Tuesday, March 5, 2019

Sugar and Sugar Cane Pricing (JR 142)
















Sugar and Sugar Cane Pricing (JR142)

Introduction
Sugar is protected all around the world by high import duties and export subsidies, Pakistan—have been keeping cane prices artificially high in order to win farmers’ (Sugar mill owners) votes, leading to massive surges in production.” Pakistan produces surplus sugar which is then exported, exports require subsidies. The farmer does not get the benefit. Sugar cane is a water intensive crop. We are therefore exporting scarce water. Sugarcane has replaced cotton and this has necessitated import of cotton to make up the shortfall. This seems to be a pricing regime set up to benefits the large industrial and political groups. According to the SBP, the sugar cane output totaled 82.1m tonnes in 2017-18 from $73.4m tonnes a year earlier an increase of 11.8 per cent. Just how fast the sugar cane output has been growing can be gauged from the fact that if we compare the 2017-18 output with 62.8m tonnes of 2014-15, we see about 31pc growth in just three years.


International Sugar prices

Sugar prices in the near past are presented as follows:

Sugar prices
Int
Pak
Price
Price
Year
$/lb
$/lb
2010
0.220
2011
0.270
2012
0.220
2014
0.1544
2015
0.1433
2016
0.1429
2017
0.158
0.143
2018
0.123
0.120
2019
0.127
Change %
-42.182
-22.221



 Forecast
World sugar production is forecast to reach a record level of 187.6 million metric tons in the 2017-18 marketing year, according to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, or FAO. That would mark an increase of just over 11% from the previous session.
“The substantial expected expansion in world sugar output means that production is set to surpass utilization by as much as 17 million [metric tons], the largest production surplus in history, leading to significant accumulated inventories, in both importing and exporting countries,” the FAO wrote in a biannual report published in July. Sugar cane production doesn’t decline significantly as prices fall because the crop, which is classified as a species of grass, can be cut back for five or six years in a row, meaning that it is seldom dug up to plant another crop. Sugar is “protected all around the world by high import duties and export subsidies.” The Indian government—and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan—have been “keeping cane prices artificially high in order to win farmers’ votes, leading to massive surges in production.” Against that backdrop, uncertainty surrounds sugar demand.
Demand is “stationary” or even declining in the European Union, the U.S. and Australia, says Shaw, as consumers opt for healthier alternatives. The U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts total domestic sugar use for the 2018-19 fiscal year at 11.33 million metric tons, little changed from the 11.27 million expected for the current fiscal year. However, in the rest of the world, sugar demand is “almost certainly still rising” due to population growth, if nothing else, he says.
In China, sugar consumption for the 2018-19 marketing year is forecast to stand unchanged at 15.7 million tons, with growth “limited by increasing health concerns and competition from sugar and sweetener replacements,” according to the FAO. Longer-term, sugar’s supply surplus will eventually push prices so low that production takes a hit.
Sugar prices may see a rise to around 15 cents “sometime in 2020,” says Shaw, who estimates that the cost of production for efficient producers such as Brazil and Thailand stands at roughly 12 cents to 14 cents a pound, above the current price of 10 cents. “Prices will, of course, go up as producers go bankrupt, but that is a very slow process,” he says.
Investors appear to be “dipping their toes in the water” given inflows into sugar-based exchange-traded products, says Gilbertie, whose company sponsors the Teucrium Sugar fund (ticker: CANE), which offers unleveraged direct exposure to sugar. The inflows suggest that investors are “taking a view that sugar prices could be at or near a multiyear cyclical bottom,” he says. Meanwhile, sugar prices are likely to decline even further. “I don’t see anything in the near term that suggests an inevitable reversal of sugar’s drop,” says Kottle, adding that some analysts expect to see eight cents a pound. That would be the lowest in roughly 14 years.

Pakistan Sugar Sector
Mushroom growth of sugar mills in the main cotton-growing areas of Southern Punjab and Sindh has placed the cotton crop in direct competition with sugar cane for area and resources,` says the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in its first quarterly report of the current fiscal year. When a new sugar mill is set up in an area, it incentivizes farmers to switch over from cotton or other crops to sugar cane. New sugar mills began springing up and the government started focusing more on the cultivation of sugar cane with   2008-09 At the end of 2007-08, there were 78 sugar mills, according to the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (PSMA). The number went up to 89 in 2017-
Sugarcane Recoveries’
Periodic sugar recoveries of some sugar mills in the province Punjab are 10.52 percent for JDW, RY Khan, 10.48 percent for  Hamza, Khanapur, 10.43 percent for Indus, Rajanpur, 9.95 percent for Noon, Bhalwal and 9.63 percent for Hussain, Jaranwala.
On the other hand, sugar recoveries of sugar mills located in the Sindh are reported maximum (11.44 percent) in Mehran Sugar Mills Tando Allahyar. Similarly, 10.85 percent in Faran, Hyderabad, 1075 percent in MPK, Mirpur Khas, 10.71 percent in Shah Murad , Jhok sharif , 10.35 percent in Habib Nawabshah, 9.95 percent in Al Noor, Mo rro  and 9.84 percent in Ansari, Matli during 2016-17.
The present average sugar recoveries of 9.5 percent can be increased up to 11.5 percent by adopting improved agricultural practices. For this, planting time, fertilizer-irrigation & harvest management, precautionary measures in diseases along with insects and cane procurement strategies. No doubt, cane variety is the single most dominant factor in improving sugar mills recoveries. High sugar early maturing varieties have the potential of giving 11.5-12.5 percent recovery. A number of high sugarcane varieties have been released by Sugarcane Research Institutes in Pakistan, during the past decades.
Impact of surplus sugar production  
 Our cotton production routinely falls short of the needs of the textile industry. An unusual shortage could hit the textile industry`s export performance and push up the total import bill with increased imports of cotton. Imports of raw cotton increased from 450,000 tonnes in 2012-13 to 610,000 tonnes in 2017-18 as local production failed to meet the textile industry`s demand. In the outgoing fiscal year, the cotton output totaled a little less than 12 million bales against the target of 14m bales. Imports of the commodity consumed $1 billion-plus Sugar exports somewhat compensate the cost of cotton imports. In 2017-18, we earned half a billion dollars through exports of sugar. That could not have been possible without a surplus in sugar production, sugar millers argue. Cotton production overtime is presented as follows:

Market Year
Production
Unit of Measure
Growth Rate
1960
1398
1000 480 lb. Bales
NA
1961
1505
1000 480 lb. Bales
7.65 %
1962
1690
1000 480 lb. Bales
12.29 %
1963
1940
1000 480 lb. Bales
14.79 %
1964
1747
1000 480 lb. Bales
-9.95 %
1965
1915
1000 480 lb. Bales
9.62 %
1966
2139
1000 480 lb. Bales
11.70 %
1967
2389
1000 480 lb. Bales
11.69 %
1968
2429
1000 480 lb. Bales
1.67 %
1969
2473
1000 480 lb. Bales
1.81 %
1970
2500
1000 480 lb. Bales
1.09 %
1971
3249
1000 480 lb. Bales
29.96 %
1972
3100
1000 480 lb. Bales
-4.59 %
1973
2909
1000 480 lb. Bales
-6.16 %
1974
2802
1000 480 lb. Bales
-3.68 %
1975
2269
1000 480 lb. Bales
-19.02 %
1976
1921
1000 480 lb. Bales
-15.34 %
1977
2539
1000 480 lb. Bales
32.17 %
1978
2132
1000 480 lb. Bales
-16.03 %
1979
3417
1000 480 lb. Bales
60.27 %
1980
3280
1000 480 lb. Bales
-4.01 %
1981
3434
1000 480 lb. Bales
4.70 %
1982
3782
1000 480 lb. Bales
10.13 %
1983
2271
1000 480 lb. Bales
-39.95 %
1984
4630
1000 480 lb. Bales
103.87 %
1985
5587
1000 480 lb. Bales
20.67 %
1986
6062
1000 480 lb. Bales
8.50 %
1987
6744
1000 480 lb. Bales
11.25 %
1988
6551
1000 480 lb. Bales
-2.86 %
1989
6687
1000 480 lb. Bales
2.08 %
1990
7522
1000 480 lb. Bales
12.49 %
1991
10000
1000 480 lb. Bales
32.94 %
1992
7073
1000 480 lb. Bales
-29.27 %
1993
6282
1000 480 lb. Bales
-11.18 %
1994
6250
1000 480 lb. Bales
-0.51 %
1995
8272
1000 480 lb. Bales
32.35 %
1996
7319
1000 480 lb. Bales
-11.52 %
1997
7175
1000 480 lb. Bales
-1.97 %
1998
6863
1000 480 lb. Bales
-4.35 %
1999
8776
1000 480 lb. Bales
27.87 %
2000
8379
1000 480 lb. Bales
-4.52 %
2001
8286
1000 480 lb. Bales
-1.11 %
2002
7972
1000 480 lb. Bales
-3.79 %
2003
7845
1000 480 lb. Bales
-1.59 %
2004
11138
1000 480 lb. Bales
41.98 %
2005
9850
1000 480 lb. Bales
-11.56 %
2006
9580
1000 480 lb. Bales
-2.74 %
2007
8550
1000 480 lb. Bales
-10.75 %
2008
8540
1000 480 lb. Bales
-0.12 %
2009
9240
1000 480 lb. Bales
8.20 %
2010
8640
1000 480 lb. Bales
-6.49 %
2011
10600
1000 480 lb. Bales
22.69 %
2012
9300
1000 480 lb. Bales
-12.26 %
2013
9500
1000 480 lb. Bales
2.15 %
2014
10600
1000 480 lb. Bales
11.58 %
2015
7000
1000 480 lb. Bales
-33.96 %
2016
7700
1000 480 lb. Bales
10.00 %
2017
8200
1000 480 lb. Bales
6.49 %
2018
7500
1000 480 lb. Bales
-8.54 %

Cotton production since 2004 has decreased by about 30%. Decrease in cotton production has necessitated import of cotton, cotton imports s is presented as follows:
Market Year
Imports
Unit of Measure
Growth Rate
1960
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
NA
1961
42
1000 480 lb. Bales
950.00 %
1962
9
1000 480 lb. Bales
-78.57 %
1963
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
-55.56 %
1964
9
1000 480 lb. Bales
125.00 %
1965
7
1000 480 lb. Bales
-22.22 %
1966
10
1000 480 lb. Bales
42.86 %
1967
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
-60.00 %
1968
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
0.00 %
1969
0
1000 480 lb. Bales
-100.00 %
1970
6
1000 480 lb. Bales
NA
1971
7
1000 480 lb. Bales
16.67 %
1972
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
-42.86 %
1973
2
1000 480 lb. Bales
-50.00 %
1974
1
1000 480 lb. Bales
-50.00 %
1975
0
1000 480 lb. Bales
-100.00 %
1976
2
1000 480 lb. Bales
NA
1977
1
1000 480 lb. Bales
-50.00 %
1978
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
300.00 %
1979
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
0.00 %
1980
5
1000 480 lb. Bales
25.00 %
1981
5
1000 480 lb. Bales
0.00 %
1982
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
-20.00 %
1983
240
1000 480 lb. Bales
5,900.00 %
1984
9
1000 480 lb. Bales
-96.25 %
1985
6
1000 480 lb. Bales
-33.33 %
1986
3
1000 480 lb. Bales
-50.00 %
1987
4
1000 480 lb. Bales
33.33 %
1988
5
1000 480 lb. Bales
25.00 %
1989
17
1000 480 lb. Bales
240.00 %
1990
2
1000 480 lb. Bales
-88.24 %
1991
20
1000 480 lb. Bales
900.00 %
1992
24
1000 480 lb. Bales
20.00 %
1993
350
1000 480 lb. Bales
1,358.33 %
1994
696
1000 480 lb. Bales
98.86 %
1995
122
1000 480 lb. Bales
-82.47 %
1996
279
1000 480 lb. Bales
128.69 %
1997
120
1000 480 lb. Bales
-56.99 %
1998
925
1000 480 lb. Bales
670.83 %
1999
475
1000 480 lb. Bales
-48.65 %
2000
470
1000 480 lb. Bales
-1.05 %
2001
865
1000 480 lb. Bales
84.04 %
2002
872
1000 480 lb. Bales
0.81 %
2003
1805
1000 480 lb. Bales
107.00 %
2004
1756
1000 480 lb. Bales
-2.71 %
2005
1615
1000 480 lb. Bales
-8.03 %
2006
2305
1000 480 lb. Bales
42.72 %
2007
3907
1000 480 lb. Bales
69.50 %
2008
1917
1000 480 lb. Bales
-50.93 %
2009
1574
1000 480 lb. Bales
-17.89 %
2010
1443
1000 480 lb. Bales
-8.32 %
2011
900
1000 480 lb. Bales
-37.63 %
2012
1800
1000 480 lb. Bales
100.00 %
2013
1200
1000 480 lb. Bales
-33.33 %
2014
950
1000 480 lb. Bales
-20.83 %
2015
3300
1000 480 lb. Bales
247.37 %
2016
2450
1000 480 lb. Bales
-25.76 %
2017
3300
1000 480 lb. Bales
34.69 %
2018
3000
1000 480 lb. Bales
-9.09 %

Pakistan had to import over 4 million cotton bales that  cost around $1.5 billion, owing to declining production of cotton this season  imports of such a large quantity would not only increased the country's import bill, but also the cost of production. Currently customs duty, additional custom duty and sales tax have been imposed @ 3 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent respectively on the import of cotton. Pakistan has produced around 10 million bales of cotton on average for the last several years against consumption of over 14 million bales. Additionally, 1 to 1.5 million bales of Extra Long Staple (ELS) cotton per annum is also imported, as this quality is not produced in the country.

Yields and Pricing of Sugarcane
Estimated yield of sugarcane in Pakistan is much lower as compared to other countries and sugarcane production showed a declining trend in 2018-19 despite increase in cultivation area, sugarcane cultivation area has been increased in the last 7 years by 9 percent on an average, whereas the production has increased by 22 percent. However, estimated sugarcane production showed a declining trend in 2018-19 due to multiple factors.  Sugarcane production accounted for 3.6 percent in agriculture's value addition and 0.7 percent in overall GDP and is mainly cultivated for sugar and sugar-related products like alcohol, molasses, and press-mud with an input for paper and board industry. Additionally, ethanol and electricity are also being produced by some sugar mills. It provides raw material for industry which is the country's second largest agro-industry sector after textiles. Pakistan ranks 5th in respect of acreage and production, however, its level of yield is ranked 53rd in the world. Average yield of sugarcane in Pakistan is 620-700 maunds per acre, which is much lower as compared to other cane producing countries. Presently, 82 sugar mills of the country are engaged to produce sugar with the production capacity of 6.8 million tons of sugar per annum as compared to national consumption of 5.3 million tons per annum.

Ministry of National Food Security & Research has regularly worked out the cost of production of sugarcane crop. In order to determine an appropriate indicative price for the next crop, all determinant factors are considered, like area and production, world outlook, cost of production, export and import parity prices, local and international prices and domestic requirement. Ministry of National Food Security & Research before the start of each sugar crushing season shares this working on the cost of production to the provincial governments. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1950 authorizes the provincial governments to fix the indicative price of sugarcane.

Cost of production of sugarcane crop 2018-19 had been worked out at the level of Rs 179/40 kg in Punjab as compared to Rs 169.22/40 kg in the last year and Rs 178.08/40 kg for Sindh as compared to Rs 171.96/40 kg of the corresponding period of last year. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa uses the indicative price of sugarcane fixed by Punjab.

Ministry of Industries and Production for the crushing season 2017-18 has estimated ex-mill price/manufacturing cost of sugar at the level of Rs 45.86/kg. It is estimated that at sugar recovery level of 9.96 percent, additional molasses with 4.4 percent is also produced which yields an additional profit of Rs 21.12/40kg.

Some sugar mills have installed extra plants for manufacturing of alcohol and electricity, which yield extra profit margin for sugar mill owners. The Ministry of Industries and Production has reported the sugar stock position for the crushing season 2017-18 (October-September) at the tune of 7.158 million tons.The quantity includes 3.856 million tons with Punjab, 2.281 million tons with Sindh, 0.470 million tons with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and leftover stock of 0.541 million tons. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics on 15-11-2018 reported the wholesale local price of refined sugar at the level of Rs 54.88/kg. International Sugar Organisation has quoted the sugar prices, which fluctuates between US $ 335- 353/tons during the month of November 2018 (November 1-15 2018).



Surplus

An intriguing aspect of the excessive cultivation of sugar cane is that often the surplus cannot be exported without offering the millers some sort of subsidy. This happens due to delays in finalising sugar export plans, high cost of domestic production and international market conditions. The SBP quarterly report points out that in the last fiscal year, the monthly average price of local sugar stood at $448 per tonne compared to the global average of about $330.The government had to give a subsidy ofRs14bn on sugar exports. What is more intriguing is the fact that larger sugar cane outputs year after year are not even helping farmers.

Millers pay them less than the indicative or support price of the commodity. Particularly, small growers suffer due to this anomaly. Yet the government continues to spend billions of rupees under commodity pricing subsidies. So technically, sugar exports are costing more to the government than the accrued benefits as a significant expenditure is incurred on facilitating these exports, according to the SBP`s quarterly report.

Water requirements

According to a WWF Pakistan chapter report of 2012, growing sugar cane also consumes more water: 0.05m cubic meters per hectare against cotton (0.02mcm per hectare) and even rice (0.03mcm per hectare).For several years, Pakistan`s water woes have been growing. The scarcity of water continues to ruin the prospects of crop outputs in large parts of Sindh, Balochistan and some areas of Punjab. `But if we don`t limit sugar cane cultivation, the economy might continue to suffer due to the erratic output of cotton and rice. That, in turn, might keep net textile exports low and affect growth of rice exports. Perhaps it`s time to initiate a major crop rationalisation plan with the consent of the provinces focusing on ensuring food adequacy, effective use of water, higher per-hectare yields and highest export value of the surplus output. But encouraging farmers to switch over from sugar cane to cotton, rice or any other crop will also require the introduction of solid provincial work plans with feedback from farmers` lobbies and local and international experts on agriculture.  
Water availability per capita in Pakistan has depleted to a level of 1017 cubic meter tons in Pakistan – very close to 1000 cubic meters, which is considered as an alarming situation and is called scarcity threshold. Using data from the Pakistani federal government's Planning and Development Division, the overall water availability has decreased from 1,299 m³ per capita in 1996-97 to 1,101 m³ per capita in 2004-05.In view of growing population, urbanization and increased industrialization, the situation is likely to get worse  increasing pollution and saltwater intrusion threaten the country's water resources. About 36% of the groundwater is classified as highly saline.
Water requirements for some crops are presented as follows:
Crop
Crop water need
(mm/total growing period)
Banana
1200-2200
Barley/Oats/Wheat
450-650
Bean
300-500
Cabbage
350-500
Citrus
900-1200
Cotton
700-1300
Maize
500-800
Melon
400-600
Onion
350-550
Peanut
500-700
Pea
350-500
Pepper
600-900
Potato
500-700
Rice (paddy)
450-700
Sorghum/Millet
450-650
Soybean
450-700
Sugar beet
550-750
Sugarcane
1500-2500
Sunflower
600-1000
Tomato
400-800

Sugar cane is a water intensive crop; it has the highest water requirement amongst the crops, listed above.
Present sugar cane situation
Pakistan's sugarcane yield averages about 46 tonnes per hectare, well below the world average of above 60 tonnes, and below neighboring India's yield of 65 to 70 tonnes. However, yields are increasing over time, at a rate of between 0.5 and 1.0 tonne per hectare annually. Yields in the Punjab, were relatively constant at 37 tonnes per hectare for about 10 years and only recently started rising to over 45 tonnes per hectare. However, individual farmers have obtained yields of 120 tonnes per ha. Precipitation averages only 335 ml a year in the Punjab, so irrigation is crucial, but the total supply of water is limited. Yields in the Sind Province are above 50 tonnes per hectare, significantly higher than in Punjab. The growth rate in sugarcane production in Sind has exceeded Punjab in recent years. However, because of its larger area under sugarcane, the Punjab produces the major share of the national output, and for 1997/98 output in this province is forecast to increase by 10 percent to 29 million tonnes, while Sind is expected to produce 13 million tonnes, unchanged from 1996/97


Small farmers often are not selling sugarcane crop to the sugar factory, for it was of fetching   an inadequate price of Rs120/40kg against the notified price of Rs182/40kg for the 2018-19 season. Small framers he preferred jaggery manufacturing, some larger framers sell their crop to cattle traders as fodder as they find this option somewhat more profitable than selling their produce to   sugar factory owners.

The growers are not only getting payment in cash but also saving on other expenditures, ranging from the cost of harvesting/cleansing grass attached with sugarcane, to  transportation a  and off loading at the factory`s gate. Selling crop for livestock and cattle is not at all a bad bargain under the existing conditions this year, when factories are unwilling to pay the due price,`  
Of the country`s 80-plus sugar factories, 38 are located in Sindh and close to 50 in Punjab. Wealthy mill owners are once again denying farmers the notified price and seeking judicial intervention though there may be little chance of getting a favorable order Farmers will want to free up land for other crops. As sugarcane crushing draws closer millers will start paying more than the notified price. But by this time growers have already sold their major chunk of crop at a low rate to middlemen who act as millers` agents.

`Fodder`s price remains high this year and it enables us to sell our produce,`  Those rearing animals and livestock herds are paying Rs140/40kg for sugarcane and it is a price millers deny. Fodder traders are bringing their laborers to harvest crop and are transporting it from fields to their workplace for onward sale.

Sugarcane producers get payment on the basis of the weight of the crop that is supplied after grass has been cleaned from each stick of sugarcane. This reduces the weight. Millers then make deductions, on flimsy grounds. In Sindh, sugarcane cultivation has become a tricky job.

The sugar industry has seen unnatural growth in Sindh over last few years, even though water shortages had serious implications of this water-intense crop. .Sugarcane is almost a year-long crop, needing plenty of water flows till it matures. In the last kharif 2018 season, Sindh faced an overall 18pc water shortage. Reduced irrigation water flows are a regular phenomenon, especially in the command areas of the Sukkur and Kotri barrages, making sugarcane cultivation increasingly unviable.

Pakistan`s sugar millers are mostly influential politicians. With their connections, they call the shots, while farmers end up hard done by. Despite billions of rupees worth of subsidies from the public exchequer to millers, the federal and provincial governments fail to get the price notification implemented. `Pakistan is producing more sugar than its consumption needs, which is around 5.2m tonnes to 5.5m tonnes, necessitating the export of surplus sweetener for which millers pressurise the government to provide subsidies,` 
In the 2017-18 season the Sindh government paid a provincial subsidy of Rs3.25bn (Rs9.30/1kg) to sugar mills located in Sindh as export rebate; of 1.7m tonnes of Pakistani sugar`s export, 0.9m tonnes were exported from Sindh. The State Bank of Pakistan is said to have asked the Sindh government to pay its remaining share out of the federal subsidy., the real issue is that  farmers don`t get adequate price. 

·         Weighing woes India
·         On the one hand, a large section of sugarcane cultivators perceive that cane supplied by them to mills is weighed less than actual by about 10 to 20 percent, whereas on the other, millers maintain that they weigh it accurately. To improve trust and harmony between the two stakeholders, the Commission recommends that Government of India should persuade the State Governments/Cane Commissioners to make adequate arrangements for electronic balances which measure and display the actual weights. These balances should be open to scrutiny for its accuracy by concerned stakeholders. 


Sugar cane and sugar pricing examples
To help ensure fair and equitable relationships between growers and millers, these groups established an innovative sugarcane payment system in 1999. The Consecana payment system is based on two fundamental principles:

1.      The price paid to cane producers is proportional to their share of industrial revenue. On average, sugarcane production accounts for 60 percent of total sugar and ethanol production costs. Therefore, sugarcane growers receive around 60 percent of the agro-industrial revenue.
2.      The industry pays more for sugarcane with higher sucrose content. The value of sugarcane is based on the so-called Total Recoverable Sugar (or ATR in Portuguese). ATR corresponds to the amount of sugar available in the raw material minus the losses in the manufacturing process.

The money sugarcane growers collect depends on the prices for sugar and ethanol sold by processors in domestic and foreign markets. So transparency is crucial to the Consecana model. Price surveys of Brazilian and international markets are conducted by a neutral body – the Center for Advanced Studies in Applied Economics (Cepea), a research center within the University of São Paulo. In addition, cane growers have the right to monitor mill laboratories 24 hours per day.
Consecana is a dynamic system, and the group reevaluates its rules every five years to adapt to new market developments. Other sugarcane producing states consider this fair-pricing program a success, and many have either adopted a similar system or to rely on information from Consecana
Sugar Pricing India
Around 5 crore Indian farmers and their family members grow sugarcane for 12-18 months on around 50 lakh hectares of land. A ratoon of 1-2 years, when farmers don’t have to put fresh seed, means once the farmers plant sugarcane, they are committed to grow sugarcane for 2-3 years. It also means that when the farmers commit themselves to sugarcane, they don’t know what the sugar price would be after a year or more. The government does well to protect farmers by deciding the price of sugarcane, called the fair and remunerative price (FRP). But on the other hand, sugar prices are determined by market sentiments and market forces, and the government can’t have much direct control over it. Everything remains good until the high FRP of sugarcane results in over-production of cane and sugar. If that in turn causes sugar prices to fall below cost levels, the mills incur losses, leading to delays/defaults in payments of farmers.  Sugarcane contributes for 70-75% of the cost of producing sugar. Therefore, if cane-price is high and sugar prices low, sugar production becomes unviable, resulting in unpaid cane-price for farmers. Cane-price arrears of farmers had unfortunately crossed Rs 18,000-20,000 crore continuously for a few years some time back. It meant that either every third farmer did not get his payment on time or a farmer got only of two-thirds of the amount due to him. Both situations are surely alarming and chaotic. The solution already suggested by the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP)—continuously for the last four years— is as follows:
a) Farmers should be guaranteed a minimum cane price at the level of FRP,
b) Liability of sugar mills will be restricted as per a revenue sharing formula (RSF), such that 75% of revenue realized from sugar (including weight age of 5% for other primary by-products) will be the cane price payable by mills.
c) If the cane-price, as per RSF, is more than FRP, the farmers get a second installment over and above the FRP.
d) If the price as per RSF works out to below FRP (which will happen when sugar prices are depressed), the gap would be paid from a fund created by the government, directly to the farmers.

It means that sugar mills will pay as per their revenue realization, i.e., as per their paying capacity. Therefore, farmers will get paid on time. It will also keep cost of production reasonable, ensuring Indian sugar is competitive globally to allow exporting the surplus. On the other hand, farmers get cane price at least at the level of FRP, or more when sugar prices are better, an improvement over the current system of giving farmers only FRP. Such a linkage formula between cane-price and revenue realisation from sugar is universal, given it is followed in almost all sugar-producing countries, and will put Indian industry on a par with other global players. The CACP’s suggestion of a fund is in fact an improvement, particularly for the Indian farmers, where they are guaranteed a minimum FRP, even when sugar prices are down, and would get more if sugar prices are good.
. A combination of Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) and Fair (India) and Remunerative Price FRP while fixing price of sugarcane. Under this approach farmers’ realization from the cane would be higher when sugar prices are on upswing. However, farmers may end up getting lower prices than the FRP during the period of downward cycle of sugar prices. In such a situation, the farmers should be paid FRP up front and the difference between FRP and prices determined by RSF should be met by Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF). This recommendation essentially has three components namely (i) FRP, (ii) RSF and (iii) SSF and all these were to be implemented as an ‘atomic whole’ for the viability of the sugar industry. The Commission recommends that all the three components of hybrid pricing approach should be implemented simultaneously. Such a rational approach for sugarcane pricing would provide a logical solution to the travails of both the cane farmers and the sugar industry.

8 comments:

  1. mran Khan is facing a sugar crisis in his nation - Part 1

    Risk in the sugar business ?

    Y is "Sugar Daddy Jehangir Tareen (SDJT)", in the Sugar business ?

    The misconception.

    It is no risk business.The CEO of the mill can see his raw material in the fields,from his glass windows.The owner of the raw material is waiting to sell ,he has to sell - as there is no storage and storage is not possible, and he has to sell to the nearest mill (to save on freight and moisture)- at the quality and other specs of the mills,and then awsit payments for months. Can there be a better business ? dindooohindoo

    The users of the end product are in the billions.The user in Pakistan WILL NOT PAY beyond a certain price - and they voted in the govtt.If some sugar mills close down - by strategy - the govtt will fall and there will be a Tahrir,as sugar stock draw down from Govtt warehouses takes time - and in riots - no logistics is possible. Even imports will take months,and then it has to be evacuated from the ports.

    Tbe user price can't fall below a certain floor,as then the mills will close down,and there will no cane purchases,and also no cane payments for old bills.This also ensures no large scale imports.The cane growers,are also in the millions,and are another vote bank.So there is a cap-collar option on sugarr prices - for the mill owner.If prices fall,the state has to offset the losses for the mill,and also waive interest and warehouse charges and offer compensation equal to the opportunity cost of capital employed in the operations.Hence,the cost of the cap-collar options is borne by the state.There is no other business like this in the world.

    Any business which relies on the state,for policies - dooms the industry.As a result, the Pakistani state has no clue of the actual operations of the sugar and cane supply chain and value chain - from costing to manufacturing to stock.That is also to the advantage of the businessmen - as the perception of unviable sugar units,ensures that the sugar units can inflate costs and hide stocks.This ensures that they keep getting subsidies.drawbacks,capital subsidies,soft loans,trade swaps, power export and wheeling incentives etc., and also,they can create shortages and price spikes, at will, in any part of Pakistan.

    A doomed sugar industry,also,is in the interest of the sugar tycoon - as they can close down the operations of any marginally viable or loss making or vulnerable unit,at will, by choking off working capital,or a truckers strike or diverting the raw material supplies of the unit.This is enough to cause panic and doom,in the sugar wholesale market.

    Holding stocks of cane,bagasse and sugar for 8-9 months and delays in payment of power exports - has a number to it - in terms of working capital cost.It is not a risk,and is part of the Business Model of a sugar unit,and the cost of working capital,can also be waived off - as interest subsidy or CDR/OTS,as the State has an interest in keeping the polity in power.The fact that,at the time of making the procurement of material,the price of the end product 9 months ahead,is nor known - is also,not a risk,and is,instead an opportunity,as all costs are a pass-through to the state.

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  2. Imran Khan is facing a sugar crisis - Part 2

    Since cane is no brain business,there will always be excess cane production and excess sugar stocks,and since the state has to fix the purchase prices of cane and sale prices,in the open market - and also, the terms of loans and incentives to units - the state will always goof it up.

    When they goof - prices will spike - and that is when the mill owners sell the unaccounted sugar stocks.When there is a reverse goof,id.est,large stocks and working capital shortage - the mill owners push the state to export.At that time,the inflated cost sheets and perceptions of poor manufacturing operations and yields and storage losses,ensures the highest inflated cost.Highest inflated cost ensures maximum subsidy and also maximum ad valorem drawback.

    Drawback is refund of non vatable taxes acros the supply and value chain,and subsidy is the export price differential (on landed cost basis in a target market).

    Hence,the state is a PE co-investor in the sugar mill,with a sweat equity stake,and no voting rights and no dividend.What is better than that ? The cane growers are bankers to the mill who give clean credit for 8-9 months and accept all the deductions made by the mill.The Politicians are the "reverse fee clients"to the Consultants (mill owners), WHO PAU THE MILL (IN TERMS OF SOPS AND SUBSIDIES),FOR THE CONSULTING advice, given by the mill owners.

    In essence,the sugar mill is used by the polity,to make transfer payments to voters in agri areas - as an NGO - except that the NGO makes a CERTAIN INFINTE PROFIT % ON CAPITAL EMPLOUED

    Sugar mills get project loans at a 4:1 Debt.Equity Ratio,with capital and interest subsidies.If the project cost is inflated by 30% by using a mix of news and used machines, and 5% is paid to bankers and netas - then the equity is nil or negative.

    The mill owner has 2 income streams - Profit and Bonus.Bonus is selling unaccounted stocks,in price spikes,and earnings on export subsidies and drawbacks (on inflated costs and hawala exports and bogus exports).Profit is the cash profit earned,as the book profit is all bogus,as costs are inflated.A Sugar mill profit has not to be assessed quarterly or yearly,but when the entire supply and value chain of a crushing season,is conclusively liquidated and realised - net of all working capital costs.
    This makes the ROE,financially incalculable.

    WW3 or N-War or Covid - U need sugar.A human cannot eat palm oil or wheat or rice - as such - but can live on just sugar for some time.There is no business like sugar..Which is Y "Sugar Daddy Jehangir Tareen (SDJT)",is in the Sugar business. He has found buyers in the Taliban ? Sugar and Nuts = Ideal food for the mujahid.

    Bumper cane crop = good news for neta,as farmers happy and cane rates not hiked much for mill owner,and the netas are sure that retail rates are low.Disaster is for the state treasury,as large stock pile will be eaten by rats,or dumped in Kabul,with huge subsidy payments.Neta is happiest

    Bad Cane Crop = doom for neta and retail and economy.Imports will take time and the state will goof up,and retail will price in hike,3-4 months before import orders are placed.Marginal cane mills are also doomed - farmers will just die.But mill owners who have plantations (as all karge units have - on principles of Strategic sourcing and backward integration into plantations) will thrive,as they will have captive supply,and will engineer farm riots and suicides,to rig up cane prices - which is a pass-through to the state - on marginal and imputed costs.Then SDJT will tell media - "How do I gain by increased sugar prices" with a non=plussed expression - only for the cameras.

    A sugar mill is a power plant,which also,incidentally makes sugar,and the price of the raw material,is a pass-through (to the state - on a loaded marginal and opportunity cost) and the by-product (sugar) supply chain,can be choked at any time,by the mill owners.dindooohinoo

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  3. People say,Y is the sugar industry run by mafias and politicians ?

    Y ?

    1st people have to understand that the sugar industry is based on the thesis,that cane is the easiest and highest risk adjusted return,for the farners - and to keep farners from starting a Tahrir or joining ISIS. Hence,over supply of cane and over-production of sugar,is an accepted reality of cane farming,in Pakistan

    This ensures perpetual raw material supply for the mill,and a PASS THROUGH of all costs to the state - on a defacto basis.Defacto basis,is key,as there is no contractual arrangement for the pass through - which is a threat to the economic security of the state,as the mill owner can create shortages,spikes and supply and payments crisis and easily manufacture repetitive, but ingenious reasons for debt waivers,tax reliefs,export subsidies and drawbacks.

    Excess cane production and sugar,is the disaster scenario for the Pakistani state.If there is a bad crop,international sugar prices would not rise,to an extent,to make imports on a duty free basis, costlier than the NSR to the sugar mill.
    In fact,the inported sugar could be sold at a profit to dealers,to more than offset the indirect tax revenue earned, by the state,on cane purchases by mills (mandi/purchase tax) and sale of sugar by mill (excise and sales and VAT tax)

    Y is the mafia required in sugar ? dindooohindoo

    Phase 1

    To start strikes in mills of competitors
    To divert raw material supplies of competitors
    To set fire to bagasse stock of competitors
    To monopolise truckers for mill logistics
    To choke off the logistics for the mill competitors
    To break unions in workers and truckers

    For the above,a mill owner needs the support of the police,mafia and the neta

    Phase 2

    To manipulate raw material supplies,as under:

    To downgrade and reject materials purchases
    To delay purchase payments w/o delayed interest
    To pick and choose cane suppliers
    To tamper quality,moisture and weighnent tests
    Using dummy names to route purchases from captive plantations
    Route farmer purchases,as captive plantation purchases
    To run a racket of farmers cane bills discounting
    To organise dharnas/riots/logistics blockades, with the aid of farners
    To charge financial conversion charges for payments to farners in cash

    For the above,a mill owner needs the support of the police,mafia and the neta

    Phase 3

    To recover the costs of fire insurance and LOP insurance, there are accidental fires in bagasse stocks - once in 5 years, to recover,in bogus claims - the aggregate premiums paid over 5 years

    Phase 4

    To con the state in export subsidies and drawbacks
    To con the state w.r.t CDR/OTS with banks
    To con the state w.r.t capital and interest subsidies
    To tamper the power consumption meters of CPP and power from grid - which is the only forensic proof of production

    Phase 5

    Bogus exports to eat up the subsidy and drawbacks - from land dry ports and sea ports
    Routing exports proceeds on actual and bogus exports,via hawala and other modes
    Manipulating cost,production and stock records to inflate costs,make off the books sales and purchases and hide stocks of finished goods
    Selling bagasse in cash,instead of selling power to the grid
    Creating shortages and spikes in prices of raw and processed/refined sugar Make fake cash purchase bills to generate cash for the sugar mill

    For all the above,you need the mafia and the neta, AND also, since the farnmers are voters for the netas.Since the netas cannot outsource the political risk of the cane souring and payments,to a private party - and that,it is a no-loss, monopoly business,the netas are in the sugar mills,and will stay so,forever.

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  4. The Solution to the Sugar Corrupti-demic ! Part 1

    What is the solution to the Pakistani Sugar Crisis ?

    Some Basic Facts

    The Sugar Mills make money at the highest capacity,and the lowest material cost.For that,there haas to be overproduction of cane - and farmers have to be pampered and brainwashed,to get the "best" cane prices.High cane prices,are of no impact for the mill,as the cabe price,is a defacto pass through,to the state. dindooohindoo

    In other words,the excess sugar produced,from the excess cane produced - will HAVE TO BE exported - with the subsidy and the drawback,at the cost of the state.In addition,the cane payments are made from working capital loans from banks - and the loans would be liquidated from the export and domestic sale proceeds - and so, the NSR from exports and domestic sales has to be profitable. Otherwise, the mill is bust and the bank loan,is an NPA,and millions of cane growers have no buyer.

    Solution 1

    The state has to rework the subsidy.The mills have availed of the advantage of the maximum capacity utilisation, arising out of a bumper cane crop.Hence,the cost of the export stock,should be computed based on the "Marginal cost of Production and Direct costs", upto sale.The difference of this,w.r.t. the FOB Export rates - should be the subsidy.

    whether the mills should get a Profit on the Marginal Cost - is a separate issue - as the economies of scale have already accrued to the mill owner,for the domestic sugar sold.In the alternative,the mills can be paid a service charge,per ton,as they have acted as an NGO - to service the farmers and use their cane,and have in effect transmitted the subsidy,defacto to the farmers.

    Solution 2

    In the current scenario,there is a time limit for exports - as the working capital bank loans,have to be liquidated - for payments for fresh stock purchases.The precise dates are known to traders and punters,all over the world - as the patterns of behavior of a baboo,in the state - as to,steps to liquidate the stocks - are predictable.

    Hence,the mills have to be provided additional unsecured credit,for fresh cane purchases - and a central state agency should sell sugar futures,every quarter,with or without selling options, and give delivery where the futures and the options are out of the money,or where the contango on futures and option premiums,added to the futures price,is closest to the Price to be paid,to the mills

    The nation will,at least, get the maximum NSR on Sugar exports - and the subsidy loss,will be minimised.

    If the 12 month futures contango or option premium, is in excess of the working capital cost of the stock,the state can hold some of the sugar stock,as the net working capital cost is nil or negative.If the futures and options turn a loss,the state can provide stock delivery. There would be several such combinations.

    Solution 3

    The farners have to be shifted from cane farming.Instead of giving subsidies to mills,for export stocks - which represent,excess cane production - the subsidies can be given to farmers directly,to shift to other crops.The subsidies can be in the form of free power,s eeds,fertilsiers,pesticides,crop insurance,supplements and implements. In addition,value added factories for the new crops,can be set up near the crops - with subsidies.As time passes,the viability of the crops will increase,and the subsidies will be nil

    It is possible that the NSR on exports + export subsidy - Marginal cost of Production and sale of export sugar, is more than the financial profit,earned by the cane grower.

    In such a case, a subsidy equal to the financial profit,which COULD be earned from the cane sales - can be paid,as a subsidy,to the cane farmer - NOT TO GROW THE CANE.

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  5. The Solution to the Sugar Corrupti-demic ! Part 2

    Solution 4

    Each crushing season,the state should calculate the excess stocks expected over 1 year based on demand and current stocks.The current production which will be in excess of the safety and base and emergency stocks - is the likely surplus stock
    to be exported.

    70% of the expected surplus stock - should be transported to state godowns,on a quarterly basis - by the cheapest mode - which is rakes.The state godowns can be near or inside the ports (warehouses),or near or inside the dry ports.

    All exports should be made from STATE GODOWNS only. This will make sure that there are no bogus exports,and also,there can be no money laundering.

    Solution 5

    A locust,is a drone with AI,and a perpetual battery of a few years,and the drone can clone itself.The cane production has to be reduced.The state can use Bio war tools to destroy crops in certain regions and certain strains - and this is surely being done,in many parts of the world.The loss to the farner,is the financial opportunity to the farmer foregone - which has to be compensated by the state.Loss to the sugar mills need not be compensated - but the interest on loans,can be waived - and banks,can be compensated,for the interest loss.

    The aggregate compensation to the farmers and mills, will be less than the subsidy and drawbacks on exports,interest and storage cost on export stock,and storage losses of export stock.dindooohhindoo

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    Sugar Exporter India

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