Rohingyas of Myanmar a people in limbo (JR100)
Introduction
The Rohingya people are a Indo-Aryan ethnic group who reside in Rakhine State.. There were an estimated 1 million Rohingya living in Myanmar
before the 2016–17 crises. By December 2017, an
estimated 625,000 refugees from Rakhine, Myanmar, had crossed the border into Bangladesh since August 2017.The majority are Muslim while a minority are Hindu. Described by the United Nations in 2013 as one of the most persecuted minorities in the world,
the Rohingya population is denied citizenship under the law. According to Human Rights Watch, the 1982 laws "effectively
deny to the Rohingya the possibility of acquiring a nationality". Despite
being able to trace Rohingya history to the 8th century, Myanmar law does not
recognize the ethnic minority as one of the eight races”. They are also restricted from freedom of movement, state education and civil service jobs.
The legal conditions faced by the Rohingya in Myanmar have been widely compared
to apartheid by many international academics,
analysts and political figures, including Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu, a South African anti-apartheid activist.
Today,
more than one million Rohingya are languishing in squalid camps in southern
Bangladesh after suffering ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Myanmar state
in late 2017. The international community has largely ignored the suffering of
the Rohingya and failed to hold Myanmar accountable. While the 2017 events are
the most recent and most gruesome in scope and scale, Myanmar’s Rohingya
Muslims have endured decades of political oppression and episodic violence
since Myanmar secured its independence from the British in 1948.
Royhingya nomenclature
The modern term Rohingya emerged from
colonial and pre-colonial terms Rooinga and Rwangya. The
Rohingya refer to themselves as Ruáingga In Burmese they are known as rui
hang gya while in Bengali they are
called Rohingga The term
"Rohingya" may come from Rakhanga or Roshanga, the
words for the state of Arakan. The word Rohingya would then mean "inhabitant of
Rohang", which was the early Muslim name for Arakan. Andrew Tan argues it comes from the Arabic word Raham (God's
blessing) and speculates that early Muslims in Arakan referred to themselves as
"God's blessed people".
The usage of the term Rohingya
has been historically documented prior to the British Raj. In 1799, Francis Buchanan-Hamilton wrote an article called "A
Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma
Empire", which was found and republished by Michael Charney in the SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research in 2003. Among the native groups of Arakan, he wrote
are the: "Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call
themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan." The Classical Journal of
1811 identified "Rooinga" as one of the languages spoken in the
"Burmah Empire". In 1815, Johann Severin Vater listed "Ruinga" as an
ethnic group with a distinct language in a compendium of languages published
in German In 1936, when Burma was still under British rule, the "Rohingya Jam’iyyat al Ulama" was founded
in Arakan
According to Jacques Leider, the
Rohingya were referred to as "Chittagonians" during the British
colonial period, and it was not controversial to refer to them as
"Bengalis" until 1990s.Leider also states that "there is no
international consensus" on the use of the term Rohingya, as they are
often called "Rohingya Muslims", "Muslim Arakanese" and
"Burmese Muslims
The government of Prime Minister U Nu (when Burma was a democracy, from
1948–1962), used the term "Rohingya". When the Mayu
Frontier District was created covering Rohingya-majority areas, the term
"Rohingya" was recognized by the Burmese government. The term was
broadcast on Burmese radio and was used in the speeches of Burmese rulers.
A UNHCR report on refugees caused by Operation King Dragon referred to the victims as
"Bengali Muslims (called Rohingyas)".Nevertheless, the term Rohingya
wasn't widely used until the 1990s.
Today the use of the name
"Rohingya" is polarized. The government of Myanmar refuses to use the
name. In the 2014 census, the Myanmar government forced the Rohingya to
identify themselves as "Bengali". Many Rohingya see the
denial of their name similar to denying their basic rights, and the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has agreed. Jacques Leider writes
that many Muslims in Rakhine simply prefer to call themselves "Muslim
Arakanese" or "Muslims coming from Rakhine" instead of
"Rohingya". The United States embassy in Yangon continues to use the name "Rohingya".
The Rohingya population is
concentrated in the historical region of Arakan, an old coastal country of Southeast Asia. It is not clear who the original settlers of Arakan were.
Burmese nationalist claims that the Rakhine inhabited Arakan since 3000 BCE are not supported by any
archaeological evidence. By the 4th century, Arakan became one of the earliest Indianized kingdoms in Southeast Asia. The first
Arakanese state flourished in Dhanyawadi. Power then shifted to the city of Waithali.Sanskrit inscriptions in the region indicate that the founders of the
first Arakanese states were Indian. Arakan was ruled by the Chandra dynasty.The British historian Daniel George Edward Hall stated that "The Burmese do not seem to have settled in
Arakan until possibly as late as the tenth century CE. Hence earlier dynasties
are thought to have been Indian, ruling over a population similar to that of
Bengal. All the capitals known to history have been in the north near
modern Akyab".
Background
Even
the name they use to describe themselves is disputed: In Myanmar, the term
Rohingya, which simply means “from Rakhine” (a state in Myanmar), is rejected
in preference to the ethno-linguistic appellation “Chittagonian Bengali
Muslims”
to describe the persons who have lived in Myanmar’s northern state of Rakhine
for generations. Neither the government of Myanmar nor most of its citizens
recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group and instead contend that
these hapless people are Bangladeshi. Bangladesh, which became an independent
state in 1971, rejects this claim and avers that they are citizens of Myanmar.
While Rohingya were citizens of Myanmar at independence, in the subsequent
decades the state vitiated these rights and waged campaigns of violence against
them, precipitating bouts of temporary displacement to neighboring Bangladesh.
With Myanmar and Bangladesh both rejecting the Rohingya as their citizens, they
are de facto stateless.
Early evidence, of Bengali Muslim settlements
in Arakan , date back to the time of Min Saw Mon (1430–34) of the Kingdom of Mrauk U. After 24 years of exile in Bengal,
he regained control of the Arakanese throne in 1430 with military assistance
from the Bengal Sultanate. The Bengalis who came with him formed their own settlements in the region.
The Santikan Mosque built in the 1430s features a court which measures 65 ft from north to south and 82 ft
from east to west; the shrine is a rectangular structure measuring 33 ft by 47 ft
King Min Saw Mon ceded some territory
to the Sultan of Bengal and recognized his sovereignty over the areas. In
recognition of his kingdom's vassal status, the Buddhist kings of Arakan received Islamic titles
and used the Bengali gold dinar within the kingdom. Min Saw Mon minted his own coins with the Burmese alphabet on one side and the Persian alphabet on the other
Arakan's vassalage to Bengal was
brief. After Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah's death in 1433, Narameikhla's
successors invaded Bengal and occupied Ramu in 1437 and Chittagong in 1459. Arakan would hold Chittagong
until 1666 even after independence from the Sultans of Bengal; the Arakanese
kings continued the custom of maintaining Muslim titles. The Buddhist kings compared
themselves to Sultans and fashioned themselves after Mughal rulers. They also continued to employ Muslims in prestigious
positions within the royal administration. Some of them worked as Bengali, Persian and Arabic scribes in the Arakanese courts, which, despite remaining Buddhist,
adopted Islamic fashions from the neighboring Bengal Sultanate
The population increased in the 17th
century, as slaves were brought in by Arakanese raiders and Portuguese settlers following raids into Bengal. Slaves
included members of the Mughal nobility. A notable royal slave was Alaol, a renowned poet in the Arakanese
court. The slave populations were employed in a variety of workforces,
including in the king's army, commerce and agriculture.
In 1660,Prince Shah Shuja, the governor of Mughal Bengal and a claimant of the Peacock Throne, fled to Arakan with his family after being defeated by his
brother Emperor Aurangzeb during the Battle of Khajwa. Shuja and his entourage arrived in Arakan on 26 August 1660. He was granted asylum by King Sanda Thudhamma. In December 1660, the Arakanese king confiscated Shuja's gold
and jewelry, leading to an insurrection by the royal Mughal refugees. According to varying
accounts, Shuja's family was killed by the Arakanese, while Shuja himself may
have fled to a kingdom in Manipur. However, members of Shuja's entourage remained in Arakan and
were recruited by the royal army, including as archers and court guards. They
were king makers in Arakan until the Burmese conquest The Arakanese continued
their raids of Mughal Bengal. Dhaka was raided in 1625.
Emperor Aurangzeb gave orders to his
governor in Mughal Bengal, Shaista Khan, to end what the Mughals saw as Arakanese-Portuguese piracy. In 1666, Shaista Khan led a 6000
man army and 288 warships to seize Chittagong from the Kingdom of Mrauk U. The Mughal expedition continued up
till the Kaladan River. The Mughals placed the northern
part of Arakan under its administration and vassalage The Muslim population
became concentrated in northern Arakan. In 1960, Burmese cabinet minister Sultan Mahmud cited the Kaladan River as the
boundary between Rohingya and Rakhine areas
Burmese conquest
Following the Konbaung Dynasty's conquest of Arakan in 1785, as many as 35,000 people of the
Rakhine State fled to the neighbouring Chittagong region of British Bengal in 1799 to escape
persecution by the Bamar and to seek protection under the British Raj.The Bamar executed thousands of men and deported a considerable
portion of people from Rakhine population to central Burma, leaving Arakan a
scarcely populated area by the time the British occupied it
According to an article on the "Burma
Empire" published by the British Francis Buchanan-Hamilton in 1799, "the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan", "call
themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan". However,
according to Derek Tokin, Hamilton no longer used the term to refer to the
Muslims in Arakan in his later publications.. Sir Henry Yule saw many Muslims serving as eunuchs in Konbaung while on a diplomatic mission to the Burmese capital
Burmese independence
The Rohingya community was recognized
as an indigenous ethnic nationality of Burma, with members of the group serving
as representatives in the Burmese parliament, as well as ministers, parliamentary
secretaries, and other high-ranking government positions. But since Burma's military junta took control of the country in 1962,
the Rohingya have been systematically deprived of their political rights.
Rohingya Origin
The history
of Rakhine is rich and greatly connected to Arab-Persian cultural world since
at least the early 8th century and with Bengal/Bangladesh region
from much earlier times. Muslim Sufis and traders had interactions with the
coastal regions of what is today's Bangladesh and Rakhine and all the way to
the Indian Ocean rim of wider Southeast Asia. Conversion to Islam took place in
areas that fall within the current borders of both Myanmar and Bangladesh. In
1406, the Rakhine king Nara Meikhla was dethroned by an invading Bamar/Burmese
force and was driven to Bengal. He was later able to regain his throne with the
help of 30,000 soldiers sent by the Bengal Sultan, Jalal al Din. Rakhine kings
used to send tribute to Bengal Muslim Sultans for a considerable period of
time. However, during the transition period between the decline of independent
Muslim rulers of Bengal and the arrival of the Mughals from northern India,
Bangladesh's port city Chittagong came under the Rakhine rulers for some time.
Despite these
political changes, Rakhine developed a cosmopolitan culture that retained
Buddhist as well as Muslim and Hindu pedigree. Rakhine kings issued coins that
contained the imprint of the Buddha and the Kalema, the fundamental article of
faith in Islam, until early seventeenth century. Medieval forms of Bengali
literature were patronized in this cosmopolitan atmosphere where Pali, Arabic
and Persian were also in vogue. Poet Alalol from today's Bangladesh, who was
kidnapped by Portuguese pirates and sold in Rakhine as a slave, ended up being
a court poet in the capital of Rakhine, where he was patronized by many Muslim
ministers of Buddhist kings. Alaol in his poems written in mid-seventeenth
century introduced Rosango, a variant of the term Rohango (Rohingya), as the
capital city of Rakhine.
Meanwhile,
the Bamars kept knocking at the borders of Rakhine and finally captured its
throne in 1784, leaving the Rakhine people, of both Buddhist and Muslim origin,
to face unprecedented persecution in their ancestral land. Most of them fled to
Chittagong region across the Naaf river. While some of them returned to
Rakhine, some stayed behind who are still known as Rakhine Buddhists, currently
numbering more than 100,000. They are now Bangladeshi citizens and Bangladesh
has never suggested their ouster because of their ancestry in Myanmar.
It needs
mentioning that despite initial persecution of local Rakhine people by the
Bamar forces, there were also the gradual realisation of the need of the
support and engagement of local people, including the Muslims. One example was
that until the British took over Burma in early nineteenth century, the Burmese
king had given charge of the Port of Rangoon (Yangon) to a Muslim merchant.
The British period saw a different
kind of mobility across today's Bangladesh-Myanmar border, which was more of a
planned mobilisation of people from all over India, Bengalis from Chittagong
being the majority who were involved in professional, commercial and
agricultural activities. By the 1930s however, the Bengalis, as well as other
Indian diasporic communities, came into conflict with local inhabitants and with
the coming of the Japanese during the World War sealed the fate of the Indians
in Burma, most of who had to return to India and Bengal under strenuous
conditions. Those few who left behind were clearly distinguished from local
Rohingya people
Postcolonial period: From citizen to stateless
The early
postcolonial policy of the Burmese government towards the Rohingya was
consistent with the pluralistic cultural and religious heritage of Myanmar and
inclusive national vision of Aung San, Suu Kyi's illustrious father.
The Muslims
of Rakhine including the Rohingyas were no longer living in the rich political
and social heritage of pre-colonial times, but there was no question about
their place in Burma's mainstream public life. In the two general elections of
1951 and 1956, at least eleven Rohingyas, including women, returned to Burmese
Parliament as MPs.
During the
1990 general election that followed the anti-military resistance led by Suu
Kyi, Rohingyas were her political allies and won four seats for her National
Democratic League for Human Rights. But in the next stage of the unfinished
journey to democracy in Myanmar, the paths of Suu Kyi and her erstwhile
Rohingya allies diverged tragically. As of 2017, no Rohingyas could vote and
there is no Rohingya MPs left in Myanmar.
Rohingya: A Long History of
Suffering
The Rohingya have faced military crackdowns in 1978,
1991–1992, 2012, 2015, 2016–2017
and particularly in 2017-2018,
when most of the Rohingya population of Myanmar was driven out of the country,
into neighboring Bangladesh
While
the social and political standing of the Rohingya began to decline when Myanmar
gained independence in 1958, their situation became ever-more perilous following the
military coup of 1988. A few years later, in 1991, the junta deployed troops to
northern Rakhine and confiscated Muslim agricultural land to feed its troops
and establish encampments while imposing forced labor and arbitrary taxes. In
response to these crippling conditions, nearly a quarter of a million Rohingya
fled to Bangladesh where they lived in congested camps. Ultimately, the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) oversaw the repatriation of about 200,000 of these refugees, all the
while repudiating the conditions under which repatriation took place, including
involuntary repatriation.
A
restless peace perturbed in Rakhine for nearly a decade, with the notable
exceptions of anti-Muslim violence that occurred in 2001. Violence returned
in 2010, when Rakhine Buddhists protested a commitment made by the
junta-established Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to grant
Rakhine Muslims citizenship as a part of the elections in which they were
allowed to vote. Subsequently, in May 2012, several Muslim men raped and killed
a Buddhist woman, which catalyzed violence in the northern part of Rakhine
state and in the provincial capital of Sittwe. The following month, a mob
assaulted and killed a group of ten Muslims in central Myanmar after anonymous
actors distributed inflammatory flyers to instigate violence against Muslims. As
the ensuing violence spread, including retaliatory Muslim assaults on
Buddhists, the government declared a state of emergency and deployed additional
troops to enforce it. According to government of Myanmar figures (which may be
inaccurate), several hundred persons were injured or killed; additionally,
5,338 homes, mostly belonging to Rohingya, were destroyed and another
75,000—again mostly Rohingya—were displaced.
In
October 2012, another wave of anti-Muslim violence resulted in the displacement
of 32,000 persons, the majority of whom were Muslim. The government responded
by interning some 140,000 Rohingya in overcrowded camps in Rakhine and imposing
harsh restrictions on freedom of movement on those not in the camps. The United
Nations reports that as of August 31, 2018, there are some 128,245
Rohingya living in 23 camps across Rakhine, most of which are near Sittwe. There is also a ghetto, known as Aung Mingalar, in which 4,000 Muslims
are confined in Sittwe itself. Without access to jobs, food, or
medicine, Rakhine’s Rohingya are dependent on the international community,
which Myanmar grants selective access.
Probes by the UN have found evidence of increasing
incitement of hatred and religious intolerance by "ultra-nationalist
Buddhists" against Rohingyas while the Myanmar security forces have been
conducting "summary executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests
and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, and forced labour"
against the community.According to the UN, the human rights violations against
the Rohingyas are "crimes against humanity".
Before the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis and the military crackdown in 2016 and 2017, the Rohingya population in
Myanmar was around 1.0 to 1.3 million, chiefly in the northern
Rakhine townships, which were 80–98% Rohingya. Since
2015, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to southeastern Bangladesh alone, and more
to other surrounding countries, and major Muslim nations. More than
100,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar are confined in camps for internally displaced persons. Shortly before a Rohingya rebel attack
that killed 12 security forces, August 25, 2017, the Myanmar military had
launched "clearance operations" against the Rohingya Muslims in
Rakhine state that left over 3,000 dead, many more injured, tortured
or raped, villages burned.
Rohingya claim
The Rohingya maintain they are indigenous to western Myanmar with a heritage of over a millennium and
influence from the Arabs, Mughals and Portuguese. The community claims it is descended from people in precolonial Arakanand colonial Arakan; historically, the region was an independent kingdom between
Southeast
Asia and the Indian
subcontinent. Rohingya legislators were elected to the Parliaments
of Myanmar until persecution increased in the late-20th
century. Despite accepting the term Rohingya in the past,the current
official position of the Myanmar
government is that Rohingyas are not a national "indigenous race", but are illegal
immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh. Myanmar's government has stopped recognizing the term
"Rohingya" and prefers to refer to the community as "Bengalis". Rohingya campaign groups, notably the
Arakan Rohingya National Organization, demand the right to "self-government within Myanmar".
History of Non-Violence
In
spite of the horrific brutalities the Rohingyas have endured, they have not
articulated an Islamist or separatist demand. Their demand is simply to return
to Myanmar with citizenship and, problematically, with government recognition
as a distinct ethnic group. The Rohingya have not given rise to many violent
non-state actors claiming to represent them. One of the few violent groups that
have emerged in recent years is the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). While many in the “Islamist
terrorism” industry have been quick to paint ARSA with the jihadi brush ARSA has assiduously rejected Islamist
appeals. The longer the Rohingya remain cramped in inadequately-appointed camps
in Bangladesh or countenance ongoing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, the more
probable it becomes that either the nature of ARSA will bend towards Islamism
and/or Islamist militant groups will conduct violence on their behalf.
Ostensibly
inspired by Islamist movements elsewhere in the world, the Rohingya Patriotic
Front (RPF) formed in 1974, but over time split into several factions. Perhaps
the most important and well-known successor to the RPF was the Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO),
which formed in 1982. It also split in 1986 and gave rise to the Arakan
Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF). The RSO and the ARIF later formed a loose
alliance in 1998 known as the Arakan Rohingya National Organization.
Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, the RSO had no presence in Myanmar but had bases in
Bangladesh along the border. It never enjoyed support within Myanmar, and by
the early 2000s, it had lost its remaining operational capabilities.
A
new actor has emerged in recent years: the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
(ARSA). ARSA is led by Atta Ullah, a Rohingya Muslim. The name of the group he
initially founded was “Harakah al-Yaqin” (literally “Movement of Faith”), which
perpetrated several high-profile attacks against Myanmar’s Border Guard Police
(BGP) headquarters and two other bases on October 9, 2016. In response, the
state launched a brutal crackdown including extensive
“clearance operations” in an effort to recapture the myriad small arms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition stolen by the outfit. The organization
subsequently rebranded as ARSA.
While
ARSA did not have any ostensible religious motivations, it did legitimize its
attacks on Burmese security forces using Islam. It also encouraged senior
Rohingya clerics and numerous foreign clerics to issue fatwas asserting that
its campaign against Myanmar’s security forces is
legal given their ongoing persecution of Muslims in Rakhine state.
ARSA
launched several high-profile insurgent attacks. On October 9 and November 12,
2016, it conducted several coordinated attacks on BGP bases in
Rakhine. Amnesty International believes the group,
brandishing swords and guns, is culpable for one and possibly two massacres of
some 99 Hindu women, men, and children, as well as other abductions and murders
of Hindu villagers in August 2017. In August 2017, it conducted its most complex attack, which entailed
attacking some 30 police posts and an army base in Rakhine; at least 59
insurgents died, along with 12 members of the security forces. In response to
this outrage, the Myanmar military mobilized to conduct mass atrocities that
the United Nations has declared to be tantamount to genocide. The most recent attack occurred on
January 5, 2018, when the group targeted a vehicle with a remote-control mine
and then staged an ambush; six soldiers and one civilian driver were injured.
It has not conducted any operations since.
Myanmar
contends, with very little evidence, that ARSA is an Islamist militant group
which aggregates the interest of
Myanmar’s Muslim mosaic to undermine the Buddhist nature of the state. The international press has also been quick,
with just as little evidence, to assert that the Rohingya are next the
wave of jihadists.
On these grounds, Myanmar has won the support of China, Russia, and India,
which have their own concerns about their domestic Muslim populations and how
best to contend with the threats they pose—both real and imagined.
Those
who argue that ARSA is a jihadist outfit focus on the fact that Attah Ullah was
born in Pakistan and raised in Saudi Arabia. They cite unnamed and unaccountable
“intelligence sources” to assert that he is close to LeT, and attempt to
connect him with Abdus Qadoos Burmi, another Pakistani of Rohingya descent
who is based in Karachi, has ties to LeT, and has appeared in videos arguing
for jihad in Myanmar. None of these analysts alleging that ARSA is Islamist
produce evidence beyond anonymous “intelligence sources,” many of whom are
Indian and have their own vested interests in this popularizing this narrative
to burnish their claims that LeT is not simply an Indian domestic problem.
Despite
these allegations, ARSA has consistently asserted that it is not seeking a
separate state or the imposition of Sharia law. In September 2017,ARSA said it wanted to
“make it clear” that it had no “links to al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria, Lashkar-e-Taiba or any transnational terrorist group.” Indeed, ARSA has nothing to gain and everything to lose by
associating with any Islamist movement.
Problematically
for ARSA’s messaging, though, its flag depicts all of Rakhine state. This has
made Buddhists worried that ARSA’s agenda is not simply securing the political
conditions for Rohingya to safely return, but a larger agenda to assert
dominance over the Buddhist-majority Rakhine state.
Rohingya
political participation in Burma
In the prelude to independence, two
Arakanese Indians were elected to the Constituent Assembly of Burma in 1947, M. A. Gaffar and Sultan Ahmed. After Burma became independent in
1948, M. A. Gaffar presented a memorandum of appeal to the Government of the Union of Burma calling for the recognition of the term "Rohingya",
based on local Indian names of Arakan (Rohan and Rohang), as the official
ethnicity of Arakanese Indians. Sultan Ahmed, who served as Parliamentary
Secretary to the Ministry of Minorities, was a member of the Justice Sir Ba U Commission charged with exploring
whether Arakan Division should be granted statehood. During the Burmese general election, 1951, five Rohingyas were elected to the Parliament of Burma, including one of the country's
first two female MPs, Zura Begum. Six MPs were elected during the Burmese general election, 1956 and subsequent by-elections. Sultan Mahmud, a former politician in British
India, became Minister of Health in the cabinet of Prime Minister of Burma U Nu. In 1960, Mahmud suggested that
either Rohingya-majority northern Arakan remain under the central government or
be made a separate province. However, during the Burmese general election, 1960, Prime Minister U Nu's pledges
included making all of Arakan into one province. The 1962 Burmese coup d'état ended the country's Westminster-style political system. The 1982 Burmese citizenship law
stripped most of the Rohingyas of their stake in citizenship.
Rohingya community leaders were
supportive of the 8888 uprising for democracy. During the Burmese general election, 1990, the Rohingya-led National Democratic Party for Human Rights won four seats in the Burmese parliament. The four Rohingya MPs
included Shamsul Anwarul Huq, Chit Lwin Ebrahim, Fazal Ahmed and Nur Ahmed. The election was won by the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who was placed under house arrest and not permitted to become
prime minister. The Burmese military junta banned the National Democratic Party
for Human Rights in 1992. Its leaders were arrested, jailed and tortured.
Rohingya politicians have been jailed
to disbar them from contesting elections. In 2005, Shamsul Anwarul Huq was
charged under Section 18 of the controversial 1982 Burmese citizenship law and
sentenced to 47 years in prison. In 2015, a ruling Union Solidarity and
Development Party MP Shwe Maung was disbarred from the Burmese general election, 2015, on grounds that his parents were
not Burmese citizens under the 1982 citizenship law. As of 2017, Burma does not have a single
Rohingya MP and the Rohingya population have no voting rights.
Pakistan and Rohingyas
The Lahore Resolution and the Pakistan demand
embodied the provinces of British India. A short time before Major General Aung
San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi, was tragically assassinated in July 1947;
he had met Jinnah in Delhi. Jinnah had assured him that whatever the solution
to British India’s communal problem, Pakistan would not stake claim to any
territory in Burma. The British colony of Burma had been a separate entity from
British India since 1937 and its separate status had been article of faith for
the British rulers as well as Indian politicians of every party including the
Congress. When certain Muslim leaders approached him to ‘liberate’ Rakhine
region from Burmese rule, he refused, advising them instead to live as loyal
citizens of Burma.
Bangladesh
Response
Responsibility
for the fleeing Rohingya has fallen on the government of Bangladesh, which
believes it has already spread its resources thin from pushing the country’s
still-developing economy onto the world stage. One in four Bangladeshis lives
in poverty,
but the rate has been dropping for decades. With the Asian Development Bank
projecting GDP growth
of around 7% for the next year, Bangladesh’s leaders are wary of any situation
that could hinder their nation’s economic development. While aid continues to
pour in from aid groups, outside governments, and international institutions,
the strain of hosting close to a million refugees is palpable.
In
October 2016 an earlier wave of
violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine state caused tens of thousands to flee
into Bangladesh, and most of these “initial” victims have been formally
recognized as refugees by the government of Bangladesh. However, the Rohingya
who arrived after August 2017 are officially classified as “Forcibly Displaced
Myanmar Nationals,” a designation that denies them many of the rights that refugees would enjoy.
Bangladesh has not acceded
to the 1951 Convention on Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Officials have been
slow to address the problem of formal status, partially out of a real concern
over constrained resources. Bangladesh is a country with 160 million people in
an area the size of the US state of Iowa but with underdeveloped infrastructure
and social services. The government fears that the massive influx of people has
the potential to disrupt the livelihoods of many Bangladeshi citizens.
In
June 2018, UNHCR and the Bangladeshi government started a joint effort to verify
the identities of
the Rohingya refugees by using biometric data and issuing identification cards
as a precursor step to eventual relocation or repatriation. The process was
initially expected to take six months but has been effectively halted after a boycott
among the refugees, who object that the cards label them as “Forcibly Displaced
Myanmar Nationals” rather than Rohingya. There are also concerns among
refugees that the collected data may be shared with the government of Myanmar,
putting individuals further at risk.
The
Rohingya are largely cut off from Bangladeshi society. Already confined to the
camps, refugees are also denied access to the civil legal system, schools, and
formal work. International pressure to address the lack of refugee status by
the Bangladeshi government has stalled, although the recent allocation of World Bank
grant-based aid to Bangladesh could accelerate the process. Fears also persist
that if the Bangladeshi government works to integrate the Rohingya into
society, Myanmar could further claim that the Rohingya first emigrated from
Bangladesh and cannot claim the Rakhine State as their home. In the meantime,
the displaced Rohingya are trapped between two options: face the harsh
conditions of the camps in Cox’s Bazar or return to their homes in Myanmar with
no citizenship or protection.
Bowing
to international pressure, the Bangladeshi government has recognized the need
to delay repatriation due to ongoing concerns for the safety and status of the
Rohingya and has begun to invest in more forward-thinking solutions. A new civilian authority is overseeing the large aid effort, and the military
is tasked with maintaining law and order in the camps. Although the task is
massive, Bangladesh’s experience managing responses to numerous natural disasters
in the past has helped to develop best practices
in the fields of risk reduction, training, communications, and community
preparedness.
Authorities
are sensitive to criticism regarding their handling of the situation, in part
because Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has wielded de facto one-party rule after
the widespread opposition boycott
of the last election in 2014. The next national election is in December 2018,
and Khaleda Zia, the leader of the opposition BNP party, remains in jail
on contested corruption charges. On the ground in Cox’s Bazar and in the
refugee camps, tensions have been raising between the military, researchers,
and journalists as more reports emerge critical of the humanitarian situation.
I was warned not to mention that my article would include analysis on how the
camps have been managed.
Can the past forecast the future
The
past outcomes of Myanmar state violence, in which, the Rohingya suffer silently
and without violent mobilization, may not be the best predictor of the future
for several reasons. First, this current crisis confronting the Rohingya is
thoroughly unprecedented in scale, scope, and the rapidity with which it has
transpired. There is a deep well of grievances from which ARSA or any number of
Islamist groups can draw.
Second,
Bangladesh’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, has sought to mitigate criticism
that she is anti-Islam given her relentless campaign against the Jamaat Islami
Bangladeshi, an Islamist political party that has traditionally aligned with
her political nemesis, the Bangladesh National Party, and is accused of
collaborating with Pakistan in perpetrating war crimes during the war for
independence in 1971. To burnish her Islamist credentials, she has allied with
the radical (and sometimes violent) Hifazat-e-Islam (HI), which nearly toppled her government several years
ago.
Hasina has allowed HI to open thousands of quami
madaris (religious seminaries that do not teach Bangladesh’s school
curriculum) in the camps in Cox’s Bazar and young men can be seen wearing the
distinctive skull cap that identifies them as madrassah students. Quami
madaris have long been associated with a “rejection of modernity as a
whole, including modern education, and their employment of vigorous
indoctrination techniques rather than methodical pedagogy,” as well as
ties to terrorist groups in Bangladesh.
At
the same time, Hasina has eschewed any form of education that would permit the
Rohingya to integrate into Bangladesh’s formal economy. Per force, they
seek to earn cash through various illicit means available.
Thirdly,
and finally, Hasina’s refusal to disperse the refugees throughout the country
will continue to tax the host community, who endure the negative externalities
of the camps in their backyards, including the imperious behavior of aid workers
in the camps. There is little short-term benefit to dispersing the Rohingya
refugees. Most Rohingya have expressed little interest in migrating onward and
there are few countries who want to receive more of them.
Conclusions
There is no
instance in the world where after decades of experience of citizenship and of
exercising the rights to electing their representative to parliament an entire
population becomes stateless without security to life, property and honor,
except of course in Nazi Germany and currently in the Eastern State (Assam) of
India where Muslims are in the process of being deprived of citizenship.. It's
an irony that Suu Kyi's ascendancy to Myanmar statecraft coincides with the
collateral destruction of her erstwhile political allies.
For
the foreseeable future, the Rohingya are most likely to be confined to the
camps in Bangladesh, no matter how crowded or dangerous. The unprecedented
scale of the crisis, domestic political concerns in Bangladesh, and growing
attention from jihadi groups make the Rohingya ripe for radicalization, even
though groups like ARSA have resisted the violent Islamist ideology associated
with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Even if ARSA does not emerge as the next
wave of jihad as some fear, it is entirely possible that other violent groups
will conduct attacks on their behalf in Myanmar or elsewhere. Should this
happen, the plight of the Rohingya will become even more dire as what little
international support they have at present will quickly dissipate.
Given
that the international community is unlikely to muster any pressure on Myanmar,
the least international actors can do is continue to help Bangladesh support
this beleaguered community and monitor the situation for any developing
security concerns while longer term solutions are being pursued
Update: Jan., 6, 2019:
Thirteen policemen were killed and nine injured in early morning attacks Friday
on police outposts in Myanmar’s Rakhine state by the insurgent Arakan Army,
state media reported. The Arakan Army is a rebel group seeking autonomy for
Rakhine state from Myanmar’s central government. It has no links with the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army, a Muslim insurgent group whose similar attacks in 2017
sparked a bloody government counterinsurgency campaign against the area’s
Muslim Rohingya minority, driving more than 700,000 to flee to neighboring
Bangladesh. While the Muslim ARSA group has become virtually inactive, the Arakan Army, which is aligned with the
state’s Buddhist population, has taken advantage of the area’s instability
to increase its military activities after training its guerrillas in regions
controlled by other insurgent groups, including the Kachin in northern Myanmar.
There has been an upsurge in sporadic fighting between the Arakan Army and
government forces since last month.
- There are over a million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh,
including the latest batch of 800,000 that came after August 25, 2017 and the
250,000 that arrived since the first exodus of mid-1990s. As Myanmar nationals,
the Rohingya Muslims have historically faced ethnic and religious persecutions,
culminating in 2017 in a fierce, protracted genocidal campaign by the Myanmar
army against its own people. The military launched a violent crackdown leading
to arbitrary killings of Rohingyas, including children and the elderly, gang
rapes of women, inhuman torture, and razing of village after village that
forced all those people to seek shelter in Bangladesh, unleashing a
humanitarian crisis unprecedented in recent history.
In the last two years, there have been many twists and turns
concerning the repatriation of the Rohingya refugees to their homeland. For
instance, first, the agreement signed in November 2017 for repatriation did not
work due to the unwillingness of the Myanmar government to recognise the rights
and citizenship of the Rohingya Muslims. Second, Myanmar imposed an unfair
screening and verification process to eliminate the so-called illegal Bengali
Rohingyas from the list of returnees. Third, in November 2018, a much-publicised
repatriation bid for some 2,000 families was stalled after the refugees refused
to return for fear of fresh persecutions and confinement in the newly-built
camps across the border in Rakhine State. The repatriation bid was later
abandoned and rescheduled for 2019. Fourth, the planned relocation of 100,000
Rohingyas to Bhasan Char appears to have met with scepticism as there are no
voluntary takers among the refugees for such a remote home on an island char.
Finally, according to an UN official, the repatriation plan is now at a “total
standstill.”
With no plausible solution to the refugee crisis in sight, there
are growing concerns in Dhaka and among the host communities in Cox’s Bazar,
who have been severely impacted by the presence of such a large number of
outsiders in their neighbourhoods. There is an equally increasing disquiet
among government officials at different levels about the future of the refugee
situation. The challenge is to find the right balance between the official
rhetoric calling for a speedy return of the Rohingyas and any long-term plans
for them in Cox’s Bazar camps, supported largely by external aid and
assistance. The ongoing initiatives for more durable houses, improved roads,
solar street lamps, training and employment for women, markets/shops within the
camps, and finally provisions for schools for the kids are all indications of a
much longer—or even permanent—stay. Given the continued military atrocities
against the Rohingyas inside Myanmar, the refugees in Cox’s Bazar are not going
back to Myanmar any time soon. Aid workers, diplomats and humanitarian agencies
working on long-term plans for improving camp conditions would not, however,
publicly state this for fear of contradicting the official position.
At this point, despite constant diplomatic efforts by the
government, there seems to be no hope for an immediate repatriation. Indeed,
the Myanmar government seems least interested in the resolution of the crisis.
The “clearance operation” is already done; the Myanmar military is sticking to
their lies and deceptions, unwilling to give in to any demands of the
international community. Even the strategy to send back the refugees to
so-called designated “safe zones” inside Myanmar is not getting any ground; but
if it does happen, which is unlikely, it will be tantamount to sending them to
concentration camps and robbing them of their future rights and
citizenships—which are their primary demands. There cannot be any safe zones in
Myanmar unless the perpetrators of the Rohingya crisis, including the military
generals, who committed crimes against humanity and genocide, are brought to
justice.
The current scenario does not provide any sense of hope or
relief for any returnees in Myanmar or those stranded in camps in Bangladesh.
The refugees are not allowed to work (although many sneak out to work); they
can’t leave the camp, open a bank account, and have a mobile phone (due to
security reasons, although many have bought phones from local Bengalis who can
have multiple phones); and children can’t attend any Bengali school, which may
lead, it is believed, to social and cultural integration. The present dense
living conditions, poor quality of water and inadequate vaccination have left
Rohingya refugees prone to many contagious diseases. As a result, both the
refugees and the host communities in Cox’s Bazar are reportedly vulnerable to
serious health risks.
Meanwhile, the host communities are also becoming apprehensive
of the long-term presence of the refugees and thus slowly turning hostile
towards them. The concern is equally evident in Dhaka. At a recent meeting,
leading economists and policy analysts have rejected the idea of providing the
refugees with access to the local labour market; instead, they recommended
their quick repatriation to ease pressures on Bangladesh because their presence
has already posed serious threats to the local environment and population.
Thus, any plan for a long-term stay or opening the door for resettlement and
integration would lead to conflicts with local communities and raise a range of
security issues for Bangladesh. A Rohingya diaspora in Bangladesh also means a
second-class status of the Rohingyas and extinction of their cultures. Many
refugees don’t want this to happen. They want to return to their homes and
re-establish their life on their ancestral lands with dignity and full rights
as Myanmar nationals.
The Rohingya crisis has not run its course yet. Bangladesh
government should continue to pursue voluntary, safe, and dignified
repatriation of the Rohingyas to Myanmar. Since the UN finds the situation to
be at a “total standstill”, Bangladesh should look elsewhere and closely work
with India and China for an acceptable resolution. India has not been friendly
to the Rohingyas and never supported Bangladesh in any international forum to
solve the protracted Rohingya crisis. Myanmar seems more important to India
than Bangladesh due to India’s economic and geopolitical interests. China has a
strong grip on Myanmar at various levels, including the government and the
military establishments. Bangladesh must seriously engage both China and India
to find a resolution for a dignified return of the refugees. Until this
happens, the crisis will continue and bring miseries to the refugee population
as well as the host communities.
US sanctions: July,
17, 2019: The US has
announced sanctions on Myanmar's
military Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing and three other military leaders
due to their role in the "ethnic cleansing" of the Rohingya
minority. The State Department said on Tuesday it took action after finding
credible evidence they were involved in the violence two years ago that led
about 740,000 Rohingya to
flee across the border to Bangladesh.
"With this announcement, the United States is the first government to
publicly take action with respect to the most senior leadership of the Burmese
military," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement.
"We
remain concerned that the Burmese government has taken no actions to hold
accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, and there
are continued reports of the Burmese military committing human rights
violations and abuses throughout the country," he added. Also sanctioned
were Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win, Brigadier General Than Oo and Brigadier
General Aung Aung, as well as the families of all four officers.
Buddhist-majority
Myanmar refuses to grant the mostly Muslim Rohingya citizenship or basic rights
and refers to them as "Bengalis", inferring that the Rohingya are
undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh. United
Nations investigators say the violence warrants the prosecution of top generals
for "genocide" and the International Criminal Court has started a
preliminary probe.
"This
is good news if this is the first measure the US will take in addressing
genocide in Myanmar against the Rohingya people. It's bad news if this is all
Secretary Pompeo and the US administration are planning to do. We are hopeful
they will do more," Smith told Al Jazeera from Washington, DC. “The impact
[of the sanctions] can be serious. This will flag the responsibility of these
individuals for international prosecutors, for example, the International
Criminal Court, and it will give pause to business leaders going to Myanmar in
doing business with military-owned enterprises
