Power system expansion planning in Pakistan, in Interim period – i.e. period before open access

Power system expansion planning in Pakistan, in Interim period – i.e. period before open access

Introduction

 Power sector additions in the last five years have been impressive; by 2018 the gap between demand and supply will almost be bridged. This impressive performance has been marred by some missteps, planning has been a weak area and power sector decisions have been taken without needed analysis and due process.

Pakistan’s power sector structure moved from a vertically integrated utility to a single buyer model. Induction of private sector necessitated that the decision making process needed to involve sensibilities and concerns of various players, use of Long term system expansion optimization software was discontinued. NTDC Planning do undertake a master planning exercise that uses optimization software but this is not a document that figures in the decision making process and is in any case updated after every few years and is therefore not current at all points in time. Power sector generation capacity, decision making is in any case fragmented, WAPDA, NTDC, PPIB, AEBD, Provincial Government Energy Departments, AJ&K and GB Power departments, Ministry of Finance, Planning Commission all play a role in this decision making, which is not closely coordinated. Mainly because in the period of shortages any capacity addition was welcome, now that the capacity gap is being bridged , such decisions are coordinated with CPPA/NTDC who verify that the capacity addition is required  as per the demand forecast and other works in progress.

The decision to liberalize the market was taken years ago and along with that decision it was deemed unnecessary to continue the use of WASP and a central power system expansion planning. It was considered that the private sector will take care of such needs. The privatization got stuck and after a partial incomplete transition the effort was stalled, in this period capacity was procured by both the private sector and the public sector routes. Addition of large hydroelectric structures was dealt by WAPDA, in the public sector. This period saw a very weak planning regime and possibly due to that there were gaps in supply and demand and other errors were also made.

 The system is stated to become a mutli-buyer market in the near future, where investment decisions’ will be taken by a multitude of players using different techniques and software. The present arrangement has not entirely worked in so far as capacity additions are concerned .There , however, has been an error made in adding to much capacity , and also by adding too much base load capacity, both actions have financial implications. The interim period ( before open access )  requires that planning error should not be made, it is proposed that:

1.      .GM Planning NTDC Office should be equipped with WASP ( or some other generation expansion optimization tool) . Capacity building would be required to enable professionals to use WASP. WASP should be used as a verification tool. Decisions like how much base load capacity is to be added in each year should be taken by using WASP. 

2.     Base load Capacity: Thar (and other domestic) coal should have priority when base load capacity is required to be added. RLNG based base load should be considered for diversification purposes  Intermediate and peak load capacity should be : hydropower ; biomass including bagasse( but excluding Bagasse with imported coal)

3.     Foreign exchange needs to be shadow priced to present the cost of making capital investments based on foreign currency.

4.     Institutional arrangements: NTDC Office of GM Planning should be entrusted with planning of the power system, the following is recommended: NTDC Power Planning (NTDCPP) be spin off as an independent authority, with the mandate to carry out; least cost expansion planning; transmission system planning; secondary system planning. In the interim period generation expansion planning  should utilize WASP ( NTDC is familiar with WASP although WASP does have some limitations related to modeling hydroelectric power capacity) ; the system is evolving into a multi buyer system , with this transition centralized power system planning will not be desirable , NTDC Power Planning needs to acquire other software which is utilized for modeling  new generation addition to the system in a mutli buyer market , this service ( and other services) should be provided at cost ; NTDCPP is currently under staffed , positions sanctioned should be filled with immediate effect ; for NTDCPP to act as a planning expert there is need to provide more trained staff to man the generation expansion and transmission expansion planning functions ; have been less than proficient in use of software to carry out secondary system planning, There is need to shift the function of secondary transmission planning to .NTDCPP.   

5.      Induction of small hydroelectric , wind, solar power plants has been stalled due to non availability of transmission interconnection to the grid .All of these including biomass based power generation are indigenous resources of energy and are therefore  contributors towards increase in local content in energy utilization. All of these except biomass are seasonal and are not base load plants. There is reluctance in allowing a free field to solar and wind on grounds of: seasonality of supply; and transmission constraints presently a committee in the MoE decides quantum of wind energy to be added each year. With loaming capacity surplus and NEPRA’s decision to only add wind and solar capacity after competitive bidding all these renewable resources will find scant space in new capacity addition. NTDC needs to use WASP to determine quantum of base load capacity tom be added and also to determine the amount of renewable capacity to be added .Decisions related to what capacity is to be added should be made much in advance and should not be sudden and abrupt , hurting investor confidence . Evacuation of power limitations is one reason cited for the reluctance to add renewable to the system, intermittent nature ( except biomass which is base load) is stated to be the other reason, cost considerations have been addressed mainly by the fast reducing cost of wind and solar power plants. GOPA study commissioned by USAID stated that there are very little system constraints against adding about 2224 MWs renewable capacity. Beyond that major reinforcements to the system will be required. The recommendations of the GOPA study (these are presented below) need to be implemented. Wind potential is located in areas which are either far away from the grid system or are located in areas where surplus power is available, therefore there is need to transmit this power to load centers using primary transmission.

6.     Capacity building and enhancement- NTDC Planning needs that the already approved positions are filled with qualified staff with immediate effect. There is also need to enhance the man power  assigned to NTDC Planning  to take up the additional generation expansion and transmission system expansion planning, along with capacity enhancement a proper detailed and  sustained effort is to be made to build capacity in NTDC planning

Gopa Study: GOPA study presents an analysis of the Pakistan Grid with reference to RE interconnection. The conclusions reached are:

1.     2224 MW wind and solar capacity can be added, with the following grid additions: 25 MVAr capacitors at Bhan Saedabad grid station; 120 MVAr Thyristor controlled reactor (TCR) inductive 200 MVAr MSC Capacitive SVC at Lal Suhanra.; Power system stabilizers (PSS) at two synchronous generators at Hub and Jamshoro. ; And operation of some renewable generators in voltage droop control mode would be beneficial.

2.     In the next phase major additional reinforcements are required these would allow the full 4067 (phase I) of renewable generation to be added but it will also facilitate addition totally 9332 MW (including the 4067 MW capacity discussed earlier) of renewable energy to be added. Improvements required are :  Lal Suhanra region requires reinforcement of 220kV system where a new collection substation is to be installed  and two radial 220kV lines are closed to form a ring  This requires addition of 80 km double circuit 220kV transmission lines , 5 km single circuit 220kV transmission line and 5 additional 220/132 kV power transformers including transformer bays . Reinforcements of the Southern wind corridor requires a new 500kV Jhampir grid station , 90 km 220kV and 500kV transmission lines , a 200MVAr capacitor at Jhampir and 100 MVAr shunt capacitors at Gharo are required .  600MVAr SVC (600MVAr TCR and 300MVAr TSC) at Shikarpur are also required.

3.     Spinning reserve requirements will increase to 1500 MW 500MW more than required by the system in 2018, Thus RE will need an additional 500 MW spinning reserves.

4.     Dispatch will, require to: re-execute wind and OV prediction at 1-4 hours ahead; and shorten the dispatch cycle from 30 min to 15 min.

5.     Wind and PV generators need to have provisions for operation in defined conditions. (Modern VRE plants connect to the grid using electronic power converters or inverters; these can be programmed to allow the way in which a VRE power plant behaves on the power grid to be controlled.) 

6.     Addition of specified levels of RE generation results in a higher NPV as compared to the one without RE capacity.

There is consensus on the fact that addition of up to 30% RE capacity is possible with needed inductive loads and SVCs but higher than that capacity will require new approaches on operating and extending grids. Variability of RE due to weather Introduces uncertainty in generation output .These could affect 70% of solar capacity due to cloud cover and 100% of wind capacity due to still days. This requires base load capacity that can follow load to be interconnected, these are costs. To reduce reserves and spinning reserve costs it is recommended that: there needs to be improvement in weather and wind forecast accuracy; forecasts should be for shorter periods than a day

Conclusions

There is need to put in place a set up for power system generation expansion planning  in the interim period. This is necessary because mistakes that were made in the last five years are not repeated in the future. This will need reintroduction of WASP as an optimization tool, and capacity building and enhancement of planning function currently housed in NTDC. There is need to spin off this unit (along with load flow capability) into a separate national organization.

How the British Divided the Middle East

How the British Divided the Middle East

Back ground

Before the discovery of oil, the Middle East was vital to Britain because it was part of trade and imperial communications routes to India the Western powers had long believed that they would eventually become dominant in the area claimed by the weak central government of the Ottoman Empire. Britain anticipated a need to secure the area because of its strategic position on the route to Colonial India, and perceived itself as locked in a struggle with Russia for imperial influence known as The Great Game. These powers disagreed over their contradictory post-war aims and made several dual and triple agreements. Syria and Lebanon became a French protectorate (thinly disguised as a League of Nations Mandate). French control was met immediately with armed resistance, and, in order to combat Arab nationalism, France divided the Mandate area into Lebanon and four sub-states.

The   partitioning of the Middle East ( Ottoman Empire) was planned in several agreements made by the Allied Powers early in the course of World War I, notably the Sykes-Picot Agreement. As world war loomed, the Ottoman Empire sought protection but was rejected by Britain, France, and Russia, and finally formed the Ottoman–German Alliance. The huge conglomeration of territories and peoples that formerly comprised the Ottoman Empire was divided into several new states.  The Ottoman Empire had been the leading Islamic state in geopolitical, cultural and ideological terms. The partitioning of the Ottoman Empire led to the rise in the Middle East of Western powers such as Britain and France and brought the creation of the modern Arab world and the Republic of Turkey. Resistance to the influence of these powers came from the Turkish national movement but did not become widespread in the post-Ottoman states until after World War II.

The League of Nations mandate granted French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and British Mandate for Mesopotamia (later Iraq) and British Mandate for Palestine, later divided into Mandatory Palestine and Emirate of Transjordan (1921–1946). The Ottoman Empire's possessions in the Arabian Peninsula became the Kingdom of Hejaz, which was annexed by the Sultanate of Nejd (today Saudi Arabia), and the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen. The Empire's possessions on the western shores of the Persian Gulf were variously annexed by Saudi Arabia (Alahsa and Qatif), or remained British protectorates (Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar) and became the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.

After the Ottoman government collapsed completely it signed the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. However, the Turkish War of Independence forced the European powers to return to the negotiating table before the treaty could be ratified. The Europeans and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey signed and ratified the new Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, superseding the Treaty of Sèvres and solidifying most of the territorial issues. One unresolved issue, the dispute between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Republic of Turkey over the former province of Mosul was later negotiated under the League of Nations in 1926. The British and French partitioned the eastern part of the Middle East, also called Greater Syria, between them in the Sykes–Picot Agreement. Other secret agreements were concluded with Italy and Russia.^[4] The Balfour Declaration encouraged the international Zionist movement to push for a Jewish homeland in the Palestine region. While a part of the Triple Entente, Russia also had wartime agreements preventing it from participating in the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after the Russian Revolution. The Treaty of Sèvres formally acknowledged the new League of Nations mandates in the region, the independence of Yemen, and British sovereignty over Cyprus.

Introduction

 More than 100 years ago in the middle of the First World War, a secret agreement was concluded between Britain and France to carve up the Ottoman Empire, which has had a terrible effect on the Arab and Muslim world right up today.  The two junior diplomats, Mark Sykes on behalf of Britain and Francois George-Picot for France, divided the Arab lands into two spheres of influence: Area A for France, including Syria and Lebanon and Area B for Britain including Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. In those areas, Britain and France were to be allowed to establish whatever such direct or indirect governments or control as they desired.

The 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement had to be secret because it went completely against the promises given to the Hashemite leader Hussain Bin Ali, the Emir of Makkah, that Arabs would eventually receive independence if they supported the Allies against the Ottomans. This came even as Emir Hussain mustered Arab forces to fight alongside the British for the next two years and help achieve the end of Ottoman rule over the Arab Middle East.

The Sykes-Picot agreement became public knowledge when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 and found copies of the “treacherous” documents which they revealed to the world, and proved to the Arabs the duplicity of their “allies”. Born of western imperialism and colonialism, the Sykes-Picot agreement became the basis of the UN mandates after the end of the war, and helped define the future boundaries of the Arab nation states that remained under British or French colonial rule, which in turn became a key factor behind the rise of military dictatorships in the 1950s and 1960s.

Throughout the decades, the Sykes-Picot agreement has served as a constant reminder to Arabs of continued western meddling in their affairs. It also set the region on a turbulent course of misery and conflict. The legacy of Sykes-Picot can be felt today in several countries – including Iraq, Syria and most terribly, Palestine. Moreover, as western powers are again involved in Syria, memories of Sykes-Picot and its betrayals shape Arab fears that the West is still not finished with interfering in the region.

How the British Divided Up the Arab World

The development of the modern nation states throughout the Arab world is a fascinating and heartbreaking process. 100 years ago, most Arabs were part of the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate, a large multi-ethnic state based in Istanbul. Today, a political map of the Arab world looks like a very complex jigsaw puzzle. A complex and intricate course of events in the 1910s brought about the end of the Ottomans and the rise of these new nations with borders running across the Middle East, diving Muslims from each other. While there are many different factors leading to this, the role that the British played in this was far greater than any other player in the region. Three separate agreements made conflicting promises that the British had to stand by. The result was a political mess that divided up a large part of the Muslim world.

The Outbreak of World War I

In the summer of 1914, war broke out in Europe. A complex system of alliances, a militaristic arms race, colonial ambitions, and general mismanagement at the highest government levels led to this devastating war that would claim the lives of 12 million people from 1914 to 1918. The “Allied” side comprised of the empires of Britain, France, and Russia. The “Central” powers consisted of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

At first, the Ottoman Empire decided to remain neutral. They were not nearly as strong as any of the other nations fighting in the war, and were wracked by internal and external threats. The Ottoman sultan/caliph was nothing more than a figurehead at this point, with the last powerful sultan, Abdulhamid II, having been overthrown in 1908 and replaced with a military government led by the “Three Pashas”. They were from the secular Westernized group, the Young Turks. Financially, the Ottomans were in a serious bind, owing huge debts to the European powers that they were not able to pay. After trying to join the Allied side and being rejected, the Ottomans sided with the Central Powers in October of 1914.

The British immediately began to conceive of plans to dissolve the Ottoman Empire and expand their Middle Eastern empire. They had already had control of Egypt since 1888 and India since 1857. The Ottoman Middle East lay right in the middle of these two important colonies, and the British were determined to exterminate it as part of the world war.

The Arab Revolt

One of the British strategies was to turn the Ottoman Empire’s Arab subjects against the government. They found a ready and willing helper in the Hejaz, the western region of the Arabian Peninsula. Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the Amir (governor) of Makkah entered into an agreement with the British government to revolt against the Ottomans. His reason for allying with the foreign British against other Muslims remains uncertain. Possible reasons for his revolt were: disapproval with the Turkish nationalist objectives of the Three Pashas, a personal feud with the Ottoman government, or simply a desire for his own kingdom.

Whatever his reasons were, Sharif Hussein decided to revolt against the Ottoman government in alliance with the British. In return, the British promised to provide money and weapons to the rebels to help them fight the much more organized Ottoman army. Also, the British promised him that after the war, he would be given his own Arab kingdom that would cover the entire Arabian Peninsula, including Syria and Iraq. The letters in which the two sides negotiated and discussed revolt were known as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, as Sharif Hussein was communicating with the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon.

In June of 1916 Sharif Hussein led his group of armed Bedouin warriors from the Hejaz in an armed campaign against the Ottomans. Within a few months, the Arab rebels managed to capture numerous cities in the Hejaz (including Jeddah and Makkah) with help from the British army and navy. The British provided support in the form of soldiers, weapons, money, advisors (including the “legendary” Lawrence of Arabia), and a flag. The British in Egypt drew up a flag for the Arabs to use in battle, which was known as the “Flag of the Arab Revolt”. This flag would later become the model for other Arab flags of countries such as Jordan, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, and Kuwait.

As World War One progressed through 1917 and 1918, the Arab rebels managed to capture many major cities from the Ottomans. As the British advanced into Palestine and Iraq, capturing cities such as Jerusalem and Baghdad, the Arabs aided them by capturing Amman and Damascus. It is important to note that the Arab Revolt did not have the backing of a large majority of the Arab population. It was a minority movement led by a few leaders who sought to increase their own powers. The vast majority of the Arab people stayed away from the conflict and did not support the rebels or the Ottoman government. Sharif Hussein’s plan to create his own Arab kingdom was succeeding so far, if it were not for other promises the British would make.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement

Before the Arab Revolt could even begin and before Sharif Hussein could create his Arab kingdom, the British and French had other plans. In the winter of 1915-1916, two diplomats, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and François Georges-Picot of France secretly met to decide the fate of the post-Ottoman Arab world.

According to what would become known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British and French agreed to divide up the Arab world between them. The British were to take control of what is now Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. The French were given modern Syria,Lebanon, and southern Turkey. The status of Palestine was to be determined later, with Zionist ambitions to be taken into account. The zones of control that the British and French were given allowed for some amount of Arab self-rule in some areas, albeit with European control over such Arab kingdoms. In other areas, the British and French were promised total control.

Although it was meant to be a secret agreement for a post-WWI Middle East, the agreement became known publicly in 1917 when the Russian Bolshevik government exposed it. The Sykes-Picot Agreement directly contradicted the promises the British made to Sherif Hussein and caused a considerable amount of tension between the British and Arabs. However, this would not be the last of the conflicting agreements the British would make.

The Balfour Declaration

Another group that wanted a say in the political landscape of the Middle East were the Zionists. Zionism is a political movement that calls for the establishment of a Jewish state in the Holy Land of Palestine. It began in the 1800s as a movement that sought to find a homeland away from Europe for Jews (most of which lived in Germany, Poland, and Russia).

Eventually the Zionists decided to pressure the British government during WWI into allowing them to settle in Palestine after the war was over. Within the British government, there were many who were sympathetic to this political movement. One of those was Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary for Britain. On November 2nd, 1917, he sent a letter to Baron Rothschild, a leader in the Zionist community. The letter declared the British government’s official support for the Zionist movement’s goals to establish a Jewish state in Palestine:

“His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

Three Conflicting Agreements

By 1917, the British had made three different agreements with three different groups promising three different political futures for the Arab world. The Arabs insisted they still get their Arab kingdom that was promised to them through Sharif Hussein. The French (and British themselves) expected to divide up that same land among themselves. And the Zionists expected to be given Palestine as promised by Balfour.

In 1918 the war ended with the victory of the Allies and the complete destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Ottomans existed in name until 1922 (and the caliphate existed in name until 1924), all the former Ottoman land was now under European occupation. The war was over, but the Middle East’s future was still in dispute between three different sides.

The mandates that the League of Nations created after WWI

Which side won? None fully got what they wanted. In the aftermath of WWI, the League of Nations (a forerunner to the United Nations) was established. One of its jobs was to divide up the conquered Ottoman lands. It drew up “mandates” for the Arab world. Each mandate was supposed to be ruled by the British or French “until such time as they are able to stand alone.” The League was the one to draw up the borders we see on modern political maps of the Middle East. The borders were drawn without regard for the wishes of the people living there, or along ethnic, geographic, or religious boundaries – they were truly arbitrary. It is important to note that even today, political borders in the Middle East do not indicate different groups of people. The differences between Iraqis, Syrians, Jordanians, etc. were entirely created by the European colonizers as a method of dividing the Arabs against each other. 

Through the mandate system, the British and the French were able to get the control they wanted over the Middle East. For Sharif Hussein, his sons were allowed to rule over these mandates under British “protection”. Prince Faisal was made king of Iraq and Syria and Prince Abdullah was made king of Jordan. In practice, however, the British and French had real authority over these areas.

For the Zionists, they were allowed by the British government to settle in Palestine, although with limitations. The British did not want to anger the Arabs already living in Palestine, so they tried to limit the number of Jews allowed to migrate to Palestine. This angered the Zionists, who looked for illegal ways to immigrate throughout the 1920s-1940s, as well as the Arabs, who saw the immigration as encroachment on land that had been theirs since Salah al-Din liberated it in 1187.  

A century after Sykes-Picot, the dual crises have stripped away the veneer of statehood imposed by the Europeans and have exposed the emptiness underneath. Iraq was managed by Britain and Syria by France, with limited nation-nurturing, before both were granted independence. They flew new flags, built opulent palaces for their leaders, encouraged commercial élites, and trained plenty of men in uniform. But both had weak public institutions, teeny civil societies, shady and iniquitous economies, and meaningless laws. Both countries were wracked by coups and instability. Syria went through twenty coups, some failed but many successful, between 1949 and 1970, an average of one a year, until the Assad dynasty assumed power—in another coup. Increasingly, the glue that held both countries together was repressive rule and fear. 

In Syria, the death toll is many times higher in Iraq, the sectarian and ethnic divide at least as deep as in Iraq. The test in both countries is not just finding a way to re-create states more viable than the various formulations attempted since the Sykes-Picot process was launched. It’s also rallying public will in the current environment.

Some of the political alternatives may be just as problematic. The reconfiguration of either Iraq or Syria into new entities could be as complicated, and potentially as bloody, as the current wars. The breakups of India, Yugoslavia, and Sudan spawned huge migrations, cycles of ethnic cleansing, and rival claims to resources and territory, which in turn sparked whole new conflicts, some still unresolved years later.

 Concluding remarks

The political mess, that Britain created in the aftermath of WWI remains today. The competing agreements and the subsequent countries that were created to disunite Muslims from each other led to political instability throughout the Middle East. The rise of Zionism coupled with the disunity of the Muslims in that region has led to corrupt governments and economic decline for the Middle East as a whole. The divisions that the British instituted in the Muslim world remain strong today, despite being wholly created within the past 100 years. Muslims have been unable to deal with: nationalism, democracy; and sectarianism. The agreements to divide the Middle East were flawed and created issues right from the outset but these were perhaps symptoms and the issue of grappling with nationalism in the Islamic World is perhaps the more important issues in context of the forces that fosters the present turmoil in the Islamic World.

The nation-state, which involves wedding a specific people to a sovereign territorial entity, is a modern phenomenon.  Nationalism, the sentiment inspiring a people to establish an autonomous state, is also strictly modern. It can be seen as a political offspring of Romanticism, part of a nineteenth century European reaction to the universalizing and anti-authoritarian tendencies of the earlier Enlightenment. There are, however, elements of nationalist thinking, along with the political arrangements they birth, that are ancient. Examples would be the civic pride exuded by Pericles in his famous speech on the eve of the Peloponnesian War and the Greek city states themselves. Islam contains teachings that clearly argue against the most important elements of nationalism. Foremost among these elements are the chauvinism and exclusiveness engendered by the nationalist project. It is worth contemplating whether Islam can play a role in shaping an effort to move beyond nationalism. 

Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members. One of the greatest keys to the emergence of that realm was the social psychology fostered by Islam. Perhaps the most important fruit of that social psychology was the creation of a political culture that discouraged the development of nationalist thinking. Such a political culture is desperately needed today as many people begin to struggle with new forms of transnational organization. If Islam is allowed, by both its enemies and advocates, to contribute to a new global sociopolitical consensus by helping to resolve the myriad problems associated with nationalism, both the Muslims and humanity will be well served.