Pakistan’s Transformation to Open
Electricity Access
Introduction
The
power market in Pakistan is required to evolve to a new structure. Today’s
wholesale power procurement model is based on Single Buyer Model where National
Grid Company (NTDC) and Distribution Companies are mandated to procure power
from generation companies. Primarily the power is procured through long term
contracts by following Cost Plus tariff settings with limited incentives for
generators to improve efficiency. It is the need of the time that desired power
market structure of procumbent of power through Multiple Buyer Model e.g. each
distribution company procuring for its own requirement, should be evolved.
Suitable mix of long, medium and short term contracts should be promoted by
allowing market forces in tariff settings and by benefitting the generators who
produce electricity at lower rate with higher efficiency.
Under
the competitive bidding route, the Regulator should in addition to regulating
tariffs, also scrutinize and approve the process to be adopted for competitive
bidding, with a view to ensure that competitive conditions do prevail in the
power market.
The
proposed Regulations states that NEPRA will be responsible for approval of
Request for Proposal (RfP) and any amendment made in the RFP during bidding
process. It also envisages that Final Evaluation of Bids shall also be
submitted for approval of NEPRA. The very purpose of having oversight on the
bidding process can best be achieved through regulations and by providing
standard bidding documents for procuring/relevant agency. However, in case the
procuring agency wants to deviate or doesn’t wish to use standard bidding
document for any reason, only then relevant agency should seek approval of the
RFP from NEPRA. By providing standard bidding documents including RFQs/RFPs, it
would be convenient for both, the relevant agency as well as Regulator to
oversight the bidding process without compromising expediency and smoothness of
process.
It
is obvious that the proposed regulations would be subservient to primary
legislation of federal and provincial PPRA Acts, so these regulations should be
formulated in conformity to the primary legislation. Under Punjab PPRARules,
2014 procurement involves the following
The
previous government had started the process for transformation of Central Power
Purchasing Agency-Guarantee (CPPA-G) as an independent operator of the
country’s electricity market from its existing role of a billing and financial
settlement agent of the distribution companies. An application to register CPPA
as a ‘market operator’ was admitted by the National Electricity and Power
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) in July 2017
The move to a competitive trading bilateral
contract market (CTBCM) is a good start towards a shift in the current model.
Doing away with inflexible long term PPAs structured as take-or-pay contracts
and encouraging competition in new capacity procurement opportunities are some
of the objectives presented in the Central Power Purchase Agency’s (CPPA)
As
market operator, the transformed CPPA-G will be responsible for almost all
buying and selling of electricity at market prices, from power generation to
transmission and distribution companies and enable third-party private players
as well. Pricing of electricity was supposed to become market based many years
ago
The
CPPA was originally a part of the National Transmission and Despatch Company
(NTDC) and then separated as a CPPA-G licensee through a business transfer
agreement (BTA). Under that agreement, NTDC became the transmission network
operator or system operator, while CPPA-G took over the role of market operator
although at a limited scale.
Turkish Model
The
plan and road map is heavily influenced by the
Turkish model and aims to to
ensure that competitive electricity markets take shape by 2020 under various
covenants from international lenders. As part of this, the CPPA-G has to
develop and expand core functions like strategy, corporate planning,
information technology, energy demand and supply forecasting mechanism and
taxation.As part of the process, the National Electric Power Regulatory
Authority (NEPRA) has accepted a petition from the CPPA-G for issuance of a
formal license
The
authorities have been engaged with Turkish authorities at different levels to
emulate their reform process. Turkish power market, according to CPPA-G, has
been reformed with great success since 2001 when the Turkish electricity market
was in doldrums like currently in Pakistan. The market conditions back in 2001
were very similar to Pakistani market conditions recognised with non-payments
and cash flow issues, high losses, long-term generation contracts backed by
government sovereign guarantees and fewer investments.
Turkey created an independent market operator,
and around two dozen distribution companies. At present, Turkey also have a
private and independent market operator, a transmission or system operator,
public and private generators and one regulator. About 30 per cent shares of
the Turkish market operator were held by the stock exchange (Borsa Istanbul),
another 30pc by the public sector and remaining 40pc shares are traded. The
market operator is responsible for management of energy market through
transparent operations of both, electricity and gas, by operating as power
exchange of Turkey. It also provides the counterparty guarantee of all the
transactions and billing and settlement of payments.
Until
recently, the Turkish market had around 950 electricity market participants of
various natures and trading is taking place on an intraday basis and what is
called the Day Ahead Market. The prices are quoted for the intraday and for a
day later.
Suggested Model
The
government claims that after the introduction of liberalized and transparent
market following creation of a market operator, the private investments in the
power sector increased manifold and no investment required sovereign guarantees
from the government as was the case in the previous structure.
It said the Turkish electricity market was moving towards
complete freedom for consumers where all the consumers have the liberty to make
bilateral contracts for buying electricity from whichever retail company or
generator they choose to. Before the liberalization and privatization of the
distribution companies in Turkey, in some areas, losses due to non-payments
were as high as 80pc. Non-collection was a prevalent culture. However, after
the transition, Turkey has been able to substantially reduce power sector
losses. Currently, the highest losses were below 40pc.
The CPPA-G has prepared its integrated business plan to lay out
scope, time and cost of various initiatives necessary to facilitate a power
market transition. The objectives also
include enforcing payment discipline, while an exchange based model will also
create more competition in the form of new capacity procurement opportunities.
As things are currently structured, power purchase agreements (PPAs) are
inflexible long term arrangements and are taking or pay contracts.
This has resulted in excess capacity
payments in times of power surplus and chronic deficits at other times due to a
lack of generation capacity. This has ensued continuous pressure on the
exchequer and frequent power breakdowns that end up hurting the end consumer eventually.
Therefore, another main objective
would be also to create the requisite conditions to reduce government
liabilities by reducing the need for sovereign guarantees and let market
participants assume the risk and provide the financial resources for management
of the power system. The market system will also ensure trading of firm or
reliable capacity at competitive and efficient prices.
According to the plan demand
participants such as DISCOs, K-Electric and BPC’s will have their capacity
obligations in such a manner that they have in advance the capacity required to
supply the forecasted system peaks as well as operational reserves. Overall,
the move to a wholesale electricity market is the need of the hour for
Pakistan’s power sector.
·
Initiate RFQ/Pre-Qualification of
Bidders
·
Shortlist bidders
·
Issuance of RFP
·
Pre-Bid Conference and
clarification in the RFP
·
Submission of Bids
·
Evaluation of bids
·
Award of bid(s)
·
Post bid negotiations
·
Award of Contract
During the bidding process, at least at three different stages
the RFQs/RFPs are modified, firstly in case procuring agency may make additions
through issuing corrigendum, secondly upon queries of bidders after pre-bid
conference and lastly while negotiation with the successful bidders before
award of contract. So if NEPRA shall assume that at all these stages, the
bidding documents will be approved by the regulator, it will result not only in
inordinate delay but also entails procedural issues as per procurement laws.
Furthermore, in case NEPRA will become the custodian of RFP, it is incumbent
upon NEPRA to solely evaluate the bidders as upon rejection of certain bidders,
a legal issue would arise that against whom the aggrieved bidders shall file
the grievance after completion of bidding process, against procuring agency (as
required under PPRA Rules) or the NEPRA.
To run the process of competitive bidding smoothly, it is
appropriate that standard bidding documents are approved by NEPRA beforehand
along with these regulations. The relevant/procuring agency should be made
responsible to conduct the bidding as per standard documents and Regulations
and then submit the final tariff proposed by successful bidder for approval of
NEPRA.
Regulations also provide for declaring a “Benchmark Tariff” by
NEPRA. However the regulations do not prescribe any procedure for arriving at
benchmark tariff. By providing a benchmark tariff, the regulator shall have to
determine the tariff twice, one while giving benchmark tariff and secondly at
the time of final approval of tariff upon completion of bidding process. By
giving benchmark tariff, there is the likelihood of receiving substantially
lower bids as it was observed in government LNG plants which ended up with
regulator’s withdrawal of upfront tariff for LNG power plants. Benchmark tariff
therefore would not serve any useful purpose and should be removed from the
regulations and bids should be evaluated on the basis of competition among the
bidders and subsequently approved by NEPRA.It is also imperative that before
commencement of bidding process for a specific technology or fuel, the
regulator should conduct diligence regarding demand forecast of electricity and
upon its satisfaction should allow the relevant agency to proceed with the
competitive bidding process.
The government has started the process
for transformation of Central Power Purchasing Agency-Guarantee (CPPA-G) as an
independent operator of the country’s electricity market from its existing role
of a billing and financial settlement agent of the distribution companies. An application to register CPPA as a ‘market operator’ was
admitted by the National Electricity and Power Regulatory Authority (Nepra) in
July 2017. Having taken stakeholder comments, NEPRA has held ta public hearing
to be held on March 6.
As market operator, the transformed CPPA-G will be responsible for
almost all buying and selling of electricity at market prices, from power
generation to transmission and distribution companies and enable third-party
private players as well. The CPPA was originally a part of the
National Transmission and Despatch Company (NTDC) and then separated as a
CPPA-G licensee through a business transfer agreement (BTA). Under that
agreement, NTDC became the transmission network operator or system operator,
while CPPA-G took over the role of market operator although at a limited scale.
Separately, the government is working on market development on the
Turkish model to ensure that competitive electricity markets take shape by 2020
under various covenants from international lenders. As part of this, the CPPA-G
has to develop and expand core functions like strategy, corporate planning,
information technology, energy demand and supply forecasting mechanism and
taxation. As part of the process, the National Electric Power Regulatory
Authority (NEPRA) has accepted a petition from the CPPA-G for issuance of a
formal license and market structure and will be holding a public hearing
process early next month.
Roadmap
The roadmap, presents a detailed plan
towards formation of a liberalized market in Pakistan. The first step which is the sharing of the
CTBCM with NEPRA has been done in May 18 this
will be followed by stakeholder and public consultations and approval by the
regulator.
The next step would be to make the necessary amendments to the legal framework, which will mean modifying the NEPRA Act to incorporate the approved market development policy. However, as this could be a time consuming process, the plan notes that the market could possibly start in a transitory mode before enactment of amendments is completed.
The next step would be to make the necessary amendments to the legal framework, which will mean modifying the NEPRA Act to incorporate the approved market development policy. However, as this could be a time consuming process, the plan notes that the market could possibly start in a transitory mode before enactment of amendments is completed.
This will be followed by the Ministry
of Water and Power (MoWP) modifying and replacing the relevant power policies
such as generation and transmission policies to comply with the market
development policy.
The next step would be the
modifications to the power sector regulatory framework and assignment of
pre-existing power purchase agreements done by CPPA among the DISCOs. After
these steps, the CPPA will then be able to be separated into a Market Operator
and Special Wholesale Supplier Business Unit. However, this is only the sixth
milestone in a roadmap comprising of seventeen steps
Background
The Economic Coordination
Committee (ECC) of the Cabinet approved the creation of a competitive
electricity market in April 2015. The development and implementation of a
competitive electric power market in Pakistan, as one of the main goals of the
NEPRA Act (Amendment) 2017, envisages the role of market participants i.e.
generators, distributors, traders, suppliers and bulk power consumers to sell
and buy in a competitive marketplace. It also delineates the role of service
providers i.e. the network operator, system operator and market operator which
will enable the selling and buying in the market.
Turkish Model
The authorities have been engaged with Turkish authorities at
different levels to emulate their reform process. Turkish power market,
according to CPPA-G, has been reformed with great success since 2001 when the
Turkish electricity market was in doldrums like currently in Pakistan. The
market conditions back in 2001 were very similar to Pakistani market conditions
recognised with non-payments and cash flow issues, high losses, long-term
generation contracts backed by government sovereign guarantees and fewer
investments.
Until recently, the Turkish market had around 950 electricity
market participants of various natures and trading is taking place on an
intraday basis and what is called the Day Ahead Market. The prices are quoted
for the intraday and for a day later.
The government claims that after the introduction of liberalised
and transparent market following operationalisation of a market operator, the
private investments in the power sector increased manifold and no investment
required sovereign guarantees from the government as was the case in the
previous structure.
It said the Turkish electricity market was moving towards complete
freedom for consumers where all the consumers have the liberty to make
bilateral contracts for buying electricity from whichever retail company or
generator they choose to. Before the liberalisation and privatisation of the
distribution companies in Turkey, in some areas, losses due to non-payments
were as high as 80pc.
Non-collection was a prevalent culture. However, after the
transition, Turkey has been able to substantially reduce power sector losses.
Currently, the highest losses were below 40pc.
Present Status
A wholesale market model is
being developed which will lead to the setting up of the first competitive
wholesale target market by mid-2021. The design of the wholesale market, will
allow, through simple regulatory adjustments, the future evolution towards
increasing competition for and in the market. More specifically, the first
target market design will also note certain conditions and whenever those
conditions are met, the future evolution towards more competitive and
sophisticated trading environment (such as spot market, electronic trading
platforms, etc.) will be made through simple regulatory adjustments. The policy
envisages that the design of competitive wholesale market for Pakistan will
pursue the achievement of the following particular-objectives to enhance power
sector security of supply, generation adequacy and contribute in developing
power sector sustainability in the short, medium and long term:
i.
Create the conditions for a fair allocation of risk and
benefit sharing between investors/sellers and buyers/consumers
ii.
Provide level playing field by removing conflict of interest
to facilitate entry of new investors and participation of private players,
including Bulk Power Customers
iii.
Create the conditions to attract investments based on credit
cover provided by market participants, by eliminating the need of the
government providing sovereign guarantees overtime
iv.
Improve efficiency arising from competition for the market
(new capacity procurement) and in the market (optimization through centralized
economic dispatch within system security constraints, to maximize the economic
benefits of available resources and promote efficiency)
v.
Create the proper conditions to facilitate and be part of a
regional electricity market
vi.
Ensure accountability of all Participants and Service
Providers
vii.
Ensure transparency and predictability
viii.
Open access to information
Roadmap to Open Access
The Market Operations Roadmap
envisages that the design of the first CTBCM market (a bilateral contract
market with balancing mechanism) and a plan to implement it will be finalized
by CPPA-G (in the role of Market Operator (MO)), to be approved by NEPRA. In
the future, the MO will work with market participants and service providers to
lead in making proposals to transition the market to more advanced stages
through simple regulatory adjustments as approved by NEPRA. The role of the
Regulator will be to ensure efficient competitive market design and promote
competition through effective stakeholder consultation process and in-line with
effective market monitoring and enforcement models. Following are some key
considerations in the design of the market model:
i.
The existence of take or pay, both capacity and energy
contracts (Power Purchase and Energy Purchase Agreements) is a reality and all
current contractual obligations will be honored.
ii.
The existing contracts will be seamlessly transitioned to
the new wholesale market.
iii.
Commercial trading in the new market will be based on
bilateral contracts for the purpose of creation of wholesale power market.
iv.
Future capacity procurement shall be based on competitive
mechanism.
v.
Efficiency will be improved by ensuring economic dispatch
run by System Operator.
vi.
Steps for the gradual evolution to increase competition for
and in the market will be undertaken leading to sophisticated trading
mechanisms in the future.
Organizational arrangements
Currently, the CPPA-G performs
two functions simultaneously – the agency function on behalf of DISCOs and
Market Operator function. The transition to wholesale market will see the
separation of the two functions that is required to maintain independence and
autonomy to function as an independent Market Operator. The System Operator
will ensure that generation scheduling and dispatch, demand control and real
time system operator are transparent and predictable. The NPCC (National Power
Control Centre) will implement the software, systems, procedures and practices
for the full implementation of the Grid Code, staffing and capacity building.
DISCOs will implement functions and systems for the participation in the
electricity market and function as retail suppliers. The BOD of NTDC will
oversee implementation of standard transmission connection agreements as
required in the Grid Code, to clarify limits, rights and obligations of power
plants, distribution licensees and bulk power consumers connected to
transmission for power to be exchanged freely in the balancing market.
Regulatory Measures
The transition to competitive
wholesale power market regulatory framework including applicable NEPRA rules,
regulations, guidelines and procedures (and if necessary (new) standard
templates for licenses and registration) will be carried out by NEPRA to meet
timelines envisaged under the ECC decision. NEPRA will ensure that sufficient
stakeholder consensus is generated which will allow a market regime to develop
which is fair and equitable to all stakeholders. In particular, NEPRA shall
develop regulations / guidelines for the monitoring of competitive process for
new contracts of DISCOs, the monitoring of dispatch and balancing mechanism,
and the monitoring of the retail/supplier’s market. Some of the major
milestones for the implementation of the roadmap to a competitive wholesale
market are presented below:
The following tasks are
identified for implementation of National Electricity Policy 2018 for
development of CTBCM market by mid-2021:
i.
The NEPRA shall approve the “First Competitive Wholesale
Target Market” design and roadmap by October 2018.
ii.
CPPA-G is assisting the Ministry of Energy to achieve
finalization of market development framework (in-line with the approved market
model) by January 2019.
iii.
A Market Implementation Monitoring Group (MIMG) has been
created to facilitate the implementation of roadmap by mid-2021; MIMG is
providing resources and capacity building support.
iv.
Legal and regulatory framework including the Grid Code and
Commercial Codes will be amended to reflect the approved market model by
January 2021.
v.
Strengthening of the System Operator, the Planning function
of NTDC and the Market Operator will be completed by January 2020 for which
NTDC and CPPA will prepare plans to be approved by their respective BODs.
vi.
Re-structuring of CPPA to remove the conflict of interest
(i.e. keeping MO and SO at arm’s length) will be completed by June of 2020.
vii.
DISCOs’ market interface departments shall be established by
mid of 2019.
viii.
The wholesale metering project for acquiring data remotely through
secured and reliable AMR systems shall be completed by NTDC by January 2020.
Federal Government will devise a
mechanism with support from NEPRA to charge the capacity charges payable to
generators for committed long-term take or pay contracts, in-case BPCs opt for
open access. Such mechanism shall be enacted by December 2018 for charging
capacity
Concluding Remarks
CPPA has prepared an elaborate plan with road map and detailed steps
to be taken. The new federal government needs to evaluate all this and enact as
per requirements.
The fact that the power sector is beset with financial problems
suggests that the first steps should include: elimination of circular debt;
removal of tax and other issues that impact upon financial health; and
introduction of competition for procurement of any capacity. After these
initial steps the open market structure can be embraced.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio - Part 1
ReplyDeleteDoom No.1
IPP/RPP Power APM, is at 12-16% in USD - which,in effect,affixes the power tarriff in USD,for sale by the IPP/RPP,to the TransCo,at a certain PLF,with passthrough of fuel,taxes and capacities,in a tolerance band,with bonus/incentives and penalties.
Solution No.1 to Doom No.1
The rationale for the USD - APM , is that the investors could have invested,in thermal loads - base and peak,in the USA and EU,and would have earned a return in USD .That is bull,as power plants based on coal,are banned in the EU, and even for liquid fuel,and gas plants - the "effective" return,is subject to market risk - and the minimum return, is way below,what Pakistan offers.dindooohindoo
It is assumed that the APM,is subject to tax/WHT etc.,subject to sectoral holidays.In other words,over the life of the project - it should not be that the APM in USD,is tax free,at point of profit,or at the point of repatriation.That would be a disaster,as the US/EU conventional power sectors,have no absolute tax waiver.
So the Dollar peg,has to reduce.In addition,the RPP and IPP cannot have the same APM rates ,in USD,for the same or different fuel,at the same or co-terminus times - as the RPP has a practical and technical exit option,from the PPA and the Pakistani nation.
Solution No.2 to Doom No.1
However,the IPP/RPP will state that they have factored Country and Grid Risk,in the APM. The Risk premiums on soverign paper,and semi-soverign paper of Pakistan,is known,and the co-terminus, risk premium is traded and known,on several Risk Exchanges all over the world.
So the APM has to be the minimum assured yield,on thermal power plants,for base load and peak load,in USD,in the USA/EU, PLUS,the risk premium for Pakistan
The soverign debt of SBP,in USD,net of US G-sec yields,for co-terminus tenor,is the country risk for Pakistan,in BPs.The Risk Premium loaded by the IPP/RPP,cannot exceed this BP spread.
Solution No.3 to Doom No.1
Unilever has invested in Pakistan - w/o an APM in PKR or USD.People can live w/o food for 3-5 days,but not w/o power.However, Unilever has an effective ROE of 30-50%,which cannot be given to a power plant.Also,Unilever has no soverign exposure, or guarantee,from the Pakistani Government.
Therefore,at a USD-APM,of 12-16%,after,say 6 years,when the entire equity is recovered,then either the APM is to be in PKR,or the USD-APM in USD has to be halved - as there is no empirical credit default,and the USD equity is recovered from the project.
Solution No.4 to Doom No.1
Even assuming an APM at 12-16%,in USD,the Risk premium,has to be on a floater mode,and cannot be fixed throughout the PPA tenor.The difference can be adjusted,in the 1st quarter, of a FY,for the previous FY,based on monthly or weekly averages,of the risk spreads , converted into Basis Points.Risk premiums,per se, and Country Risk premiums change over time - and an IPP,cannot claim a valid bet,on implicit soverign risk.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio - Part 2
ReplyDeleteSolution No.5 to Doom No.1
If all the above solutions,were not thought of,at the stage of the MOU/PPA, AND it was on account of coercion,corruption and /or fraud - then the PPA and MOU,is void ab initio.
Basically,the minutes of meetings by bureaucrats,will prove the fraud.In any case,any fundamental vulnerability or inequality or inequity or foolishness, in any contract,is a sign of fraud and coercion.dindooohindoo
Power Demand will crash, during and post COVID.
CPEC will have its own Gwadar based CPP.A SEZ needs CPP, as a pre-requisite - and the PRC,will not buy power from the IPP/RPP - but they may buy,from the state grid - but only,at levelised rates.
IN ANY CASE,COVID is MORE THAN a Force Majeure event,as a Force Majeure event - after it occurs - has an ending and a quantification.For COVID,there will be NO CURE,and there MAY BE a vaccine - but only,after a long time.Hence,power demand,will disappear - and that is the basic premise,of a power project.Hence the IPP/RPP,have to re-negotiate,or exit and go,to the Hague.
Several nations will terminate PPAs and Fertiliser plants, on APM and Capacity charges - as even if a vaccine comes,BILLIONS will NOT Take the shot.
Doom No.2
In nations like Pakistan - IPPs use multi-fuel power plants,and bill the grid, for fuels which they do not have,or which do not exist,in that specification.So a liquid fuel RPP,on a ship,or an IPP on land - can use several types of liquid fuel.So they have paper and tank stocks of various fuels - whose ACTUAL stocks,are NEVER checked by the state - and the clown auditors,do not have the technical skill,to check the stocks,from several angles.In addition,the shipping documents,and the ship draft and tank meters,and dips etc.,are all fudged,within a tolerance limit.
So,in a compromised or inept systen,WITHIN A CERTAIN LIMIT, the IPP can bill for expensive fuel,which it did not have,or claim that the demurrages were paid,as the tanks were full,as the state did not have facilities,for power evacuation etc.Even a coal based Power plant,at a point in time,will have several grades of coal,in different storage conditions,and of different specifications.
Solution to Doom No.2
INTENSIVE,SYSTEMIC,ONLINE,TECHNICAL - BUT NON INTRUSIVE PHYSICAL VERIFICATION OF STOCKS,and the entire supply chain,from load port of fuel port to discharge port,evacuation to port tanks,port tanks to IPP/RPP tanks,meters,pressure and temperature gauges,sludge tanks etc.
Doom No.3
The FX loss on IPP/RPP PPA.The concept of keeping the FX position,on the IPP/RPP unhedged,especially since the SBP,in effect,affixes the PKR float - with no NDF trades - makes no sense at all.It is assumed that the IPP/RPP.,do not get the USD index gains on the retained earnings,at all - as the IPP/RPP,should have the dollar index frozen,on the date of the retained earning (which would be,the end of the FY)
If the PKR declined by 100$,in say 4 years,then the USD-APM of 16% or 12%,is 32& or 24%,in PKR
If the world economy is doomed,PKR exports will fall,manufacturing and power demand will crash,PKR will crash and THE CAPACITY CHARGE IN USD will be paid to IPP/RPP - which is a dead loss to the state.At the minimum,the state can hedge the USD Risk - as Imran Khan cannot revive the world economy.
Solution to Doom No.3
The Pakistan state has to HEDGE THE ROE-APM in USD,as the SBP knows the daily IBR,in the morning and the evening - before the sun rises,and before the sun sets.Irrespective of the nature of the project (BOO/BOOT etc.),the IPP has to forfeit the power plant salvage and sale value,at any stage of the project,except when the state is in default.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio - Part 3
ReplyDeleteThe Sugar-Power Paradox
Pakistan sugar mills,make sugar,at say,a Total Cost,of Rs 60/kg,sell it,at Rs 65/kg,when the import price (duty free) would be,say Rs 30/kg.In addition,the stocks of sugar,liened to the banks,are liquidated by exports,by selling the sugar,in the export markets,at Rs 30/kg. Hence, the sugar mills are paid Rs 30/kg,as subsidy.dindooohindoo
However,it must be noted that subsidy of Rs 30/kg,or the higher sugar price,paid by Pakistanis, HAS BEEN PAID,IN A SIGNIFICANT PART,BY THE SUGAR MILLS,to the farmers,the state (as taxes),and to the bank (as interest).The nation has received stocks of sugar, produced a strategic input,and kept millions employed and nutritious - in lieu of the subsidy,and import proection.
Therefore,the SUBISDY ON SUGAR,is not the same,as the CAPACITY CHARGE,paid to IPP/ RPPs.The State receives nothing,in lieu of the capacity charge,as,in theory, no power is produced by the IPP/RPP,at all.
Doom No.1 - Capacity Charges,in a No-Power scenario
The Capacity Charge paid to IPP/RPPs - which is a dead loss,to the state - as the IPP/RPP,will repatriate the money,to the overseas principals.The Capacity Charge is paid,irrespective of power demand, evacuation issues and Force Majeure events,and also,new power corridors and West and Central Asia.The capacity charge,is also paid,notwithstanding,peak and base load power plants.
Solution No.1 to Doom No.1
The State has to terminate the capacity charge agreements,due to the COVID Force Majeure,as this event will destroy power demand for ever,as also change the power corridors in West and Central Asia.COVID was planned to ensure financial forfeitures and preclosures. There is no DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRY - DUE to fire,or an accicent - and so,there is no loss to insurers.The Millions,who will die of COVID,would have died in any case,it is,thus a timing loss - and there is no investment loss,to the insurers,as the claims will be paid, from the sharp rise,in new premiums (by new scared and panicked and hapless sentients).There is no "Loss of Business" Insurance Policy,in vogue - as it is expensive,and a compendium of sophistry.
When insurers do not LOSE,due to a disaster - they gain exponentially - as everyone will insure,for the unknown - especially,"loss of business" policies - which are LOP (Loss of Profit Policies - and very expensive).This is a sure sign,of a man made virus - with a financial, economic,military and political objective.
This is the right time,to 1st kick out the RPPs - as they can physically exit,at will - with a few contingencies.Then the IPPs,have to forfeit the capacity charges - for those projects,where APM in USD,has already recouped the EQUITY,of the project cost.The IPP/RPPs have to partake in the realties of the energy paradign,in light of the Force Majeuere world.Even the Hague will accept this logic - as the continued operations - will be a prime case,of
rapacious profiteering.Capacity charges have to be forfieted,by all the IPPs,with USD-APM,and,for others,the capacity charges have to be drastically cut down,AND,if needed,the liquid fuelpower sector,can be nationalised.
Nationalisation will have no impact on FDI etc.,as the prime investor is PRC - which will,thus, not bother about the implications of PPA termination,or Power plants takeover. In a world of economic ruin,the PRC is sitting on 3-4 Trilion USD,of US-DEBT and Gold.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio - Part 4
ReplyDeleteSolution No.2 to Doom No.1
The Capacity charges have to be re-negotiated - on purely technical reasons.The engineering and maintenance supply chain,of power plants,will be destroyed - as the suppliers will be busted,and those in operation,will have shortages of staff and inputs.Thus,the IPPs will ultimately default,on their capacity commitments.If the IPP can claim Force Majeure,w.r.t their engineering supply chain,the State,can also invoke Force Majeure,on their commitments,to profiteering clauses,in the PPA..dindooohindoo
Besides,with the crash in power demand, the technical life of the power plants will increase, as there will be,less usage,and depreciation and damage.Due to the disaster in the power sector,there will be less R&D,and so,lesser risk of technical or technology obsolescence.
In view of the above,the capacity charges have to be drastically reduced,and/or forfeited
Solution No.3 to Doom No.1
In the COVID scenario, and in view of the above, the high marginal cost IPP/RPP and SOE,and also,old power plants - whose engineering supply chain will collapse - can be shut down,and kicked out - and the resultant cost saved - even on,revised power demand estimates,can be shared with the residual IPPs,in terms of higher power tarriffs (in lieu of elimination of capacity charges,PPA restructuring and eradication of high cost power plants)
It might also be noted that,with the crash in power demand,and possibly agri activities, the hydel power plants of Pakistan,might be able to take over the peak load power demand - and so,gas-combined cycle-liquid fuel-naptha based plants - MIGHT not be required - and,if required,will need to be negotiated,in light,of the new environment.
Thus,in addition, there can be no basis,for payment of capacity charges,for peak load IPP/RPPs,as,in the new power demand matrix - there may be no peak demand, and the peak demand,may be met,by hydro power plants.In any case,in a free market,for peak load power,or a supplier's market, there is no case for capacity charges,in a nation,like Pakistah - as there was,in the past,enough residential and industrial peak demand,and grid disasters - with ample scope for the IPP,to make exorbitant profits.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio – Part 5
ReplyDeleteDoom No.1 – Capacity Charge with no Power
Solution No.1 to Doom No.1 – If the IPP/RPPs cannot be kicked out,the capaciy charges cannot be renegotiated,the technical life of the power asset cannot be agreed to be extended,or the capacity charges cannot be waived – then it is best,to avail of the power supply,with the incremental Marginal Cost of Power,from the said IPP,if no other power supply is available, or if the Opportunity Cost of Power,from other sources,is higher than the Marginal Cost of Power,from the said IPP..dindooohindoo
The power supply so made,at a certain tarriff to the grid,and at a certain economic cost to the state – has to be recovered by any mode,even at cost – from any activity,which ideally exports power (power intensive products – ferro alloys,metals),or which leads to any economic activity,which recovers, at the minimum,the total cost of that activity (which will include the billable value of the power,at the distribution load point)
The VAT and Non-VAT taxes, which accrue to the state,as a result of the said economic activity,across the supply and value chain – arising out of the economic activity, is an added bonus to the state (besides the taxes on the employment derived therefrom)
On a cash flow perspective,the taxes on the economic activity derived,from the power produced,will pay for the Marginal Cost of the Power,from the IPP (beyond the capacity charge),with some timing mismatches.
Solution No.2 to Doom No.1 – If the T&D losses in Pakistan are 20-30%, the strategy of maximising the power output and feeding into the grid among millions of users and SMEs – has the incidental T&D loss – as,on a Marginal basis,on certain Grid-Trans lines, the entire Marginal Power produced,may be stolen (not paid for).
Hence,the IPPs have to be forced to make a JV,for Ferro Alloys manufacture or other value added activities (using power) to evacuate the power,and ensure that the cost of the power,billed by the IPP to the Grid,is recovered – by the said activity.In such a case, the power will be wheeled through the grid,at say 2-3% wheeling charge, and used by the manufacturing unit,near the port (if the output is to be exported).If the unit is given free land ,at cost water,Nil VAT, and a limited tax holiday, and at Cost-Power,
then,even if the current scenario,several JV partners,will be available.
The Limited Profit tax,on the said manufacturing unit,and the WHT and DDT on profit distributed,will MORE than,cover the cost of the power to the grid – and the state,will be a JV partner,in lieu of the free land – and if required, in lieu of free power – which will be offset,by the dividends to the state (on the JV stake)
As a generic law,any nation like Pakistan,with surplus PLF of thermal Power plants (not Hydel power),and for the state owned power plants, the aim should to be to hit the maximum PLF, and dispose the Marginal Cost of Power Produced, at the highest possible rate – in terms of economic activity.Even if 200 million Pakistanis,increase their use of e-appliances (24×7),the sale and purchase of the e-appliances,and the services on the e-appliances,has an extensive multiplier effect and impact on supply and value chain – and the taxes thereon,will more than offset,the Marginal Cost of Power produced
If peak load power tarriffs can be reduced,and the peak load supply increased,to increase the absolute profit to the grid – the downstream economic gains,to power users,will be incalculabe.
The increased load on the power plants – has no economic risk – as in the future, there will be an abundance of power corridors in West and Central Asia and PRC – bypassing Afghanistan.The Marginal cost of thermal power,is w/o considering the losses on account of spinning/reactive power,of renewables and hydel power plants.Post Aramco in Pakistan,there will be no need for these IPP/RPPs – so power generation at the cheapest cost – will not be a bottleneck,for planning or economic activity.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio – Part 6
ReplyDeleteSolution No.3 to Doom No.1 – If the Marginal Cost of Govtt Power plants,is higher than the Marginal Cost (beyond the capacity charge) of the IPP,then it is obviously better to use the power from the IPP,in lieu of the Govtt Power plants – and thus,pay no capacity charge.If the scenario,is in the opposite,then one should ask – why an IPP is required,if the state owned power,has a lower marginal cost (except when the power supply is limited,or not reliable.or the power plant is too old)
Solution No.4 to Doom No.1 – If the above options are not feasible in the interim,then,in any case,the state should use hydel punped storage plants – to ensure that the Marginal Cost of power from the IPP (w.r.t the alternative to pay the capacity charge),can be consumed via the pumped storage plants,to generate and store,peak load power.In any case,the excess PLF of the state owned power plants,can also be used for the same,when the Marginal cost of the power is low – and the economics of the said pumped storage,is viable.
Solution No.5 to Doom No.1 – Pakistan has to shift to N-Power, for base load power plants.The Japanese and the PRC,give N-power plants,on 40-50 year payment terms,at low prices – and the decommissioning costs,are after 40 years.The economic cost of the uranium is negligible,as the DU has several military applications,in armour and anti-tank missiles etc.There is also,no dearth of enrichment facilities in Pakistan.Even in the event of sanctions, some HEU-235,could be obtained from PRC,for downblending. Hence, there is no fuel supply risk, no logistics risk,and no manpower supply risk. dindooo hindoo
In addition,the Japanese and PRC,provide the plants at zero interest rates, and also,have provisions for supply of LEU-235-5%.If by the grace of Allah,Hindoosthan is destroyed,then Pakistan will have enough HEU,to downblend and generate power,till the Mahdi arrives on earth.
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio – Part 7
ReplyDeleteDoom No.1 - Pakistan has failed to avail of the perks of the doom of the IPP/RPP scam
Solution No.1 to Doom No.1 - The doom of the IPP/RPP,have not been encashed by the Pakistani state.The COVID is a divine opportunity.Besides the case for a debt waiver,seizure of power assets,making IPP/RPPs forfeit clauses of the PPA ,setting up Saudia refineries and power plants - the key opportunity, is to justify the thrust,into N-Power.
This is the best time to strike a deal for N-Power - with the disaster in the world economy,on account of COVID.The benefits are strategic - besides the obvious financial and economic advantages to the state.dindooohindoo
The Solution to the Pakistani Power Imbroglio – Part 8
ReplyDeleteDoom No.1 - Liquid fuel and coal based power plants,for base and peak load power - instead of N-Power
Solution No.1 to Doom No.1 - Pakistan has to sift to N-Power,as it is the cheapeast and low to Nil risk option,from all angles.The only contingency,is the "water quotient",as in Fukushima - the water from the sea,and the need of the water,as a coolant,moderator and conductor.Unless Afghanistan is partitioned,no energy corridor passing through it,will be bankable or insurable,or risk free. Similarly, no energy corridor through Iran,will be unviable (from the point of UN Sanctions/ Trade sanctions/geo and financial risk).
When Oil prices are at 20 USD - there is demand destruction, and so,power availability and fuel availability,is not an issue,as there is no power demand - and the state has to pay the capacity charges to IPP/RPPs.At high oil prices,IPP/RPP power costs are high,even if the power demand is muted (as the oil price,prices in political/geo/logistics risks - and not an uptick in demand or economic activity),and even,if the power demand is high - there is no international competitiveness,w.r.t the exports,as other nations,have lower power costs and export sops.
Further,in the event of any Conflict in the Persian Gulf,which is certain,in a block of,say 3-5 years,there is a supply risk,w.r.t fuel logistics,to Pakistani ports, and especially,the liquid fuel cargos - besides the risk premium,in the fuel prices,and the sea freight and insurance.1 disaster in the Persian Gulf,will wipe out the economic activity,of a few decades in Pakistan.
Hence,the Pakistan state should use N-power,and there are several nations,which will supply the tech and reactors,at ultra low costs,with 40-50 year repayment tenors, and will also,in some cases,supply the N-plant free of cost,and operate the same - to earn profits,from sales to Grid.Several nations are exiting N-power,and so, their technologies and reactors,are useless - as is,their stockpile of LEU and DU.They will be glad,to sell their LEU and DU.
Some of the Pakistani enrichment facilities and the NFC,are already under IAEA inspection - but if they are to kept secret,enriched uranium or the fuel rods,can be obtained from PRC,or France or Russia etc.In that event,there is no controversy over generation and use,of DU.Ideally,the yellow cake should be processed into UF6, and enriched in Pakistan - as that provides the basis,for the dramatic upgrading,of the entire nuclear fuel supply chain,in Pakistan.In such cases,some ore suppliers require the return of DU - as per a set norm.Return of some of the DU,is good,as it obviates the storage risk.
Power is a fungible commodity - but the uranium ore,is not.So the uranium can be,within limits,diverted to the HEU program.From the DU stock of a batch,it is possible,via scientific testing,to trace the COO of the ore - but even,this minutae in uranium accounting,can be navigated.
As a matter of N-Fuel supply risk,in the current scenario,it would not be unreasonable, to ask for several years of LEU - which insulates the nation,from fuel supply risks (of price,quality and quantity) - which is the only risk - and so,you have have a fixed price fuel supply,with a viable commercial use,of the DU - in the military - and a covert generation of HEU - which makes the fuel cost - nil to negative.
It is irrelevant,that Pakistan has uranium reserves -as it is in the strategic interest of the state,to understate the quality and quantity,of the ore, and generate as large, a stockpile as possible.Further any mining,is the extraction of poison,from the earth's core,and bringing it onto the earth's surface,or into contact with water acquifiers and bodies.It is best that that this poison,is dumped,in 3 rd countries.dindooohindoo
There is also no DU disposal risk,as nations like USA/France/Russia and PRC,need to worry about it,far more.Sooner or later,these nations will need to make DU dump farns,in some nation (with exceptional security) - and the excess DU in Pakistan,can be dumped there - if the Pakistani ordinance factories,cannot use the DU (which is extremely unlikely).
ReplyDeleteLastly,there is no security risk,to the N-Power plants - as a gas,naptha/liquid fuel power plant,can be blown to smithreens,at the fuel dumps or the plant or the pipelines - by just a elemenary ED, and not even a IED or a Grenade.On the other hand,all these toys,have no impact on a N-Power plant.The reactor core,can survive a tactical N-Strike.
Even if there is human sabotage,it will have no impact (although a liquid fuel plant,can be blown to bits) - so long as the coolants,moderators and condutors,are working.Fuku occurred,because the pumping system which evacuated the heat,from the reactor - just collapsed.Chernobyl also blew up,as the core temperature in the reactor core kept rising,as the control rods failed,and the reactor could not be cooled (for whatever reason) - so it just blew up.Simple !
It is said that the sound of the enriching centrifuges,capture the recitation of "some specific ayats of the Quran",strung and recited at a certain speed and frequency.It is the divine calling. dindooo hindoo