Foreign Policy of Pakistan (JR129)
Introduction
Foreign policy, solely guided by a country’s national interest, is used as a tool by a particular country for dealing with the outside world in various areas such as security, economy, trade, commerce, culture
and
technology. As International Relations have been evolving since the treaty of Westphalia, the conduct, methods and scope of foreign policy have also been changing.In the age of Globalization, more and more areas of global, regional and
bilateral interactions
today fall within the ambit of foreign
policy. Terms like cultural diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, defence diplomacy, digital diplomacy, economic diplomacy and regional. Diplomacy are presently considered part and parcel of foreign policy.
Foreign Policy is the reflection of a country’s internal environment and, states’ foreign policy remains neither static nor rigid.
The objectives of foreign policy can be summarized as: Promotion of Pakistan as a
dynamic, progressive, moderate, and democratic Islamic country; Developing
friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers and
immediate neighbors; Safeguarding national security and geo-strategic
interests, including Kashmir; Consolidating our commercial and economic
cooperation with international community; Safeguarding the interests of
Pakistani Diaspora abroad; and Ensuring optimal utilization of national
resources for regional and international cooperation.
The objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the contemporary era can be
outlined as under:
1.
The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to safeguard the national security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country.
2.
To protect Pakistan’s economic interests abroad.
3.
To project the image of Pakistan as a progressive, modern and democratic Islamic country.
4.
To
promote
peace, stability and
friendly relations with
Afghanistan.
5.
To find the resolution of all disputes with India including the issue of Kashmir. Raise the Kashmir issue on international forums.
6.
To forge cordial and friendly relations with all neighbors, Muslim countries and the
larger international community.
7.
To fulfill its responsibilities as a responsible member of the
international community.
8.
To
prevent and respond to threats
and capitalize on opportunities.
9.
To
safeguard the interests of Pakistani
diaspora.
10.
Seek relevant
technology transfer to assist the effort to industrialize the country
11.
Seek space for Pakistani exports.
12.
Work towards beneficial trade agreements on bilateral
and multi lateral basis.
The country has historically enjoyed cordial
relations with states like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, China, the United Arab
Emirates, Turkey, and Iran. But, at the same time, it had to change course at
various crossroads of global politics
India
With
India, Pakistan has core territorial and serious water issues coupled with
alleged interference in each other’s affairs. Pakistan has been repeatedly
saying that India is using Afghan territory to sponsor terrorism in Pakistan
but has not been able to convince the world community of the veracity of its
claims. A serving Indian Naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav, was arrested in
Pakistan who also confessed to have been a RAW agent and had carried out
activities to destabilize the Pakistani state by terrorist activities. On the
other hand, India has succeeded in creating a perception around the world as a
result of terrorist events like the attack on Indian parliament in 2001, the
Mumbai terrorists’ attack in 2008, and armed assaults in Uri and Pathankot a few
years ago. The very recent US attempt to seek withdrawal form Afghanistan and
Pakistan’s contributions related to ongoing negotiations, have somewhat altered
the equation in the sub continent. The US is unlikely to abandon the Indian
connection as that is still needed in the effort to contain China, India as per
US perceptions could contribute to the Naval domination efforts to contain
China. US could however alter the relationship with India and Pakistan to make
this a little more balanced and even handed. This altered environment has also
resulted in India to slowly seek a more
normal relationship with Pakistan.
India
is a huge market for Western consumer and military goods and services. At the
same time, it has strategic significance for the US in its policy of containing
China. This has created a sympathetic environment for India in the West. It has
also created a sense of arrogance and pride in India. In recent years, Pakistan
has approached India multiple times to revive the comprehensive dialogue process
which was disrupted after the 2008 Mumbai attack. But it has met with a cold
Indian response. The Indian response to any Pakistani talk offers in the last
ten years has been to reject it on the pretext that Pakistan was sponsoring
terrorism in India-occupied Kashmir and that India would consider resuming the
dialogue when IOK becomes peaceful again.
The
flurry of events after the new Pakistani government proposed a meeting of
Indian and Pakistani Foreign Ministers at the UN General Assembly is evidence
of the Indian mindset. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ statement in
response to the Pakistani proposal seems to have lacked seriousness. First, it
accepted the idea of the meeting but a day later backtracked on the grounds of
a postage stamp issued by the Pakistani government honouring the late Kashmiri
freedom fighter Burhan Wani sometime ago. This was a flimsy reason as the
postage stamp was issued before the present Imran Khan’s government came into
power and a caretaker set-up had taken that decision.
India has made significant economic progress in the past two decades Choosing its way between Socialism and Capitalism, the Indian economy stands 3rd as per GDP (PPP) in the world and is likely to grow further. This is an important development for Pakistan because India, like any other country in the world, is translating its economic development into political, military and diplomatic strength.
The environment that surrounds Pakistan clearly dictates that Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India will be guided by security – that should be considered as the rule of the thumb. Henceforth, the general expectation should be that Pakistan’s foreign policy
towards India will remain directed by the security concerns emanating from across its eastern and western borders. This means, Pakistan will be taking a good care of its borders, improving its conventional and deterrent capability against India, while at the same time allowing diplomacy to try its luck on Kashmir, trade, crisis management, and people-to-people contact.
Diplomacy, no doubt, plays a significant role in resolving long standing disputes. The appeasement of India, however, should neither be the choice nor option. Thus, Pakistan would not like another Ufa taking place, where India dictated the rules of engagement. It is to be noted here that by not reciprocating to the goodwill gestures of Pakistan, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to have decided to walk on the traditional path of keeping Pakistan under diplomatic pressure.
The events of the past two years, therefore, lead us to the conclusion that
India will try
to use pressure
tactics
in order
to take concessions from Pakistan on Kashmir and other issues. If history be the guide, India’s current strategy is that normalization of relations with Pakistan will depend on Islamabad’s acceptance of Indian regional hegemony and its stance on Kashmir. Pakistan on the other hand, should maintain its position by telling India that normalization of relations will not be coming without discussing and resolving the core issues between the two countries. The Musharraf regime did make unilateral
concessions whilst none were made by India, Pakistan agreed and implemented the
elimination of terror camps in AJ&K and elsewhere and allowed India to build the fence that put
to stop most if not all infiltration .India now seeks that Pakistan also clamp
on non State actors and on Kashmir movements for freedom inside held Kashmir .
Pakistan seeks to eliminate or reduce Indian influence in
Afghanistan. Pakistan should develop an approach that can bring about normalization of relations with Afghanistan that should also aim at a reduced Indian influence as a crucial component of this process.
Pakistan’s immediate goal should be to minimize and, ultimately, eliminate threats to its security on the eastern border, while India’s influence in Afghanistan should be viewed in a relative rather than in an absolute way. This means that India will remain influential in Afghanistan, because over the last 15 years it has massively invested in creating a pro- Indian lobby in the political and defence establishment of
Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s foreign policy, therefore, by combining soft and smart power, should play a skilful stroke of public and economic diplomacy to counter Indian propaganda, increase trade and commercial activities with Afghanistan and
work on an outreach to all Afghans.
India
has
grown economically and strengthened diplomatically. With Narendra Modi occupying the office of the Prime Minister of India, relations should not be expected to take a turn towards normalcy any times soon. The government led by Narendra Modi may add even more offensive elements to its foreign policy viz-a-viz Pakistan which might include, massive arms buildup, conspiring against China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, defaming Pakistan diplomatically, violation of the ceasefire on the border with Pakistan, and a more potent interference in FATA and
Baluchistan.
India’s violations of the ceasefire along the Pakistan-India border have risen sharply. Moreover, Pakistan’s internal problems as well as the conflict in Baluchistan and Fata should give enough reason to India for becoming more offensive. Thus, India, by benefitting from its economic stability and diplomatic clout in the world and by capitalizing on the diplomatic lag of Pakistan, will continue to create more problems for Pakistan. So it should not be beyond the imagination of anyone in Pakistan’s foreign office that India would like to bring Pakistan face to face with a strategic
fatigue or choke.
With the “Cold Start” in place and the doctrine of “Offensive Defense” in operation, Ajit Doval, the national security adviser to Prime Minister Modi,
has publicly stated
that India will exploit Pakistan’s internal problems
for its advantage As long
as India continues with its “Offensive Defence” policy viz-Ã -viz Pakistan, Islamabad must be cautious in yielding any such incentive to New Delhi. Pakistan’s defense of Indian offence has started giving its own fruit.
The internal dynamics of Pakistan are changing. What had kept Pakistan and its society bleeding over the past 10 years or so, are taking its final breaths. Thanks to operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan has made significant gains against extremism. Insurgency in Baluchistan has been degraded and FATA is no more a rendezvous for local and international militants. The mood at all levels inside. The people, government and the army of Pakistan have decided to
put
an end to the menace of terrorism, fanaticism and sectarianism. In a nutshell, it can be said that Pakistan is on the right track that will finally lead it to come out of
the
baggage of the Afghan war.
Pakistan’s military and nation as a whole have proved its mettle and resilience. This must be enough to make India understand that they too will be dealing with a different Pakistan in the times to come. And if economic turnaround is also made — the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor be the case in point — then Pakistan will be even stronger and different.
So the change that Pakistan is currently going through is positive, solid and will have long-lasting effects. China is now a global economic powerhouse and its relations with Pakistan will further enhance in the coming years. Sri Lanka can also be considered as wary of Indian domination in the region and the sane heads in Washington and Kabul realize that Pakistan’s role with regards to any settlement in Afghanistan is vital and cannot be ignored. Moreover, Pakistan’s relations with Iran are expected to improve further especially after Islamabad’s principled stance on Yemen.
All
of these developments, when looked at collectively, provide Pakistan ample opportunities to play an active role and adopt a region- centric
approach to counter Indian designs.
Iran
Despite some difficulties common in international relations — Pakistan’s relations with Iran have remained good and friendly. Both countries have enjoyed a long period of good relations that are central to the stability of the region. Pakistan and Iran have stakes in Afghanistan as well as in the wider region
Pakistan must bring dynamism in its foreign policy regarding Iran and the gulf countries. Walking a fine line between Iran and the GCC will be a major challenge for Pakistan’s future
foreign policy.
Iran also looks freer and more confident after the nuclear deal., even though the deal has since been
cancelled by the Trump administration, The Europeans have upheld the deal and
have made practical steps to assist Iran
in circumventing the American sanctions ( a SPV to allow payments for oil and
other products to be made to Iran to
circumvent US sanctions for example) So Iran, too, must be looking
for a strategy to
translate its
huge stock of natural resources into economic and political strength. Again, Pakistan’s policymakers should be cognizant of the fact that Iran’s role in the Middle
East
and Afghanistan and its relations with India will strongly resonate in Pakistan as well as across the OPEC
Recent investments and deposits to bridge the foreign exchange reserves by
Saudi and GCC has the potential to drive a wedge between Pakistan and Iran., a
large refinery is envisaged by the Saudis in CPEC. Saudis and GCC have concerns
related to the Charbahar port. This will require very careful handling of the
relations with Iran, The US under Trump is also raising the temperature against
Iran and may attempt to use Baluchistan as a launching pad against Iranian South
East. Pakistan should stay away from such efforts and refuse to allow its
territory to be used against Iran. Efforts to destabilize Iran are underway and
attempts will be made to use Baluchistan for this effort, Pakistan needs to
strictly stop any such effort being made through its territory. A recent attack
on Iranian soil seems a harbinger of things to come( One member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards was killed and five
were wounded in an attack on a base in southeastern Iran on Saturday, as the
country holds official celebrations on the 40th anniversary of its Islamic
Revolution. On Tuesday, Jaish al-Adl (Army
of Justice) claimed responsibility for two bombings that wounded three police
officers in front of a police station in the city of Zahedan, capital of
Sistan-Baluchestan province.)
Middle East
The
Middle East is undergoing a significant change that has not only transformed the Middle East but has sent shocks much beyond the region. Although one would have been expecting or wishing for a different kind of change, yet no matter how it is, the change is occurring. Most of the Middle East has fallen into chaos. Syria, Yemen, Palestine and, Iraq are bleeding, . The US has lost both its credibility and efficacy in the Middle East and now Russia is emerging to fill the void. As it did in Ukraine, Syria and might be thinking of reasserting itself over geopolitics in Central
Asia as well. Russians cooperate with Iran and
China to offer alternative s to the US and the West . The Trump administration
has moved the US embassy to Jerusalem and are now encouraging the “Zero”
Palestine solution, where Gaza and West Bank will be divided between Egypt,
Jordan and Israel, thereby eliminating any trace of Palestine.
The Middle East is one of the most troubled regions today. It is considered as an “arc of crisis” owing to the speedy changes that have swept the region since the US invasion of Iraq, and later the Arab spring that began in 2011. As Iran, the GCC and the wider Middle East comprises of Islamic countries, the concept of Muslim brotherhood will naturally resonate across the width and breadth of Pakistan. Our relations with the GCC, Afghanistan and Iran involve societal, religious and cultural factors that come under the
broad umbrella of ideology.
No doubt ideology is an important part here,
but it should not supersede the vital interests of Pakistan such as religious and sectarian harmony as well as social cohesion. Pakistan should know that the ideology has
not worked
in
its diplomacy as
far as the Middle East is concerned. Therefore, future foreign policy must revolve around our national interest. One of the most outstanding challenges for Pakistan’s
Foreign policy viz-a-viz the gulf countries will be to wash away the impact of Pakistan’s decision on Yemen. It will take some time to undo the effects of Pakistan’s decision on Yemen, but again Yemen should serve as an example for Pakistan so in the future it should not opt for indulging in any regional conflict.
The
widening gulf between Saudi GCC with Iran and also the gulf within GCC are
issues that will need careful attention. Qatar has been practically expelled
from GCC. Iran, Russia and Turkey now play crucial roles with the Middle East.
Pakistan should seek a reduction of animosities with In Muslim nations and
should avoid becoming a party to that various warring parties within the Middle
East.
Afghanistan
As regards Afghanistan, it differs with
Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. The background of the Afghan Jihad against
Soviet occupation and the recent War on Terror are issues on which Pakistan and
Afghanistan see the developments differently. Pakistan, along with the United
States and Saudi Arabia, had supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan Jihad but in the
latter years, the Afghan government began to suspect that Pakistan was also
backing the Afghan Taliban in the ongoing War on Terror. Pakistan believes that
irrespective of issues of trust deficit, the conflict in Afghanistan has no
military solution and favours reconciliation between the Afghan government and
the fighting groups.
Afghanistan
has seen political instability and internal fighting for the last four decades.
Afghan instability has also a spillover effect on Pakistan. Pakistan has
experienced the proliferation of gun and violence as a result of internal
instability in Afghanistan and suffered from acts of terrorism. In fact, Afghan
policymakers in collusion with their Indian counterparts, particularly their
intelligence agencies, have been jointly working to carry out terrorist
activities inside Pakistan, as suspected by the Pakistani leadership.
Afghanistan provides a mix of challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. As with India, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been hostage to security. However, the biggest trouble with Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan is its deep socio-political and economic impact on Pakistan. The past 35 years have proven the fact that any foreign policy towards Afghanistan will have great social, economic and political fallout on Pakistan be it the Afghan-Soviet war of 1979 to 1988, the era of Taliban or 9/11.
Since the unfortunate event of 9/11, Afghanistan and the region have gone through a rapid change. The Taliban, although ousted from power, are not yet defeated. America and the West have, to a large extent, given up their interest in Afghanistan; new players have taken positions in the region. The only thing that one finds common when it comes to Afghanistan, is the concern among Afghanistan’s neighbors regarding the threat of terrorism, extremism and militancy reaching their borders. This threat,
therefore, raises the
interest of
all
neighboring states to
get
Involved with Afghanistan. So dealing with Afghanistan means dealing with a number of countries that include China, Russia, United States and Iran.
Since the United States attack on
Afghanistan in
2001, Pakistan has been facing continued challenges on its western border. Unfortunately,
Promises
that the Americans made to Pakistan prior to the attack
were not
kept. Resultantly, Pakistan could not develop a considerable support base or a
strategic space
in
Afghanistan’s current political establishment.
Secondly, Pakistan, due to its own economic downturn, could not buttress
its
foreign
policy goals
in Afghanistan
with economic
tools.
Therefore, we could not invest much in Afghanistan as India or Iran did. Thirdly, the
mistrust
between the
two
countries as
well as with
the
Americans and NATO remained a hurdle in developing friendly relations with Afghanistan.
Pakistan should clearly and effectively communicate to Afghanistan that Pakistan’s foremost objective — the sanctity of its sovereignty, security and
territorial
integrity
—
can never
be
compromised. Therefore, cooperation with Afghanistan will be conditioned with the elimination of anti-Pakistan elements on Afghan soil
— be it the Baloch separatists, remnants of the TTP or other terrorist outfits.
Stability in Afghanistan is in the utmost security, political, economic and
social interest of Pakistan. Policymakers in Washington and Kabul understand that stability will not come to Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help. Kabul and Islamabad also agree that terrorists, extremists, militants and others of their likes cannot be and will not be allowed to hijack the
destiny of the two countries. The presence of militants on both sides of the border necessitates mutual cooperation to deal with this menace. But in
reality this has proved to be an ardent task. Translating the goal of ending militancy into practical action requires; coordination, trust, political will, vision and
flexibility which unfortunately do not exist currently.During last few
years, Pakistan has
taken
serious
measures to reach to
all
Afghans. This time Afghanistan
must
understand that
blaming Pakistan for everything that goes wrong in Afghanistan will achieve no end. Therefore, the government in Kabul should look to their own incompetence, discrepancies, governmental and institutional problems rather than blaming Pakistan for every wrongdoing that takes place in Afghanistan.
The most crucial point on Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda with Afghanistan
should be preventing India from
using Afghanistan . Recent development related to the announced
US withdrawl and the report agreement on
a peace agreement between US and Taliban has raised hopes for reduction in terrorism
within Afghanistan. So far the talks have been held only between US and Taliban
the missing discussions between Taliban and The Afghan Government and or the
Northern Alliance or the non Pakthun Afghan population are still outstanding.
If the negotiations between Taliban and Afghan government do not proceed
smoothly Afghanistan could well see an increase in the civil war .
United States
The
Pak-US relationship has seen both positive and negative phases in its
diplomatic history. Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has been a major reason
for cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. The US mainly sought
Pakistani cooperation in promoting its interests against a third party. The
Soviet Union was such a party during the Cold War and the Taliban after 9/11.
The geo-strategic location of Pakistan was a major determinant in both cases.
Factors other than its location have played only a minor role in the relations
between the two countries.
The Afghan Jihad was an era of close cooperation between Pakistan
and the United States. Both the US and Pakistan supported the Afghan Mujahideen
in order to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. After the fall of the Soviet
Union, the relationship saw a decline. But post- 9/11 Pak-US ties again saw an
upward trajectory, whereby the US needed Pakistani support to support its
fighting in Afghanistan. Pakistan did support the US to the extent to which it
had agreed initially but the United States expected more from Pakistan. The US
developed the mantra of “do more” vis-Ã -vis Pakistan. As the war on terror in Afghanistan
has prolonged and has reached a stalemate now over seventeen years, Pak-US ties
have come to their lowest level ever. The US has stopped military assistance to
Pakistan. It has also been blaming Pakistan for its failure in Afghanistan. The
Trump Administration’s 2017 South Asia Strategy clearly reflected this
perspective.
The
United States can also influence Pakistan’s dealings with international
organisations. Pakistan could not get the support of the United States on the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issue. United States Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo also warned against the International Monetary Funds’ financing to
Pakistan citing the likelihood of Pakistan using the funds for paying back the
Chinese debts.
US, Afghanistan and India
Another
aspect of Pakistan’s relationships with India, Afghanistan and the US is a
strong trilateral relationship between the latter three countries. US, India,
and Afghanistan are closely aligned with one another albeit indirectly. India
enjoys a close relationship with both the US and Afghanistan. Similarly, the US
presence and long-term interests in Afghanistan make it a troublesome
stakeholder in that country and decisions it takes with regard to its security.
They share similar views on the War on Terror and blame Pakistan for backing
terrorism in Afghanistan and India. Hence, they collude against Pakistan.
Their
trilateral understanding of events makes it harder for Pakistan to convince any
one of these three countries. To convince Afghanistan of its sincere intentions
to resolve the Afghan issue would also require the United States to believe in
the sincerity of its efforts. Similarly, Afghanistan is not likely to improve
relations with Pakistan without the consent of India and the United States.
The
nationalistic governments in both the US and India rely heavily on political
rhetoric. They focus on strategy to make the outer world look evil to secure
their respective political support base. India and Afghanistan will hold
general elections in 2019 and later 2018, respectively. Anti-Pakistan rhetoric
is likely to see a sharp rise in India. During this time any hope of even
minimal engagements between Pakistan on the one hand and the US and India on
the other may not materialize. Pakistan, meanwhile, can wait for the new
administrations in India and Afghanistan to come into power and start fresh
engagement with them.
China and Afghanistan
Pakistan and China have been enjoying close, amiable and ever- growing diplomatic, economic, trade and security relations since the independence of Pakistan. After partition of the sub-continent both China and Pakistan have been working closely with each other in many areas of mutual interests. As the time passed by, the relations of Pakistan
and China have gathered more strength and dynamism. Currently these relations cover a wide spectrum of areas such as; diplomacy, culture, science, technology, economy, military and people-to-people
contact.
Pakistan and China’s interest converges in many areas that makes cooperation both possible and desirable. Pakistan’s geography attracts huge interest from China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is crucial for China’s economic development because this project provides the shortest transit route between Eastern China, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. It is not only about distance, CPEC is also of strategic importance for China
because
it acts
a
malady for China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” So the huge economic opportunities that CPEC gives to both countries necessitate deep and growing relations between the two neighbors.
In addition to these, the India factor will also be a crucial player in Pak-China relations.
Both
Pakistan and China
serve
each other
as a counter-weight to Indian designs. So Pakistan’s
relations with China have a strategic, economic and political value for Pakistan and are expected to become stronger as
well as closer with
the passage of time.
The Chinese do insist on keeping engaged with the Indians and attempt to
mitigate the Indian involvements to embrace the US designs, Indians of course
are playing the usual double game , they derive as much benefit from the US
embrace as possible whilst keeping communications open with the Chinese .
China has being paying attention to Afghanistan. China will
reportedly train Afghan troops for deployment in the Wakhan Corridor, which
links the Afghan province of Badakshan with western China. It is also
considering Afghanistan’s request for combat aircraft. These are the latest
developments in a growing military relationship: Beijing has granted $70
million in military aid to Kabul over the past three years. China has also held
meetings with Afghan Taliban representatives over the past year, and was rumored
(alongside Pakistan) to have brokered and guaranteed the Eidul Fitr ceasefire. These
developments should remind Pakistan that China only does what it does to serve
its own interests. In this case, Beijing has three reasons to pursue closer
involvement in Afghanistan.
The most important, in Beijing’s perspective, is to check Uighur radicalization.
China fears that oppressed Uighurs will increasingly depart for Afghanistan to
receive militant training, and that fighters affiliated with both the East
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the militant Islamic State group will
increasingly access western China via the Wakhan Corridor to carry out attacks.
The main goal of Chinese investment in a ‘mountain brigade’ in the
Wakhan Corridor is to block this two-way flow. This also explains why the
majority of Chinese development spending in Afghanistan — $90m worth in
September 2017 alone — is concentrated in Badakshan, the proximate Afghan
province.
Media reports suggest that part of China’s efforts to engage with
the Afghan Taliban is to dispel the perception that the Chinese are anti-Muslim
(apparently Taliban representatives were offered tours of a Chinese mosque).
These interactions are aimed at staving off Beijing’s nightmare scenario of the
Afghan Taliban formally joining forces with ETIM.
China’s second, related goal is to ensure the security of its Belt
and Road Initiative. Beijing has recognised that an Afghanistan offering
sanctuary to various militant groups poses the greatest threats to its flagship
CPEC projects, and seeks to stabilise the country before the corridor is fully
‘online’. Finally, growing Chinese influence in Afghanistan will help loosen
the historic US grip over Kabul, something Beijing will increasingly seek as
Sino-US tensions intensify.
These drivers present Islamabad with an opportunity to equalise
its relationship with Beijing. After all, China does not know Afghanistan the
way Pakistan does. It requires Pakistani interlocutors to achieve its goals.
And in exchange for facilitation, China will be the heavy hitter ensuring
Pakistan’s seat on the table during any peace negotiations.
Knowing this, China is already playing an important role in
brokering Af-Pak ties. It has urged the new government to establish a crisis
prevention mechanism to prevent hostilities from escalating after incidents
such as terror attacks within Afghanistan. Last December, it hosted trilateral
talks where Kabul, Beijing and Islamabad jointly called on the Afghan Taliban
to engage in peace talks.
But China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan may also create tensions
in the Sino-Pak relationship. Here’s the thing: China’s main goal in
Afghanistan is ostensibly to keep ETIM out, while Pakistan’s is to keep India
out. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s counterproductive last visit is a
good reminder of how alliances end up when supposed allies have divergent
strategic objectives.
China will use all the resources at its disposal to achieve its
ends in Afghanistan. And this includes India. Just this April, Xi Jingping and
Narendra Modi agreed to cooperate in Afghanistan, including by launching joint
economic projects to spur growth and stability. At some point, China may ask
Pakistan to curb what some allege is its tolerance of militants in Afghanistan.
So far, Islamabad has not appeared averse to Chinese intervention
in its security policies. But as Washington will tell Beijing, there is a point
at which Pakistan will not budge from prioritizing its security and strategic
objectives, no matter how high or sweet the friendship. It remains to be seen
whether Afghanistan will be the forge that further melds the allies, or the
anvil on which the relationship faces blows.
US needs exit strategy from Afghanistan
The war in Afghanistan has already gone on 11 years longer than
World War II. And whereas Germany and Japan were both modern industrial nations
with their own histories of democracy when that war started and have since
become close allies, Afghanistan, still beset by conflict, has never really
been anything more than a collection of ethnic clans only loosely bound
together by nationhood—where the fragments often command a greater allegiance
from individual citizens than the whole.
The U.S. Defense Department’s own metrics suggest that
Afghanistan’s insurgents are nowhere near losing. The percentage of the
country’s 407 districts under government control has decreased from 66 percent in May
2016 to 56 percent in May 2018. Over the same two-year period, the number of
areas under Taliban or insurgent control has risen, as did the number of
districts considered “contested,” according to an audit by the Pentagon’s
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Afghanistan is as much the graveyard of empires as it ever was.
But U.S. civilian and military leaders routinely claim that they are capable of
winning the war there. That wishful thinking aside, the argument against
withdrawing U.S. forces boils down to inertia. As in Vietnam, the United States
is trapped. It can’t win, yet it can’t leave for fear that the government in
Kabul would collapse and Afghanistan could once again become an oasis for
terrorists who threaten the United States.
There is reason to believe
that the realities on the ground—exhaustion after years of war, a more
politically sophisticated Taliban, and a multiplicity of competing jihadi
groups—have changed and that a different outcome is now possible. And other
countries, including China, could be convinced to take on a greater role in
assuring Afghanistan’s future.
It is not hard to understand why the idea that the United States
can stay in Afghanistan and win seems to hold widespread appeal. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have defined the careers of an entire generation of the
U.S. military
The U.S. presence in Afghanistan safeguards two vital interests:
the need to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and to eliminate terrorist safe
havens. But the United States could ensure those interests without staying in
Afghanistan forever. However, the country would need to change its mindset in
order to both get out and have a chance of avoiding a much-feared collapse in
Kabul, which would lead to Afghanistan becoming a jihadi playground.
Any plausible exit strategy must involve handing over U.S.
military and political roles to the countries most directly impacted by turmoil
in Afghanistan. First on that list is China, which has large economic and
counterterrorism interests at stake. Washington should signal its intent to
withdraw troops and quietly begin a dialogue with Beijing to coordinate an exit
that minimizes the possibility of a political-military vacuum. China prefers to
free-ride on the United States but, faced with the reality of U.S. withdrawal,
could assemble a group committed to securing Afghanistan—including Russia,
India, Pakistan, and Iran—operating under a U.N. Security Council mandate.
Then, under U.N. auspices, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
the loose Eurasian alliance aimed at counterterrorism and regional cooperation,
perhaps in cooperation with NATO, could convene a peace conference in Geneva.
The participants would primarily focus on setting the terms and conditions for
the Taliban to take on a primary position in a national unity government—on the
condition that it holds free and fair elections within 12 to 18 months of assuming
power.
In return, a Taliban-majority government would have to agree to
deny safe haven to the Islamic State or other Islamist militant groups; to
support the inclusion of major non-Pashtun ethnic groups (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek,
Turkmen) in a de facto federal system that grants autonomy to non-Pashtun
districts; and to solemnly promise to protect women’s rights, especially to
education and to participation in social life—something the Taliban now claim to
accept, although the facts on the ground tell a different story.
One major incentive for the Taliban would be the creation of a $25
billion multiyear reconstruction fund jointly managed by the Asian Development
Bank and Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The fund would operate
on principles similar to those of the U.S. Millennium Challenge account created
by the George W. Bush administration; grants and loans offered through the fund
would require fully vetted business plans. And assistance would be conditioned
on the Taliban abiding by the terms of the peace accord: that is, no safe
havens for terrorists and political tolerance.
There is reason to think this exit strategy is plausible. China, through
its massive Belt and Road development strategy and long-standing alliance with
Pakistan, has far more leverage with Islamabad than the United States does.
Beyond its large-scale investments in Afghan mining, China’s counterterrorism
policies also overlap with the United States’. Thus, U.S.-Chinese
counterterrorism cooperation in both Afghanistan and in the greater Middle East
could continue. It might even be a tonic for the otherwise volatile
relationship between the two countries.
First,
depleted blood and treasure is the price it has paid for allowing al Qaeda a
safe haven. Moreover, its evolution from an insurgency tasked with destruction
to a governing political party will undoubtedly change its decision-making
calculus. In 2018, even a Taliban regime in Afghanistan would have little
incentive to open the country’s doors to the Islamic State or any of a plethora
of Islamist militant groups to undo a fragile peace. Indeed, the political
incentive of becoming not only a legitimate political party but the dominant
one should not be underestimated, especially in combination with the economic
benefits such an agreement would unlock.
Meanwhile, with the Taliban as the dominant power in Kabul,
Islamabad may find reason to be a more cooperative member of the negotiating
team. Chinese pressure could reinforce the tilt. The United States faces
enormous global and regional strategic challenges from China and Russia from
which it cannot afford to be distracted by continuing its presence in
Afghanistan. In his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump pushed for a radical
rethink of this endless and unwinnable war. His instincts were right on this. A
pragmatic, workable exit strategy from Afghanistan is the least dishonorable
way for the United States to turn the page and step out of the graveyard that,
from the time of Alexander, has buried empires.
In his latest book, Fear, Bob Woodward
notes Trump had initially insisted “Afghanistan is a total disaster. We don’t
know what we are doing. Let’s get out". After becoming president he found his
generals opposed his views. National Security Adviser Gen McMaster sought to
“align military recommendations for Afghanistan with the president’s goals” but
he discovered “this president’s only goal was to get out”. Since then, the
generals and civilian hawks have controlled Trump and got him to stay on in
Afghanistan indefinitely.
A State Department official asked the generals some “fundamental
questions”. Why do we think we need a counterterrorism base in Afghanistan to
prevent another (9/11) attack? What do we think the terrorist threat emanating
from Afghanistan really is? Why do we think thousands of US troops and
intelligence specialists are needed when we have drones and everything else?
An enduring US presence in Afghanistan, he said, could cause
“further instability from not only insurgents, but also regional players, such
as Pakistan”. Moreover, when the US invaded Afghanistan it did not want to
establish a permanent presence. Why did it want to after 16 years? The military
denied it wanted a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The official accordingly
asked: when would the US military presence end? Or was the search for a
political settlement “a way to sell continued US military engagement in
Afghanistan?” Senator Lindsey Graham answered a similar question from Trump by
saying “It never ends.”
Pakistan, however, cannot broker a peace settlement between a Kabul
government that deeply mistrusts it and the Taliban insurgency that is
suspicious of Pakistan’s motives and reliability. Reports that Pakistan now
wants US forces to stay in Afghanistan until peace is achieved would confirm
Taliban suspicions and the success of US pressure on Pakistan to realign its
Afghanistan policy. Pakistan does have limited influence with the Taliban, such
influence has resulted in the partial peace agreement between US and the
Taliban .
Should the US be willing to consider a time-based, instead of a
conditions-based, withdrawal from Afghanistan, a sensible and far-sighted
Pakistan policy could, in concert with other regional countries, significantly
assist a time-lined Afghan settlement. So far, this has not been Pakistan’s
preferred policy option.
President Ghani “dangled the possibility that the US would have
exclusive access to the vast mineral wealth” of Afghanistan saying “there’s so
much money to be made. Don’t walk away. Rare earth minerals, like lithium, etc
worth several trillion dollars!” An impressed Trump said, “[the Afghans] have
offered us their minerals. Offered us everything! Why aren’t we there taking
them? The Chinese are raiding the place.” McMaster pointed out that “a lot of
the minerals are in Taliban-controlled areas”.
Ghani also promised Trump he would allow “as many counterterrorism
troops as he wanted plus CIA bases wherever he wanted”. But Kabul failed to
regain Taliban-controlled areas because, as the US Directorate of National
Intelligence reported, “Pakistan was not playing ball or responding to
pressure. Any settlement was premised on Pakistani participation".
Moreover, “a drought was coming, and with it a crisis of food security”. In
addition, Pakistan was about to send back “one or two million Afghan refugees”.
It is still not clear whether Trump wants to include Pakistan or
exclude it from an Afghan peace process. The US needs Pakistan. But it prefers
to see Indian influence prevail in Afghanistan. It also wants an Afghan
settlement that forestalls Chinese influence. Pakistan needs the US to adopt a
more balanced policy towards it. But not at the cost of its strategic
relationship with China.
In turn, China realizes Trump is a dangerous and destabilizing
foe, not the global partner for regional and international stability it had
hoped. For India, a Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement is a strategic nightmare. Regarding
Afghanistan, almost everyone is “as straight as a jalebi”. Woodward notes
McMaster proposed a R4 strategy: Reinforce (Kabul); Realign (concentrate on
areas under its control); Reconcile (with the Taliban while killing and
dividing them); and Regionalize (essentially bringing in India).
This was to reinforce his four frames policy: achieving political
stability through a political settlement with the Taliban; building
institutions to counter the Taliban; increasing pressure on Pakistan which was
playing a “double game”, and maintaining allied support. Trump believed “things
will work out with Pakistan”. But, according to US intelligence, “Pakistan has
not changed since 9/11 and they won’t".
The only option in Afghanistan was “a new House of Broken Toys”
(the CIA’s reference to Iraq when it was planning its invasion). In other
words, the US needed a CIA or US Army-run Afghan insurgency against the Taliban
insurgency (and Pakistan).The “House of Broken Toys” in the Afghan context
alludes to expanding Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT) made up of “the best
Afghan fighters, the cream of the crop” who are “paid, trained and controlled
by the CIA”. Could this “CIA paramilitary force” make a US troop increase
unnecessary? CTPTs had previously “conducted dangerous and highly controversial
cross-border operations into Pakistan”. The CIA now wanted to hit two High
Value Targets in Pakistan! Moreover, Senator Graham warned Trump that pulling
out of Afghanistan could lead to another 9/11 for which he would be condemned.
To conclude, US Afghan policy is focused on containing China.
Staying on in Afghanistan, having military/intelligence bases, and disengaging
Pakistan from its embrace of China are part of the US strategy. So are its
threats, sanctions, FATF and the IMF’s focus on “China debt”. These are
ultimately aimed at CPEC and the Belt and Road Initiative.An intelligent and
sustainable Afghan policy is an urgent strategic requirement for Pakistan. It
would need to be situated in a broader set of domestic and external policies.
Recent US announcement to withdraw from Afghanistan and the
subsequent agreement to withdraw with 18 months from Afghanistan has altered
most thinking related to Afghanistan. The Taliban has agreed to a peace
agreement. The missing part is an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan Government,
without which peace will not prevail in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s
immediate foreign policy challenges: Building
the Pakistan-China strategic partnership-China has the strategic motivation
and financial, technological and weapons capabilities to help Pakistan emerge
as a militarily strong and economically dynamic state. The substance and depth
of the future strategic partnership will depend mainly on the ability of the
Pakistan government and its private sector to conceive and execute cooperative
projects and ventures with China. Pakistan needs to prepare for utilization of
the full impact of CPEC, by means of human development and identification of
key areas of cooperation. Pakistan also needs to address the inimical trade
agreement already signed with China; Managing Sino-US rivalry-The Trump
administration has designated China as a strategic competitor and opposes
China’s Belt and Road Initiative including CPEC. The US diplomatic and media
onslaught against China and CPEC has intensified. In fact, China’s investment
and infrastructure building can help stabilize the entire South Asian region
including Afghanistan. With growing indications that Donald Trump wants a hurried
withdrawal from Afghanistan,
agreement on the role China can and should play in stabilizing the region must
become a priority for Pakistan’s regional diplomacy.: Afghanistan-Pakistan
and US positions appeared to converge recently as the US belatedly accepted the
need for a political settlement in Afghanistan and opened direct talks with the
Afghan Taliban which Pakistan facilitated. However, the entire negotiating
process, including the one initiated by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, may
be thrown in disarray by Trump’s announcement to withdraw 7,000 US troops from
Afghanistan. Sensing US abandonment, and under unrelenting Taliban pressure,
the Kabul ‘unity’ government, even the Afghan National Army, may collapse,
reviving the likelihood of another prolonged civil war. Pakistan needs to assist
in the oderly change in regime in Kabul. Pakistan’s diplomacy must work
simultaneously with the US and China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent
civil war and promote a viable political settlement in Afghanistan. A
conference involving these states and major Afghan parties could be convened to
draw up the broad parameters of such a settlement; Pakistan-US-In
Trump’s ‘America First’ environment, there is a growing ‘Washington Consensus’
against China, Russia and the Muslim world, including compliant ‘allies’. The
US has been reluctant to acknowledge Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan and
continued to adopt punitive measures against it. If the US leaves Afghanistan
without a political settlement, it may feel free to take further action against
Pakistan. Islamabad needs to negotiate the structure of its future ties with
the US in tandem with arrangements for US troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan.
After America’s exit, Pakistan’s leverage will be diminished. Pakistan should
not assume clear sailing in US Pakistan ties, the lull is temporary and
tactical, US will revert back to its pre pull out stance -once they wash their
hands off Afghanistan, Pakistan needs to reset relations with US at a low but
stable level; Kashmir
and India-It is evident that Imran Khan, the PTI government and
Pakistan’s army chief desire normalisation with India. This sentiment is not
reciprocated, although Pakistan’s unilateral gesture of opening the Kartarpur
corridor put New Delhi temporarily on the defensive. In the run-up to the 2019
Indian elections, the Modi government may seek to revive its flagging political
fortunes by generating hostility against Pakistan, or even ‘limited’ military
action, on some cooked-up pretext. Pakistan must remain vigilant and defeat any
aggressive move. Normalisation with India is highly unlikely so long as it
continues its oppression in occupied Kashmir and refuses to resume a comprehensive
dialogue with Pakistan. To defend Kashmiris’ fundamental rights, Pakistan must
launch an international diplomatic and media campaign to project and condemn
India’s human rights violations in occupied Kashmir (confirmed and documented
in the recent report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights). There are
signs that India is aware of the altered environment post US departure from
Afghanistan and at some stage India may chose to deal directly with Pakistan
(most likely after Indian general elections) instead of the present where
relations are managed through China and Iran. Already the Kartarpur crossing,
power projects inception by Pakistani experts, and prisoners release and
exchange signal a slight softening in the Indian stance ; Terrorism-India’s
campaign to portray Pakistan as a sponsor of ‘terrorism’ is designed to
constrict Islamabad’s ability to advance its national security and economic
development goals. Fortunately, this campaign, although supported by the US,
has failed so far. Pakistan must kill it. To this end, it could: 1) fulfill its
obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions (placing required restraints on
designated entities and persons); 2) insist on elimination of the BLA and TTP
presence from Afghanistan in the context of an Afghan political settlement, and
3) launch a diplomatic and media campaign to project India’s state-sponsored
terrorism in Kashmir and from Afghanistan and elsewhere; Saudi Arabia and Iran-The
government has, by force of circumstance, revived Pakistan’s close relationship
with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their financial support is essential at present
to keep the economy afloat. The future commercial viability of Gwadar (and
CPEC) depends to a considerable extent on its emergence as the oil and gas
transshipment centre and a petrochemical complex. This will become feasible if
Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies route a part of their oil, gas and refined
product exports through Gwadar to China. Pakistan should resist the urge to
mediate between Riyadh and Tehran, at least for now. Pakistan’s ties with Iran
are vital and Saudi-Iranian reconciliation is essential for regional peace and
stability. However, the US and Israel are likely to subvert mediatory efforts.
Riyadh is vulnerable to US pressure at this time. Pakistan still has issues to
resolve with Iran including the reported presence of RAW operatives on its soil
and cross-border incidents eg the recent attack on the FC patrol. Saudi will
also try and use Pakistani soil for actions against Iran , already a few incidents
have occurred where a Sunni group has taken a few terrorist acts within Iran,
Pakistan should not allow its territory to be used against Iran ; Economic diplomacy-Pakistan’s
diplomats and embassies should play a larger role in promoting trade and investment.
But Pakistan must first be able to produce goods and services it can export and
create the economic environment conducive for foreign investment. Pakistani
diplomats should also seem transfer of appropriate technology to Pakistan; Islamic world-Pakistan
should revive its traditional leadership role in the Muslim world which
confronts multiple challenges. An initiative to provide humanitarian support to
Muslims in occupied territories and war zones could be a worthy initiative.
Larger objective of seeking peace between warring Muslim sections and also
within GCC is perhaps not ripe for diplomacy on a large scale at this point in
time; Global
challenges-Nor should Pakistan discard its traditional
leadership role at the UN and other international fora. Although by population
Pakistan is the sixth largest country, it has been excluded from most groupings
of the powerful — G20, BRICS, APEC, etc. Yet, by this very token, Pakistan is
well placed to lead the vast majority of developing countries, which have also
been excluded from these ‘elite’ groups, and ensure their voices are heard on
global issues like climate change, development and disarmament.
Shortly after this, Pakistan caved into pressure from the failed
Kabul regime and cancelled a meeting that was scheduled between Afghan Taliban
representatives and Prime Minister Imran Khan. This betrayed any sense of logic
as American, Russian, Iranian and Chinese officials
have met with Taliban officials in pursuit of bringing some sense of normalcy
to Afghanistan. It is ludicrous that as Pakistan stands to gain more from a
placid Afghanistan than America, Russia, China or even Iran, the Pakistan
government caved into pressure from a regime that does not even control much
(if not most) of its own territory. This of course came at a time when the
wider world including many in Washington openly admit that
Pakistan has a vital role to play in the all-parties peace process.
More recently, the same PTM that the civilian government had
been walking on egg shells to appease has been exposed as an anti-state
organisation that recently conducted a violent attack against the Army. Whilst
ISPR has revealed PTM’s foreign links to the world, the civilian authorities
have yet to designate the group as a terrorist organisation. This is both
dangerous and dangerously embarrassing.
Now, after having insulted the Taliban, the only Pashtun faction
in Afghanistan that is not explicitly anti-Pakistan, Imran Khan is set to host
Kabul regime leader Ashraf Ghani, a man who is no longer even taken seriously
by his American patrons, yet a man who still refuses to recognise
Pakistan’s borders in spite of not even controlling those of his own nation.
When taken as a whole, this means that Pakistan’s government is
in disarray and self-evidently the “opposition” parties are vastly worse. Due
to the fact that Pakistan remains at war (however
much liberals in Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad may pretend otherwise) it is
high time to reconsider not only Pakistan’s methodological but infrastructural
approach to foreign policy and security matters.
Pakistan must consider transforming the Foreign Ministry into a
High Council of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security. Such a Council would be
comprised of a combination of highly patriotic independent experts, military
commanders, ISI officials, some elected members of the National Assembly,
representatives of all provinces and a small number of directly elected individuals.
All and all, the Council ought to start with 15 members with the aim to expand
as credible, strategic and intelligent patriotic voices rise to the fore.
The Council would continue its work uninterrupted in spite of
any election cycles. New appointments to the Council could only be made through
a 2/3rds vote of existing Council members that would later be approved by a
simple majority of the National Assembly. Likewise, one could only be removed
from the Council through a 2/3rd vote of other Council members or by a 2/3rds
vote of the National Assembly.
Such a High Council of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security
could not only harmonise the relationship between military and civilian
authorities but it would help to largely de-politicise this relationship.
Furthermore, by elevating foreign affairs to an apolitical status, it would
mean that like the Army and ISI, foreign affairs could at long last begin to
transcend the vulgar and petty nature of political points scoring.
Pakistan’s political class is letting the nation down by
allowing foreign affairs and security matters to take a backseat to the inanity
that continues to define Pakistani party politics. By creating a High Council
of Foreign Affairs And Regional Security, democracy could continue to develop
at pace whilst those protecting Pakistan would have a diplomatic voice whose
professionalism could match that of the Army and ISI. The time to consider such
a re-organisation of foreign and security affairs cannot come soon enough.
US China Cold War: June, 10, 2019: Rivalry
with China is becoming an organising principle of US economic, foreign and
security policies”; “The aim is US domination. This means control over China,
or separation from China”. “This is the most important geopolitical
development of our era. ...[I]t will increasingly force everybody else to take
sides or fight hard for neutrality”; “ Anybody who believes that a rules-based
multilateral order, our globalised economy, or even harmonious international
relations, are likely to survive this conflict is deluded”.
Pakistan
is near if not in the eye of the brewing Sino-US storm. Neutrality is not an
option for Pakistan. The US has already chosen India as its strategic partner
to counter China across the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and South Asia. The announced US
South Asia policy is based on Indian domination of the subcontinent.
Notwithstanding India’s trade squabbles with Donald Trump, the US establishment
is committed to building up India militarily to counter China.
On the other hand,
strategic partnership with China is the bedrock of Pakistan’s security and
foreign policy. The Indo-US alliance will compel further intensification of the
Pakistan-China partnership. Pakistan is the biggest impediment to Indian
hegemony over South Asia and the success of the Indo-US grand strategy. Ergo,
they will try to remove or neutralise this ‘impediment’.
The US is arming India
with the latest weapons and technologies whose immediate and greatest impact
will be on Pakistan. India’s military buildup is further exacerbating the arms
imbalance against Pakistan, encouraging Indian aggression and lowering the
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a Pakistan-India conflict.
Washington has joined India in depicting the legitimate Kashmiri freedom
struggle as ‘Islamist terrorism’.
A hybrid war is being
waged against Pakistan. Apart from the arms buildup, ceasefire violations
across the LoC and opposition to Kashmiri freedom, ethnic agitation in ex-Fata
and TTP and BLA terrorism has been openly sponsored by India, along with a
hostile media campaign with Western characteristics. FATF’s threats to put
Pakistan on its black list and the opposition to CPEC are being orchestrated by
the US and India. The US has also delayed the IMF package for Pakistan by
objecting to repayment of Chinese loans from the bailout.
Although the US has
moderated its public antipathy towards Pakistan while it extracts Pakistan’s
cooperation to persuade the Taliban to be ‘reasonable’, it is likely to revert
to its coercive stance once a settlement is reached in Afghanistan, or if the
negotiations with the Taliban break down.
The Sino-US confrontation
is likely to escalate further in the foreseeable future. US pressure on smaller
states to fall in line will become more intense under the direction of US
hawks. Under Xi Jinping, China will not “hide its strength or bide its time”.
Beijing has retaliated against Washington’s trade restrictions. It will “defend
every inch” of Chinese territory.
Likewise Narendra Modi in
his second term is unlikely to become more pliant towards Pakistan. He has been
elected on a plank of extreme Hindu nationalism and hostility towards Muslims,
Kashmiris and particularly Pakistan. Modi will not shift from this posture
since he needs to keep his people’s attention away from the BJP’s failure to
create jobs and improve living conditions for anyone apart from India’s elite.
India’s economy is facing headwinds and growth has slowed. There are multiple
insurgencies across the country, apart from the popular and sustained revolt in
disputed Kashmir against India’s brutal occupation.
The Pulwama crisishas
confirmed the imminent danger posed by the Kashmir dispute. In their resistance
to Indian occupation, Kashmiris groups will at times respond violently to
India’s gross and systematic violations of human rights. India will blame
Pakistan for such violence and its failure to put down the Kashmiri resistance.
The next Pakistan-India confrontation could lead to general hostilities. These
could escalate rapidly to the nuclear level.
The most dangerous
scenario for Pakistan would be an Indian conventional attack under a US nuclear
‘umbrella’. Pakistan’s second strike capability is the only certain counter to
this catastrophic scenario.
Some in Pakistan may be
sufficiently disheartened by its imposing challenges to advocate peace with
India at any cost. But, for Pakistan, “surrender is not an option” (to quote
the title of John Bolton’s book about the UN).
Accepting Indian
domination over South Asia will compromise the very raison d’être for the
creation of Pakistan. The current plight of India’s trapped Muslims should be
an object lesson to those who believe that displays of goodwill will buy
India’s friendship. A thousand years of history refutes that thesis.
In any event,
irrespective of what Pakistan does, the Kashmiris will persist in their
struggle. They have survived periods of Pakistani indifference. If Modi’s
government attempts to fulfil its campaign pledge to abrogate Jammu &
Kashmir’s special, autonomous status, the Kashmiri resistance will further
intensify. Islamabad will then face a choice of supporting the just Kashmiri
struggle or cooperating with the Indians to suppress it (just as the Arab
states are being pressed to do to the Palestinian struggle for statehood.)
Even as it seeks to
stabilise the economy and revive growth, Pakistan’s civil and military
leadership must remain focused on preserving Pakistan’s security and strategic
independence. The alternative is to become an Indo-American satrap. A better
future is possible. But it is not visible on the horizon.
Against
all odds, presidents Trump and Xi may resolve their differences over trade and
technology at the forthcoming G20 Summit or thereafter. Or, Trump may be
defeated in 2020 by a reasonable Democrat who renounces the cold war with
China. Alternately, Modi may be persuaded by Putin, Xi and national pride not
to play America’s cat’s-paw and join a cooperative Asian order, including the
normalisation of ties with Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan cannot base its security and
survival on such optimistic future scenarios. It must plan for the worst while
hoping for the best.
