and fascist tendencies of the country’s current
Hindutva rulers.
The Roots Of India’s Fear
India’s
Hindutva rulers are deathly afraid of the Khalistan national liberation
movement, though not so much for the separatism that it supports
but because of the decentralizing and democratic principles enshrined in its
1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution. That
revolutionary document could enable the movement to become the core of a
nationwide opposition movement to the BJP’s vision of creating a Hindu Rashtra,
but only if the country’s diverse population becomes aware of it in the first
place. New Delhi has been doing all that it can over the decades to suppress
any serious discussion about the constitutional reforms contained in that
manifesto, which is why the Khalistan movement should prioritize spreading its
details far and wide in order to counter the state’s de-facto censorship of
their proposals.
Making The Best Of Bad Developments
India
is already extremely worried about the political
consequences of the Kashmiri national liberation movement‘s
recent successes in raising awareness about their cause, so the Khalistani one
would do well to emulate its informational tactics in order to achieve a
similar level of global renown. The Sikhs For Justice’s Referendum 2020 plans
to hold a vote on Punjab’s independence are a step in the right direction, and
the India’s recent
banning of this peaceful group could be taken advantage of
to bring even more attention to their goals, as could Twitter’s scandalous
suspension of the account held by the organization’s lawyer
at New Delhi’s demand. The contemporary zeitgeist is such that people all
across the world are suspicious of states banning peaceful groups and Big Tech
companies shutting down activist accounts, so that all works in Khalistan’s
favor.
The
movement should capitalize on both of these developments by reaching out to
other peaceful organizations within India and abroad that have been banned by
their countries and/or Big Tech companies for political reasons. This strategy
could allow the Sikhs For Justice to expand their network of supporters and
possibly even gain access to other media platforms, which would further the
goal of popularizing the decentralizing and democratic principles articulated
in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The international community would become more
sympathetic to the Khalistan cause if they were made aware of its political
foundations, while a new Indian opposition movement could coalesce around its
revolutionary vision and ultimately pose the greatest challenge to the
country’s Hindutva rulers.
Dismantling The Bollywood Myth About India
It’s
that latter development that could change India forever if it succeeds, but
there would have to be additional informational components to this strategy in
order to make it more viable, especially in the realm of international public
opinion. It’s not enough for the average person to know what the Khalistan
national liberation movement is, but for influential ones (especially in social
media and NGOs) and foreign government officials to be aware of it too. Once
people hear about it, they should also be informed of India’s 1984 “Operation
Blue Star” against the Harmandir Sahib, one of Sikhism holiest
places. Speaking of which, many people don’t even know that Sikhism is its own
separate religion and wrongly think that it’s a sect of Hinduism, so that
misperception should be corrected whenever possible.
That’s
very important since Khalistan’s case would engender more international
sympathy — and consequently, pressure on the Indian government — if people
learned that New Delhi doesn’t even recognize the religion’s separate standing
which is one of its adherents’ many grievances against the Indian government.
The other more obvious one is “Operation Blue Star”, the legacy of which
continues to poison the Sikhs’ relations with the state and explains why the
decision was made to pursue separatism as opposed to the federal principles
originally proposed in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. It also powerfully
contradicts the notion that India is a peace-loving country that wouldn’t dare
kill its own people like other ones with much worse international reputations
have done before on a similar scale to near-unanimous global condemnation each
time.
Closing Down The “Prison Of Nations”
Dismantling the Bollywood myth about India reveals that the contemporary
civilization-state is actually a “prison of nations” like the USSR was once
described, though one in which its many linguistic, ethnic, religious, and
regional minorities are regularly oppressed without barely anyone abroad
uttering a word of support on their behalf. While the Kashmiri struggle is the
most well-known one in India today, the state has succeeded in discrediting it
to a certain extent because of the militant tactics that some of its members have
resorted to out of desperation, but the Sikhs For Justice’s purely peaceful
approach to Referendum 2020 means that it’s not at risk of having its
international reputation tarnished on that basis. That said, the organization
would do well to raise the concern that India might be planning a brutal
crackdown against it in the coming future.
Referendum
2020 will still happen in spite of India banning the group, but the state could
exploit its “unlawful” designation as a pretext for using force against it in
order to stop the vote. Depending on how much the Sikh majority of Punjab
publicly expresses its support for this plebiscite in the run-up to the event,
the authorities might declare part or all of the region a “disturbed area” in
line with the controversial 1958 Armed Forces
(Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) that’s been abused for over half a
century to carry out
crimes against targeted populations all across the country that
include arbitrary arrests and even extrajudicial executions. The Sikhs For
Justice should warn the world about this dangerous scenario ahead of time in
the hopes that foreign pressure could be put upon India to eschew this course
of action.
Fleshing Out The Future Vision Of Federalism
Unlike
the Kashmiris, many Sikhs live in the influential Western countries of the US,
UK, and Canada, where they’re sometimes prominent members of their communities
who command a lot of respect. This preconditions the citizens of those
countries to having sympathy for the Khalistani cause, which could be furthered
by those individuals using local, regional, and national media to advance the aforementioned
informational strategy. What’s most important is to bring this issue to a high
level of discourse that succeeds in breaking through the Indian state’s
censorship about it within the country, thereby inspiring all Hindutva
opponents — and especially minority groups with similar ambitions as
Khalistan’s and/or who would benefit the most from decentralization — to unite
in presenting an alternative national vision based on the 1973 manifesto.
The
proposals for decentralization and democracy shouldn’t just be kept at the
level of slogans, however, but should be elaborated upon in a detailed fashion
for their intended domestic audience and interested members of the
international one who want to know more about what exactly it entails. It might
be helpful to learn from the Kurds’ system of “democratic
confederalism” that they adapted from the late anarchist thinker
Murray Bookchin’s theories about “Communalism”
since their vision broadly aligns with the one expressed in the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution. That could add some substance to how they envision the New India
functioning if the opposition movement that they might inspire ever ends up
coming to power, as well as importantly give voters a sense of exactly how
different it would be than the current centralized and fascist status quo.
Concluding Thoughts
All
in all, the Khalistan movement must appreciate the importance of perception
management and media messaging in spreading awareness of its goals across India
and the rest of the world. Conceiving of itself as the core of a new nationwide
opposition to Hindutva based on the decentralizing and democratic principles of
the Anandpur Sahib Resolution would imbue the government’s many opponents with
a much-needed sense of vision to fill the void left by Congress’ lack thereof,
which could therefore transform the rest of rump India for the better in the
event of Khalistan’s eventual secession. Even prior to the scenario of its
national liberation campaign succeeding, the Sikhs can still play a leading
role in national affairs by following this strategy.
August 15 as Black day: Aug., 13, 2109: Extending their solidarity with Kashmiri
people and their cause, radical Sikh organization Dal Khalsa besides SAD
(Amritsar), United Akali Dal and Sikh Youth of Punjab have decided to observe
August 15 as Black Day. Kanwar Pal Singh of Dal Khalsa said that they will
stage protests on Independence Day against the atrocities, political
subjugation and denial of rights to Sikhs in the last seven decades. Their
activists will hold a two-hour demonstration at 15 district headquarters. He
fired a salvo against Shiromani Akali Dal for supporting NDA Government to
strip J&K of its special status. Referring to PM Modi’s address in which he
said article 370 and 35-A paved way to secessionism in Kashmir, Singh reminded
that Modi’s one-time mentor and BJP stalwart L K Advani has dubbed the Anandpur
Sahib resolution as secessionist document in his book “My country, My life”. He
slammed BJP leaders including Haryana chief minister for using derogatory words
against Kashmiri women.
Blue
Star: Jun., 10, 2020:
Eight-day long Operation Blue Star (OBS) still haunts the Sikh community
although 36 years have passed. For those who lived through Operation Blue Star
(OBS), the situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir today brings back vivid
memories of what they went through in 1984. OBS was an official beginning of a systematic purge of the
Sikhs community in India. Over 100,000 Sikhs (mostly youth) were killed in the
next four years (till 1988) while over 25,000 victims were left crippled for
the whole of their lives. Over 20,000 Sikh families migrated out of India
(mostly in Canada, United States, United Kingdom) after this event as they felt
India does not own them and they were alien in their land people in Amritsar
could not have imagined in their wildest dreams in mid-May .1984 that their
beloved Golden Temple would be fired upon by their own Army.The OBS assault
started on June 1, 1984, and continued till the night of June 8. Indian
government came out a cooked, fictional, concocted and fabricated ‘White Paper’
on Operation Blue Star, but no one believed it. Then as now, the official
version projected the government’s decision as absolutely justified, given the
fact that militant leader JS Bhindranwale had dug in his heels inside the
Golden Temple with his heavily armed followers. Then as now, came the whitewash
of the terrible fallout. Desperate to restore the Akal Takht, reduced to rubble
by tank fire, the Centre ultimately found a little-known Nihang to undertake
‘kar seva’, the voluntary labour with which Sikhs build their gurdwaras. “Stories
coming out from Punjab (Indian Punjab) of Army excesses resulted in anarchy
within the Indian Army and Punjab Police. As many as 2,800 Sikh soldiers
deserting their regiments. Three officers were shot by deserters; one, Brig SC
Puri, died. Many deserters were jailed, court-martialed, and dismissed. The 9th
battalion of the Sikh Regiment, the first to react, was never raised again,”
said Jyoti Punwani in her article published on August 2, 2019, in New Indian
Express under the .One of the most important events related to OBS is the
“Mutiny of 9th battalion of the Sikh Regiment” that started from Bihar and spread
as far as Rajasthan and over 2600 Sikh soldiers were killed by Indian Police
and Army after this mutiny and their bodies were not handed over to their
relatives. One serving Brigadier Brig Puri was shot dead at brigade
headquarters in Ramgarh in Bihar by Sikh soldiers. Sikh Soldiers were under
constant surveillance in the Indian Air Force, Army, and Indian Navy for years
to come after this incident. Operation Blue Star was planned by RAW to purge
the rising demand of the Khalistan movement. It was planned well before it
started to purge the rising demand of the Khalistan movement. The Khalistan
movement was a politico-religious Sikh nationalist movement which aimed at
creating an independent state for Sikhs inside the current North-Western
Republic of India. Even though the Khalistan movement started in the early
1940s and 1950s, it gained popularity in 1970s when former East Pakistan became
“Bangladesh”. Sikhs understood that India helped Bangalis to form their
separate country on the bases of language, culture, ethnicity then why Sikh
should not get their own separate country on the same basis Her murder was instantly followed by Anti-Sikh
riots spread all over India, killing more than 8,000 Sikhs in New Delhi alone
in four days, and an estimated 20,000 or more Sikhs were killed in 40 cities
across India. At least 50,000 Sikh families were displaced and their
belongings, homes, shops, transport, offices, and businesses were looted and
burnt down. Like recent Anti-Muslim Delhi Riots which took place in February
2020, Hindus attacked Sikhs with iron rods, knives, clubs, and combustible
material (including kerosene and petrol). They entered Sikh neighbourhoods,
killing Sikhs indiscriminately and destroying shops and houses.Armed mobs
stopped buses and trains in and near Delhi, pulling off Sikh passengers for
lynching; some were burnt alive. Others were dragged from their homes and hacked
to death, and Sikh women were reportedly gang-raped and acid was thrown on
them. Anti-Sikhs Riots continued for four days (like recent Anti-Muslims riots
in Delhi) with the complete support of Police and paramilitary forces all over
India. The next two years for Sikh community were very punitive and their
economic survival was at stake. Hindu community did not forgive them and caused
all kinds of social and economic boycotts of the Sikh community. The first
Operation Black Thunder took place on April 30, 1986, and was carried out by
Black Cat commandos of National Security Guards (NSG) to remove Sikh militants
from the Golden Temple. Second Operation Black Thunder began on May 9, 1988,
and both operations cost disappearance of over 7,000 young Sikhs and killing of
over 3,500 undocumented youth from Indian Punjab. Indian Army used tanks,
artillery, helicopters, and armored vehicles in this Operation. Retired Sikh
bureaucrats claimed that Intelligence Units working in universities all over
India were keeping eyes on Sikh students almost two years before Operation Blue
Star and their (students) data had been compiled with details. Indian Army
simultaneously attacked over 45 gurdwaras in Punjab and did massacre all over
Punjab which was not confined only to Amritsar. Over 50,000 Sikhs were killed
within the first three weeks of Operation and businesses and shops belonging to
Sikhs were looted by Indian Army and Hindu mobs. Thousands of Sikh girls and
women were raped by soldiers of the Indian Army and Hindu Policemen who were
sent from Delhi. It is pertinent to mention that pro-Hindu leaders including LK
Advani, Vajpayee demanded Army action against Sikhs in 1984 and led the
anti-Sikh Movement. Economic cost and social deprivation faced by Sikh
Community after OBS, Anti Sikh Riots, and Operation Black Thunder (Part I and
II) are still undocumented and need detailed research work. https://dnd.com.pk/from-operation-blue-star-to-operation-black-thunder/190989
India began its nation-building project, bringing the immense challenge of forging a common identity among large and religiously, linguistically, and culturally diverse populations. What a majority of the total population shared, though, was a Hindu identity, and this religion became the center around which political leaders decided to coalesce Indian national identity, much to the dismay of India’s minority populations.
Indian leadership came to see religious minorities as a threat to their nation-building project, viewing Sikhs with particular suspicion and disdain, recognizing they catalyzed anti-colonial efforts and played a leading role in them. They were also aware that Sikhs still had recent memories of political autonomy in Punjab. Indian elites worried about Punjab becoming a majority Sikh state that would gain in political power and threaten the stability of young India. This led Indian leadership to deny Punjab and its Sikhs consequential rights that were afforded to other states, including official language status for Punjabi and its own state capital. India also weakened Punjab’s political power by carving out territory from it for other states, such as Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, contravening riparian law, an international norm, India diverted Punjab’s river waters to other states and regions, a massive economic blow to the state long-known as the breadbasket of India, and a threat to the livelihood of Punjab’s agrarian society.
Punjabi Sikhs soon began agitating against the Indian government, protesting the erosion of its cultural, economic, and political rights. In 1978, Sikh leadership drafted the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, which laid out a list of demands to safeguard the rights of Sikhs in Punjab and other minorities around India.
A charismatic Sikh leader from a religious seminary emerged during this period, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, whose ascent caught the eye of the Indian government. Bhindranwale spoke adamantly against the infringements of the Indian state, which by this stage had escalated to include gross human rights violations. He called on Sikhs and minorities everywhere to stand up against oppression. Citing him as an anti-national who threatened India’s stability, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi launched a military assault against him and his followers at the Golden Temple of Amritsar—the most significant site for Sikhs—on a major religious holiday. Bhindranwale was killed in the assault, along with thousands of other Sikh pilgrims who were worshipping there.
The global Sikh community was furious about the government’s attack and demanded justice. In this moment, the movement for a separate Sikh homeland was reborn. Bhindranwale had stated openly that he neither supported nor rejected the idea of Khalistan – but that if the Indian government ever invaded the Golden Temple complex, the foundation for an independent Sikh homeland would be laid.
Later that year, Ms. Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, presumably to avenge her assault on the Golden Temple. In the days that followed, the ruling Congress Party, utilizing state agencies and infrastructure, organized violent anti-Sikh pogroms across North India, focused primarily on the Indian capital of New Delhi. The pogroms left thousands of Sikhs dead, thousands more displaced, and all Sikhs wondering if they could ever have a home in India.
Bhindranwale’s prediction came true. The anti-Sikh violence of 1984 made many Sikhs feel like the pattern of abuses under Indian leadership would not end, and it fueled a new movement for Sikh self-determination. In July of 1984, Sikhs gathered in Madison Garden in New York City and announced their commitment “to support the struggle of Sikhs in the Punjab for self-determination and the preservation of their distinct and religious identity.” Less than two years later, thousands of Sikhs gathered at the Golden Temple in their political tradition of Sarbat Khalsa and announced a resolution to recognize Khalistan.
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Punjab was enmeshed in a violent struggle. A segment of the Sikh population took up armed resistance, with the aim of winning an independent Sikh state, free from the tyranny of India. This period of insurgency is often what westerners mean when they are referring to the Khalistan Movement.
While India accused militants of targeting politicians and civilians, Indian security forces employed widespread and systematic abuses for over a decade, including torture, murder, and enforced disappearances, targeting anyone it suspected of being involved in the insurgency or political movement for self-determination. In the years since, human rights defenders and researchers have uncovered the extent of India’s atrocity crimes. In 1995, human rights defender Jaswant Singh Khalra released official records demonstrating Punjab Police had abducted, killed and secretly cremated thousands of Punjabi Sikhs. Punjab Police subsequently abducted, tortured, and killed Khalra for refusing to retract his findings. In 2017, new evidence demonstrated more than 8,000 additional extra-judicial killings, bringing total estimates to 25,000.
Although the violent conflict subsided by the mid-1990s, the culture of impunity for gross human rights violations and extra-judicial violence continues to grip Punjab. None of the chief architects of the crimes against humanity have been brought to account, nor have survivors and their communities been given reparations. Moreover, the government continues to use the specter of terrorism to target its critics, and the central issue of the denuding of Punjab’s river waters serves as a continuing flashpoint.
This tension was evident over the last couple of years, when India attacked Sikhs during the 2022 Farmers Protests by calling the protestors “Khalistanis and “Anti-nationals.” The accusations fell on deaf ears, with global recognition that Sikhs and others were organizing to protect their agrarian livelihoods. The government used these same tactics this past spring during their manhunt for Sikh leader Amritpal Singh—again, using the threat of national security to violate human rights, targeting journalists and community organizers in dragnet operations. Sikhs have become desensitized to these spurious accusations, well accustomed to the cynical nationalist playbook: demonize minorities to galvanize the Hindu majority. That this strategy is being deployed in the midst of an election year is no coincidence. Modi and his BJP regime have used this program diligently for two decades.
And yet, the Indian government’s alleged attempts to kill foreign nationals on foreign soil indicate a shifting approach. Modi’s India is now willing to engage transnational repression and murder of his critics, joining the ranks of China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia with these practices.
As India continues its slide from democracy to authoritarianism, Sikhs in India and around the world have been reminded that this devolution is not just Modi’s India. It is India as they have always experienced it. The latest assassination attempt in New York City and the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar on Canadian soil fall into a long history of abuses, underscoring why Sikhs do not feel secure and vindicating their long-held belief that India poses the greatest threat to its own national security.