Showing posts with label Kashmir dispute. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kashmir dispute. Show all posts

Monday, August 28, 2023

Chenab Formula & Musharraf’s four point formula - A possible Solution of the Kashmir Dispute and a criticism of the two proposals


Chenab Formula & Musharraf’s four point formula - A possible Solution of the Kashmir Dispute and a criticism of the two proposals

Possible Solutions

1. The Status Quo
 In 1947-48, India and Pakistan fought their first war over Jammu and Kashmir. Under United Nations’ supervision, they agreed to a ceasefire along a line which left one-third of the state administered by Pakistan and two-thirds by India. In 1972, under the terms of the Simla agreement, the ceasefire line was renamed the Line of Control (LoC). Although India claims that the entire state is part of India, it has been prepared to accept the Line of Control as the international border, with some possible modifications. Both the US and the UK have also favored turning the Line of Control into an internationally-recognized frontier  This is more or less what late Mr. Vajpayee offered to Pakistan during his visit to Lahore and Pakistan.
But Pakistan has consistently refused to accept the LoC as the border since the predominantly Muslim Kashmir Valley would remain as part of India. Formalizing the status quo also does not take account of the aspirations of the Kashmiri’s.

2. Kashmir Joins Pakistan
On 2nd November, 1947 India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Jawharlal Nehru announced on All India Radio that “Kashmir future will be decided by the means of plebiscite”. It essentially meant that the allegiance of the state of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided by the Kashmiri’s. Had the majority voted in favor of Pakistan, the whole state would have become part of Pakistan.
However the promise of plebiscite is still pending. India claims that people’s participation in elections shows that people are happy and there is no demand for any plebiscite. Pakistan and those opposing this viewpoint on the other hand say that the elections have never been free and fair in Kashmir and when they have been so, the people have voted for governance issues like roads, electricity and other amenities, and not for sorting out the Kashmir dispute.
However the demand for a plebiscite to be held, as recommended by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten in 1947, and endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, is still considered by Pakistan as a way of letting Kashmiri’s exercise their right of self-determination.
3. Kashmir Joining India
In 1947, the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir agreed to the state becoming part of India. India and Pakistan then agreed to hold a plebiscite to confirm which country Kashmir’s citizens wanted to join. The Indian Government believed that the majority population, under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, would vote to join India, with its secular constitution, rather than Muslim Pakistan. If the plebiscite had been genuinely held and the majority had voted in favour of India, Pakistan would have had to relinquish control of the Northern Areas and the narrow strip of Jammu and Kashmir. But, sensing an impending defeat of its aspirations, India has intentionally kept shut the door of plebiscite. Moreover, such a solution would be unlikely to bring any stability to the region as the Muslim inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir have never shown any desire to become part of India.
4. Independent Kashmir
In the 1960s, following discussions between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, a group of Kashmiri’s demanded that the entire state should become independent as it was prior to the Maharajah’s accession to India in 1947. But, the difficulty of adopting this as a potential solution is that it requires India and Pakistan to give up territory, which they will not be willing to do. Any plebiscite or referendum likely to result in a majority vote for independence would therefore probably be opposed by both India and Pakistan. It would also be rejected by the inhabitants of the state who are content with their status as part of the countries to which they already owe allegiance. And in view of the likely regional instability, an independent Kashmir is not supported by the international community either.
An independent Jammu and Kashmir might also set in motion the demand for independence by other states in both India and Pakistan and lead to a “Balkanisation” of the region.
5. A Smaller Independent Kashmir
If, as the result of a plebiscite, which offered the option of independence, the majority of the inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley chose independence and the majority of the inhabitants of Azad Jammu and Kashmir also chose independence, a smaller, independent Kashmir could be created by administratively joining these two areas together.
This would leave the strategically important regions of the Northern Areas and Ladakh, bordering China, under the control of Pakistan and India respectively. However both India and Pakistan would be unlikely to enter into discussions which would have this scenario as a possible outcome. Regardless of the aspirations of the inhabitants, to date neither country has contemplated a situation where the end result would adversely affect their own interests.
6. Independent Kashmir II
The movement for independence in the Kashmir Valley gained momentum in the late 1980s when Kashmiri’s protested against their continuing allegiance to the Indian Union. In the present day, if a regional plebiscite offered independence as an option, it is possible that the majority of Kashmiri’s would vote in favor of independence. Moreover, an independent Kashmir has been considered by some as the best solution because it would address the grievances of those who have been fighting against the Indian Government since long. But critics say that the region would not be economically viable without external assistance.
7. The Chenab Formula
This plan, first suggested in the 1960s, would see Kashmir divided along the line of the River Chenab. With the inclusion of Ladakh, which also lies north of the Chenab River, India would be left with approximately 3,000 square miles of territory out of 84,000 square miles. This would give the vast majority of land to Pakistan and, as such, a clear victory in its longstanding dispute with India. The entire valley with its Muslim majority population would be brought within Pakistan’s borders, as well as the majority Muslim areas of Jammu.
This solution would require the voluntary agreement of India to give up territory which it wants to retain. It is impossible to see what benefit India could derive from the transfer of so much land, and why the government – or the inhabitants of the region who are not contesting their status – would ever agree to such a solution.
8. The Chenab Formula II
Chenab Formula is one the seven popular formulas given for resolving Kashmir conflict.  These series of formulas ranges to two extreme with one of them allotting entire Jammu and Kashmir State to Pakistan while other one allotting entire state to India.   The Chenab formula was proposed in late 1960s as one of the possible solution to conflict. However, it gained prominence (with some differences) during Musharraf period of Pakistan. It is based loosely on combination of 2 nation theories and geographic feasibility of division of the state.
Under the Chenab formula, the state of Jammu and Kashmir should be divided on the lines of Chenab River which flows through the state. If divided, the north of the river part will go to Pakistan while southern part will go to India. The formula can be described as follows:


1 Three entities to be carved out of the area of pre-1947. Jammu and Kashmir are now being administered by India. These three parts would be represented by a body which will take care of issues of common interest.

2 Two entities, in the part being administered, by Pakistan would be established, these being Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas. They would be represented in a coordinating body that would consider issues of mutual interest.

3. An All-Kashmir body will be set up to co- ordinate issues of broader interest such as trade , tourism , environment and water resources .this body will include representatives from each of the five entities as well ad from India  and Pakistan .

4. Each of the five entities would have its own constitution, flag, and legislature. Which would legislate on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs? India and Pakistan would be. Responsible for the defense of the entities and the entities would maintain their own internal law and order. India and Pakistan would be expected to work out the financial arrangements for the entities.

5. Citizenship of the entities would also entitle the citizens to acquire Pakistani or Indian passport depending on which side of the Line of Control they live in. Alternatively they could use entity passports subject to endorsement by India or Pakistan .as appropriate.

6. The border of the entities with India and Pakistan will remain  open for the free transit of people  , goods and services in accordance with arrangements 
to be worked out between India , Pakistan and the Entities .

7. While the present Line of Control will remain in place until such time as both  India and Pakistan decided to alter it in their mutual interest , both India and Pakistan will demilitarize the area included in the entities . Neither India nor Pakistan could place troops on the other side of the Line of Control without the permission of the other State.

8. All displaced persons who left any portion of The Entities would have the right to return to their home localities.

Musharraf’s Four-point Formula  

There have been numerous attempts, certainly, in the past to present proposals for resolving this dispute, but none has seemed to take hold. Musharraf’s Four Point Formula which was widely discussed in 2006 
    General Musharraf’s Four-point formula involves the following:

1.         Demilitarization or phased withdrawal of troops
2.         There will be no change of borders of Kashmir. However, people of Jammu & Kashmir will be allowed to move freely across the Line of Control.
3.         Self-governance without independence
4.         A joint supervision mechanism in Jammu and Kashmir involving India, Pakistan and Kashmir.


 9.  Discussion
Demilitarization is an option that was suggested by the United Nations and in particular by Sir Owen Dixon of Australia. This has been the demand of the leadership of the Kashmiri resistance that demilitarization from both sides of the Ceasefire Line will pave the way for a serious and thoughtful solution to the Kashmir dispute.
The Line of Control is in fact a line of conflict which needs to be eroded so that the people of Kashmir can move freely from one area to the other. But the problem arises when the ‘Four-point Formula’ says that borders cannot be withdrawn. That is a very loaded phrase. That means that the Line of Control should in fact be established permanently as an international border.   This would be a possible ‘solution’ for both India and Pakistan but not for the Kashmiri people. India lost an opportunity and the Butt, Guru and Wani affairs have perhaps brought the Kashmiri to a tipping point where a status within the Indian federation would not be at all acceptable
Self-governance undoubtedly has broad meaning. Self-governance means freedom, independence and autonomy. It means that the people would be makers of their destiny. It also means that one has to be the shaper of one’s future. So, the term self-governance by itself is not an issue but the concept of self-governance within the parameters of Four-point Formula is. It is problematic because under this plan, self-governance excludes the option of freedom or independence. In fact it clearly says that the people of Kashmir will be given self-governance without independence. Will India retain the power to tax the Kashmiris?  Will people have a hand in the politics and influence who has the mandate to rule? Will they pass new laws which infringe on the limited self-rule the Kashmiris possess?  Where does self-rule begin and where does it end, if Kashmir does not possess sovereignty over its land?
The drafters of the four-point formula have been quite conscious of the sentiments of the people of Kashmir. They knew that the resistance to foreign occupation that began in 1931 and continues until now does not accept de-facto rule by any country over Kashmir. Therefore, they wanted to play a linguistic game and came up with the idea of self-governance which is a deceptive and misleading term that gives an appearance of sovereignty without any substance. It is purely a mask. It prohibits further discussion on the subject of independence and promotes internalization of the Kashmir dispute. Without actual sovereignty for Kashmir, under the Four-point formula, the people of Kashmir will have to accept the supremacy and rule of India over their lives, and the possibility of that being eroded by whatever whim, fancy or circumstance may intervene in the future. Perhaps self-governance now, designed and managed by external powers, which is subject to the will of those foreign powers without due respect for the sovereignty of Kashmir and all the international protections that accompany it, has the appearance of a step in the right direction but on an extremely slippery slope. Self-governance is a mere illusion: what is given can be taken away, when it does not in fact include true sovereignty. 
Those who believe that the people of Kashmir should accept the Musharraf’s Four-point formula should be bold enough to say exactly what it is i.e., that the formula gives the people of Kashmir only choice and that is to be part of India. There are no ifs, ands, or buts about it. This is only a slightly broader version of Article 370 drafted in 1949 which today practically has become meaningless.
  In order to reach an imaginative settlement of the Kashmir dispute, all parties concerned – Governments of India & Pakistan and the leadership of the people of Kashmir – will have to show flexibility. But in the Four-point formula the only party which becomes a sacrificial lamb and shows flexibility and makes sacrifice are the people of Kashmir. That should not be an option.  The demand for self-determination is greater now than it has been in many years.  


Dr Shireen M Mazari has stated that Pakistan needs to aggressively put forward concrete proposals for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the UN resolutions,  on principle of self determination and plebiscite, comprising the details of intermediary steps.
 Proposed solution should problem resemble the Irish Peace Accord. She made it clear that she was not referring to any specific clauses of the said accord but the broad concept on the basis of which the accord was signed and implemented. She also referred to the East Timor independence based on the concept of self determination and said Pakistan should press the Kashmir case on these lines. She also said Pakistan should ask the United Nations to document all the Kashmiri’s in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and also of the Kashmiri Diaspora across the world who qualified to vote in the referendum based on the UN resolutions whenever it took place adding that such documentation needed to be done. The minister said the citizens of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) were already documented because they were participating in regular elections.
 The Anglo-Irish Agreement was a 1985 treaty between the United Kingdom and Ireland which aimed to help bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland.The treaty gave the Irish government an advisory role in Northern Ireland's government while confirming that there would be no change in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people agreed to join the Republic. It also set out conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus government in the region.
An independence referendum was held in East Timor on 30 August 1999. The referendum's origins lay with the request made by the President of Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 27 January 1999, for the United Nations to hold a referendum, whereby the Indonesian province would be given choice of either greater autonomy within Indonesia or independence.



 Conclusion

Kashmir conflict is no doubt an intractable conflict making all parties to search for a formula to resolve the conflict peacefully. What could be the political framework that will accommodate the Kashmiri aspiration for self-determination, the interests of India and Pakistan is the real challenge for those who seek peace in the region.
Considering the ground geo-political realities in the Indian sub-continent, the most workable solution to the Kashmir dispute seems to be minimizing the security forces in Kashmir and granting basic human rights to the Kashmiri’s, reliving them from daily frisking, and focus should be on creating more employment and education opportunity for Kashmiri’s. While this may not be the ultimate solution to this issue, it may well prepare some ground for a better solution and meanwhile relieve the people of the region from their day-to-day turmoil. Musharaff did provide the Indians an opportunity, He gave one sided concessions which included the elimination of State owned training camps etc ; and allowed the Indians to fence the LoC and Line of Actual Control , this was a big concessions for which neither the Pakistanis nor the Kashmiri’s got any counter concession. India did not use the respite offered wisely, Butt, Guru and Wani incidents have brought the Kashmiri’s to a tipping point. Post Wani’s martyrdom  the freedom movement is no linger in control of the Freedom leadership in Kashmir the Indian actions have now brought the Kashmiri Muslims to a tipping point where any Indian presence or role is completely off the table.
Norwegian Initiative
December 14, 2018, 9:44 AM IST
The meeting of former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik with Kashmiri separatists in Srinagar has drawn sharp reactions from former diplomats, security advisors and strategic thinkers, given India’s declared policy on Kashmir of not allowing third-party mediation on the issue.

Of the experts whom News18 reached out to, some called the move - of bringing in an outsider apparently to mediate in the affairs of Kashmir - as “unfortunate” and a move “against India’s national interest”. A former diplomat even took a dig at Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, whose Art of Living (AoL) organised Bondevik’s visit, saying that Shankar seemed to be under the illusion of being “a great peacemaker.” Bondevik, who heads the Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights, visited Srinagar on November 25, where he met senior Hurriyat leaders, members of chamber of commerce and of the bar association. A week later he visited Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and met the local leaders there.
Reacting to the developments, seasoned diplomat and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, G Parthasarathy told News18, “We have a bigger policy to deal with Pakistan. Our relations will be settled bilaterally. There is an agreement which we have to always observe—the Shimla agreement.”

He added that there was a need to look “seriously” on the issue of Bondevik meeting Hurriyat leaders, and the manner in which this development came about. This was not the right way to negotiate. Bondevik at the time had said, “There are channels of communications open with Pakistan and backchannel talks that are never made public”.

Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary termed the meeting between Bondevik and separatists as “unfortunate”.

“It is very unfortunate that the sense was not shown by such people by interfering in very delicate foreign policy issues which goes against India's national interest,” Sibal said.

Taking a dig at Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, Sibal said, “He has illusion about being a great peacemaker internationally.”

Shankar had organised a peace meet in Srinagar earlier in March this year as well. The event ran into controversy after a section of the audience reportedly left the venue before the spiritual leader could finish his address. Some local dailies quoted several attendees complaining they had been "tricked" into attending with promised gifts of cricket kits, sewing machines and bank loan waivers. AOL representatives had denied the reports.

On the question that how it could have been possible for Bondevik to travel to Kashmir without permission of the government, Sibal said, foreign diplomats visit Kashmir and there is no bar.

“This was not advisable and that this was touching upon very core national security sensitivities of India reliable to complications in the bilateral relationship,” he said.

Sibal says that the Norwegian ambassador to India should not have allowed this to happen.

“I think this is part of loose approach against the separatists. This is not a happy development at all because it creates confusion about our foreign policy,” Sibal said.

Sources say there might be more meetings between Hurriyat and representatives from AoL.

“There are general elections ahead. We will have to be a bit patient. Developments can take place only after the new government is formed,” said a person involved with AoL’s events in Kashmir.

However contrary opinions, hailing the initiative, were also expressed. Among those who welcomed the move was former R&AW chief and Kashmir advisor to former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, AS Dulat.

Dulat said that the fact that Bondevik could travel all the way to Srinagar and meet Geelani meant that New Delhi was also on board.

He said that “there is no option but to talk”. He expressed optimism about Bondevik’s meeting saying “Scandinavians are masters” in settling disputes.

“They are masters of negotiations. They have always remained neutral and are very good at talking,” Dulat said referring to Irish settlement and other negotiations. “This is not a big development but certainly a positive one. Now we will have to see Mr Bondevik’s follow-up on this.”

According to some sources who were privy to the half-hour long discussion that happened between Geelani and Bondevik at the former’s residence, the “follow-up” on the meeting is likely to be with the “four-point” formula in the agenda.

Also known as the Musharraf formula or the Manmohan-Musharraf formula, the four-point formula is basically an idea of demilitarization, maximum autonomy, making border irrelevant, and joint management of the region.

It was the basis on this formula that the former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had said, according to a leaked diplomatic cable, that the two sides had come quite close to resolving the Kashmir dispute. A final draft in keeping with the four-point template was reportedly being worked upon by the “back-channels”.

Most leaders in Kashmir, when the four-point formula was being touted as the key to resolving Kashmir dispute, including Abdullah and Mirwaiz, had shown willingness to work on it. But Geelani had been its most severe critic.

When asked about the reports that talks may be headed in the direction of the four-point formula, Dulat said, “It is the best point to start at.” “All the people including the separatists accept it. You might end at two points or two-and-a-half but it is the best point to start talks.”




Gupkar Declaration An Absolute Fallacy Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai Secretary General World Kashmir Awareness Forum Washington, DC August 27, 2020 On August 22, 2020, the pro-India leadership in Srinagar (Capitol city of Kashmir) issued Gupkar Declaration, stating that they “are committed to strive for the restoration of Articles 370 and 35A, the Constitution of J&K and the restoration of the State.” Let us analyze the Declaration dispassionately but from a Kashmiri perspective. The Gupkar Declaration says, “The series of measures undertaken on 5th August 2019 were grossly unconstitutional.” But Gupkar Declaration fails to mention that these measures also contravene the UN Security Council resolutions #122 and #126 adopted on January 24, 1957, and December 2, 1957, respectively. These resolutions prohibit any unilateral action targeted at changing the disputed nature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is important to mention here that the United Nations Security Council Resolution # 122 “reaffirms the affirmation of its resolution 91 (1951) and declares that the convening of a constituent assembly as recommended by the General council of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference’ and any action that assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof, or any action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by the assembly, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle.” Leaving aside linguistic and strategic maneuvering, the Gupkar Declaration leads us to one conclusion: that the autonomy is the only option. But the present situation in Kashmir has also made it abundantly clear that the autonomy is unjust, untenable and not acceptable to the people of Kashmir. The Aazadi is the only catch phrase of resistance on the streets of Kashmir which does not mean autonomy but right to self-determination. When Arundhati Roy, internationally known Indian human rights activist was asked on October 3, 2019, what do the people of Kashmir want, she responded: “I don’t think that they could have been clearer. They’ve been saying it for 70 years. They’ve been saying it loudly. They’ve been saying it with their blood since 1990. Of course, it’s self-determination. You know, of course, it’s self determination.” Now the question arises why should some friendly country endorse the Gupkar Declaration which goes against the UN Security Council resolutions and more importantly against the wishes and will of the people of Kashmir. Here are few possibilities: i. It could be due to ignorance or disregard of inalienable right to self-determination that Gupkar Declaration is being invoked. ii. There exists apprehension that, whether on account of its present internal weaknesses or under external pressure, the Government of Pakistan will be forced to dilute its stand on Kashmir. iii. Being here in the west, we smell that the two ideas are being discussed between the few world capitols and Islamabad on one side and these capitols and India on the other. First, turning the Line of Control (LoC) into a permanent international border. Such an option is an insult to the intelligence of the people of Kashmir. It also cynically mocks their suffering. The people of Kashmir revolted against the status quo; how can they accept the status quo as a settlement? And second, autonomy or self-governance for Kashmir within the Indian Union. The policy makers of these capitols view the Kashmir dispute as a problem between Srinagar and New Delhi, which can be solved by improving their relations. Pakistan, they feel, can be mollified easily. They have consistently sought to dodge the question of sovereignty over Kashmir when that is the heart of the issue and it can neither be finessed nor be evaded. There seems to be an inherent incapacity to empathies with suffering populations unless some political advantage can be derived from a pretended concern. iv. There is also a serious discussion going on in many important Capitols to pursue the Musharraf formula to resolve the Kashmir dispute. If one did not know the authorship of the Musharraf formula and were asked to guess it, one would say that a fairly clever strategist has crafted it to confuse the whole issue and, in the bargain, to throw dust in the eyes of world powers. The world powers forget that ‘Restoration of Article 370,’ or ‘self-governance,’ or ‘Musharraf's formula’, or ‘Autonomy’ is a clear fallacy. Here you will have to rely on a provision of the Indian Constitution. All Constitutions of the world are subject to amendments and Indian Constitution is no exception. If not now, in the foreseeable future, like India did on August 5, 2019, this provision can be deleted from the Constitution and the move will not even need a debate in the Indian Parliament. The world powers also need to know that Kashmiris have had the experience of a limited autonomy, which was first practiced under a personal understanding between Nehru, then the prime minister of India and Sheikh Abdullah, then the prime minister of Jammu & Kashmir and later provided for by Section 370 of the Indian Constitution. It was eroded and eventually whittled away by the forces of circumstances. In conclusion, the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir acquire a continuing decisive importance from two crucial factors. One, they constitute the only international agreement freely negotiated between India and Pakistan on the future status of Kashmir. Two, they embody the only principle on whose basis a just and durable settlement of the problem can be achieved- -- the principle of freedom of choice by the people concerned. Therefore, it is fair to say that no settlement of the status of Kashmir will hold unless it is explicitly based on the principles of self-determination and erases the so-called line of control, which is in reality the line of conflict. Dr. Fai can be reached at: 1-202-607-6435 or gnfai2003@yahoo.com www.kashmirawareness.org

Tuesday, March 10, 2020

Northern Areas: Gilgit and Baltistan (JR213)






Northern Areas: Gilgit and Baltistan  (JR213)
Introduction:
After Pakistan's independence, Jammu and Kashmir initially remained an independent state. Later on 22 October 1947, tribal militias backed by Pakistan crossed the border into Jammu and Kashmir Local tribal militias and the Pakistani armed forces moved to take Srinagar but on reaching Uri they encountered defensive forces. Hari Singh made a plea to India for assistance and signed the Instrument of Accession.
Gilgit Action
Gilgit's population did not favour the State's accession to India. The Muslims of the Frontier Districts Province (modern day Gilgit-Baltistan) had wanted to join Pakistan. Sensing their discontent, Major William Brown ( the major part was played by Muslim Officers nd the British Officer later joined in ) , the Maharaja's commander of the Gilgit Scouts, mutinied on 1 November 1947, overthrowing the Governor Ghansara Singh. The bloodless coup d'etat was planned by  Col. Hasan Khan,  to the last detail under the code name "Datta Khel", which was also joined by a rebellious section of the Jammu and Kashmir 6th Infantry under Mirza Hassan Khan. Brown ensured that the treasury was secured and minorities were protected. A provisional government (Aburi Hakoomat) was established by the Gilgit locals with Raja Shah Rais Khan as the president and Mirza Hassan Khan as the commander-in-chief. However, Major Brown had already telegraphed Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan asking Pakistan to take over. The Pakistani political agent, Khan Mohammad Alam Khan, arrived on 16 November and took over the administration of Gilgit.  Brown outmaneuvered the pro-Independence group and secured the approval of the mirs and rajas for accession to Pakistan. 
 Provincial Government
The provisional government lasted 16 days. The provisional government lacked sway over the population. The Gilgit rebellion did not have civilian involvement and was solely the work of military leaders, not all of whom had been in favor of joining Pakistan, at least in the short term. Historian Ahmed Hasan Dani mentions that although there was a lack of public participation in the rebellion, pro-Pakistan sentiments were intense in the civilian population and their anti-Kashmiri sentiments were also clear.  According to various scholars, the people of Gilgit as well as those of Chilas, Koh Ghizr, Ishkoman, Yasin, Punial, Hunza and Nagar joined Pakistan by choice.
Ladakh Action
After taking control of Gilgit, the Gilgit Scouts along with Azad irregulars moved towards Baltistan and Ladakh and captured Skardu by May 1948. They successfully blocked the Indian reinforcements and subsequently captured Dras and Kargil as well, cutting off the Indian communications to Leh in Ladakh. The Indian forces mounted an offensive in Autumn 1948 and recaptured all of Kargil district. Baltistan region, however, came under Gilgit control.
UN
On 1 January 1948, India took the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to the United Nations Security Council. In April 1948, the Council passed a resolution calling for Pakistan to withdraw from all of Jammu and Kashmir and India to reduce its forces to the minimum level, following which a plebiscite would be held to ascertain the people's wishes. However, no withdrawal was ever carried out, India insisting that Pakistan had to withdraw first and Pakistan contending that there was no guarantee that India would withdraw afterwards. Gilgit-Baltistan and a western portion of the state called Azad Jammu and Kashmir have remained under the control of Pakistan since then.
Inside Pakistan
While the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan expressed a desire to join Pakistan after gaining independence from Maharaja Hari Singh, Pakistan declined to merge the region into itself because of the territory's link to Jammu and Kashmir.  For a short period after joining Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan was governed by Azad Kashmir if only "theoretically, but not practically" through its claim of being an alternative government for Jammu and Kashmir.  In 1949, the Government of Azad Kashmir handed administration of the area to the federal government via the Karachi Agreement, on an interim basis which gradually assumed permanence. According to Indian journalist Sahni, this is seen as an effort by Pakistan to legitimize its rule over Gilgit-Baltistan
There were two reasons why administration was transferred from Azad Kashmir to Pakistan: (1) the region was inaccessible to Azad Kashmir and (2) because both the governments of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan knew that the people of the region were in favour of joining Pakistan in a potential referendum over Kashmir's final status 
 
In 1970 the two parts of the territory, viz., the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan, were merged into a single administrative unit, and given the name "Northern Areas".[ The Shaksgam tract was ceded by Pakistan to China following the signing of the Sino-Pakistani Frontier Agreement in 1963.  In 1969, a Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) was created, later renamed to Northern Areas Council (NAC) in 1974 and Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) in 1994. But it was devoid of legislative powers. All law-making was concentrated in the KANA Ministry of Pakistan. In 1994, a Legal Framework Order (LFO) was created by the KANA Ministry to serve as the de facto constitution for the region.
In 1984 the territory's importance shot up on the domestic level with the opening of the Karakoram Highway and the region's population came to be more connected with mainland Pakistan. With the improvement in connectivity, the local population availed education opportunities in the rest of Pakistan.  Improved connectivity also allowed the political parties of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir to set up local branches, raise political awareness in the region, and these Pakistani political parties have played a 'laudable role' in organising a movement for democratic rights among the residents of Gilgit-Baltistan.
In the late 1990s, the President of Al-Jihad Trust filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan to determine the legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan. In its judgement of 28 May 1999, the Court directed the Government of Pakistan to ensure the provision of equal rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, and gave it six months to do so. Following the Supreme Court decision, the government took several steps to devolve power to the local level. However, in several policy circles, the point was raised that the Pakistani government was helpless to comply with the court verdict because of the strong political and sectarian divisions in Gilgit-Baltistan and also because of the territory's historical connection with the still disputed Kashmir region and this prevented the determination of Gilgit-Baltistan's real status.[
A position of 'Deputy Chief Executive' was created to act as the local administrator, but the real powers still rested with the 'Chief Executive', who was the Federal Minister of KANA. "The secretaries were more powerful than the concerned advisors," in the words of one commentator. In spite of various reforms packages over the years, the situation is essentially unchanged[ Meanwhile, public rage in Gilgit-Baltistan is "growing alarmingly." Prominent "antagonist groups" have mushroomed protesting the absence of civic rights and democracy.  Pakistan government has been debating the grant of a provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan.
According to Antia Mato Bouzas, the PPP-led Pakistani government has attempted a compromise through its 2009 reforms between its traditional stand on the Kashmir dispute and the demands of locals, most of whom may have pro-Pakistan sentiments. While the 2009 reforms have added to the self-identification of the region, they have not resolved the constitutional status of the region within Pakistan.
The people of Gilgit-Baltistan want to be merged into Pakistan as a separate fifth province, however, leaders of Azad Kashmir are opposed to any step to integrate Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan. The people of Gilgit-Baltistan oppose any integration with Kashmir and instead want Pakistani citizenship and constitutional status for their region.  Gilgit-Baltistan has been a member state of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization since 2008.
 Supreme Court Of Pakistan
The Supreme Court of Pakistan’s recent verdict on the constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan, declaring it an inseparable part of the Kashmir issue and the inability due to international law governing it, to assimilate the region into the body-politics of the Pakistani state, has once and for all laid to rest the confusion over the region’s political status, especially within the minds of the masses of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) itself. The urgency displayed at times by certain elements to unconditionally absorb the region into the Pakistani state, not only defied legal logic and historical processes but also undermined contemporary imperatives of preserving the region’s core indigenous rights and identity, especially in the milieu of a shifting strategic calculus.
The verdict has set the ball rolling for a reset of the region’s relationship with Islamabad especially in the popular imagination — something that was earlier missing or made to be irrelevant. The various lacunae in the CPEC framework with regards to the region if not addressed prudently especially in terms of local rights and share in development could sharpen the emerging fissures between ambitions of the Pakistani state and the indigenous aspirations of the region. The evident prejudice in the projected windfall of CPEC towards GB beyond the extractive transit route (Karakoram Highway — KKH) could bring to the fore the hitherto veiled deprivation institutionalized in the “management” of the region. While not much ground has been lost yet, unattended fault lines could prove an inflicting inflection point.
Conclusion
The spirit of Jihad inspired the people of Gilgit and Baltistan to enroll as volunteers to fight alongside the Gilgit Scouts. They managed to defeat the enemy and routed the Maharajas forces, which liberated an entire area which subsequently was called Northern Areas. Northern Areas came into existence to join freely on its own accord with Pakistan