Science and Technology Revival in the Muslim World

 

Science and Technology Revival in the Muslim World

Introduction, the Problem

It is no secret that Muslim-majority countries have lagged behind much of the world in scientific and technological progress for far too long. On average, they spend less than 0.5 per cent of their GDP (gross domestic product) on research and development, compared with five times that in developed economies. OIC countries account for just 2.4 per cent of global research expenditure, 1.6 per cent of patents and 6 per cent of scientific publications, despite holding nearly a quarter of the world’s population.

By any index, the Muslim world produces a disproportionately small amount of scientific output and much of it relatively low in quality. In numerical terms, forty-one predominantly Muslim countries with about 20 percent of the world's total population generate less than 5 percent of its science. This, for example, is the proportion of citations of articles published in internationally circulating science journals. Other measures -- annual expenditures on research and development, numbers of research scientists and engineers -- confirm the disparity between populations and scientific research.

Whatever indicator one looks at, the status of science in most Muslim countries is bleak. Just as evident is the fact that this situation is not caused by an idiosyncratic relationship between science and Islam, or between science and Muslims, as rational science flourished under the Abbasid Caliphate during the 8^th to 13^th centuries and Muslim scientists fare well in academic institutions around the world. Several analyses have tried to explain the state of scientific progress in Islamic societies, mostly focusing on traditional factors, such as inadequate funding, brain drain, or shortcomings of the educational system. Others have taken a historical perspective by contrasting the evolution of science in the Muslim world with the path of Western science. However, these analyses failed to account for the modest return on considerable investments in science that some rich Muslim countries have made during the past years, or how countries such as Japan, South Korea, or China successfully implemented “Western science” without having gone through the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution. What is still missing in this debate are the unique dynamics of how the interplay between religion and politics during the 20^th century created a hostile environment to the general values of modernity in Islamic societies. These dynamics  have more to do with the stagnation of science in Islamic societies than other factors, such as lack of funding and scientific capacity.

The social, economic and security implications of this are staggering. It means that the Muslim world is not investing enough in the core scientific and technological tools to generate solutions for newly emerging threats from climate change, water scarcity and food insecurity. Several studies have also shown a link between the outbreak of conflict and how climate change affects drought and food prices.

This situation leads to some hard questions: Is Islam an obstacle to modern science? If not, how does one explain the huge gap in scientific output between the Muslim world and the West or East Asia? And what must change so that science can flourish in Muslim countries?

While Islam has yet to reconcile faith and reason, other factors such as dictatorial regimes and unstable funding are more important obstacles to science and technology's again flourishing in the Muslim world. Significant progress, in other words, depends on changes in values and institutions -- no small order.

The Current Situation

In the aftermath of World War II, for the first time, a perceived need for indigenous science and technology spread in the Muslim world. Such events as the creation of Pakistan and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war made Muslims very acutely aware of their deficiencies in science and technology. The attainment of independence fostered a technological (but not a scientific) nationalism. States took responsibility for managing technology as an instrument of national power and made relatively ample resources available for technology (though, again, not science).

More than sixty new universities and technical schools opened during this period in the Arabic-speaking countries alone but none of them has world-class standing. Science and engineering programs received the most resources and so attracted the finest students; further, they have grown to the point that hundreds of thousands of students now graduate annually in the Muslim world. In addition, several hundred thousand Muslim students have since the 1950s studied science and engineering in the West, the former Soviet Union, India, and elsewhere, and a majority have returned home. Trouble is, these results have been more impressive quantitatively than qualitatively.

The implementation of science and technology policy takes place at the national, not regional, level. Most governments have established councils to oversee science and technology, drafted some sort of national plan, and made an attempt at implementation. National science policies vary widely. Turkey has achieved the most research cooperation between the public and private sectors, especially in hydrology, textiles, and agriculture. Egypt has a cumbersome, centralized research bureaucracy and policy with little diffusion or practical results. Pakistan pursues a comprehensive, government-directed research effort with a priority for nuclear energy and other highly centralized projects, but implementation has been slow and expensive. Malaysia has a sophisticated applied-research policy focused on getting local private investors to work together to expand the export of electronic items. Indonesia has opted for a high-tech policy based on a national aerospace industry with high-cost risks.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have poured vast amounts of money into science and technology. But the research output has not matched the state-of-the-art facilities. The prevailing mentality continues to be that of buying science and technology rather than producing it. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia each operate its own modest version of French-style centralized research policies but their lack of linkages to the private sector or ability to diffuse results limits their productivity. Iran and Iraq concentrate on petroleum and weapons research to the detriment of other sectors. Other countries, such as the Sudan, Yemen, or the newly independent Central Asian republics, lack a critical mass of researchers or have experienced extensive emigration, or both. Political repression has crippled science in Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria.

Fundamentalist governments in Iran and the Sudan have shown no interest in developing a specifically Islamic science.   Further, the emigration of so many scientists and engineers from Iran after 1979, coupled with the devastating effects of the war with Iraq, meant that the authorities were most concerned with nurturing the remaining research community. Indeed, the priority to reconstruct the war-damaged petroleum and petrochemical industries has dictated generous treatment of scientists and engineers. The science curriculum in the schools and universities has been largely retained along pre-1979 lines. Iranian scientists have preserved international contacts; even Abdus Salam, the Pakistan particle physicist and the only Muslim Nobel Prize winner in science, has visited Iran.

The Sudan has experienced one of the most severe instances of brain-drain anywhere in the world. It appears that a half-million Sudanese technicians and professionals have emigrated, primarily to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, since 1960. Scientists, engineers, and physicians have left, primarily to the Persian Gulf countries. The military-fundamentalist junta that came to power in 1989 has been concerned to slow down this exodus of talent and to retrieve what remains of Sudanese scientific and technological capabilities. Hasan at-Turabi, philosopher-theologian of the regime, envisions a moral, democratic, Islamic state with ample room for research. The Sudanese government, with its enormous internal problems, appears to have no interest in attempting an Islamization of science.

Nor do fundamentalist movements in opposition aspire to Islamize science. Movements in Algeria and Tunisia, for example, demand the replacement of French with Arabic at all educational levels, but their objectives are political and cultural rather than anti-scientific.

Only in Pakistan, due to internal political pressures and the particularly influential role of the mullahs (clergy), have fundamentalists attempted to impose a version of Islamic science. The government of Zia-ul-Haq in 1987 introduced fundamentalist doctrines in the teaching of science at all levels, from primary schools to universities. The regime organized international conferences and provided funding for research on such topics as the temperature of hell and the chemical nature of jinns (demons). After considerable damage had been done to science education, secularists counterattacked and in 1988 won the right to teach and research modern science. In spite of extensive publications and academic exchanges, Islamic science has not taken hold outside of Pakistan, where its support appears to be on the decline.

Islamic or Muslim seats of civilization did demonstrate elements of “creativity” and “innovation” centuries before the relatively recent scientific and technological revolution and consequent dominant position of the West. During the second half of the twentieth century there has been a general awakening in the developing countries on the need for ‘catching up’ with the West with respect to Science and Technology and removing the “road blocks” in the path of scientific development. However, Muslim countries over the past centuries have not fared well compared to others in their policies and plans for adoption of scientific methods of inquiry, creation of a climate for innovation and adaptation of modern technology.

The results shown in the tables (Tables 1 and 2) below indicate that there are great disparities between Muslim countries and technologically advanced countries of the West. 

Table 1: Human Development and Technology Achievement Indices of some Muslim Countries

Country	HDI Ranking (2007-08)	TAI Ranking (2001) [Only 72 countries were ranked]
Algeria	104	58
Bangladesh	140	NA
Egypt	112	57
Indonesia	107	60
Iran	94	50
Jordan	86	NA
Kuwait	33	NA
Lebanon	88	NA
Malaysia	63	30
Pakistan	136	65
Saudi Arabia	61	NA
Syria	106	56
Tunisia	91	51
The “Spread”	(33-140)	(50-65)

Human Development and Technology Achievement Indices of some Technologically Advanced Countries

Country	HDI Ranking (2007-08)	TAI Ranking (2001) [Only 72 countries were ranked]
Australia	3	10
Belgium	17	14
Brazil	43	43
Canada	4	9
Croatia	47	31
Germany	22	11
Hong Kong	21	24
Israel	23	18
Japan	8	4
Korea(South)	26	5
Netherlands	9	6
UK	16	7
United States	12	2
The “Spread”	(3-47)	(2-43)

The human development situation varies widely across the Muslim world. UNDP’s 2006 Human Development Report which examines human development across 177 countries, shows a picture of sharp contrasts; human development in the Muslim world ranges from Niger and Mali, which rank bottom at 177th and third from bottom at 175th respectively (both countries are about 90% Muslim), to Kuwait and Brunei which are ranked 33rd and 34th from the top respectively—both oil-producing countries, Kuwait, (the native population of which is almost exclusively Muslim) and Brunei (which is two thirds Muslim), just below Portugal and the Czech Republic. For the “Muslim world,” however defined, the status of its human development ranges from the bottom of the HDI in Africa to just below the top tier in the oil-producing states.

The harsh reality of the present day Muslim World is that despite being in possession of enormous potential and immense resources, most of the countries are at a lower level of development, barring a few exceptions, mostly the natural-resources-rich countries.

However, a major chunk of the global Muslim population continues to languish in abject poverty. A sizable number of populace in Muslim countries, with large populations, lives below the internationally defined poverty line; in some cases, this ratio is as high as 60 and 70%  

  Population below Poverty in Selected Muslim Countries

Country	Population below Poverty Line % of Total Population
Azerbaijan	49.6
Albania	22.6
Algeria	25.4
Bangladesh	43.2
Chad	63.0
Egypt	16.7
Indonesia	16.7
Mauritania	46.3
Pakistan	32.6
Sierra Leone	70.2
Turkey	27.0

Source: The PEW Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011

The OIC average of adult literacy rate, i.e. 70.2%, for the period of 1999-2008 was approximately 10 percentage points lower than the world average of 79.6%. For Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the figure was even lower, with 56.6% and 54.4% . On average, 2.7% of the total GDP of the OIC Member Countries was spent on public education in the period of 1999-2008, which was less than the World average of 4%. As to the average health expenditure from the total GDP of the OIC Member Countries, it stood at almost half of the world average, in percentage.

Golden Age

  The Muslim experience consists of a golden age in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, a subsequent collapse, a modest rebirth in the nineteenth century, and a history of frustration in the twentieth century. The deficiency in Muslim science and technology is particularly intriguing given that Muslims were world leaders in science and technology a millennium ago -- something that distinguishes them from, say, the peoples of Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa.

 The period 900-1200 A.D. represents the approximate apogee of Muslim science, which flourished in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, and Cordoba, among other cities. Significant progress was made in such areas as medicine, agronomy, botany, mathematics, chemistry, and optics. As Muslims vied with Chinese for intellectual and scientific leadership, Christian Europe lagged far behind both.³

This golden age was definitely Muslim in that it took place in predominantly Muslim societies, but was it Islamic, that is, connected to the religion of Islam. States were officially Islamic, and intellectual life took place within a self-consciously Islamic environment. Ahmad al-Hassan and Donald R. Hill, two historians of technology, see Islam as "the driving force behind the Muslim scientific revolution when the Muslim state reached its peak." But non-Muslims had a role in this effort, and much of the era's scientific achievements took place in a tolerant and cosmopolitan intellectual atmosphere quite independent of the religious authorities.

Muslim countries occupied a predominant leadership role in scientific and technical innovation. The economic integration of the trading worlds of the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans under a common language and culture stimulated growth through both the larger market it generated and the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge (Lal, 1999). This region probably anticipated the expansion and influenced the expansion of Western Europe. In spreading to Spain in the west to India and Southeast Asia in the east, these countries unified much of Eurasia and Africa and took over and created the first global system. Through this culture, albeit an Islamic one, the technological achievements of China and India were diffused throughout Western Europe.

During this period Arabs became heirs of the ancient civilizations of western Asia and northern Africa. Baghdad in the ninth century was the scene of intense intellectual activity. With the active inspiration of the kings (Caliphs) a number of eminent scientists worked in the House of Wisdom (Baitul Hikma) a kind of research institute for scientific and technological innovation. They rend major Hellenistic works from Greek into Arabic. These translations and those from Indian sources gave impetus for genesis and development of new knowledge. In the course of the century original works were written on mathematics, astronomy, physics and medicine. In the field of technology they continued the innovative culture of their Persian predecessors constructing and innovating large hydraulic systems, building water-raising wheels and large mills for supplying the city with flour. In the case of more delicate machines, a treatise written about 850 AD describes about 100 ingenious devices which display a mastery over sensitive control mechanisms that remained unsurpassed until modern times (Hill, 1993, Nasr, 1976). However these devices were of small "pilot scale" and were never scaled up to put into general service for productivity increases in economic activities. Possibly these were developed as intellectual challenges and not innovated to meet industrial needs.

Scholars of these eras were the first to recognize importance of and use of zero (borrowed from Indian sources), founded modern Algebra (by Al-Khawarzimi) and made monumental strides in the practice and study of medicine. Ibn Sina's (Avecinna) text the Canon of Medicine was used as a text in Europe centuries later (Tarabishy, 2004). Scientific endeavors in this region lasted for nearly six centuries and this, as George Sarton (Sarton, 1975) observed, is longer than Greek, medieval Christian, or even modern science has lasted. Karen Armstrong (Armstrong, 1991) writes “The Arabs were light to the … West and yet this debt has rarely been fully acknowledged. As the great translation work had been completed, scholars in Europe began to shrug off this complicating and schizophrenic relationship… And became very vague indeed about whom the Arabs really were…"

George Sarton in his monumental work marks the time from the 2nd half of eighth century to the 2nd half of the eleventh century into:

• The time of Jabir Ibn Haiyan which covers the 2nd half of eighth century
• The time of Al-Khwarizmi which covers the 1st half of ninth century
• The time of Al-Razi which covers the 2nd half of ninth century
• The time of Al-Mas'udi which covers the 1st half of tenth century
• The time of Abu-l-Wafa which covers the 2nd half of tenth century
• The time of Al-Biruni which covers the 1st half eleventh century
• The time of Omar Khyyam which covers the 2nd half of eleventh century

The Golden Age for Muslims as the leaders in science continued until the 14th century. The highlight of this era was in the 10th and 11th centuries when three great thinkers strode the East: Abu Ali al- Hasan ibn al-Haytham, also known as Alhazen; Abu Rayham Muhammad al-Biruni; and Abu Ali al-Hussein Ibn Sina, also known as Avicenna. Al-Haytham, born in Iraq in 965, experimented with light and vision, laying the foundation for modern optics and for the notion that science should be based on experiment as well as on philosophical arguments. It has been suggested that al-Haytham “ranks with Archimedes, Kepler and Newton as a great mathematical scientist”. The mathematician, astronomer and geographer al-Biruni, born in what is now part of Uzbekistan in 973, wrote some 146 works totaling 13,000 pages, including a vast sociological and geographical study of India. Ibn Sina was a physician and philosopher born near Bukhara, also now in Uzbekistan, in 981-1037. He wrote al-Qanun fi al-Tibb, or The Canons of Medicine, a million-word medical encyclopedia, a seminal volume that was the first to recognize the contagious nature of tuberculosis, to identify meningitis, and to describe all the minute parts of the eye. By the 12th century, the Canons had been translated into Latin, and European medicine relied on this text until well into the 1700s. Thus, if it were not for these Islamic scholars, developments in Western sciences may not have advanced as much as they had (Habibi, 2008).

Technology

 Between 750 and 1100 AD, the Muslim world had a number of impressive technological achievements to its credit, in addition to being a more tolerant and cultured society (Singer, 1958). This included development of “Lateen Sail” which allowed building of larger merchant ships. In power technology, Muslims were the first to use a tidal mill in Basra around 1000 AD. Both wind mills and water power were used in sugar mills and saw mills.

Muslims were also responsible for the introduction of paper into the Middle East and Europe. By 1000 AD the entire Islamic world was enjoying bound books. In textile production, the Muslim world made substantial advances in fabric quality. Most original contribution was in Chemical Technology. Al Jabir and Al Razi wrote books which for centuries were recognized as standard works in the field. They invented Alkalis and greatly improved the quality of glass and ceramic products. They produced naptha and their perfumery and acid industries were advanced for that age.

In Mechanical Engineering, from water mills to clocks, the Muslims were for centuries far ahead of the West. Al Jazari’s “Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices” has been recognized as the most remarkable engineering document to have survived Pre-Renaissance times (Hill, 1993). They were masters in the utilization and modification of hydraulic technology. Spread of irrigation helped agricultural progress and between 700 and 1100 AD “Agricultural Revolution” occurred in areas populated by Muslims (Mokyr, 1990). 

Stagnation and Decline in the Muslim World.

 Things started to go awry in the early thirteenth century, when the Muslim world began to stagnate and Europeans surged ahead. Even revisionist historians who challenge this date as the time that decline set in do accept that decline eventually took place. Thus, Marshall Hodgson -- who argues that the eastern Muslim world flourished until the sixteenth century, when "the Muslim people, taken collectively, were at the peak of their power" -- acknowledges that by the end of the eighteenth century, Muslims "were prostrate."⁵

Whatever its timing, this decline meant that Muslims failed to learn from Europe. In Bernard Lewis's phrasing, "The Renaissance, Reformation, even the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, passed unnoticed in the Muslim World."Instead, Muslims relied on religious minorities -- Armenians, Greeks, Jews -- as intermediaries; they served as court physicians, translators, and in other key posts. With their aid, the Muslim world accomplished what is now known as a limited transfer of science and technology.

The deficiency in Muslim science and technology is particularly intriguing given that Muslims were world leaders in science and technology a millennium ago -- something that distinguishes them from, say, the peoples of Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa (Segal, 1996). From the tenth through the thirteenth centuries

Decline in science resulted from many factors, including the erosion of large-scale agriculture and irrigation systems, the Mongol and other Central Asian invasions, political instability, In my opinion some of the blame is wrongly assigned to the great theologian Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (1059-1111) The Imam did protest but his protest was in fact related to the fact that the best Muslim minds preferred to become theologians rather than scientists. The Muslin society accorded a very high status to the theologian than to the scientist. this in my opinion is perhaps one of the reasons that science and technology stagnated The Mongols who sacked Bagdad did become Muslims but they did not encourage science and technology and the Ottoman  Empire chose to imports Jews and other non Muslims to run the governments and ignored the scientific traditions of the Muslim World from the near past.

The Mongols, after their conquest, converted to Islam but took an ambivalent attitude towards knowledge accumulation. A section of religious teachers of the time connived with the powers that be to remove secular subjects from the school curricula. Scholars between the ninth and eleventh centuries concluded that answers to all-important question were already available and, thus, students needed only to learn existing knowledge. This approach to education resulted in rote learning and a culturally inward focus, which served to stifle creativity, and suppress technological innovation (Kuran, 1997). This inward focus prevented the Middle Eastern countries from engaging in a meaningful intellectual exploration of the technological transformation taking place in Europe. Scholars of this region of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were aware of the decline of their civilization but saw Europe's advantage as consisting essentially of superior weaponry, failing to analyze the deeper causes. Ottoman rulers, too, fearing corrupting influences from the West, closed their cultures to exchanges with and diffusion from next door Europe   

The economic decline of the Middle Eastern countries relative to Europe (given their geographical proximity) has been a continuing puzzle to both scholars and reformers. The puzzle is confounded by the fact of their earlier dominance alluded to in the section above (Ruttan, 2001). The first wave of destruction of centers of learning and innovation came during Mongol invasion of Middle Eastern heartland. Sack of Baghdad destroyed records of achievements of scholars and scientists.

The reasons for Muslim decline have been ascribed (wrongly as I have discussed elsewhere) to the works of   Imam al-Ghazzali and later rulers (The rulers who ignored science include the Mughal Empire in India and the Ottoman Empire ( this seems to be a simplistic assumption as the Islamic Golden Age was traditionally believed to have ended in the 14th century, but has been extended to the 15^th and 16^th  centuries by recent scholarship, which has demonstrated that scientific activity continued in the Ottoman Empire in the west and in Persia and Mughal India in the east.) , which were great Muslim empires in the world in the late middle ages with Safavid Iran, from the 16th century) especially the Ottomans and their scholars. Through the promotion of a traditional religious attitude, the Ottoman rulers considered science and philosophy as "un-Islamic activities" that had to be stopped. On the political level, this attitude was supported by a symbiotic relationship that existed between the rulers and the religious scholars, the rulers supporting the ulama and the ulama supporting the rulers, as in several Muslim and Arab countries today. The conservative Caliph Mutawakkil, in support of the orthodox party, drove the first nail in the coffin of knowledge. Since then, Muslims went down; today they became "the weakest" in science in the world, according to a famous statement proffered by Abdus Salam.

Revival of science.

 In combination, the Enlightenment and French Revolution made European science accessible to the Muslim world. The former detached science from Christianity, thereby making it palatable to Muslims. The latter, and especially Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, with its entourage of scholars and supplementary mission of knowledge, imposed European power on and brought European science to a Muslim people. Within years, some rulers -- led by Muhammad `Ali of Egypt -- recruited European technicians and sent students to Europe.

Technology takes root. An extraordinarily rapid diffusion of Western technologies throughout most of the Middle East took place in the period 1850-1914. With the approval of local elites, European colonial authorities imposed public-health measures to contain cholera, malaria, and other contagious diseases.⁷The Suez Canal, opened in 1869, reduced shipping time and distance and generated new trade. Railways, telegraphs, steamships and steam engines, automobiles, and telephones all appeared. Much of this technology transfer took the form of Middle Eastern governments' granting monopoly concessions to European firms. Muslim rulers had little concern about developing indigenous capabilities in technology adaptation, design, or maintenance.

Science was an afterthought, at best embedded in scientific technologies but not transferred explicitly as knowledge or method. Instead, members of minority communities continued to intermediate by providing clerical and skilled labor. Minorities also helped to establish the first Western education institutions in the region, such as the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (founded in 1866) and the Jesuits' St. Joseph's College (founded in 1875). These schools and others in Istanbul, Tunis, Tehran, Algiers, and elsewhere primarily served minority communities and Europeans, though some elite Muslims also attended. Middle Eastern medical schools quickly accepted and taught the medical discoveries of Pasteur, Koch, and others concerning microbes and bacteria. The schools contributed to the translation and publication in Arabic of major scientific works and to the organization of the first scientific societies in the region. Such societies were founded in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Istanbul in the late nineteenth century, often sponsoring journals that featured translations. Thus, Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species, published in 1859, was translated in Arabic journals by 1876, though not in book form until 1918. Throughout this period, Muslim intellectuals presented minimal resistance to the diffusion of Western scientific ideas. For example, the major opposition to Darwinian ideas of evolution came not from Muslim scholars but from Eastern-rite Christians.⁸. In the 1914-45 period, Muslims slowly, and often in frustration, attempted to strengthen indigenous science against the imported variety. New universities with an emphasis on engineering and medicine sprang up in Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and the Sudan. During the depression years, however, reduced employment for graduates and increased discontent over the dominant role of expatriates and minorities constrained science and technology.

The nationalist politicians who arose after World War I mainly concentrated on gaining political independence; science and technology hardly concerned them. The one exception was Turkey, which under Kemal Mustafa Atatürk after 1922 launched an ambitious program of industrialization and an expansion of engineering education. Elsewhere -- in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran -- politicians made only faltering attempts at industrialization to serve small local markets. Turnkey, off-the-shelf projects prevailed, especially in engineering; this meant that few scientific inputs existed, most technologies were imported, maintenance was a persistent problem, and limited shop-floor learning took place. Only in the petroleum industry, which after 1914 took on major proportions in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, did the pattern differ, for multinational firms subcontracted locally such tasks as maintenance engineering and geological surveying.

To illustrate the apathy towards the creation of sciences, which came over the Muslim countries, Nobel Laureate Professor Abdus Salam quotes from Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 AD), one of the greatest social historians and one of the brightest intellects of all times in his own field. Ibn Khaldun writes in his Muqaddima:

 “We have heard, of late, that in the land of the Franks, and on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, there is great cultivation of philosophical sciences. They are said to be studied there again, and to be taught in numerous classes…….But it is clear that the problems of physics are of no important for us in our religious affairs. Therefore, we must leave them alone” (Salam, 1986). Such apathy must have led the inevitable distrust of sciences as essential to intellectual enrichment. Leading jurists in those times understood “ilm” (knowledge) as referring to that knowledge which derives from the Prophet (PBUH). Everything else are to be regarded either as useless or no science at all. Such beliefs are still prevalent among the puritan clergy (Ulama) in Islam.

Anti-intellectual activities in the Middle Eastern countries were started much earlier. Even though prevalence of an organized Clergy or "Ordained Priests" is not legitimized by Islamic dogma, the religious teachers and scholars (Ulama) were able to assume a similar role and received legitimacy from general public. After the demise of the "rational" period the "Ulama" were able to promote a slide towards acceptance of a "tradition and compliance" regime from an earlier one which had encouraged "innovation". Decline of science in Middle Eastern culture was contemporaneous with the ascendancy of an ossified religiosity. The rumblings against rational thinking and culture of science and technological innovations were there and leading "Ulamas" worked tirelessly to rid the culture of "foreign" intrusion of thought. Some of the leading Islamic theologians of the Fourteenth century condemned study of mathematics with vigor and without reservations because its precision and logical clarity might lead to disbelief and contempt for religious edicts (Hoodbhoy, 2002). Finally the "Golden Age" of Middle East ended in the 14^th century.

Unfortunately majority of Muslim theologians of today neither have the necessary training nor the intellectual background to appreciate the methods of scientific enquiry. Their intellectual universe is limited to medieval theology. This medieval theology becomes their power and any one opposing may be declared heretic. They have often endeavored to assume the power of excommunication reminiscent of the Christian clergy in the medieval times.

The Muslim world has not systematically debated the issue of the reconciliation of Islam with science and technology. Few theologians are interested in dealing with this issue. Few scientists wish to incur the wrath of the religious community by publicly raising it. In most Muslim countries a tacit agreement therefore exists between scientists and theologians not to debate issues that could harm both sides. However, the religious leaders seldom speak against the tenets of science and scientific doctrines and concepts are, fortunately, free from religious challenge. The teachings of Darwin on evolution are taught in almost all Muslim countries.

Essential Ingredients of a “Technology Culture”

  Technology culture refers to an attitude of individuals in a given cultural environ. The spirit of inquiry, the degree of acceptance of the right to question and be questioned is to be considered fundamental to the development of technological temper. It calls upon one to seek the “hows”, “what” and “why” of everything that goes on in the society. The existence of a technology culture is complementary to the initiative taken by a country in the introduction of productive forces, which can lead to technological development. A socio-economic entity may decide to develop the “object embodied form” (i.e. the hardware) of technology based on its relevant factor endowments existing at a given period of time. However, simultaneous development of the other three “soft” components i.e., “human embodied form”, “information embodied form” and “organization embodied form" of technology constitute the more innovative and intellectual aspects and presupposes existence of a technology culture in the country. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that such a culture exist in a well developed form in all leading industrial countries and developing countries are currently at various stages of acquiring it in a form complementary to their own societal ambience. However, in this mission to develop a technology culture, they are also engaged in the process of removing some “road blocks”. We discuss below some of those “road blocks” or “negative elements” which probably are more significant than others among the myriad of causes of uneven progress in embracing a technology culture Muslim countries.

Traditional Value System and Orthodoxy

Distrust of new technologies is deeply rooted in most cultures with old value systems because people in general are resistant to change. The fears of changes that usually follow introduction of new technology; results from the belief that these changes are likely to be adverse. New technology, be it the product of local development, a transfer from abroad, or some combination of the two, carries with it implicit behavioral changes which may not be consonant with existing traditional values. Scientific and technological changes can undercut systems of belief with behavioral implication far beyond those necessary to carry on the scientific and technological endeavor. In our discussion on these issues we shall look at some historical instances of technological change and their relationships to other dimensions of culture and try to discern some insights into the nature of the process and the range of possible consequence. It will seem that there is always a fear in a society steeped in orthodoxy (evident even in western cultures during earlier centuries) that something important (e.g. cosmological belief, family values, social equilibrium among classes, etc.) would be lost as a result of the new technology (DeGregori, 1989).

This reality coincides with the conflict of belief between conservative or puritan Muslims and the so-called Westernized Muslim scientists who could separate out the science and religious. For example, some typical comments from puritans include “Since all knowledge is in the Great Text, there is no need to provide incentive to seek new frontiers of knowledge” and “It’s destructive if we want to create a thinking person, someone who can analyze, question and create” (Habibi, 2008).

Resignation    

Sufi thought which was Islamized by Imam Ghazali in his famous work related to the boundaries  of Faith in Islam , created  dependence upon fate and general inaction .Many people in these countries continue to view life as a zero-sum game. They seem to believe that there is a limited pie of resources and attempt to expand resources through some form of innovation is likely to result in a smaller share of the pie for them. Increased productivity can increase the pie for everyone, yet in many countries people have not made this mental shift and are resigned to the older modes of production. People resigned to the cultural perspective of life as a zero-sum game seem to resist learning the lesson that exploiting areas of overlapping interests expands the pie for everyone   

 Stratified and Exclusive Societies

People may possess identical material and intellectual resources and yet be treated as unequal because of social stigma or due to the denigration of the world-view that informs their way of life and frames their identity (Bhargava, 2004). Many Muslim countries still retain stratified social structures that resist change. Such exclusive societies restrict social mobility, which is considered fundamental in building a dynamic cultural milieu. In some areas the colonial legacies and in others ancient pseudo-religious practices and beliefs exacerbate their problem. Culturally rigid social stratification in such exclusive societies artificially reduces the availability of appropriate human resource for development. Meritocracy is not encouraged and the excluded section of the society is resigned to the rule of the established elite even when their members are mediocre. Thus, the urge to excel is lost and the spirit of competitiveness is repressed.

A negative element in the culture of some Muslim countries that merits serious attention is the exclusion of women from intellectual and social intercourse. The exclusion of women from participation in cultural, intellectual, economic and political spheres of activities was not ordained during the Prophet's lifetime but was introduced through edicts handed down afterwards by his followers to address certain social exigencies of those times. Such injunctions appear to have continued over centuries to the advantage and convenience of male dominated cultural milieu giving rise to exclusive societies in these countries.

 Highly Centralized Bureaucratic Decision-Making Systems  

Almost all cultures in the world have been borrowers of technology throughout history. A vast majority of the technology in a culture was, in all probability, developed by others. Most innovations are borrowed from other societies and improved upon. In fact, for several centuries there was a continuous and fruitful (occasionally not so fruitful!) interchange of tools and diffusion of ideas in the area that included South Asia on the east and stretched to Europe in the West. Useful technologies spread, either through migration of populations or by diffusion of techniques to neighboring population both within and outside a given geo-political region (Cravens, 2003). The diffusion of technology is critical and often more important than its invention, because most complex technological advances depend upon previous mastery of basic problems. Thus technology develops in a cultural ambiance which welcomes cross border diffusion and exchanges.

Most Islamic countries are economies based on natural resources in contrast to developed economies based on industrialization, wealth in a resource-based economy is distributed much more unequally and more inefficiently. It goes to a small number of people at the top, and they're at the top due to tribal, family, or political connections, not due to skill or productivity. In a vibrant, competitive manufacturing economy, wealth tends to accrue to innovators and efficient operators, and someone with a new idea or better way of doing things has a chance to get to the top.

Unfortunately, however, in the countries under discussion there have been periods when some ruling elites or powerful centralized bureaucracies consciously opted out of the interchange and diffusion process thus stymieing local innovation activities. Such isolationist policies can be adopted and implemented only when a ruling elite or highly centralized bureaucracy in a country exists and purposely opts for them. Such an option is often exercised out of fear of “corrupting” influence of new technologies or due to complacency resulting from a belief that answers to all-important questions is already available. In general, centralized systems stifle innovation.

Most of the countries under discussion have highly centralized system of government. Egypt, which probably invented centralized bureaucracy in Pharaonic times, remains largely centralized today. Ottoman Empire was also run as highly centralized bureaucracy. Ottoman rulers, fearing “corrupting” cultural influences from the West, closed their society to exchanges with Europe as the latter began to take off. This was one of the factors contributing to the decline of technological innovations in the Ottoman Empire, compared to the middle Ages, when the Islamic civilization led the world in science and technology.

Islam and Science

Religion has played an important role in the economic and political culture of the Middle East and other Muslim countries. Looking back, one finds that the kind of Islam and the cultural roots that it formed in the Middle East at the time of the Prophet (PBUH) was neither monolithic nor normative: it was in constant flux as it was developing throughout the Prophet's career. Seeking knowledge had been one of the more important injunctions of the Prophet (PBUH) in a cultural milieu that hardly had any tradition of scientific inquiry at that time.  In one of his injunctions he exhorts his followers "Seek knowledge even if you have to go to Cathay (China)." It should be taken into consideration that in the sixth century there were no adherents of the religion in China, however she was the foremost center of scientific learning in those times. Since the beginning of Islam there has been many different understandings of this religion each identified by its historical time and locality, and with multiple contents, not always in harmony with each other (Gutas, 2003). As posited earlier, cultural developments in the Middle East have been significantly influenced by Islam throughout history and these have impacted differently in encouraging or discouraging scientific inquiry and technological innovations depending on political exigencies and whose interest the religious leaders preferred to promote. Therefore, in judging the influence of Islam on development of S&T there is hardly any need to question whether it is for or against science and technological innovation because throughout history religious arguments (in all cultures) have been found for any position.

Western observers and “orientalists” more often than not ascribe the apathy for S&T developments in Muslim countries today to Islam such an impression are quite erroneous. The blame for the apparent backwardness of Muslim countries in S&T does not and should not go to Islam per se as is often propagated by many western observers. There is nothing in the Quran, which discourages acquisition of knowledge and the Prophet also made acquisition of knowledge obligatory for believers.   

One of the most important Quranic commands is for individuals to seek knowledge and read nature for signs of the Allah (SWT). Seven hundred and fifty verses (almost one eighth of the Book) exhort believers to study nature, to reflect, to listen, or to observe (for instance, see, sura 30, verses 21 to 24) in their search for the ultimate.  Also see sura 41, verses 53-54, “Soon WE will show them Our Signs in farthest regions of the earth and among their own people until it becomes manifest to them that it is the truth. It is not enough that thy Lord is Witness over all things? Aye, they are, surely, in doubt concerning the meeting with their Lord; aye, HE, certainly, encompasses all things”. Interestingly, there are only eight verses on Hajj (one of the five pillars of Islam) and only six on fasting in the month of Ramadan (another pillar). Whereas, there are several hundred verses on issues related to sciences, natural phenomena, etc.

In the whole of Islamic history there has rarely been incident like that of organized persecution by the Christian clergy of the great scientist Galileo. Persecution, denunciation, excommunication do occur in Islam over doctrinal differences, but never for scientific beliefs. Paradoxically, the first inquisition (like that of medieval Catholic Church) came to be instituted, not by orthodox theologians, but by the so-called “rationalists”, the Mu’tazzila-theologians themselves who prided on the use of reason. The great jurist Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal was one of the victims (Salam, 1986).  

Some authors posit that what a particular society accomplishes in the way of science wholly depends on who is using that religion or ideology and to what ends. The analysis of scientific activity in Muslim countries, therefore, should proceed only from the investigation of the social and political factors at play in each particular time of history (Gutas, 2003). Gutas illustrates this point succinctly thus: “In which modern state of the Islamic world there is a research library of the caliber of a major American or northern European university library, with open stacks and borrowing privileges? It is instructive to compare this situation in the modern Islamic world with that in the medieval, when there was a plethora of libraries with holdings in all the arts and sciences, especially in Baghdad……The current scientific backwardness of the Islamic world, just like its medieval superiority, is thus clearly a political and social issue……Injecting the notion of “Islam” into these discussions merely obfuscates the issue and confuses the students, distracting them from historical analysis and political action.”

Efforts for Reformation

Several attempts were made during the 19^th century for "reformation" of the concept held by "Ulama" that worthwhile knowledge acquisition ought to be restricted to religious knowledge. However, political turmoil and wars for over a century in the region probably prevented such revivalist initiatives to gel. We now briefly cite the important messages from three of the leading reformists (quoted from “Islam and Modernism”, Eagle Enterprises, 2003[internet]).

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), the pioneer of pan-Islamism,was convinced that nothing but science and technology could eliminate economic and cultural backwardness. Afghani objected to dividing science into European and Muslim. He said modern science as universal, transcending nations, cultures and religion. Afghani criticized the Muslim scholars for not seeing it that way by saying: "The strangest thing of all is that our Ulama these days have divided science into two parts. One they call Muslim science, and one European science. Because of this they forbid others to teach some of the useful sciences.” Afghani was indignant that natural science was left out of the curriculum of Muslim educational establishments. He said: “Those who imagine that they are saving religion by imposing a ban on some sciences and knowledge are enemies of religion.”

Sheikh Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905), the Chief Mufti of Egypt argued that traditional Islam faced serious challenge by the modern, rational and scientific thought. But he did not believe that the faith of Islam in its pure and permanent core of norms clashed with science. Instead he asserted that the faith and scientific reason operate at different levels. The real Islam, he maintained: "had simple doctrinal structure: it consisted of certain beliefs about the greatest questions of human life, and certain general principles of human conduct. To enable us to reach these beliefs and embody them in our lives both reason and revelation are essential. They neither possess separate spheres nor conflict with each other in the same sphere…" He was sincerely interested in eliminating the obstacles to the development of science and technology essential for the revival of the Muslim peoples and for economic and cultural progress. He wanted Muslims to use scientific achievements without heed of the world outlook implicit in science.

Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), the pioneer of Indian Muslim reform, basically subscribed to the same ideas of Islamic reform as Sheikh Abduh. Both agreed to the point of necessity to harmonize Islam with modern science and rationalism. Sir Sayyed, however, viewed revelation by the criterion of its conformity to Nature. To him, Islam was the religion of most akin to Nature. Reason and “conformity to Nature” according to Sir Sayyed was the essence of Islam. His main argument was that the Quran was the word of God and the nature was the work of God; a disparity between the two was unthinkable. According to him, Wahy (revelation) and reason are identical. The latter operates in man's scientific investigations as much as in his concept of deity, his distinction between good and evil, his views on divine judgment and retribution, and his belief in life after death.

Sir Doctor Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938 ) widely known as Allama Iqbal, was a poet, philosopher and politician, as well as an academic, barrister and scholar in British India who is widely regarded as having inspired the Pakistan Movement. He is called the "Spiritual Father of Pakistan. He is considered one of the most important figures in literature, with literary work in both Urdu and Persian. Iqbal also wrote two books on the topic of The Development of Metaphysics in Persia and The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam and many letters in the English language. Iqbal presented the concept of revival of the instrument of Ijtehad and also the reconstruction of the method such Ijtehad can or should be carried out.

The Intellectual Response

Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani physicist and science policy writer, identifies three broad Muslim responses to modern science. A small number of fundamentalist Muslims reject science for the Muslim world, seeing it as immoral and materialist; for example, a leader of the Muslim Brethren in Egypt declares epidemics to be a form of divine punishment ("God developed the microbe and kept it away from those He wished to spare") and argues against scientific efforts to eradicate the problem.A larger number seek, through suitable interpretations of the Qur'an, a reconciliation between revealed truth and physical reality. A third, and perhaps predominant, faction regards religion and faith and modern science as essentially unrelated. This last viewpoint sustains the vague belief that Islam and science are not in conflict, without ever closely examining the specifics.

Indeed, in keeping with this imprecise approach, it is striking to note how the Muslim world has hardly debated the issue of the reconciliation of Islam with science and technology. Few theologians are versed in science or interested in dealing with this issue. Few scientists wish to incur the wrath of the religious community by publicly raising it. Few institutional forums exist for such a debate, and their dependence on the state further dampens incentive. In most Muslim countries, including Iran, a tacit agreement therefore exists between scientists and theologians not to debate issues that could harm both sides. That Islamic leader seldom rail against the tenets of science means that scientific doctrines and concepts are mostly free from religious challenge. The teachings of Darwin on evolution, for example, are allowed everywhere but Saudi Arabia

Seldom has the debate over reconciling Islam and science addressed the Qur'an itself and the claims made for its infallibility. A work of exalted and unadulterated monotheism, the Qur'an presents God as the Creator bringing into being all material objects and all life. God's will is responsible for earthquakes and other natural events; Nature is a oneness derived from Him. Some scholars find in the Qur'an the prototype of environmental sciences, such as ecology and biology. But finding "proto-science" in a holy book dating from the seventh century A.D. raises all sorts of problems. One verse (6:1) reads, "He created the heavens and the earth in six days, and then mounted his throne." Were this verse, borrowed from Genesis I, interpreted literally, it would devastate astrophysics, cosmology, geology, and other disciplines. But Muslims have neither interpreted the verse (as have most Christians and Jews) to understand that a "day" means some length of time to God other than twenty-four earth hours, nor have they given it a metaphorical meaning. For their part, Muslim geologists practice their profession without trying to reconcile the Qur'an with the assumptions of their profession.

Science is curiously missing from the passionate and ongoing debate over Islam and the West. Religious extremists have attacked the social order, corruption, and immorality, but not the minor heresies, of science. No Islamic theological splits or fractures have occurred comparable to that between evolutionists and Christian creationists. Instead, Islamic intellectual history is characterized by loosely grouped individual thinkers attempting single-handedly in their writings to achieve reconciliation. Technology benefits from often unqualified approval.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98), for example, devoted much of his life to convincing Muslims in India "that western scientific thought was not antithetical to Islam." He reinterpreted the Qur'an to find passages consistent with reason and nature, and insisted that "Muslims have in the Koran the source of a rational religion attuned to modern man's scientific interests." In a bold approach, he stripped the Qur'an and the hadith (anecdotes concerning the Prophet Muhammad) to render them compatible with the science of his time. In perhaps the most influential modernist effort vis-à-vis science, the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) developed a belief system based on reason. He argued that "religion must be accounted as a friend to science, pushing man to investigate the secrets of existence, summoning him to respect the established truths and to depend on them in his moral life and conduct."²¹

Moving to the present, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, an Iranian Shi`i and professor of Islamic studies at George Washington University, defines contemporary Islamic science in terms of humanist values he finds in the Qur'an and the hadith. Inspired by mystical ideals, Nasr articulates less a practical program than a vague Islamic science free of nuclear energy and devoted to environmental harmony. Similarly, Ziauddin Sardar, a Pakistani science-policy specialist, envisions an "Islamic science" rooted in humanistic values. He wants no weapons research (though it is hard to find Islamic support for such a ban). He has written detailed proposals for networks of Muslim scientists, joint projects, and regional cooperation, all based on Muslim solidarity. Nasr and Sardar do not address the problems that Islamic doctrine poses to science; nor do they admit the totality of science (for instance, nuclear energy can be used for peaceful purposes). Also, they fail to comprehend the universal, international, and open-ended nature of science.

Abdus Salam is the Muslim world's foremost scientific secularist. In an important collection of essays published in 1987, he insisted that science is universal and international rather than Islamic. Adapting to Islam the nineteenth-century Christian and Jewish reconciliation of faith and reason as separate, complementary paths to knowledge, Salam maintains that "there truly is no disconsonance between Islam and modern science." He also asserts that "there is not a single verse in the Qur'an where natural phenomena are described and which contradicts what we know for certain from our discoveries in science." In spite of identifying the roots of science in the Qur'an, Salam insists on separating faith and reason. He calls faith "the timeless, spiritual message of Islam, on matters which physics is silent, and will remain so." To flourish, science requires autonomy, freedom to inquire, and assured resources, not the stifling embrace of religion.

Pervez Hoodbhoy joined the ranks of militant secularists with his 1991 book Islam and Science, in which he appealed for tolerance to permit reason and faith to coexist within each sphere. "While recognizing that religion and science are complementary and not contradictory to each other, a clear demarcation between the spheres of the spiritual and the worldly is necessary." He also insisted that science is universal, not Western.

Reasons for Muslim World Underdevelopment

Islam contributes to the Muslim world's lagging behind in science insofar as its tenets have not satisfactorily been reconciled with those of science. Islam's most deleterious effect may be to remove most Muslims from direct contact with science. Except for a brief exposure in school, there is little science in Islamic popular culture. Scientists rarely turn up in the media. Pleas by scientists like Abdus Salam to the religious authorities for sermons about elements of science in the Qur'an and hadith go unheard. A modus vivendi has been arrived at in several countries (for example, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Iran, Indonesia, and Malaysia) after informal, low-profile discussions between clergy, academics, and scientists. This works on a practical level without providing the intellectual context, sustained financial commitment, or human resources needed for science again to flourish in the Muslim world.

Islam is not, however, the key problem facing scientific achievement in the Muslim world. Rather, the low level of achievement results from the cumulative effect of multiple factors, and not from a single dominant cause. Here are some ten of those factors:

Demographics . The number of research scientists and engineers remains well below that of rich countries as well as Latin America and South and East Asia. Science and engineering students are drawn primarily from urban middle-income backgrounds; few of the much larger number of poor students can pursue research careers. Participation by women in science remains low, as the disincentives, formal and informal, for women to study science or engineering are formidable. Only a handful of mostly urban, middle-class male students have sufficient exposure to science to even consider making it a career.

Language . With an estimated 80 percent of the world's scientific literature appearing first in English, the literature in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and other languages is inadequate for teaching students as well as researchers. Scientific work, therefore, requires a competence in reading, writing, and comprehending English, an area in which Muslims overall lag behind other peoples, such as Chinese, Thais, and Brazilians. Even though the Arab League has systematically promoted scientific translations and an updated Arab vocabulary, Where English or French are the language of instruction (the former in the Arabic-speaking countries of the Persian Gulf, the latter in North Africa), hostility often develops between students in science, who study in a foreign language, and those in other disciplines, who work in Arabic.²⁷

Education . Effective science education at primary and secondary levels is available in many countries only at a handful of urban private schools. There is too much rote learning, a legacy in part of Qur'anic schools, and far too little support for science education at all levels. Universities and technical schools emphasize teaching rather than research. Few strong doctoral programs or research centers of academic excellence exist. Overcrowded, underfunded, and turbulent universities have been unable to protect space and resources for research.

Research . The Muslim world suffers no shortage of scientists and engineers, but it does have an acute scarcity of career researchers. While several countries boast outstanding individual researchers and projects, there is little mentorship or in-house ability to train young researchers. And many of the few science and engineering graduates being trained in research are then employed in bureaucratic posts. Inadequate equipment and access to data also reduces scientific output per researcher, as do the few incentives to publish and the absence of quality doctoral programs within the region. Attempts to develop research capabilities -- whether in universities, research institutes, government ministries, nonprofit foundations, multinational corporations, or local corporations -- have rarely succeeded.

State-owned corporations . Given the increasing links between science and technology, state-owned corporations have a potentially important role, especially in Algeria and Syria, but they have woefully neglected science. Research by parastatals such as Sonatrach, the state petroleum firm in Algeria, has been plagued by poor management, erratic funding, political instability, and personnel problems. Lack of accountability and inability to diffuse research -- even within the firm -- are persistent problems. Unwilling to build linkages to university researchers or to collaborate with admittedly weak government ministries, the parastatals have wasted resources.

Industrial import substitution often continues to rely on turnkey projects and foreign maintenance. There are signs, especially in Pakistan, Turkey, and Lebanon, of local firms' developing adaptive research capabilities. Multinational firms active in the region prefer to conduct research at European or North American sites. Some adaptive research in the petroleum and petrochemical industries, mostly small-scale quality control, provides few incentives for joint ventures in research with state-owned companies. Except for Algeria, Iran, and Iraq, state oil companies are more managers of concessions than operators with strong technical capabilities.

Professional societies . Professional societies of physicists, engineers, dentists, physicians, and other disciplines generally sponsor journals and meetings but have no structures or resources for research. Sometimes harassed politically (as in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, and Iraq), the professional societies often opt for the most narrow and technical concept of their mission. Broad-based interdisciplinary professional societies for science and engineering have been slow to develop in the Muslim world. The one exception is the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, which has monarchical patronage and interdisciplinary participation.

Resources . A lack of financial resources and incentives has been a major barrier to research except in some oil-rich states. Whereas Japan, the United States, Germany, and other Western countries spend 2 percent or more of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually on research, no Muslim country spends more than .50 percent of its (much lower) GDP on research. Not only is money scarce but what little is available comes sporadically, further bedeviling long-term research (which requires equally long-term financial commitments). Even where funds are available, research-management capabilities are in short supply. The prospects for stable research funding and effective institution-building are both poor.

Authoritarianism . Authoritarian regimes deny freedom of inquiry or dissent, cripple professional societies, intimidate universities, and limit contacts with the outside world. A horrific detailed account by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences documents the long-term destruction of the scientific community in Syria29 by a nationalist regime, not a fundamentalist one. Authoritarian regimes also reinforce the prevailing pattern of relying on technology transfer. Distrustful of their own elites and institutions, the rulers prefer to buy rather than generate technology. The oil-exporting countries especially see science and technology as commodities to be purchased, an outlook that has a pernicious effect on the development of indigenous research capabilities.

Regional cooperation . Regional cooperation in science and technology has a checkered history in the Muslim world. It makes eminent sense in principle, for a handful of countries (like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) are oil-rich and short of researchers, while other countries (Egypt and Pakistan) export them. Also, the similarity of applied-research needs and priorities, such as solar energy, desertification, and desalination, should produce shared interests. Meetings held over two decades to coordinate regional research have produced much rhetoric and little action.

Government incompetence . Applied-research units in government ministries, such as agriculture or construction, have often become sinecures for political appointees with little or no interest or capabilities for research.

What relative importance do these factors have in terms of impeding science in the Muslim world? The matter of reconciling faith and reason would seem to be among the less consequential. The prevalence of authoritarian regimes counts more. Also, while obscurantists reject science, popular ignorance and indifference to science are far more problematic than fundamentalist hostility. Lastly, science and technology research is not adequately institutionalized: continuity of funding and personnel, long-term goals, and management autonomy are all lacking.

Economic liberalization

In the West, the advancement of science was a slow process associated with a shift in religious dogma from being the central pillar of society to a domain mostly concerned with individuals' spiritual well‐being. Within that complex and often bloody history, important milestones emerged: the Protestant Reformation, the advance of empirical science, and the rise of industrial capitalism. The Protestant Reformation provided an alternative moral basis centered on economic activity, compared to the self‐purification ethics of Catholicism, while the economic wealth created by the Industrial Revolution during the 18^th and 19^thcenturies made European cities, with their emerging bourgeoisie and diverse socio‐economic makeup, the epicenter of the European renaissance. The Western path to modernity was thus paved by liberalism and capitalism, for which science provided a universal catalyst.

The course of science in the Islamic world was different. After Islam's initial stage of expansion and conquest, the vastness and riches of the Abbasid Caliphate during the 8^th to 13^th centuries created optimal conditions for the arts and science to flourish. Moreover, the focus of Abbasids on trade rather than conquest was perhaps a major factor in seeding the diverse and tolerant society that prevailed during that period. Coupled with a fundamental focus of Islam on learning and the patronage of knowledge hubs, the Abbasids ushered in a rational path to knowledge influenced by Greek philosophy. Thinkers from all creeds and backgrounds mingled in the major Islamic centers of Baghdad, Damascus, and Cordoba to translate the body of Greek knowledge and to search for answers to natural phenomena that were based on reason and observation. As divisions and changing alliances began to erode the house of Abbasids, their knowledge quest came under attack by conservative scholars, who propagated an interpretation of Islam that denounced philosophy, reason, and any causal framework that was not derived from divine will. The calamitous fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 marked the end of the “Golden Age” of Islamic Caliphate and the rise of conservative schools of thought that continue to dominate the Muslim world until today.

One of the main messages of this historical synopsis is that Islamic societies have yet to muster a class similar to the European industrial bourgeoisie: entrepreneurs who have an economic stake in modernization and the power to champion it. This is due in part to the fact that the richest Muslim societies are natural resources economies that lack real market dynamics, which can drive innovation and competition. Moreover, the concentration of power and resources in the hands of ruling elites, and lack of tolerance to opposition in most Islamic societies hindered free economic enterprise and civic activism that could have challenged the status quo. As a result, scientific institutions in the Muslim world could not develop into independent hubs of knowledge through free association with diverse societal ventures and economic interests, and continue to be dependent on political patronage and subject to political interference.

Social Liberalization  

Generally speaking, Islam differs from Christianity in that it does not distinguish between the political and the religious, and provides a complete system within which all aspects of life submit to the service of religion. The prophet Mohammed, after all, belonged to the socio‐political order of tribal Arabia, and thus had direct claim to dominion—the new religion provided the legitimacy for his ascent to power. This made religion's involvement in all aspects of life germane to the culture of Islamic societies, a situation that has been exploited by different fractions at different times to suppress any “unwarranted democratic” trends. Increasingly, most Islamic societies became rife with taboos and codes, where the cultural, religious, and political mix and match according to the context to quell any attempts at breaking out of these taboos.

From the science perspective, a general look at the scientific landscape of most Islamic societies reveals a striking absence of social and political sciences, and the absence of critical research topics, such as sexual and reproductive health. When these topics are researched, it is usually done at the descriptive level without any attempt to probe into their underlying social, economic, and political roots. For example, women's obesity levels in many Islamic societies are among the highest in the world, yet no serious research is being done to get at the root of this problem in terms of power relations, gender roles, and the normative values of these societies.

Far from being a formal inquisition, incidents such as the targeting and imprisonment of secular reformists in different Islamic societies have had a ripple effect throughout the Islamic world. The glorious days of Islam, in contrast, reveal an extraordinary level of tolerance by today's standards. I can cite the example of Abul Ala Al‐Ma'arri (973–1057), the renowned Muslim philosopher and poet and an outspoken critic of religion. Despite his highly controversial views, Abul Ala lived in his hometown Ma'arra (Syria) as a venerated figure until his death at the age of 84. Below are few of Abul Ala's translated verses criticizing religion and affirming his outright rejection of it.

What is religion? A maid kept close that no eye may view her;

The price of her wedding gifts and dowry baffles the wooer.

Of all the goodly doctrine that I from the pulpit heard.

My heart has never accepted so much as a single word.

Eleven centuries later, in 2011, a Muslim zealot killed Salmaan Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, for merely advocating the amendment of Pakistan's harsh blasphemy laws. His murder was celebrated by many Muslims in his country and beyond .

Science of the Infidels  

The scientific revolution was at its core a Western development and, for many Muslims, also a Christian one. This belief created negative connotations in the popular perception of science and modernity among Muslims, which was further enforced by the continued failure of the Western‐dominated post‐WWII political system to deliver anything but mayhem to many in the Muslim world. These sentiments have been channeled outwards in the form of disdain for the West and its values, and inwards in the call to return to Islamic roots. They were further conceptualized into a bipolar perception of the world: technologically conquered by the material west, and morally conquered by spiritual Muslims. Accordingly, any attempts to expose problems with the assumed moral stronghold of Islam, such as the debate about women's rights, are viewed as a Western conspiracy against Islam .. As a result, anti‐Western rhetoric became an essential component of most Islamist movements, and, by default, devalued the Western system of liberal democracy and its institutions, including science.

Antagonism to science can be overcome by promoting the value of free exchange of ideas and the role of scientific evidence in guiding development. Yet, most educational systems in the Middle East focus on rote and sterile learning, and often serve as propaganda outlets for the political regimes. The scientific revolution, for example, is often framed within an imperial context, and stripped of its liberal and free market roots. Science's inconvenient roots moreover are dealt with by turning it from a process to a commodity that can be purchased “purified” from its historical origins, or the moral values of its producer . This allows consumers to selectively choose or reject “products”, such as evolution, the origins of life, and free market economics, based on religious rather than scientific justifications. This did not only prevent Islamic societies from learning from the Western experience, but also created a religious buffer from modernity. For this buffer to work, the sanctity of religion needs to take precedence over the welfare of its holders, a fact that is tragically translated nowadays into Muslim‐on‐Muslim violence.

 The reasons that lie behind the decline of Islamic science, and  the  reasons that still prevent the Muslims today from developing a community that can thrive in science, as it did in the Golden Age of Islam can be summarized as follows:  Social attitude ;the nature of the state; Higher education; collegiality and dissemination ; funding support for science; and  Inadequate Islamic Law.

Recommendations 

After nearly fifty years of would-be institution-building, the Muslim world has failed to provide a satisfactory home for science. The failure to build viable research institutions at the national level has thwarted most attempts at regional cooperation. Talented researchers must still leave the region to obtain advanced postgraduate training.

In spite of this pessimistic assessment, measures do exist to improve Muslim achievements in the sciences. Fiscal and other incentives can promote shop-floor learning and informal research, especially in locally owned enterprises. Professional societies can, given sufficient autonomy, play an important role in improving science education, scientific communications, and the place of science in popular culture. Small-scale projects can establish links between the public and private sectors and universities and technical schools. The basis exists for fostering regional and subregional cooperation, for there is a consensus on research priorities in much of the Muslim world. These include solar energy, desalination, arid lands agriculture, irrigation, animal sciences, and petrochemicals. While these are applied-research and demonstration-and-development priorities, they do involve a substantial amount of science. With agreement on priorities, long-term funding can be developed.

Yet, these incremental and pragmatic measures must still confront a hostile environment. For science again to flourish in Muslim countries requires recognition that it requires long-term continuities, the lessening of authoritarianism, and a serious effort to reconcile faith and reason.

Most Arab countries in the Middle East, the heart of the Muslim world, came to be as a result of the collapse of the last “formal” Islamic Caliphate of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the short period of colonialism that followed. After centuries of Ottoman (Muslim Turks) rule that witnessed most of the decline of Islamic civilization, Arabs coalesced around a strong nationalistic drive that dominated the post‐WWI era. As a result, the major Arab states emerging after WWII were ruled by Nationalists—the Baath party in Iraq and Syria or Nasserism in Egypt—that brought some stability during a turbulent period, but failed to deliver socially, politically, and economically. In addition, conflicts within the Arab Nationalist movement began to accelerate after the defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. This war was a pivotal moment in the history of Middle East that shattered the last shred of “legitimacy” of Arab Nationalism and their quasi‐secular model. Discontent started brewing in many Arab societies, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's cry “Islam is the solution” started to echo throughout the Middle East. It meant in ideological terms that Islam must become again the source of all political, economic, legal, and social transactions in Muslim societies, in order to return to the “glorious days” of Islamic civilization. It also undermined allegiance to existing political structures for the sake of a poorly defined, in political terms, “Nation of Islam”.

As the cradle of Islam, and the richest country in the region, people started looking to Saudi Arabia for guidance during this period. This coincided with Saudi's own concerns about the threat that pan‐Arabism (and its secular model) posed to their Islamic rule. Soon, the wheels of Islamization of Arab societies were set in motion. From shielding Islamists fleeing their “secular” regimes to financing religious ventures such as mosques, schools, groups, TV channels, and popular preachers all over the region, the Saudis did not miss the opportunity to become the epicenter of the Sunni Muslim world. This was timely, also to confront the increasingly expansionist Shiite theocracy of Iran that came to power after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Both countries came at odds in a new round of rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites dating back to Islam's original schism 14 centuries ago.

Sensing the threat of Islamization, Arab rulers began a race toward social “piety” through power alliances with the clergy that gave them an expanded influence in all aspects of societal interactions. During the 1980s and 1990s, religious schools, media programs, elaborate public celebrations of religious holidays, and the crackdown on “unethical” and “Western” lifestyles became commonplace in most societies in the Middle East. In fact, both Islamic and Nationalist rulers in the region saw social Islamization as a strategy to absorb the discontent of the rising Islamic tide, without having to give away power or undergo any substantial political reforms.

The problem with this strategy, however, is that it encouraged religious hypocrisy and curtailed individual freedoms and civic activism. More importantly, social Islamization started a race to the bottom, where discontented members of already “Islamized” societies were left with only one option: to offer more extreme platforms. This explains why increasingly conservative societies in the Middle East kept generating more radical movements throughout recent decades. With the power of the Internet and social media, these radical views were carried to every corner of the globe, transforming their context from local to global, and signaling the arrival of global Jihadi Islam.

Without any illusions about the remote prospect of Western‐style democracy becoming a reality for most Muslim countries, the described dynamics underscore the lack of real champions or an environment that could nurture science and usher in modernity in most Islamic societies. Large sectors of these societies are not only disenchanted with science, but denounce any value of modernity beyond technological consumerism. Nurtured initially by their own governments, this attitude gradually became a self‐sustaining current that made change difficult by creating a contradiction between the values of modernity and those of Islamic societies. It also hijacked the modernization discourse in Islamic societies into a reactive mode in response to the “invasion” of Western values, rather than an internally needed debate about the welfare of Muslims.

Many societies throughout history, including the European nations, have started from this point of antagonism between prevailing values and those of science and modernity. Muslims, as far as history is concerned, need not borrow any foreign system to modernize, for they can find all the ingredients they need in their own “Golden Age”; tolerance, rationalism, and economic activity for the pursuit of peace and prosperity. In the end, Muslims are not different from anybody else in their yearning for a prosperous future for their children and themselves, but they are trapped in an identity crisis based on false contradictions. The recent election of a liberal government in Tunisia and the economic success of Turkey's free market system show that, given the choice, Muslims can dissociate elements of their cultural identity from how they want to be governed and develop.

The modernization of Islamic societies is not primarily about investment in science, increasing research capacity, or acquiring top equipment and scientists, as it is usually suggested. It is more about social and economic liberalization that can provide a natural driver for innovation and competition. In essence, traditional societies' political hold on the economy and the pandering to an assumed religious sensitivity need to give way to a wider involvement of the moderate majority in shaping the modernity discourse in Islamic societies. There is an opening now, given that even the most “pious” regimes in the Muslim world understand that they cannot control the extremism monster they helped to create with the usual manipulation‐and‐exploitation game. The way to modernization, therefore, is not only in keeping with core Islamic values of tolerance, sanctity of life, and the virtues of knowledge seeking, but it is the best bet for promoting peace and progress in Muslim societies. Otherwise, the tides of refugees that we are witnessing today, the rising extremism on all sides, and the mushrooming of terror groups are likely to be the opening salvo of a global, never‐ending conflict.

Since the later half of the last century the products of scientific research and technological innovation have given rise to a “knowledge society”. According to Peter Drucker, “The emerging (knowledge) society is the first society in which ordinary people — and that means most people—do not earn their bread by the sweat of their brow” (Drucker, 1968). Presumably he was referring to “knowledge workers” and “Intellectual Entrepreneurs” exploiting the benefits of advances in S&T in the industrialized nations. Given the knowledge "explosion" that is taking place in this century it is pertinent to note “it took from the time of Christ to the mid eighteenth century for knowledge to double. It doubled again 150 years later and then again in only 50 years. Today it doubles every 4 or 5 years. More new information has been produced in the last 30 years than in the previous 5000 years” (Linowes, 1990).

The above quotes clearly establish the compelling reasons for a massive shift towards cultivation of S&T in Muslim countries. The response of a majority of countries to the need for S&T modernization has been to import technology to meet the knowledge gap. Plans for education reforms often converge on proposals to import computers, involve foreign experts/consultants (encouraged by donors), fund health care diagnostic laboratories etc. We do not deny that some of these are necessary technologies (mostly in the form of hardware).

However, creating an environment that inspires local talent to innovate requires additional efforts in terms of openness to cross-border exchange and diffusion of scientific ideas, exchange of faculty and students, creating atmosphere for intramural dialogue and cross-sectoral debate, and the conscious promotion of questioning minds and creativity in the curricula at every level. Such determined and purposeful initiatives are evident only in a few Muslim countries. What is absent is a system of tertiary education that can play the key role in generating and applying knowledge in this network age that can help produce world standard S&T and narrow the ever widening knowledge gap (Sharif, 2004).

Commitments to education in general and tertiary sector in particular are substantial and the fraction of tertiary students in S&T subjects is considerable in some Muslim countries. Yet their achievements in terms of scientific discoveries and technological innovations (e.g. patents and payments received from royalties) have been minimal. It is possible that the effort to give a boost to S&T development has been made only recently and one has to give time for the gestation period. However one is wary of the prevailing mind-set and the manner in which science and engineering are being taught. One would like to be assured that the curricula have been designed to test the creativity of the young mind which can help him or her to develop a questioning mind.

It is imperative that the countries take initiatives for shedding bureaucratic and cultural hangovers of the past. This is possible if enlightened leadership is provided from the top and courageous initiatives taken to counter obscurantism. The Muslim countries have to concentrate its investment in human resources and purposefully encourage questioning minds to extend the frontiers of knowledge.

Historically, there was no conflict between scientific inquiry, the free and open exploration and expression of ideas, and genuine Islamic teachings. That is precisely why science flourished under past Islamic civilizations, and why fields of science like astronomy, agriculture, medicine, horticulture, oceanography, physics, mathematics and chemistry were revolutionized or pioneered by Muslims.

It is also why it is so fitting that member states adopted the Astana Declaration, which calls on “all Muslim world countries to strengthen the culture of education and science, especially for youth and women as a means of enhancing social and economic modernization and socio-economic progress.” Rather than seeing science as an alien doctrine that threatens Islamic traditions, the Islamic world must re-orient its perspective by reclaiming its role in science.

Update: Feb., 10, 2019:

The Problem

Some 57 Muslim countries in the world are home to more than 25 per cent of the population. Most of these nations are confronted with problems such as poverty, war, unrest and political instability However, the countries in Gulf and United Arab Emirates are rich in resources and are self-sufficient. Despite the varied spectrum, one factor is common in all of these states – they lag far behind in science, technology, new patents and innovations as compared to other developed nations. .

Only three scientists from OIC namely Dr Abdus Salam from Pakistan (Physics 1979), Prof Ahmed Zewail from Egypt (Chemistry 1999) and Aziz Sancar from Turkey (Chemistry 2015) received Nobel Prizes in their respective fields. All of them did their award winning work outside their home countries. The Muslim world produces only six per cent of the global academic publications, 1.6 per cent of the world’s patents and shares 2.4 per cent of global research expenditures. Muslim countries on an average invest 0.5 of their GDP in research and development program.

Reasons

US intervention in Iraq and Arab Springs has resulted than Muslims were struggling for everyday utilities as war after war had badly disturbed every aspect of their lives. The US-led invasion of Iraq not only destroyed dozens of universities and science institutes but also targeted hundreds of top scientists. Baghdad University geologist and head of Association of University Lecturers Al-Rawi archived that around 300 academics and university administrators have been assassinated since the US occupation of Iraq that began in 2003.

Almost all scholars agreed that lack of political will in acquiring higher education and conducting research was another problem in majority of the Muslim states.  

Karachi University director of International Center for Chemical and Biological Sciences Dr Muhammad Iqbal Choudhary said the leaders have failed to understand that progress without science and technology is not possible in the ever changing world. “I would state three problems: First is the lack of understanding and political will. Secondly, our own issues and problems kept busy in the civil wars and political unrest. The third is our failure to unite as Muslim Ummah or our inability to create a Pan-Islamic movement for science and technology,” he added.  There was no luxury of science amid war and insecurity.  Low capacity and teaching instead of research were three main problems of higher education in the Palestine. .“In general, from Palestine, only those research publications are high ranking if they are jointly produced with at least one or two western scholars,” he added. Sahar Mostafa of Mansoura University in Egypt reiterated that majority of Egyptian scientists are not concerned with research and development. They only focus on their own promotions by writing papers which is a waste of time and resources.

Solutions

Pakistani scientist Dr Muhammad Iqbal Choudhary stressed upon the need of virtual network of scholars from Islamic countries. “Instead of waiting for the political leadership, I think it is important that the scientists from chemistry, medicine, social science and other disciplines should create a web-based network to achieve the common goals,” he said. Eminent Malaysian chemist Prof Dr Dato Ibrahim Jantan maintained that science is controlled by the west. A strong leadership is required to bring the Muslim scholars together.