Chinese solutions for
the Kashmir dispute
Introduction
China
has maintained an overall tilt towards Pakistan’s standpoint on Kashmir.
Rejecting New Delhi’s claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India, China
views Kashmir as a dispute between Pakistan and India. However, the details of
China’s Kashmir policy have varied over time. Its emphasis on various methods
for resolving the dispute has also shifted from time to time, mainly because of
the changes in its South Asian policy and interaction with the West
China adopted different policies at
different points of time. China has interests in both Indian occupied Kashmir as well as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. These interests are purely related to energy and military superiority of India. In South Asian region, China considers India a big rival and in order to counter India, it supports Pakistan. Both Pakistan and China maintained strong strategic partnership in all circumstances and China supported Pakistan at the
UN. Currently, China is in favor of some peaceful solution of Kashmir
by both South Asian Nations.
Evolution or changes in Chinese
policy on Kashmir ( Indian perspective)
The
trajectory of China’s declared positions, specifically on the Kashmir issue,
evolves through five distinct phases. In the 1950s, Beijing upheld a more or
less neutral position on Kashmir. The 1960s and 1970s saw a perceptible shift
in the Chinese position toward public support of Pakistan’s position on the
issue as Sino-Indian relations deteriorated. Beijing supported Islamabad’s
position on the Kashmir issue to demonstrate solidarity with an “all weather”
ally during periods of Sino-Indian estrangement and hostility.
Since
the early 1980s, however, China’s and India’s moves towards normalization of
bilateral relations necessitated the adoption of a policy of neutrality to
avoid needless alienation of India, coupled with running the risk of
entrapment. For that matter, the Chinese policy got reflected in Deng
Xiaoping’s June 1980 statement “… Kashmir … was a bilateral issue left over
from history between India and Pakistan, and should be resolved
peacefully…”This carried forward to the decade of the early 1990s, when China’s
position became unequivocal that the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter.
Beijing returned to a position of neutrality even as it sought to balance out
the need to satisfy Pakistan’s demands for support and the growing interest in
developing a better relationship with India.
From a Chinese perspective, the period of the
late 1990s saw a gradual shift in the regional balance of power in South Asia,
with the steady emergence of India, and the concurrent decline of Pakistan,
following a series of important events that unfolded in the subcontinent. Most
momentous among these was the nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998 which
heightened Chinese concerns regarding conflict escalation over Kashmir that
could precipitate into a nuclear exchange. The Kargil conflict brought into
focus the possibility of introduction of nuclear weapons onto the battlefield
between India and Pakistan, which caused considerable anxiety in China in that
any debate on nuclear weapons’ usage could draw/impact China’s own nuclear
arsenal into the fray. This was clearly visible in many Chinese commentaries
that emphasized upon the threats to the stability of the entire region, of
which China too is an integral part. The
fifth and present phase of the Chinese strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan involves the CPEC investments and China’s
added interest in the Kashmir.
According to Hu Shisheng, at the China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, China cannot wait for India
and Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue before going ahead with the transit
and transport project that passes through PoK. While comparing the venture to
developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by Beijing, Hu
argued that if India can carry out developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh,
China can do the same in PoK. India can “oppose the project passing through PoK
in the same way China continues to oppose schemes in the eastern disputed area”
or Arunachal Pradesh.Hu said China cannot wait for India and Pakistan to settle
their dispute in Kashmir while terrorism spilled over to Xinjiang in the
country’s northwest, since then, “... China’s Xinjiang will be
full of a conflict. That is too risky.” That Beijing is pursuing an aggressive
engagement strategy in the region cannot be more apparent. It has been long
known that by means of sponsoring and investing in numerous “infrastructure
development projects” inside Gilgit-Baltistan
Beijing’s shows its reading of the Kashmir by issuing stapled visas to Indian passport
holders from Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), rather than stamping the visas on
their passports, as is the norm, Beijing has attempted to question the status
of J&K vis-à-vis the Indian Union, and provide inferred support to
Pakistan’s diplomatic position on the subject. In this backdrop, it would not
be entirely incorrect to state that China is not likely to be a “neutral party”
to the Kashmir issue any more. More recently, in April 2016, China’s official
news agency, Xinhua, filed one report after the other on Kashmir, stating “…a
separatist movement and guerrilla war challenging New Delhi’s rule is going on
in Indian-controlled Kashmir since 1989.”
This was followed by another reportage coming in from Beijing that narrated
“…trouble in Indian-controlled Kashmir … and Kashmiri protesters throwing
stones at Indian police and paramilitary troopers during a protest in Srinagar,
the summer capital of Indian-controlled Kashmir.” All this while, China
published tourist maps depicting Kashmir as an entirely separate entity. It
would be extremely difficult for China to defend and justify its self-styled
“consistency” on neutrality over Kashmir in the above-mentioned backdrop.
China’s Current Position on Kashmir: Reminiscent of 1965 Furthermore, calling
for a “proper settlement of the Kashmir clashes”
The
Chinese power elite is accruing its strategic agenda for the region, one, that
is becoming far more interventionist, and expansionist. In a meeting on the
side lines of the G-20 Summit in Hangzhou in September 2016, Chinese President
Xi Jinping is reported to have conveyed to Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi
that “China is willing to work with India to maintain their hard-won sound
relations”, further suggesting that “China and India should continue dialogues
at various levels and areas, and frequently exchange views on major issues of
common interest to enhance understanding and trust”. However, China’s
state-controlled and run Global Times, affiliated to the People’s Daily—the
official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party—took on a contrarian and
almost diametrically differing note to Xi Jinping’s statement just a week prior
to the G-20 Summit, which saw an assembly of the world’s top political
leadership. The Global Times ran a rancorous commentary on how the Indian PM’s
“provocations raise risks for India”, and charged PM Modi of “losing patience
and switching to the expected hard-line tone of hostility”. The commentary
further highlighted Modi’s address to the nation on India’s Independence Day
during the course of which, he expressed gratitude to the people of Baluchistan,
Gilgit, and Pakistan-controlled-Kashmir. The Chinese state-controlled media
termed this gesture as being “so provocative” that it would reduce a response
by Pakistan, inevitably, thus, drawing the world’s attention at a time “…
[Modi’s] government is trying to prevent the issue being internationalized…”
These
commentaries can be referenced back in terms of their tone and tenor to the
decade of the 1960s when China endorsed “Kashmir people’s war of self determination”
in a piece that was published on September 05, 1965, in the People’s Daily
(Renmin Ribao) which read, “…the Chinese people deeply sympathize with the just
struggle of the people of Kashmir for their right to self-determination... the
Chinese government and people... resolutely support... the Kashmir people’s
struggle for national self determination... the Kashmir people will surely
realize their desire for national self-determination.” For China that is
intently keeping a tab on, and highlighting, the “excessive use of force by the
Indian government to suppress local calls for autonomy”,
Chinese companies are reportedly kick-starting
with an investment of $22.5 billion in coal-fired, hydro, wind and solar energy
projects in Pakistan – quite a few of which will be situated in the
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir region. As the Chinese government provides
concessional loans for these infrastructure projects, Pakistan has great hopes
that the economic corridor shall provide a much-needed boost to the nation’s
sluggish economy, and bring some respite to its ostensibly ceaseless economic
woes, while providing employment opportunities. For the same, Gwadar is being
given top priority primarily since it is the entry point for the CPEC where
China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project converges. Pakistan’s Senator Mushahid
Hussain underlined the role of
Baluchistan and Gwadar port, as was reported by The Frontier Post, stating that
without these two “there would be no CPEC”. Not surprisingly, Hussain is one
among many in Pakistan who firmly believe that the “CPEC is the future of
Pakistan
Chinas Appraisal of the Kashmir
Issue
China has some favorable sentiments
towards Kashmiri people which can be explained as following:-
1.
In 2009, China invited Mirwaiz Umer Farooq the leader and president of All-Parties Hurriyat Conference. He was first time invited for official visit to China. This thing was very significant for internationalizing the Kashmir cause.
2.
In 2009, China adopted separate visa policy for Indian administrated Kashmir
but no policy was made regarding Pakistan’s Occupied Kashmiri people. This thing shows that in the view of China, Indian official view point that Kahmir is not internal part of India is a direct rebuke.
3.
China refused to issue visa to Lt. Gen B S Jaswal who was the head of Indian army northern command and was serving in Indian Occupied Kashmir. This thing
sent a clear message that China will not welcome any official of Indian military serving
in disputed territory.
4.
Lastly, China invested billions of dollars on different energy and power generation projects on both sides of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and similarly in Gilgit-Baltistan region. There is a clear-cut difference in China’s approach regarding both sides of Kashmir. China has refused to accept Indian control of Kashmir and considers it as disputed territory while on other side it is actively involved on Pakistan’s side and perceives this control as legitimate.
China’s policy towards Kashmir
can be understood in larger South Asian context. In South Asia, China is interested in securing its strategic interests and improving its bilateral ties with both India and Pakistan. At start, China adopted the policy of neutrality over Kashmir conflict but later on it supported Pakistan in all Indo-Pak conflicts. The reason behind this was to demonstrate its solidarity to ‘All Weather Friendship’. Later on it changed itself to its earlier position of neutrality. China’s concerns over Kashmir
were increased when both
India and Pakistan declared themselves as nuclear states. China was extremely worried that the escalation of conflict over Kashmir can increase the chances of nuclear exchange and its effects would be horrible.
China is interested in reduction of tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. China highly appreciated and encouraged the efforts of ceasefire on line of control, defense secretary meetings
regarding demilitarization of Siachen
Glacier and opening bus service between Pakistan and India. Different Chinese analysts have view point that by adopting above measures both can gain mutual benefit.
China in its policy regarding Kashmir maintains the tilt towards Pakistan’s viewpoint. China
considers Kashmir as disputed territory between India and Pakistan and rejects Indian claim that Kashmir is its integral part. However, its policies towards
Kashmir changed from time to
time and offered different methods of resolving Kashmir dispute. China’s policy towards Kashmir is largely based on its policy towards South Asia. Generally in larger context, China’s policies are based on its interests in South Asia and particularly bilateral ones with both India and Pakistan.
China remained neutral over Kashmir issue during that period. A clear shift in China policy towards Pakistan was observed after Indo-China 1962 border conflict. In the same period,
Pakistan adopted the policy of developing cordial relations with Asian nations. Similarly, the focus was also on maintaining friendly cordial relations with China. In accordance with that high officials of both sides exchanged their visits. Pakistan diplomatically supported China for her UN seat and in response China also altered its posture regarding Kashmir dispute. In 1964, China’s Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai visited Pakistan and declared support of China for the resolution of Kashmir
dispute “in accordance with the wishes of people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan”. In 1965, President Ayub visited China and in joint statement the support for self-determination of Kashmiri people was announced. Along with this China also said that, this issue should be resolved in accordance with UNSC resolutions.
In 1965,
when a war broke out between India and Pakistan, China gave full support to Pakistan. On 12th September 1965, China said that China’s non-intervention in Kashmir dispute doesn’t mean that China is depriving Kashmiris’ from their right of self-determination or it is accepting Indian hostility against Pakistan.
In all high level communication, China supported
the right of self-determination for Kashmir people. In early 1970s China repeatedly supported two inter-related issues; First Pakistan’s national independence and secondly right of
self- determination for Kashmiri People. During Z. A. Bhutto’s period China endorsed and supported right of self-determination for Kashmiri people. Subsequently, China supported for the same till early 1980s.
In early 1980s, a sudden shift in China’s policy towards Kashmir was observed. At that time, China was in favor of developing
functional relations with India. So, it gave the statement that Kashmir issue
should be resolved according to Simla agreement and UN resolutions. Subsequently, China drifted back to its 1964 position and adopted the approach of neutrality. It said that both Pakistan and India should resolve this issue bilaterally through peaceful means. In the shift of policy, China wanted to adopt the policy of reconciliation in South Asia.
The same tactical change was also observed during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and many observers in Pakistan had not viewed it as withdrawal of support. From start till
2000 China’s policy adopted four different shapes. In 1950s China remained neutral but in second decade from 1960s to 1970s it supported Pakistan’s position over Kashmir issue. In 1980s normalization in China-India relations was observed and China again moved towards its 1950s approach of neutrality. In post Cold War period it changed its position and said that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and it should
be resolved through peaceful means.
China is distancing itself from Kashmir conflict because the Chinese believe that it will create
problems for their own security. For instance China is facing ethnic
problems in some areas and it wants to protect itself from being victim of terrorism.
It can be observed that China’s policy towards Kashmir is
also based on its five principles of peaceful co-existence. According to these principles China is not in favor of any kind of war over the issue. It always supported both India and Pakistan for some peaceful settlement. China is not in favor of any aggressive policy towards Indian position on Kashmir because
it wants to maintain smooth
relations among all South Asian nations.
In Pakistan occupied Kashmir, Karakorum Highway has strategic significance in bilateral relations.
This road connects Kashgar to Gilgit and has occupied vital place in bilateral relations. The basic aim of China is to get access towards the region of rich natural reserves and China is constructing rail and road connections
to Persian Gulf via Pakistan. These connections will enable China to transport oil tankers and cargo from Eastern China to Gwadar, Pasni and other ports inside Pakistan. Recently, China is working on enhancement of Karakoram Highway, building
dams and other projects. Through KKH China can get access towards different regions of the world and this route is feasible during winter season. Currently, China is focusing on use of Gwadar Port as alternative of Malacca Strait regarding the reduction of oil dependency and KKH will serve as land route from Gwadar to China. Apart from trade route this road has also served for the transportation of military equipments between Pakistan and China. Moreover China has invested in the construction of many other projects in different
parts on Northern Areas which includes telecommunication facilities, hydro-power projects and economic connection between Northern Areas and Xingjian.
In 2009, Chinese
authorities decided to issue visa to Indian occupied kashmiri people on separate sheet. They have stance that Kashmir is a disputed territory and Indian occupied Kahmiri people would not be considered as Indian citizen so visa for China would
not be granted to them on Indian passport. The solution of Kashmir dispute lies in the goodwill
of Kashmiri people as well as government of both India and Pakistan. Kashmir
is a bone of contention between India and Pakistan or somehow it is a triangular conflict between China,
Pakistan and India. China is a country which has cordial relations with Pakistan and now its bilateral relations with India are improving gradually. China and India are competitors but both are cooperating in many fields. In contemporary international economic
relations, China is the largest trading partner of India and it is also expected that bilateral trade will increase in future.
As China is Emerging power in Asian region, it is defining
its image as peaceful rising power. It is developing cordial relations generally with all states and mainly with neighboring states. In its relations
with bordering states it is putting all conflicts behind. In South Asian region, China has territorial conflicts with India and both fought a full-fledged war. At the dawn of 21st century, a shift was observed in Sino- Indian relations in term of bilateral trade. China and India put their differences behind and increased their trade tremendously. The officials of both sides knew that trade is an important indicator of economic development.
Chinese Articles of
Settlement
Chinese Articles of Settlement are based on the principle that,
“the Security Council should aim at the maximum agreement possible between the
two delegations. It is a comprehensive document of twelve paragraphs and could
be updated in view of any development, inequity and other developments in
international law. Paragraph eight has specifically addressed the rights of the
all the people of the state. Paragraph 10 proposes an “Interim Government of
Jammu and Kashmir, with a provision for adequate representation of all major political
groups in the state”. It makes the present government in Srinagar
non-representative as envisaged in the UNSC Resolution of March 30, 1951 as
well.
China has made a serious case for ‘pacification’. There would be
many more countries in the future that would in pursuance of their Charter
obligations revise their policy on Kashmir and support the right of
self-determination.
Conclusion
The role of China as mediator can be utilized in resolving
long standing Kashmir Dispute. In contemporary, international and regional environment China
is the only state which can resolve
Kashmir dispute
by playing its role as mediator. In this picture, basic problem would be from Indian side that it would refuse to accept any solution
proposed by China as mediator. If the issue should be taken seriously by China and it shows its willingness for mediator, then it can use different strategies to force India for any possible solution of dispute.
Pakistan’s economic corridor and its
centrality to Xi Jinping’s OBOR project has drawn the Chinese even more
intrinsically to the regional geostrategic arithmetic vis-à-vis Kashmir. The
growing Chinese stakes in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir by virtue of heavy economic
investments and the presence of Chinese personnel make China, an indispensable ‘factor’ in the
Kashmir debate China’s somewhat balanced foreign policy towards Kashmir involves an effort to balance its interests with both India and Pakistan. The objective
of Chinese foreign policy is to increase cooperation with all South Asian Nations particularly with India and Pakistan. As China is rising peacefully, it needs peace and stability particularly in its neighborhood because any conflict can pose different challenges to its security or economic rise. In South
Asian region, this Kashmir issue
has the
potential to initiate a full-fledge war which can turn into nuclear war. China has massive concerns on the issue.
China and Kashmir: Aug., 17, 2019:
China Appears to
Understand the Risks in Kashmir More Than India or Pakistan , There are, of
course, many fears of where revoking the semiautonomous status of Jammu and
Kashmir could lead—from another retaliatory insurgency by militants in Kashmir
backed by Pakistan, or worse still a destabilizing war between the two nuclear-armed
rivals. Ultimately, though, it is China—not India or Pakistan— that will likely
tip the balance in a region teetering yet again on the brink. Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party view
downgrading Kashmir’s status from a state in India to a union territory
directly governed by New Delhi as a decisive blow to Pakistan’s claims over the
disputed territory. But everyone stands to lose if regional tensions escalate
further, starting with the 8 million residents of the Kashmir Valley now living
under a total Indian security lockdown and communications blackout . China, more than any other player in this
dangerous game of Risk, seems to understand that best. Clashes between India
and Pakistan over the Line of Control in Kashmir, the de facto border between Indian-
and Pakistan-administered territories, have been so frequent that it is
sometimes easy to overlook China’s role elsewhere in the region. But Beijing
also has competing claims over parts of Kashmir and has contributed to
long-running frictions. In recent years, however, it is the uneasy semi-détente
between China and India over the Line of Actual Control—which separates
Chinese-controlled territory from Indian-administered Kashmir—and the so-called
McMahon Line on Kashmir’s northerly flank that has kept India-Pakistan tensions
in check. Previously subtle signs of China growing into its role as a regional
arbiter in South Asia have become more pronounced recently. In June, Beijing
publicly acknowledged that Foreign Ministry representatives met with leaders of
the Afghan Taliban in China The Chinese government has also held steady as a
supporter of the Iran nuclear deal, a key plank of stability in the wider
region. While Beijing protested India’s unilateral move in Kashmir last week,
its response has so far been measured, despite having legitimate concerns about
its own territorial claims. At issue for China this time is what will become of
the border area it calls Aksai Chin, a vast high desert that comprises part of
a far western stretch of China’s troubled Muslim-majority Xinjiang region, and
that India historically has laid claim to as part of Ladakh, a district of
Indian-administered Kashmir. New Delhi’s decision to revoke Kashmir’s
semiautonomous status would effectively appear to put India in charge of the
fate of Aksai Chin, at least on paper. Logic and restraint are likely to
prevail, at least where China’s interests are concerned in Kashmir. Beijing has
challenged that very notion since the 1950s, including in a short war with
India in 1962. China has repeatedly pressed India to drop its claim to Aksai
Chin in exchange for Beijing’s agreement to cede another contested area along
the McMahon Line known as Arunachal Pradesh to New Delhi. Despite small,
occasional military incursions from both India and China, the two countries have
signed on to a series of confidence building measures since
1996 that have largely succeeded in dampening the risks of escalation. Yet
tensions still escalated in April 2015 when China’s Xi Jinping signed a $46
billion deal for several big-ticket infrastructure
projects collectively called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or
CPEC, a portion of which runs through Kashmir. India sees the multifaceted
project, which includes extensive new networks of highways, railways and energy
pipelines across Pakistan and is part of China’s massive Belt and Road
Initiative, as perhaps the greatest challenge to its influential position in
South Asia. Some analysts have argued that the joint Sino-Pak venture may fuel
India’s fears of encirclement by a key economic competitor and a hostile
rival. There may be a grain of truth in that assessment, but India’s claims to
arguably more important maritime trade routes in the oil and gas rich Indian
Ocean probably hold far more weight in its calculations. Plus, last year’s
informal summit in Wuhan, China between Modi and Xi after a
different border spat near Bhutan and the subsequent appointment of Indian and
Chinese special envoys to deal with border disputes, seems to have helped
reframe how both parties view the Kashmir question. 17/08/2019 China Appears to
Understand the Risks in Kashmir More Than India or Pakistan This
may be one reason why Beijing seems to be flashing mixed signals in response to
the latest flare-up in Kashmir. Within hours of the Indian Parliament’s
decision on Aug. 5 to annul Kashmir and Jammu’s statehood, a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson issued a statement saying that the move “hurt Chinese
sovereignty by unilaterally changing domestic law. Yet a
week later, in a meeting with his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,
Foreign Minister Wang Yi appeared to suggest that Beijing was prepared to
exercise a kind of strategic restraint, framing the crisis as a matter to be
settled by peaceful means Although China’s statement was issued as
Pakistan vowed to bring its fight to the U.N. Security it
seemed phrased to signal to India that Beijing would try to stand firm on prior
confidence-building guarantees on Aksai Chin and build on the goodwill
generated at Wuhan. Nevertheless, China faces a different challenge from
Pakistan, with Prime Minister Imran Khan pressing Islamabad’s claims to Kashmir
through a combination of ethnonationalist polemics and diplomatic maneuvering.
Khan’s stream of statements on Twitter about
Kashmir have been full of hyperbole about India’s power grab and Hindu
nationalism, which he has described as “inspired by Nazi ideology likening “Hindu Supremacy” to “the Nazi Aryan
Supremacy.” Modi, for his part, has only added to the vitriol, vowing in a
provocative speech on India’s Independence Day on Aug. 15 to restore Kashmir to
its “past glory despite all the heated rhetoric, neither
Pakistan nor India hold the kind of sway that China does at the U.N. Security
Council. China’s chief counterparts, the United States and Russia, have
indicated that they have little appetite for the kind of brief air war over Kashmir
that erupted after militants mounted a suicide attack on an
Indian military convoy in Kashmir in March., Chuna is likely to support Pakistan in the quest to seek United Nations Security Council intervention.
1.
Global dimensions of Indo China Face Off: Jun., 12, 2020: it began to sink
in that the incidents were not of the usual scuffle and flag-meeting variety,
it turns out that the PLA has opened several fronts along the LAC. On May 26,
the episodes were capped by high-level meetings in Beijing and Delhi. President
Xi Jinping is reported to have urged “battle preparedness” on the part of the
PLA. Prime Minister Modi’s meeting, with his military chiefs and national
security advisors on the same day, concluded without any comment to the media.
All of these occasions may have been pre-scheduled, but the Ladakh situation
added a visible dimension. Objective observers compared the confrontations to
the 2017 Doklam hostilities, suggesting that they may have to do with India’s
cartographic rush to show Aksai Chin as part of its territory and China’s
objections to the construction of a road near
the Galwan River Valley just south of Daulat Beg Oldi. Astute practitioners and
cautious pundits characterised the confrontations as “predictable
Chinese behavior”, even berating Delhi for its lack
of foresight.
The observation by Gautam Bambawale, India’s former ambassador to China,
Pakistan and Bhutan, comes
closest to a statement of realpolitik scrutiny: “One cannot discount that the [Chinese] actions are
guided by concerns regarding the Indian UTs [or “Union Territories”] of Jammu
& Kashmir and Ladakh.” It is a perceptive observation that intuitively
addresses both historical idiosyncrasy and legal confusion through a
geostrategic lens. The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is a geopolitical conundrum
that has been almost two hundred years in the making. In that span of time, the
region defined by the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and its twin, the Line of Control
(L0C) with Pakistan has flared up as a global (I use the term advisedly)
political issue each time there has been a paradigmatic shift in the global
world That said, Delhi’s J&K policy
was marked by two significant changes after the second coming of a Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) led government in 2014. First, the government adroitly
sought to make the J&K dispute a unilateral problem, internal to India. Its
instrument for that objective was to abandon any nuanced paradigm of
Islamophobia as a policy frame and to replace it with a monomaniacal hatred of
Islam and Muslims. This served to strengthen its demographic and electoral base
in the name of a Hindutva nationalism. To wit: by promoting a thousand years of
the presence of Islam and Muslims in South Asia as the cause of India’s ills;
by helping to define India’s rivalry with Pakistan as a civilisational one; and
to sharpening the demonisation of the seven million Kashmiris of the
Valley as the vanguard of an existential threat to the one billion
Hindus of India.The second mood change was the BJP’s ideological zealotry,
political impatience and deficit in geo-strategic sensibility. This resulted in
the BJP government pursuing an internal policy of brutalising Kashmiris, a
bilateral policy maximally alienating Pakistan and, in its external policy,
triggering a clumsy choreography of statecraft in its messaging on J&K. It
is these blind spots of smug ideological certainty, arrogant confidence of
power and tetchy methodology in communications that produce the governmentality
that led to the August 5, 2019 action on India’s side of the LoC – the ending
of J&K autonomy and its partitioning into two separate Union territories. The dismantling of the state of J&K on
its side of the LoC was enabled by the BJP’s ideological zealotry,
administrative subterfuge, political arrogance and military force. But Delhi
has been bereft of a consistent external strategy on J&K other than
intransigence. In that context, it must be admitted, the August 5, 2019 decision
was unexpected, bold and clever. In one fell stroke, the government hived off
Ladakh so that it could be ruled directly by Delhi and gave Ladakhis what
(Ladakhis thought) they wanted. Simultaneously, in declaring Kashmir and Jammu
a Union Territory, it brought mostly Muslim Kashmir under Delhi’s thumb, while
positioning mostly Hindu Jammu to dominate it as power becomes incrementally
concentrated in Delhi under a muscularly centralising Indian state. However,
Delhi did not anticipate the implications of its action for China’s and
Pakistan’s territorial interests along the LAC and the LoC. First, in
its eagerness to embrace the United States, particularly after Trump’s
virulently anti-Muslim policies starting in 2016, Delhi initiated a policy
trajectory of a rapid expansion of its relationship with an unstable White
House. So, when the latter came up with its 2017 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Delhi’s
eager embrace of that initiative left its already susceptible Himalayan
boundary even more vulnerable, especially considering the PLA’s infrastructural
fortifications along that boundary. This factor goes some way in explaining the
1,025
boundary incidents between 2016 and 2019 along the LAC. Second, the Kashmir issue refused to go away despite
the BJP government’s hardline domestic policy in Kashmir and its confident
braggadocio in the international arena since 2014. Today the ten-month old
dismantling of the J&K state is witnessing far-reaching consequences in
Delhi’s relations with Beijing. Its cartographic assertiveness ignores the
reality that the the territory of erstwhile J&K is disputed, even by its
strategic ally the United States, let alone China. Moreover, the boisterous
claims by BJP ministers for many months now, most recently on May 21, 2020,
that all that now remains is for India to regain
Gilgit and Baltistan – clearly endangering not just China’s
claims on the Aksai Chin and its conditional occupation of the Shaksgam valley,
but also its not-small investment in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) portion of the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Add to this Ladakh’s
territorial contiguity to Xinjiang directly to the north and we have the full
sense of the meaning of a geopolitical dispute. It is no accident that the nub
of Delhi’s negotiations with China today are focused on ambiguities along the
LAC in “eastern Ladakh”. The Indian media’s emphasis of “eastern” is an
assertion meant to exclude “western” Ladakh, which, of course, would drag the
LoC into the discussion and link Islamabad to its all-weather friend. Few would
have imagined this scenario even two months ago. So, unlike routine flag
meetings following bellicose chest bumps and stone pelting skirmishes, or even
protracted talks such as the ones following the more serious 2017 Doklam
confrontation, this altercation is far from over. In effect, Beijing has
expanded the canvas to include the LAC, and itself, in future talks on the
J&K conundrum. As a result, it has forced statements of support for India
from United States, coaxed Russia to act as a calming voice between Washington
and Beijing, and even emboldened a claim of Indian cartographic aggression by
Nepal. It is a stark irony that this has happened during the BJP government’s
watch; a party that has consistently and vociferously claimed that J&K is
not a dispute and sought to reduce it to a unilateral, internal affair.
Instead, it finds itself facing a discourse that has catapulted the J&K
dispute from its tacitly accepted bilateral dispute into a multilateral one
and, indeed, now, a global “issue”. In doing so, the BJP government has
brought the former princely state of J&K’s geopolitical locus back into
fashion after a hiatus of almost half a century. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/global-dimension-india-china-confrontation-in-ladakh
