Qatar and Saudi GCC ISSUES

Qatar and Saudi GCC ISSUES

 Introduction

Arab states cut ties with Qatar the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain have joined with Saudi Arabia in severing diplomatic ties with Qatar over 'terrorism'. All the nations also said they planned to cut air and sea traffic to the country

Bahrain blamed Qatar's "media incitement, support for armed terrorist activities and funding linked to Iranian groups to carry out sabotage and spreading chaos in Bahrain" for its decision. The decision comes after Qatar alleged in late May that hackers took over the site of its state-run news agency and published what it called fake comments from its ruler about Iran and Israel. Its Gulf Arab neighbors responded with anger, blocking Qatari-based media, including the Doha-based satellite news network al-Jazeera.

 The latest crisis started when the state-run Qatar News Agency carried comments by Qatar's ruler, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, criticizing mounting anti-Iran sentiment. Officials quickly deleted the comments, blamed them on hackers and appealed for calm. That didn't stop Saudi and UAE media outlets from launching a verbal war against Qatar, and their attacks escalated after Sheikh Tamim's phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani over the weekend, in apparent defiance of Saudi criticism. Saudi Arabia's Okaz newspaper accused the Qatari ruler of "committing the gravest of sins" by supporting "terrorist groups and the sectarian Iranian regime".

Seems that the overwhelming support Trump gave to the Saudi position now has been interpreted by the Saudis to silence all dissenting views.  US under President Trump very closely aligning itself with the interests of Saudi Arabia , it is perhaps this alignment  that  makes the Saudis feel that they are now empowered to really swat down anyone within their region or within their allies who might try to pursue a more independent path.  Recent moves to protect Qatar seem to mitigate the unbridled support given to Saudi perceptions.

Historical Context

 Saudi Arabia and Qatar have long been at odds over the latter's support for Islamist groups, particularly Egypt's Muslim the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas . The Qatari channel's reporting has been a   major source of tension between Doha and its Arab neighbors

Boundary Disputes Before the oil era, the Gulf States made little effort to delineate their territories. Members of Arab tribes felt loyalty to their tribe or shaykh and tended to roam across the Arabian Desert according to the needs of their flocks. Official boundaries meant little, and the concept of allegiance to a distinct political unit was absent. Organized authority was confined to ports and oases. The delineation of borders began with the signing of the first oil concessions in the 1930s.

 The national boundaries had been defined by the British, but many of these borders were never properly demarcated, leaving opportunities for contention, especially in areas of the most valuable oil deposits. Until 1971 British-led forces maintained peace and order in the gulf, and British officials arbitrated local quarrels. After the withdrawal of these forces and officials, old territorial claims and suppressed tribal animosities rose to the surface. The concept of the modern state- -introduced into the gulf region by the European powers--and the sudden importance of boundaries to define ownership of oil deposits kindled acute territorial disputes.

 Point of contention in the gulf is the Bahraini claim to Az Zubarah on the northwest coast of Qatar and to Hawar and the adjacent islands forty kilometers south of Az Zubarah, claims that stem from former tribal areas and dynastic struggles. The Al Khalifa had settled at Az Zubarah before driving the Iranians out of Bahrain in the eighteenth century. The Al Thani ruling family of Qatar vigorously dispute the Al Khalifa claim to the old settlement area now in Qatari hands as well as laying claim to the Bahraini-occupied Hawar and adjacent islands, a stone's throw from the mainland of Qatar but more than twenty kilometers from Bahrain. The simmering quarrel reignited in the spring of 1986 when Qatari helicopters removed and "kidnapped" workmen constructing a Bahraini coast guard station on Fasht ad Dibal, a reef off the coast of Qatar. Through Saudi mediation, the parties reached a fragile truce, whereby the Bahrainis agreed to remove their installations. However, in 1991 the dispute flared up again after Qatar instituted proceedings to let the International Court of Justice in The Hague decide whether it had jurisdiction. (Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the court. As of early 1993 the dispute remained unresolved.) The two countries exchanged complaints that their respective naval vessels had harassed the other's shipping in disputed waters.

 Starting in 1936, Qatar and Bahrain were involved in territorial disputes over the Hawar Islands, Fasht Al Azm, Fasht Dibal, al-Jaradah, and Zubarah. The most substantial dispute was over Fasht Dibal. In 1985 after Bahrain began constructing fortifications on the island. Qatar considered the construction to be a violation of an existing agreement made in 1978. In April 1986, Qatari troops arrived on the island via helicopter and declared it a 'restricted zone'. They seized several Bahraini officials and 29 construction workers hired by the Dutch contracting company Ballast Nedam. On 12 May 1986, following protests by the Netherlands and mediation by several GCC member states, Bahrain and Qatar reached a settlement, after which the foreign workers were released. Qatari troops evacuated the island on 15 June. In 1991 the dispute flared up again after Qatar instituted proceedings to let the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, Netherlands, decide whether it had jurisdiction. The two countries exchanged complaints that their respective naval vessels had harassed the other's shipping in disputed waters.

 In 1996, Bahrain boycotted the GCC summit hosted in Qatar, claiming that the last summit held in Qatar in 1990 was used as a platform to reiterate their territorial claims to the other GCC states. They also cited the 1986 Qatari incursion in Fasht Dibal as a reason for not attending The disputes were resolved by the International Court of Justice on 16 March 2001, awarding both sides equal amounts of land, giving Bahrain the Hawar Islands (excluding the Janan Island), al-Jaradah, and Fasht Al Azm, with Qatar receiving Zubarah, Fasht Dibal, and the Janan Island. The "bad boy" of the GCC, a status achieved under Sheikh Hamad who abdicated in June 2013, is an even more accurate label for his son and successor, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, who is just 33. The country appears to be proud of its reputation for causing trouble whether it is allowing a platform for radical Muslim preacher Yousuf al-Qaradawi, supporting some of the worst jihadists Syria, or backing the Muslim Brotherhood in neighboring UAE. Having agreed to behave better at a meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in November 2013, Sheikh Tamim then failed to deliver, prompting the withdrawal of their ambassadors by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE in March 2014

 The al-Thani is a large clan and many members are excluded from political power. Hamad's authority was questioned because he gained power by overthrowing his father, a reclusive alcoholic The rupturing of diplomatic relations between Qatar and five regional states—Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the internationally recognized Yemeni government-in-exile—has brought to a head a long-simmering dispute about the country’s distinctive approach to regional affairs. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, last cut ties with Qatar in 2014, withdrawing their ambassadors from the country for nine months. But this latest standoff has gone markedly further. For one thing, it includes economic sanctions—and given that Qatar’s only land border is with Saudi Arabia, any disruption to the flow of goods and people by air, land, or sea, could cause rapid economic dislocation and lead to social or political unrest.

 While it remains unclear what the Saudi and Emirati endgame is, the roots of the tensions between Qatar and its neighbors go deep, predating the Arab Spring in 2011 and Qatar’s subsequent high-profile support for Islamist transitions in North Africa and Syria. In fact, nearly every “crisis” in the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over the past quarter-century has, in some way, involved Qatar.

The other Gulf leaders’ patience with Doha’s sometimes-maverick regional policies may have finally snapped. Qatar extends northward into the Persian Gulf from Saudi Arabia. In the mid-nineteenth century, the al Thani family emerged as its preeminent local power brokers. In 1868, they reached an agreement with Britain, then the paramount power in the Gulf, that recognized their leadership over the peninsula. Prior to their emergence, parts of the Qatari peninsula had been settled by the al Khalifa family, the present-day rulers of Bahrain. Although the al Khalifa family has ruled Bahrain since 1783, it was locked in a territorial dispute with Qatar over the Hawar Islands, which both countries claimed as their own, until the issue was settled at the International Court of Justice in 2001. Bahrain and Qatar came to the brink of conflict over the islands in 1986, and the two countries only established full diplomatic relations in 1997, fully 26 years after becoming sovereign states. A September 1992 skirmish on the Saudi-Qatari border that left three people dead illustrated the pitfalls of the longstanding failure to properly demarcate Qatar’s only land boundary. Though the two countries had signed a border agreement in 1965, it was never properly ratified, and was cancelled by Qatar after the border clash. Qatar and Saudi Arabia supported different sides in the brief Yemeni civil war of 1994, and Qatar also objected vociferously to the proposed appointment of a Saudi as secretary general of the GCC in 1995. In response, the Qatari delegation walked out of the closing session of the annual GCC summit in December 1995 and declared its intent to boycott all future meetings attended by the secretary general; the country even reportedly considered cancelling its membership in the GCC. Much of the anger that has defined the relationship between Qatar and its neighbors since 2011 originated in the policies of its emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, after he seized power from his father in a bloodless palace coup in June 1995. Together with his foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al Thani, Emir Hamad was instrumental to Qatar’s rise to global prominence in the 1990s and 2000s as he accelerated the development of its liquefied natural-gas infrastructure and forged long-term energy agreements with industrialized and emerging economies worldwide. Emir Hamad’s accession was, however, not welcomed in neighboring Gulf capitals.

 Saudi Arabia was implicated in a counter-coup attempt in February 1996 designed to reinstall the ousted Sheikh Khalifa. Following a second attempted counter-coup in 2005, also believed by Qataris to have been instigated by the Saudis, the Qatari government stripped up to 5,000 members of the Bani Murra tribe (whose tribal territory had, historically, straddled the Saudi-Qatari border) of their citizenship in retaliation for the involvement of some of its members in both affairs. A key preoccupation of Qatar’s post-1995 leadership has been the pursuit of autonomous regional policies designed to bring the country out of the Saudi shadow.

 Qatar’s support for regional Islamists, notably but not only the Muslim Brotherhood, and provision of Doha-based Al Jazeera as a platform for groups criticizing regional states, incited periods of intense friction. Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador from Doha in 2002 in response to Al Jazeera’s coverage of domestic affairs within the kingdom. It took five years to resolve the issue.

 Tensions rose again thanks to Qatar’s backing of Islamist movements before, during, and after the Arab Spring, as Qatar and the UAE pursued diametrically opposed policies toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt and Libya became battlegrounds for regional influence as Doha and Abu Dhabi backed different sides. At the time of the handover of power from Emir Hamad to his 33-year old son, Emir Tamim, in June 2013, hopes were high in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that the young new emir would recalibrate Qatar’s approach to regional affairs. However, in November 2013, five months into Tamim’s rule, Saudi and Emirati leaders reacted viscerally to reports in U.S. media outlets that members of the Muslim Brotherhood were regrouping in Doha following the toppling of Egypt’s President Mohamed Morsi and the institution of military rule. Emir Tamim was summoned to Riyadh by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and presented with an ultimatum to “change Qatar’s ways and bring the country in line with the rest of the GCC with regards to regional issues.” Tamim was also told to sign an additional security agreement that stipulated “non-interference” in the “internal affairs of any of the other GCC countries,” and sign a pledge of compliance.

 A key preoccupation of Qatar’s post-1995 leadership has been the pursuit of autonomous regional policies designed to bring the country out of the Saudi shadow. That crisis would peak in March 2014, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE judged that Qatar was not in full compliance with the agreement Tamim signed. Together with Bahrain, they withdrew their ambassadors from Doha. For the UAE, whose leadership was cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood, a particular flashpoint was the discovery that several Emirati members of al-Islah, the Brotherhood’s UAE-affiliated branch, had been given refuge in Doha after fleeing the UAE in 2012. Months of acrimony followed, with periodic attempts at negotiation mediated by Kuwait, whose emir, Sheikh Sabah, reportedly has a close relationship with Emir Tamim. But the dispute ended in November 2014 after a series of Qatari concessions. These included relocating Muslim Brotherhood figures in Doha to Turkey, ordering the Emirati dissidents to leave Qatar, closing Al Jazeera’s Egyptian branch, and enforcing the GCC Internal Security Pact and cooperating closely with GCC partners on matters of intelligence and policing. The current crisis has, therefore, been building for years. This time, it may have been triggered by a complex prisoner swap that Qatar negotiated in April to release 26 members of a Qatari hunting party, including many members of the Qatari ruling family, who had been taken hostage in Iraq in December 2015. The group had been held by Kitaeb Hezbollah, a Shia militia with links to Iran, and Qatar reportedly negotiated with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Syrian rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra to secure their release.  

 Allegations that Qatar may have paid up to $500 million for the prisoner exchange caused fury in regional capitals, including Baghdad, where Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi claimed that the deal had been done without Iraqi government involvement or approval. While the exact details of the agreement remain unclear, the suggestion that such large sums of money had been paid to violent non-state actors in Iraq, with the tacit connivance of Iran, reinforced perceptions in other Gulf capitals that Qatar’s proximity to such groups posed a threat to regional stability and security. Although the actions taken thus far fall short of outright acts of war, both Qatar and its accusers are boxed in, and may be unwilling to back down from such a high-profile game of brinkmanship. And yet, any hopes that Saudi and Emirati official might entertain of forcing the Trump administration to take sides will be complicated by the considerable range of U.S. defense, security, and energy interests in Qatar, which cannot be easily unwound or replicated elsewhere. This notwithstanding, the sudden spike in regional tension presents the administration with a problem that defies easy resolution and casts a pall over the afterglow that President Donald Trump enjoyed following his visit to the Gulf two weeks ago.

The possible end of GCC

 The Saudi-led bloc has failed to achieve its objectives, so far and instigating the Qatar crisis proved to be another misstep in the Saudi-UAE muscled approach to foreign policy. But the consequences of this aggressive move may bring tectonic shifts in the region, strengthen the position of Iran, and deal a serious blow to the GCC organization, bringing it to the verge of extinction.

Although it is hard to envision the GCC formally dissolved, it is very likely that it will become a rather irrelevant organization,  the region has a long history of dysfunctional and marginalized institutions, with earlier attempts to set up collective security groups (e.g. the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, etc.) having also eventually come unstuck. Right now the GCC looks likely to share the same fate. It also seems probable that Kuwait and Oman will try to balance their relations with the Saudi bloc, as neither have the massive resources of Qatar, which would enable them to pursue Qatar-like global foreign policies.

 The current siege on Qatar reflects the flaws of GCC as a collective security organization of Gulf Arab states, which have struggled to achieve balance between common interests of Gulf nations and the states' particular goals. The shift in Saudi and Emirati foreign policy approach has revealed a new pattern of the interventionist and aggressive politics of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, expecting others to submit to their leadership. But it is hard to believe that Qatar will be willing to accept such terms and change its traditionally independent foreign policy. In the past months, the anti-Doha bloc has raised the issue of the Doha's future membership in the GCC. While the UAE openly discussed Qatar being expelled from the GCC, and argued for a "new set of alliances", Bahrain has suggested that the Gulf bloc suspend Doha's 

 
 Preservation of the GCC, in any form, is the goal of western states, particularly the US and UK. These parties are seeking to develop ever-closer defense and security ties - with arms sales attached - to all GCC countries, including Qatar. The GCC bloc is also viewed as an important ally against Iran, who US President Donald Trump has called a "rogue state" and a "corrupt dictatorship", and thus any breakup of the bloc - or Qatar's departure from it - would certainly strengthen Iran's position in the region, while complicating Western interests in the Gulf. 

Qatar also hosts a forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM), headquarters of the US air force's Central Command, as well as the Expeditionary Air Group of the UK's RAF and 379th Air Expeditionary Wing of the USAF. Closer alignment with Iran - due to a pressure coming from its neighbors - would look awkward for the US and UK, especially if they fail to defend Qatar from foreign interference.   

A GCC without Qatar would be weaker, especially if Qatar was forced to seek an alliance with Iran. In the past months, the US has intensified efforts to mend relations. According to diplomatic sources, the announcement of a US-GCC summit at Camp David, scheduled for May 17, is the last chance to save the GCC. However, Donald Trump warned that the planned summit will not take place if Saudi Arabia and its allies do not take steps to resolve the Qatar blockade. So far, Saudi and UAE seem either unwilling or incapable of agreeing to any reconciliation. But keeping the GCC afloat won't be an easy task in any case, as it will be far harder this time for the GCC to repair internal fractures than in when a similar crisis took place in 2014. Current confrontation greatly exceeds the 2014 experience in scale and any sudden agreement with Doha is hard to imagine, without the Saudi-led camp losing their face.   it's unlikely that the Gulf dispute will end as things are now too 'far gone' to be put back in the box again. It is more likely that the GCC will simply stop functioning as a six-member entity, and will instead be left with three effective members (Saudi, UAE and Bahrain), plus a satellite (Kuwait).

Current Situation (Qatari version-Aljazeera)

§  On August 2, Qatari Defence Minister Khalid bin Mohammad al-Attiyah visited Washington to meet with the US Department of Defense to discuss the upcoming expansion of a major US base in Qatar, and the strategic military partnership between both countries.  al-Attiyah laid the foundation stone for the expansion project of Al Udeid base where roughly 11,000 US military personnel are stationed. The ceremony was also attended by US Army Brigadier-General Jason Armagost, commander of the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing at Al Udeid. The planned expansion will include construction of additional housing facilities and service buildings. 

§  On August 1, Qatar's Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs refuted claims that Qatar was preventing its nationals from going to Mecca for Hajj, a pilgrimage that Muslims worldwide are expected to make at least once in their lifetime if they are able to In June, last year, Saudi Arabia and three other Arab nations barred Qatari nationals from their countries and set up a blockade to prevent goods from entering the Gulf emirate

§  On August 1, the investigative news website The Intercept revealed that former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stopped Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from attacking Qatar in June 2017.Tillerson, a former executive for the energy company Exxon, repeatedly criticized the blockading countries for the crisis, and in October last year, accused them of heightening tensions. 

§  The United States is looking to "build some momentum" towards resolving the Gulf crisis ahead of a possible summit in the autumn, a US diplomat said on July 24."We want to build to a point where there will be a meeting of all of the heads of state ... it might be September or it might be October", Ryan Gliha, US charge d'affaires to Qatar, told journalists.

§  On July 23, the United Nations' top court  issued a provisional ruling, saying that measures put in place by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as part of its boycott against Qatar amount to racial discrimination The UAE was ordered by the highest UN court to immediately allow Qatari families to reunite, imposing a measure before it hears in full a discrimination case filed by Qatar. On June 15, Qatar filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing the UAE of violating international laws by expelling thousands of Qataris - many of whom have family or own property in the UAE - and closing UAE airspace and seaports to Qatar.   

§  On June 9, Qatar Airways CEO Akbar al-Baker said Qatar Airways has been impacted by the blockade, "it increased our flying time, and put pressure on [our] operational cost, but it did not stop the will and our determination to keep on our part of growth. On Wednesday, April 25, Qatar Airways CEO Akbar al-Baker told reporters that the airline has made a "substantial" loss in its financial year because of the regional dispute.   The blockading countries have targeted Qatar Airways by forbidding it from using their airspace, but it has found alternative routes and expanded its travel network with new international partnerships.   

• On June 2, a senior Russian politician said Moscow plans to supply an advanced aerial defense system to Qatar despite Saudi Arabia's reported opposition."Russia seeks its own interest, supplying S-400 to Qatar and earning money for the state budget. Saudi Arabia's position has nothing to do with it, Russia's plans will not change," Aleksei Kondratyev, the deputy chairman of the committee on Defense and Security was  quoted as saying by Sputnik on Saturday.
• On May 27, Qatar ordered shops to remove goods originating from a group of Saudi Arabian-led countries. A directive from the economy ministry ordered shops to immediately strip shelves of products from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. Inspectors will visit stores to ensure they comply with the order. The government will also try and stop products such as Saudi dairy goods from entering Qatar via a third country. Qatar's Government Communications Office said it was trying to "protect the safety of consumers."

§  On May 27, Bahrain's foreign minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa accused Qatar of prolonging the crisis by taking its case to Western allies, instead of dealing with it inside the Gulf Arab bloc."We were expecting from the beginning of the crisis with Qatar that the emir of Qatar would go to Saudi, but this did not happen," he told the newspaper."The information in our hands today does not indicate any glimmer of hope for a solution now, as the matter does not happen  

§  On May 16, Qatar National Bank reported that the country's current account surplus widened to 6.4 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter in line with higher oil prices while the financial account deficit narrowed. However, fiscal account remained in deficit but should recover subsequently as revenue rises in line with higher oil prices. On May 7, the Ministry of Finance reported that Qatar is estimated to go from a deficit of 1.6 percent of its GDP in 2017 to a surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP in 2018. This is based in the Economic Outlook Brief to be released by the IMF in May 14. On April 12, Qatar raised $12bn from its first bond issuance on the international market since 2016; a few days after Saudi Arabia raised $11bn in bonds.    

• On May 8, Saad al-Kaabi Qatar Petroleum CEO, said the company will push ahead with its production expansion despite the blockade. Qatar is one of the most influential players in the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market due to its annual production of 77 million tonnes. 

§  :On April 23, Qatar's civil aviation authority denied UAE's claims that Qatari military planes intercepted a civilian aircraft on April 22. According to Qatar, an unauthorized military aircraft from the UAE entered Qatar's airspace in the same area as the UAE's civilian aero plane. On April 22, the United Arab Emirates said that a civilian aircraft heading to Bahrain was approached by a Qatari jet, forcing its pilot to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision. On March 28, Qatar reported to the UN Security Council an alleged violation of its airspace by a Bahraini warplane. Since December, Qatar has reported four such violations to the UN.  

§  On April 22, Bahrain's Foreign Minister, Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa tweeted his "14th demand", calling for the prosecution of Al Jazeera for "spreading lies and rumors that cause confusion in our countries”. In July 2017, Bahrain and the other blockading countries issued a 13-point list of demands to lift the blockade on Qatar, including the shutdown of the Al Jazeera's Network.

§  On April 16, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdg visited a Turkish military base in Qatar as part of his official tour to the Gulf state. Earlier this year, the Turkish ambassador to Qatar said that "according to the agreement signed between Qatar and Turkey in 2014, all ground, air, and naval forces will be deployed to Qatar."Qatar also hosts American, British and French forces at the Al Udeid airbase.

§   On April 5, in Bahrain, the UK inaugurated its first permanent naval base in the Middle East since 1971.Bahrain's crown prince said that it "reflects Bahrain's support for the international coalition against terrorism and will also contribute to global security by safeguarding maritime activity and global trade”. Meanwhile, Bahrain and the Saudi-led quarter expect Qatar to shut down a Turkish military base, together with 12 other demands which Qatar consider to violate its sovereignty.    

Concluding Remarks

The Muslim World failed to understand and accept nationalism and democracy. The formation of States in the Middle East, which the British carved after the Second World War, created States that were fragile to start with. Recent Shia Sunni rivalry has added to the strife in the Middle East. The Islamic World has also failed to contain the Shia Sunni schism, which was political to start with and now has added strategic and hegemonic elements to further widen the gulf. .US and Western interests have also encouraged and actively supported strife with the Muslim Middle East, partly to support Israel which is now striving the creation of a zero Palestine solution..  The considerable oil wealth is being dissipated in this infighting at great human and economic cost. Islamic though needs to come with terms with: nationalism, sectarianism; and democracy.

Update : Jan.,12,2019:

The Qataris had a two-fold battle to fight .One was to convince world opinion that they weren't these horrid terrorist-supporting Bin Laden types. And the other was to show that the economy was robust, that it was a good place to invest, and that the Qataris were creating conditions that will make it easier for foreign direct investment to thrive."

The embargo was introduced by four countries - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates - who accused gas-rich Qatar of supporting terrorism, a charge it strongly denies. They also made 13 demands; including ending economic cooperation with Iran, and closing down TV station al-Jazeera. Qatar refused to meet any of these, and so 19 months later the blockade remains in place. While the question of whether Qatar supports terrorism is no longer in the headlines - superseded by Saudi Arabia's woes following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul - Qatar is still working hard to show that its economy is open for business.

  Prior to the blockade, as much as 60% of Qatar's imports are estimated to have come through the countries now boycotting it, particularly its food supplies, so the government had to act fast to secure alternative supply routes through Turkey and Iran. It also moved quickly to ramp up domestic production, even importing tens of thousands of cows to ensure milk supplies.

Qatar has managed to cope quite well but perhaps Qatar - the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) - to have used its vast wealth to instead buy stakes in Western food companies so as to better guarantee supplies in the longer term.   governent has done a far better job in handling this extraordinary crisis than most could have expected., they ensured the lives of residents were virtually unaffected. The blockade has affected sentiment, but not ability to conduct  business.

Qatar has also been helped by timing, in that in September 2017, three months after the blockade started, it officially opened the $7.4bn (£5.8bn) deep-water Hamad Port, which has enabled the country to receive much larger cargo ships. Previously, Qatar was greatly dependent on re-exports - goods from around the world that were first sent to ports in neighboring countries, such as Dubai in the UAE, before then being shipped to Qatar on smaller vessels. In addition to ensuring supplies of food and consumer goods, Qatar has been working hard to increase economic ties outside of Middle Eastern region, particularly with the US. To try to boost overseas investment in Qatar, the government has announced economic reforms related to labor laws, privatization, special economic zones, and higher foreign ownership limits that it says will make it easier to invest and operate in the country.  

Ultimately though, it is Qatar's vast gas reserves - the third largest in the world - that is enabling it to shrug off the blockade after the initial scramble to secure alternative supplies of food and consumer goods.

The world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, it shipped 81 million tons in 2017, or 28% of the global total. Qatar also exports 600,000 barrels of oil a day, but it left oil producers cartel OPEC at the start of this year to focus more on gas. It said the move was unconnected to the boycott. The diplomatic and economic overtures are all part of a new Qatar engaging more fully with the world outside the Gulf   such is Qatar's hydrocarbon wealth that its economy has continued to expand despite the embargo. Its economy grew by 1.6% in 2017, and that rate of expansion is expected to rise to 2.4% in 2018 and 3.1% in 2019, says the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Qatar doesn't have to have a diverse business-friendly economy unless it wants to. Ultimately, the Qataris can survive if they need to just by pumping out more gas. The gas money can prop.

Update 

Syria :Jan.,15,2019:Qatar's foreign minister ruled out on Monday  (jan.,14,2019) the possibility of re-opening an embassy in Damascus, in line with some other Gulf countries, calling Syrian President Bashar al-Assad a war criminal.“Normalization (of relations) with the Syrian regime at this stage is the normalization of a person involved in war crimes, and this should not be acceptable,” said Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani at a Doha press conference.  He added that Damascus under Assad should not be allowed back into the Arab League — its membership was suspended in 2011 — as “the Syrian people are still under bombardment... by the Syrian regime”. His comments come after Gulf neighbors the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain announced late last month they reopened their Damascus embassies. That move also emphasized the foreign policy differences between the three Gulf States. For the past 19 months Qatar has been in a deep diplomatic dispute with the UAE and Bahrain, in part over the direction of Doha's regional foreign policy in recent years. Syria's opposition leader Nasr al-Hariri has pleaded with Arab leaders not to rebuild relation with Assad as his government now controls almost two-thirds of the country following military backing from Russia and Iran.